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This thesis is about the reconciliation of realistic views of rationality with in­
ferential-intentional theories of communication.
Grice (1957; 1975) argued that working out what a speaker meant by an ut­
terance is a matter of inferring the speaker’s intentions on the presumption 
that she is acting rationally. This is abductive inference: inference to the best 
explanation for the utterance. Thus an utterance both rationalises and causes 
the interpretation the hearer constructs.
Human rationality is bounded because of our ‘finitary predicament’: we 
have limited time and resources for computation (Simon, 1957b; Cherniak, 
1981). This raises questions about the explanatory status of inferential-inten­
tional pragmatic theories. Gricean derivations of speakers’ intentions seem 
costly, and generally hearers are not aware of performing explicit reasoning. 
Utterance interpretation is typically fast and automatic. Is utterance interpret­
ation a species of reasoning, or does the hearer merely act as i f  reasoning?
Within the framework of cognitive science, mental processing is under­
stood as transitions between mental representations. I develop a traditional 
view of rationality as reasoning ability, where this is essentially the ability to 
make transitions that preserve rational acceptability. Following Grice (2001), I 
claim that there is a ‘hard way’ and a ‘quick way’ of reasoning. Work on 
bounded rationality suggests that much cognitive work is done by heuristics, 
processes that exploit environmental structure to solve problems at much 
lower cost than fully explicit calculations. I look at the properties of heuristics 
that find solutions to open-ended problems such as abductive inference, par­
ticularly sequential search heuristics with aspiration-level stopping rules.
I draw on relevance theory’s view that the comprehension procedure is a 
heuristic which exploits environmental regularities due to utterances being 
offers of information (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This kind of heuristic, I argue, 
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Chapter 1 • Introduction
1.1 PRAGMATICS, RATIONALITY AND COGNITION
Why study pragmatics and rationality together? If I address an utterance to 
you, you have understood if you grasp what I meant by the utterance. Part of 
this is a matter of recognising the linguistic items used and any non-linguistic 
gestures which encode meanings1. If you know the meanings of the linguistic 
and non-linguistic components of an utterance, then you have a better chance 
of working out what I meant. As Grice stressed, however, what a speaker 
means by an utterance typically goes well beyond what the phrase uttered2 en­
codes3. The meaning conveyed by uttering a phrase varies depending on how 
it is uttered and in what context. Understanding utterances involves inference 
that takes into account these factors and the linguistic meaning of the phrases 
uttered. Pragmatics is the study of this inferential aspect of utterance under­
standing and production.
Any understanding of what a speaker means by the sounds she makes, the way 
that she waves her hands around, and so on, relies on two assumptions: 1) that 
she is behaving rationally, so that her behaviour serves her purposes, or is at
1. Non-linguistic gestures divide into those which encode meaning, such as thumbs up for ‘o k ’, 
and those which do not have any encoded meaning and are invented and understood purely 
inferentially. See Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 52 for examples. A further division can be made 
between gestures (and sounds) with natural and those with non-natural meaning. See 
Wharton, 2003 for comprehensive discussion.
2. I write ‘phrase uttered’ rather than ‘sentence uttered’ because many utterances are of less 
than complete sentences (Barton, 1990; Progovac, Paesani, Casielles, & Barton, 2006). There 
is reason to believe that most are complete linguistic constituents, that is, phrases.
3. Grice’s distinction was “between what is said (in a favoured sense) and what is implicated” 
(Grice, 1989c, p. 41). I follow relevance theory and other ‘radical pragmatics’ in believing 
that inference (often, indeed typically) contributes to the explicit meaning of an utterance 
including the proposition expressed (Wilson & Sperber, 1981; Carston, 1988). Hence the 
neutral formulation in the text at this point.
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least intended to, and 2) that she intends to convey meaning. If she does not 
intend to communicate she might be making noises and waving her hands 
around for some other reason -  to scare away a fly, or just to amuse herself. If 
she is not behaving rationally at all then it will be hard to infer anything about 
her intentions. So communication can only get going if the hearer can assume 
the speaker is rational, and is rational himself to the degree that he is capable 
of working out how the use of phrases and gestures is intended to serve the 
speaker’s purposes. Looking at it from the other side, the speaker’s production 
of phrases and gestures in order to get her meaning across to the hearer 
makes no sense unless there is a standing assumption on her part that the 
hearer is at least rational enough to be able to grasp that she meant something 
by her utterance and to have a good chance of working it out.
I am using the term ‘pragmatics’ to mean the study of this aspect of com­
munication4 on the assumption that this is a distinct task for the mind/brain 
from linguistic processing.
1.1.1 PROCESSING
There are strong reasons to think that pragmatic processing should be distin­
guished from linguistic processing. Linguistic items encode meaning, so lin­
guistic processing is a matter of coding and decoding. W hat a speaker 
expresses by an utterance goes beyond what the utterance encodes, so work­
ing out the non-encoded information is a qualitatively different task from 
parsing. Indeed, the system can also work with gestures or sounds that do not 
encode any meaning. Thus pragmatic processing and parsing are conceptually 
quite separate (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). (See §1.3.1 below).
The strongest evidence that abilities are underpinned by different mental 
equipment is double dissociation, cases of selective impairment of each ability 
(Smith, 1 9 9 9 . P- 21). There is strong evidence that linguistic skills and pragmat­
ic ability doubly dissociate. There are people who can manage language but 
not pragmatic processing. Others may have good pragmatic skills, but 
severely impaired language. (See §2.4.2 below.)
4. In saying this I am agreeing with Sperber and Wilson (1986) on the issue of the semantics/ 
pragmatics borderline.
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My thesis is that pragmatic processing is a bounded reasoning process, in­
ferential and heuristic, which works so that an utterance made is both a cause 
of and a reason for the construction of a particular interpretation in the hear­
er’s mind. I explain this thesis and the terms used in what follows: schematic­
ally first, in this introduction, then in greater detail.
1.1.2 grice’s theory
In the picture Grice developed (Grice, 1989c, Chapters 1-7 , 14 and 18 and 
‘Retrospective Epilogue’), understanding what a speaker means by an utter­
ance is a matter of recognising intentions that she has expressed. This insight 
provides the basis of an ‘inferential model of communication’ (the phrase and 
the observation are from Sperber & Wilson, 2004, p. 607). In this model, 
hearers understand utterances by inferring non-demonstratively what the 
speaker intended to convey on the basis of the linguistic meaning of the 
phrase uttered (if any) and other clues in the utterance and the context.
As Levinson says:
Grice’s theory gives us an account both of how we can communicate 
without conventional signals at all5... and of how we can communicate 
something distinct from what the conventional signals actually mean. 
(Levinson, 2006, p. 50)
How does this work? W hat makes the clues provided by a speaker reliable 
guides to her intended meaning? Grice proposed that conversation should be 
understood as cooperative, rational behaviour, suggesting that principles 
guiding conversation (the ‘conversational maxims’) should be derivable from 
the assumption that conversation is a cooperative activity carried out ration­
ally (Grice, i975)» and that the standing assumption that those principles will 
be followed by speakers underwrites hearer’s inferences about speaker mean­
ing. Thus Gricean explanations of the derivation of inferred components of 
utterance meaning involve inference schemas similar to logical arguments: 
e.g. the speaker has said x, but x  on its own does not meet the standards in
5. Levinson has in mind here cases where the utterance is of a gesture or sound with no en­
coded meaning.
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force in communication (perhaps it is not informative enough, or not relevant 
enough); the best explanation for that is that she meant y; she knew that I 
knew (etc.) that that was the best explanation, so she has intentionally com­
municated y.
So the idea that conveying meaning is a rational activity is the keystone of 
Gricean pragmatics, but one that Grice did not quite fix in place, for two reas­
ons. The first is that he was not able to derive the Cooperative Principle and 
conversational maxims from considerations of rationality. My opinion is that 
rationality rather than cooperation is the key to pragmatics, agreeing in this 
respect, although not others, with Kasher (1976) and Horn (2006, p. 35) and 
pace Levinson who stresses cooperation over rationality (e.g. Levinson, 2006) 
(although he means something broader by cooperation than Grice did). I also 
think that the maxims are not derivable from any set of plausible 
assumptions.6
There is a second way in which Grice did not complete the linkage of 
communication and rationality, and this is the focus of my thesis. Even sup­
posing that there are regulative principles for communication (whether 
Gricean maxims or otherwise) which will make inferential derivations of 
speaker meaning go through, there is still an important question about this 
kind of account. Do hearers really engage in this kind of reasoning? We are 
not generally aware of doing so, and there is a good deal of evidence that in 
reasoning we often use shortcuts. How are such schemas explanatory, then? 
How does it help us to understand communication to describe it in a way that 
is not a description of the mental states that must be gone through in order to 
understand an utterance?
It might seem that Gricean explanations of this type assume a classical, 
idealised vision of human rationality, since they explain behaviour in terms of 
an argument that one might construct, given ample leisure, to justify a judg­
ment or decision that is actually made quickly. In fact, a Gricean picture of 
communication, I will argue, is compatible with a realistic view of human ra­
tionality as bounded by our limited mental resources.
6. Kasher (1976; 1982) attempts a derivation of the conversational maxims from a rationality 
principle plus some other assumptions.
13
1 .1 .3  COOPERATION OR COORDINATION?
As I have said, what is meant can be inferred on the assumption that the 
speaker is acting rationally in making her utterance, since this allows the hear­
er to assume that the speaker has attempted to make effective use of the 
means chosen, that is, making an utterance at all. However, the hearer is not 
justified in assuming that the speaker has made or attempted to make the very 
best use of the means available. Human beings have only limited computa­
tional resources, and communication takes place quickly. Further, the speaker 
proceeds on the assumption that the hearer is able to make inferences -  more 
specifically that he has the ability to infer her meaning from what is uttered 
and how it is uttered. This can only work if the utterance is suitable for the 
hearer to work out quickly, with finite resources.
There is a parallel with a game of catch. If I throw a ball to you, wanting 
you to catch it, and I am rational, I will try to make the trajectory suitable: to­
wards the place where you will be, not too fast, nor too high. All of this can 
only happen if I assume, tacitly, that you have certain abilities.
Similarly, the receiver of a ball is justified in making certain assumptions 
about a ball that is apparently thrown with the intention that he catch it. The 
thrower should not intend to throw the ball too high or too fast for someone 
of the receiver’s ability to catch -  although she might by mistake, or if she 
does not really want the ball to be caught.
There are a number of similarities with a communicative situation. If you 
want me to understand you (and you are rational), you have to try to produce 
an utterance that I will be able to understand, just as if you want me to catch a 
ball you have to try to throw it so I can catch it. If I think that you want me to 
understand you, then I am rationally justified in assuming that you will try to 
produce an utterance that can be understood without excessive effort, just as, 
if I think that you want me to catch the ball you are throwing then I can as­
sume you will try to produce a catchable throw, but cannot assume you will 
manage perfection, or even attempt it. I can assume that your throw will not 
require me to fling myself full-length at the ball like a slip-fielder, but I cannot 
assume that it will land in my hand with no effort on my part.
Does understanding utterances require cooperation? It need not. We are 
not as ready to catch balls as we are to understand utterances. If we were, I
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could throw a ball to any passer-by with the reasonable expectation of a catch, 
with no need to signal to him what kind of interaction we are engaging in ex­
cept by the act of throwing, just as I can address an utterance to him and be 
understood on the basis of my attempt to be understood and his to under­
stand. There does not need to be any shared aim in either case. I intend him to 
catch the ball or to understand the utterance and he may try to do so7. The 
speaker and hearer are engaged in different activities, with different aims, and 
this is not cooperation in the Gricean sense, which requires that the talk-ex­
change have a shared aim or purpose.
It is helpful to distinguish between coordination and cooperation. In co­
operation two or more agents have a shared aim or purpose. Coordination is 
behaviour of two or more agents which dovetails so that it might appear that 
there is a joint purpose, whether there is or not. It has been one of the more 
useful roles of game theory to draw attention to coordinated behaviour that is 
not cooperative but emerges from quite separate, even conflicting aims pur­
sued by interacting agents.
As far as communication is concerned, wanting to be understood does 
not entail wanting to contribute to a joint undertaking. Levinson separates 
these two aspects (although for him the distinction is between two types of 
cooperation):
Interaction is by and large cooperative ... there is some level, not necessar­
ily at the level of ulterior motivation, at which interactants intend their ac­
tions (a) to be interpretable (the underlying intentions to be recoverable), 
(b) to contribute to some larger joint undertaking (having a conversation, 
making a hut, even having a quarrel!) (2006, p. 4).
While I agree that speakers generally intend their utterances to be inter­
pretable, I regard that as coordination arising from general rationality consid­
erations, not cooperation. It is rarely worth saying something to someone else 
unless you intend to be understood. (There are cases where the speaker does 
not want to be understood or does not care whether she is: for example,
7. It is not easy -  perhaps impossible -  to stop oneself from interpreting an utterance simply by 
choosing not to try. One can stop oneself from interpreting utterances by directing one’s at­
tention elsewhere preemptively, as when one reads a book to avoid eavesdropping on a 
conversation.
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showing off by speaking in a foreign language not known to the hearer; but 
that is not communication.) So making an utterance with the aim or intention 
of being understood is not cooperation, but simply the rational interest in 
one’s action succeeding (as argued in Sperber & Wilson, 1986, pp. 161-162; 
Sperber & Wilson, 1995, pp. 267-268). For a communicative action to succeed 
as such, it must interpretable.
Levinson’s second sense in which interaction is cooperative is the sense 
Grice intended: that conversations or talk-exchanges must have an “a com­
mon purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction” 
(Grice, 1975, p. 45). If this were true then communicative interaction would be 
genuinely cooperative. There are counterexamples which are nonetheless 
central cases of communication. I do not have the space here to go into this 
debate in detail but I give a few examples (see also Grice’s own later discussion 
of the issue: Grice, 1989b, pp. 368-370). In interrogation and cross-examina­
tion, the participants’ purposes may be diametrically opposed. The lawyer 
wants the defendant to incriminate himself or to appear unreliable or un­
truthful. The defendant wants the exact opposite. A second kind of case is 
one-off communication. A speaker making a one-off statement to a passer-by 
need share no purpose with the passer-by. Some threats and orders (‘Get off 
the grass, or I’ll belt you!’) are non-cooperative in both ways: there is no estab­
lished talk-exchange, so no pre-established purpose; and the speaker's pur­
pose in making the utterance is to get the hearer to behave in a way that he 
would rather not, and has little in common with any purpose the hearer is 
likely to have. The hearer need not have any goal beyond the usual one of un­
derstanding what has been said to him (and this not explicitly or con­
sciously -  rather, it is built in to our pragmatics faculty, in my opinion). I take 
it, then, that communication is coordinative but not necessarily cooperative.
1 .1 .4  REALISTIC AND UNREALISTIC VIEWS OF RATIONALITY
According to Grice, utterances are actions directed towards fulfilling certain 
intentions. Rationality demands that action be appropriate to the desired end. 
Appropriateness implies efficiency: an action which will achieve the desired 
end but at much greater cost than an alternative is not as appropriate as that 
alternative, other things being equal. Speakers will not make utterances per-
16
feet at all costs, but must put in enough effort to make their utterance effect­
ive. Utterances also demand effort of hearers, since they must work out what 
was meant.
Considerations of this sort have led to pragmatic theories that are broadly 
Gricean but suggest that a balance is struck between the effort required by an 
utterance and the effects produced by it. Kasher advocates a principle o f effect­
ive means: “Given a desired end, one is to choose that action which most 
effectively, and at least cost, attains that end, ceteris paribus.” (1982) Horn col­
lapses Grice’s maxims into two principles: one that requires the production of 
an informative utterance (“Say enough”) and one that mandates low speaker 
effort (“Don’t say too much”) (Horn, 1984; Horn, 2006). In Sperber and 
Wilson’s relevance theory, the relevance of a stimulus such as an utterance is 
higher the more cognitive effects it has for the hearer, and lower the more 
effort it requires to process (to derive those effects) (1986).
Theories of classical or idealised rationality do not take into account the 
limitations imposed on humans by our limited time and resources for repres­
enting and processing information: the ‘finitary predicament’ (Cherniak, 
1981). The most implausible type of theory would assume that processing and 
information search are costless; so the very best solution to any problem is 
found, taking into account all relevant information weighted appropriately, no 
matter how implausible it is that this could be achieved.
Pragmatic theories that propose a balance between results and the effort 
expended avoid the trap of assuming that rational agents operate without any 
cost considerations, but this is not enough to ensure that they make realistic 
assumptions. A variant of classical rationality explicitly allows for costs as well 
as benefits -  for example in decision theory and game theory (Simon, 1983, 
pp. 12-17) -  but is still an impossible idealization since it assumes that “the 
decision maker contemplates, in one comprehensive view, everything that lies 
before him” (Simon, 1983. p. 13) and chooses the best option, taking costs into 
account, that is, the one that best balances benefits and costs. This is ‘optim­
isation’ in Simon’s terms.
Even the weaker idea that optimisation provides a standard to aim at 
should be treated with caution, in my opinion. For example, Kasher’s version 
of the rationality constraints on utterance production requires a ‘rationally
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ideal' speaker to optimize in this sense: “given a desired end that can be ob­
tained only by some speech act, a rationally ideal speaker opts for a speech act 
that, to the best of one’s belief, attains that end most effectively and at least 
cost, ceteris paribus”. (Kasher, no date). Depending on whose cost is to be 
minimised this either amounts to choosing a maximally efficient utterance, i.e. 
one that conveys the speaker’s intended meaning at least cost to herself; or to 
the speaker minimizing the effort required by a hearer, so that, given a partic­
ular utterance, a hearer can simply look for the interpretation that provides 
most information for the least effort.
Real speakers and hearers are not rationally ideal, of course, and those 
who think that rationally ideal speakers maximize effects achieved for effort 
expended do not necessarily suppose that real speakers do. In my opinion one 
can go further than that: it is implausible that speakers or hearers even aim to 
maximize in this way, or that hearers proceed on the assumption that speak­
ers do.
In arguing that this is not the way communication works, I draw on vari­
ous strands of work in psychology and philosophy which converge on the 
claim that classical, ideal rationality is unattainable by human beings in prin­
ciple and in practice. Christopher Cherniak has argued that the (correct) 
concept of rationality is much more minimal than classical theories propose 
(Cherniak, 19&1; Cherniak, 1986). In practice, it is clear that we are finite be­
ings and we work within the restrictions that imposes, as argued by Herbert 
Simon (e.g.Simon, 1955; Simon, 1956; Simon, 1957a; Simon, 1969) and more re­
cently Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g. Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).
On the short timescales involved in quick inferences or decisions, includ­
ing most utterance production and understanding, it is implausible that we 
act as though we take all information into account (‘optimize’ in Simon’s 
sense), finding the best possible balance of cost and payoff, a global maximum. 
Rather we use procedures that aim to find solutions that are good enough by 
searching and stopping once expectations are satisfied. In special cases we fol­
low procedures that aim at local maxima, trying to find solutions that are the 
best within the compass of a limited search. Basing my account on Sperber 
and Wilson’s relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, I will argue that
18
utterance understanding is one of these special cases, an expectation-based 
search which stops only when its quite specific aspiration-level is attained.
Heuristics
Generally, instead of behaving as though we weighed up all of the options and 
information, as classical agents do, we use heuristics that allow us to ignore 
large amounts of information by making use of properties specific to the task.
The way that we catch balls is an example. (McLeod & Dienes, 1996; 
Gigerenzer, 2001, pp. 3007-3008). Successful catching depends on environ­
mental regularities that we become attuned to. The gravitational field where 
we live, near to the surface of the earth, is nearly uniform, so the acceleration 
of any object due to gravity, g  is nearly constant. This means that a thrown 
object will move in a certain kind of nearly parabolic path. (It would be exactly 
parabolic without wind resistance, but this is non-negligible for thrown balls 
(Brancazio, 1985)). It happens that this means that one can catch a ball by 
moving backwards or forwards so as to keep the angle between the ball and 
one's eyeline increasing at a certain rate, and thereby ensuring that it will stay 
between o° and 90° until the ball is within reach (McLeod & Dienes, 1996)8- 
The procedure is a heuristic. It works under the right conditions, getting 
the fielder to the same place as the ball, as long as he can run fast enough.9 It 
would not work reliably under other conditions, such as non-constant g or 
with a self-propelled object. It is only applicable to one environmental prob­
lem, catching objects, and is not applicable outside of this domain. This kind 
of problem specificity or domain specificity10 is a property of heuristics in the
8. To be more precise, the fielder keeps the second derivative of the tangent of the angle equal 
to zero: d2(tan a )/d t2 = o; equivalently he keeps d(tan a)/d t constant (McLeod & Dienes, 
1996).
9. This heuristic only solves the part of the problem of catching concerned with how far along 
its trajectory a ball will be at catching height. A catcher generally has to move left or right as 
well as towards or away from the point of projection. A separate procedure takes care of get­
ting into the correct position laterally (McLeod & Dienes, 1996, p. 532). A combination of 
the two procedures is used in the general case (McLeod, Reed, & Dienes, 2001; McLeod, 
Reed, & Dienes, 2003; McLeod, Reed, & Dienes, 2006). A further procedure is used as a fine 
adjustment at the last moment. The fielder stretches out his arms forward or above his head, 
diving forward or jumping upwards as necessary (McLeod & Dienes, 1996, p. 537).
10. Problem specificity and domain specificity are not generally the same. A heuristic may be 
useful for similarly structured problems in different domains. The recognition heuristic, for
19
sense that I use the word in this thesis11. The procedure requires only a small 
amount of mental resources and information, using only the angle of gaze as a 
cue. It is fast and frugal, in Gigerenzer’s terminology.
In comparison, a rigorous calculation of the intersection of the ball’s tra­
jectory with the ground would require more mental resources and more in­
formation from the environment: projection angle, initial speed, and wind- 
resistance at least (McLeod & Dienes, 1996, p. 531; Gigerenzer, 2001, pp. 
3007-3008). For a fully accurate calculation, the spin of the ball and the hu­
midity and wind-speed would also need to be ascertained and taken into ac­
count. In contrast with the heuristic, a truly rigorous calculation using the ini­
tial velocity and the law of gravity to calculate the trajectory, with 
modifications for wind-resistance, spin and other factors, would work under 
any conditions, but at the cost of vastly increased effort and information 
required.
The reason why a heuristic only reliably works under certain circum­
stances is because assumptions about the structure of the task environment 
that are not true in all domains are built in, rather than explicitly given as 
premises or parameters. (For example, the ball-catching heuristic has built-in 
the assumption that acceleration is close to constant throughout the flight.) 
This contrasts with algorithmic procedures such as arithmetic, or truth-table 
proofs in classical logic, which guarantee correct answers; and with Bayesian, 
decision-theoretic, and game-theoretic accounts of decision-making where 
the decisions to be made are assumed to be those that would be reached if all 
available information were considered and taken into account. In such cases, 
domain-specific assumptions must be put in place in order to solve problems 
in the relevant domain, and since the mechanism is domain-general overall, 
these assumptions must be explicitly included.
There is a further difference between heuristics and idealised classical ra­
tionality. For heuristics -  and for bounded rationality generally -  search is
example, works well when the sole cue, that is, whether an item is known or unknown, is 
correlated with the criterion, whether the problem is determining the larger of a pair of cit­
ies or picking stocks for a portfolio. (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999; Borges, Goldstein, 
Ortmann, & Gigerenzer, 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003, pp. 
149-150,155-157)
11.1 explain this choice and look at other uses of the term in chapter 3.
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crucial. The catching heuristic is a good example. It takes the catcher to the 
correct position at the correct time to catch the ball, but the catcher does not 
explicitly12 calculate where the ball will land (McLeod & Dienes, 1996, p. 
539) 13.
If humans were ideally rational, with no time-constraints or resource lim­
itations on calculation or information gathering, they could make all judg­
ments and decisions using domain-general procedures with situation-specific 
information explicitly fed in. Under time and resource limitations, however, it 
makes sense to have procedures that do not allow for the vast range of possib­
ilities but work reliably in a small corner of human experience. Some such 
procedures will be highly innately-specified, others will depend more on ex­
perience of the environmental regularities in the relevant domain. A collec­
tion of such procedures all applicable to one domain might be seen as a m ent­
al organ or module.
In their recent work, Sperber and Wilson view the utterance comprehen­
sion system as a dedicated module of this type.14 This module includes the rel­
evance-theoretic comprehension procedure, a fast and frugal heuristic 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 45; Sperber 8c Wilson, 2002, p. 9; Sperber 8c 
Wilson, 2004. p. 624)15, which makes use of regularities that are specific to in­
ferential communication about a speakers intentions. One centrally im port­
ant regularity is described in the communicative principle o f relevance, which 
licences the presumption o f optimal relevance (both from Sperber 8c Wilson, 
1995):
12. The point is not that the fielder is not conscious of a calculation of the position where the 
ball will land, but that no such calculation is made. That is, the relevant pieces of informa­
tion are not mentally represented nor mentally manipulated in the way that such a calcula­
tion requires.
13. If fielders did this, they could run to the position where the ball lands and wait for it. They 
do not do this, instead running through the catching position as the ball reaches it.
14. The question of modularity is not central to the concerns of this thesis. Pragmatic inference, 
whether or not it is carried out by a module, proceeds fast without consulting all potentially 
relevant information. See chapter 5.
15. Indeed in a recent overview, Sperber and Wilson use the term ‘relevance-theoretic compre­
hension heuristic’ (2005, p. 360, and thereafter) to the exclusion of the previous ‘relevance- 
theoretic comprehension procedure’. I keep the older formulation here, since part of what I 
am discussing is whether the procedure is in fact a heuristic.
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(1) Communicative principle o f relevance:
Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance. 
(Sperber & Wilson, i995> p* 260)
(2) Presumption o f optimal relevance:
a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s 
effort to process it.
b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the 
speaker’s abilities and preferences. (Sperber & Wilson, i995» P- 270)
This presumption is a precise proposal about what it is that a hearer is ration­
ally justified in expecting from any utterance intended for him. If these ex­
pectations are justified, then, faced with an utterance, it makes sense to look 
for an interpretation that satisfies them. Sperber and Wilson propose that the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure does just this. In chapter 5 I 
look at the properties of searches that exploit these regularities.
1.1.5 s u m m a r y
This thesis combines three key elements. The first is the broadly Gricean view 
of utterance production as intentional action intended to induce the hearer to 
recognise the intention behind the action, and a corresponding view of utter­
ance understanding as a process of grasping the relevant speaker intentions. 
This makes utterance interpretation a form of inference to the best explana­
tion and utterance production a matter of devising clues that will be inter­
preted correctly. Thus, as Grice put it, “the idea [is] that the use of language is 
one among a range of forms of rational activity” (Grice, 1989b, p. 341).
The second is a realistic version of a traditional view of human rationality. 
I argue that realism about human abilities requires that we view rationality as 
bounded and mostly implemented by heuristics (chapter 3). My view is tradi­
tional, though, in that I argue that rationality is centrally the ability to reason 
and that reasoning involves ability with truth-preserving logical operations 
(chapter 2). I draw on Grice’s work here too, in reconciling a traditional view 
of this type with the reality of fast and frugal reasoning. His position was that
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there is “a ‘hard way’ of making inferential moves; [a] laborious, step-by-step 
procedure [which] consumes time and energy... .A substitute for the hard way, 
the quick way, ... made possible by habituation and intention, is [also] avail­
able to us” (Grice, 2 0 0 1 , p. 17).
A third key element, not described so far, is a view of the mind/brain as a 
device which processes information (i.e. a view congruent with modern psy­
chology and modern linguistics). It is this commitment to understanding cog­
nition as computation over mental representations that makes it clear that, to 
avoid computational explosion, heuristics must be used in cognition.
1.1.6 CARTESIAN THEORIES OF COGNITION
Representational-computational theories are a product of what Chomsky calls 
the second cognitive revolution, the renaissance of mentalist and nativist ex­
planations in linguistics and psychology in the late 1950s and 1960s, reviving 
Cartesian and other rationalist views in the context of a greater understanding 
of computation. This view of psychology treats it as a branch of natural sci­
ence: specifically, the branch which tries to explain thought and behaviour in 
terms of states of the mind/brain (Chomsky, 1991a, pp. 4-5). This thesis is in­
tended in that spirit as a contribution to the explanation of how we under­
stand and produce utterances in terms of mental states, specifically mental 
representations. Later I discuss mentalistic approaches to central, conceptual 
cognition (in chapter 2), and to utterance understanding (in chapter 4). In this 
introduction I make only brief remarks on the general project.
One important part of the second cognitive revolution has been the re- 
emergence of Cartesian representational theories of perception. In contrast to 
empiricist theories which treat the mind as a passive recipient in perception, 
in the Cartesian picture the mind generates a representation of objects on the 
basis of perceptual stimuli, but going beyond them (Chomsky, 1991a, p. 14).
... the eye scans a surface, or a blind man taps it with a stick... The mind 
then uses this sequence of impressions to construct the representation of 
a cube or a triangle or a person, employing its own resources. (Chomsky, 
1991a, p. 14)
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The generative grammar research programme in linguistics adopts the same 
approach: “the mind produces the representation of a presented expression, 
making use of the I-language and of course much else” (Chomsky, 1991a, P- 
14)
It is an assumption in this thesis (as in relevance theory) that utterance in­
terpretation is to be accounted for in a similar way, as the generation of a 
mental representation of the meaning of an utterance as a response to stimuli 
relating to that utterance. I will argue, though, that there is a crucial difference 
between the pragmatic process and perceptual processes. As I have said, I 
agree with Sperber and Wilson that utterance understanding is an inferential 
process, in contrast to linguistic parsing or visual processing, which are non- 
inferential processes16, effectively very complex reflexes. In addition, I argue 
that utterance interpretation is a reasoning process in that the representation 
generated in successful utterance interpretation is not only caused by but also 
rationally justified by the utterance, in that the utterance (and other clues) 
provide good evidence for the interpretation. This relies on a further key di­
fference between pragmatic processes and perceptual processes. Pragmatic 
processing is a central process rather than a peripheral, perceptual one, in that 
it takes propositional input, rather than, as perceptual processes do, input dir­
ectly from transducers connected to sense organs. (I return to these points in 
chapter 4).
1.1.7 a s s u m p t i o n s
In the remainder of this introductory chapter I comment on some issues 
which concern alternatives to assumptions which I make. One crucial as­
sumption is that communication involves inferences about speaker’s inten­
tions. In section 1.3 I briefly consider work in psychology on the development 
of the ability to reason about other s mental states, and comment on anti-in- 
ferentialist theories of communication.
First, I consider the relationship between reasonableness and rationality. 
The legal conception of what it is to be reasonable suggests that the views that
16. Linguistic parsing is a decoding process; visual processing is non-inferential but not 
(strictly) a decoding process, since visual cues are natural signs rather than a code.
24
rationality is bounded has deep roots, as Cherniak pointed out. The contrast 
with reasonableness helps to create room for a view of rationality as what an 
agent is able to do, rather than what he actually does. (I develop this view of 
rationality as reasoning ability further in chapter 2.)
1.2 REASONABLENESS AND RATIONALITY
While this thesis addresses rationality, not reasonableness, some of what mat­
ters for understanding rationality is arguably to be learned from the ordinary 
notion of reasonableness and derivative concepts such as reasonable person. 
There are competing conceptions of reasonable in the law, where it is an cru­
cial notion, as well as in philosophy, and competing ideas of how it relates to 
rationality. I explore some of these links in this section, then set aside the 
concept reasonable for the remainder of this thesis.
In English law one conception of reasonableness, close to the ordinary 
meaning, is something like proportionate. A reasonable person in law, for ex­
ample, is one who takes account of such possibilities as could be expected to 
occur, and exercises due care towards possible occurrences which are unlikely 
but not so improbable or out of the ordinary as to be unforeseeable (Cherniak, 
1986, pp. 101-102).
This conception of reasonable coexists uneasily in law with another mean­
ing closer to that of rational:
It is extremely difficult to state what lawyers mean when they speak of 
‘reasonableness! In part the expression refers to ordinary ideas of natural 
law or natural justice, in part to logical thought, working upon the basis of 
the rules of law. (Salmond, 1947. Jurisprudence, quoted in Garner & Black, 
2004, p. 1293)
W hether reasonable relates to logical thought or to something closer to com- 
mon-sense is an important matter in law, not least because ‘beyond a reason­
able doubt' is the standard a jury must use to decide whether a defendant in a 
criminal case is guilty (Garner & Black, 2004, p. 1293). One controversial sug­
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gestion is that a reasonable doubt is -  like a rational belief in philosophy -  one 
for which there is a (good) reason .17
In one sense the word [reasonable] describes the proper use of the reas­
oning power, and in another it is no more than a word of assessment. ... 
Lawyers say a reasonable doubt, meaning a substantial one; the Court of 
Appeal has frowned upon the description of a reasonable doubt as one for 
which reasons could be given.” (Devlin, i979> in The Judge 134, quoted in 
Garner & Black, 2004, p. 1293)
The meaning of reasonable as something close to ‘in proportion, as common 
sense would have it’ is dominant. ‘Reasonable’ has a similar meaning in the 
concept reasonable person, derived from ordinary usage and folk psychology 
and embodied in English common law. This concept is a key notion in negli­
gence cases. A person cannot be expected to foresee all consequences of his 
actions. Tort law18 recognises this by postulating a hypothetical reasonable 
person used as a yardstick. One may be negligent if one fails to consider the 
possibilities that would be considered by a reasonable person and to act ap­
propriately. One cannot be held negligent for failing to take action that a reas­
onable person would not take.19 (Cherniak, 1986, pp. 101-102)
As Cherniak points out, there is a parallel with theoretical discussions of 
agents who are rational but less than classically so. W hat it is rational for an 
agent to do or to believe depends on which factors can realistically be taken 
into account, and, because agents have finite resources, it is not possible that 
every confound to the truth of a belief or to the desirability of an action is 
taken into account by an agent. In contrast, classical rationality requires that 
an agent consider all relevant factors. It seems that the legal conception reas­
17. The issue is actually even more complicated. The word ‘rational’ is sometimes used in cases 
where reasonable -  in the sense close to proportionate -  is generally used. Thus, for ex­
ample, “‘rational doubt' means the same as ‘reasonable doubt’” (Garner & Black, 2004, pp. 
1290,1293).
18. Tort law is the area of law concerned with breaches of obligations that people owe to each 
other, except for contractual obligations (Garner & Black, 2004, pp. 1290,1526).
19. Less is required of those with 'diminished responsibility’, children, for example. Conversely, 
the standard required is higher for experts such as doctors, engineers and lawyers. 
(Cherniak, 1986, p. 103; Martin, 2002, p. 409)
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onable person is aligned with the idea of a finite agent.20 As Cherniak remarks, 
“standards on an agent’s performance that fall short of unequivocal perfection 
are not just an unwieldy philosophical contrivance; they have been used tradi­
tionally as a core element of procedures in a domain of great practical import­
ance” (Cherniak, 1986, p. 102) I return to classical rationality, bounded ration­
ality and Cherniak’s ‘minimal rationality’ in chapter 3.
In philosophy, it has been proposed that reasonable behaviour is appro­
priate and balanced behaviour. Reasonableness is often seen as going beyond 
rationality. Robert Audi’s views are a good example. For Audi, “nothing reas­
onable fails to be rational; but a rational person, or stance, can surely fail to be 
reasonable.” (Audi, 2001, p. 149) Reasonableness consists of rationality, which 
can be seen as the property of “conforming to logical and epistemic stand­
ards”, plus something else: “the sort of thing one would expect of a rational 
person who is at least moderately thoughtful and balanced” (Audi, 2001, p. 
149).
According to Audi, rationality is something like a capacity; the ability to 
do things logically. Having this capacity does not determine how it is used. To 
say that a person or stance is reasonable, on the other hand, is to say some­
thing about actual conduct.
A second difference is that “reasonableness requires a greater responsive­
ness to reasons than mere rationality” (Audi, 2001, p. 149). This seems to 
mean that a reasonable person must be able to tell good reasons from bad 
reasons or the absence of reasons: “being a reasonable person requires a 
measure of good judgement and is incompatible with pervasively bad judge­
ment” (Audi, 2001, p. 150). Thus reasonable people act on good judgement 
more than merely rational people do and they act on a whim (i.e. for no par­
ticular reason) less than merely rational people.
A related requirement is that “reasonable people are to some degree self- 
critical” (Audi, 2001, p. 150) This is congruent with the requirement of “re­
sponsiveness to reasons” since being self-critical is plausibly helpful in appre­
ciating whether one has good reasons for one’s attitudes.
20. The remarks here about the conception of ‘reasonable’ in law are only intended to demon­
strate this point, and are far from a complete survey. For example, there is a tort of nuisance, 
distinct from negligence, and there the term is used somewhat differently (Jones, 2002, p. 
333).
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It follows from Audi's conception of rationality as a capacity that irration­
ality excuses -  or mitigates -  foolish or bad behaviour that occurs as a result 
of it, as for example in children; unreasonableness does not, since an unreas­
onable person is one who has the ability to fit beliefs and actions to reasons 
but will not.
I think Audi's way of making the distinction draws out some of the implic­
ations of normal usage. I agree in this thesis with his conception of rationality 
as a capacity. I would say that it is a kind of disposititional property of a m ent­
al system: what it is capable of doing with incoming and stored information in 
virtue of its internal structure. His conception of reasonableness as both pos­
sessing these capabilities and using them correctly, so that reasons guide be­
liefs and behaviour suggests that it is a doubly normative concept. Rationality 
is the ability to deal correctly with beliefs etc.; reasonableness is the correct 
use of this ability.
There is some similarity with Grice’s division of rationality into a basic 
reasoning capacity, flat rationality, and higher levels of reasoning ability, vari­
able rationality (Grice, 2001, pp. 28-36), which I discuss in chapter 2. A differ­
ence is that Grice does not mean by variable rationality the correct use of the 
abilities making up flat rationality; rather possession of a higher degree of var­
iable rationality is the possession of greater reasoning ability, including some 
capabilities useful for reasoning but not essential to it.
Grice also comments briefly on reasonableness (2001, pp. 23-25), taking 
the view that ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’ refer to two different general qualities 
of reason (Grice, 2001, p. 23). He draws on a distinction made by Aristotle in 
the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle distinguishes between parts of the soul 
which possess reason intrinsically -  the parts that do the reasoning -  and 
non-reasoning parts of the soul which possess reason extrinsically insofar as 
they are governed by the principles of reason.21 Grice suggests mapping this
21. Views along these lines became a commonplace in the classical world, forming, for example, 
a basis for Stoicism. Cicero reflects Stoic values in the famous line, “Reason should direct 
and appetite obey.” Plato had also previously made a distinction between the rational part of 
the soul, which may override the (non-rational) appetites:
... the [principle of the soul] with which a man reasons, we may call the rational prin­
ciple of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the 
flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of 
sundry pleasures and satisfactions. (Plato, 1991, Book IV)
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distinction onto the distinction between rationality and reasonableness so 
that in behaviour, rationality is possession or display of “the capacity to reach 
principles or precepts relating to conduct” (Grice, 2001, p. 24) and to be reas­
onable is “to be free from interference, on the part of desire or impulse, in 
one's following such principles or precepts.” (Grice, 2001, pp. 24-25). In this 
view reason is a kind of regulation. This has the advantage that we can say that 
behaviour that is not according to reason (unreasonable behaviour) need not 
be due to irrationality. Rather, what is being regulated, the parts of the soul 
(mind) that are not in themselves reasonable, may have got out of hand. This 
should allow a simpler theory of rationality than one which must account for 
all lapses as failures of reasoning (Grice, 2001, p. 25), just as the competence- 
performance distinction makes a theory of grammar possible by removing the 
necessity for the grammar to generate the ill-formed utterances that are made 
when tired, drunk or confused.22
There are examples which seem to challenge Grice’s view. In an episode of 
the Simpsons, Homer, trying to steal coke and sweets, gets his hands stuck in 
vending machines. Help is summoned but the hands cannot be freed and he is 
told that his arms will have to be amputated. Just in time, it is noticed that 
Homer is holding on to a can inside the machine.23 I think we would call 
Homer’s behaviour irrational rather than unreasonable (or perhaps both irra­
tional and unreasonable). It is clear, though, that on Grice’s definitions Homer 
is behaving rationally but unreasonably. Homer can work out the con­
sequences of his actions (although he hopes his arms will grow back after­
wards), but is unable to act appropriately precisely because he is overcome 
with desire.
Perhaps Homer’s actions seem irrational because his actions are not well 
suited to achieve his desires. This would accord with a well-known version of
22. Grice does not draw the parallel with generative grammar. The case of rationality is com­
plicated by the fact that we can say that a person is rational as well as a belief, whereas only 
sentences are grammatical or otherwise.
23. Marge on the lam, episode 1F03, season five, first aired 5th November 1993. The dialogue in 
the scene is as follows: f i r e m a n : Homer, this... this is never easy to say. I'm going to have 
to... saw your arms off. [brandishes a circular saw] h o m e r : [plaintive] They'll grow back, 
right? f i r e m a n : Oh, er, yeah, h o m e r : Whew! s e c o n d  f i r e m a n : Are you just holding on to 
the can? h o m e r : Your point being? (Adapted from http://www.snpp.com/episodes/ 
1F03.html)
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the contrast between rationality and reasonableness made by the political 
philosopher John Rawls, who draws on work by WM Sibley (Sibley, 1953).
Knowing people are rational we do not know the ends they will pursue, 
only that they will pursue them intelligently.
Knowing that people are reasonable where others are concerned, we 
know that they are willing to govern their conduct by a principle from 
which they and others can reason in common. (Rawls, 1993, P- 49)
What is to be taken away from this discussion? Two points seem important. 
First, as Cherniak suggests, there are indications in the ordinary use of the 
word 'reasonable' and its precipitate over time in the terminology of common 
law that folk psychology regards people as bounded agents, capable of paying 
attention to some reasons for actions and beliefs but not all. Secondly, some 
philosophical discussion of the difference between reasonableness and ration­
ality suggests that rationality should be seen as a capacity or faculty that may 
or may not be manifested in any particular judgement or action. This opens 
the way to a simpler, competence theory of rationality and is perhaps a pre­
requisite for any realistic attempt at such a theory.
1.3 ALTERNATIVES TO INFERENTIAL-INTENTIONAL THEORIES
1 .3.1 CODING AND INFERENCE
Grice's major achievement in the field of communication was to show that 
what a speaker meant by an utterance must be inferred. His theory of mean­
ing, and other theories which follow him in arguing that hearers infer speak­
ers’ intentions (I will call them inferential-intentional theories), are therefore 
in implicit opposition to an older theory, the code model of communication 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986, pp. 2-21, 44-6; Sperber, 1994).
According to the code model, communication involves the transmission 
of a meaning -  the message -  by means of language. The idea is that the 
speaker encodes and transmits her meaning as a linguistic signal, which the 
hearer then decodes (Sperber Sc Wilson, 1986, pp. 4-5; Sperber, 1994). The
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‘messageV'signal’ terminology is from information theory (e.g. Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949, P- 3).
There are two fundamental differences between the code model and the 
inferential model. First, the relationship between the signal and what it en­
codes is arbitrary in the sense that it does not provide evidence for the mes­
sage, absent the code. As Sperber says, “just as the letter ‘m’ does not logically 
follow from two long beeps [its symbol in Morse code], the meaning of a sen­
tence does not logically follow from its sound” (i994> p p -181-182). In contrast, 
the inferential model treats utterances, their features, how they are made, and 
that they are made, as clues to the intended meaning. The meaning can be 
worked out on the basis of the utterance, together with appropriate back­
ground assumptions, and follows logically (although non-demonstratively) 
from the fact that that utterance has been made (by a certain speaker, in cer­
tain circumstances, etc.).
Secondly, a coding/decoding process will lead to perfect transmission of 
the message if certain conditions are met. That is, there will be perfect trans­
mission if the code is shared, encoding and decoding are carried out success­
fully, and the signal is not distorted by noise or interrupted. There are in prin­
ciple no strong guarantees of that sort for inferential processes: the hearer 
may work out what the speaker s intended meaning was or he may not.
A third difference rests on these. As Sperber points out, there is no room 
for creativity in encoding or decoding: strictly speaking, applying a code creat­
ively is applying it wrongly (Sperber, 1994). In contrast, working out what lo­
gically follows from an utterance is a creative process. It involves postulating 
(or generating) a conclusion, assessing whether the utterance (or the way it is 
made, or the fact that it has been made) supports it, that is, whether the con­
clusion follows from the utterance together with other assumptions, and 
whether those other assumptions are plausible or at least not unreasonable.
I do not provide arguments here that a view of communication purely in 
terms of coding and decoding is untenable. In my opinion, Grice’s work estab­
lishes this, setting the bar higher for anti-inferential views of communication. 
Any theory of communication has to give some explanation of how hearers 
work out parts of speaker meaning that are not part of the stable, encoded 
meaning of the linguistic items used.
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A danger for anti-inferentialist models is that they will reduce to the code 
model and will be unable to account for disambiguation and reference assign­
ment as well as apparently more complex phenomena such as implicature and 
modulation of word meaning. Alternatively, they may slip towards redescrip­
tion of the problem, noting that linguistic items are often used to convey 
meanings beyond, or at variance with, their fixed meanings, but failing to give 
an account of the processes involved.
1 .3.2 ANTI-INTENTIONALISM AND ANTI-INFERENTIALISM
A number of theorists espouse views of communication which are prima facie 
distinct both from Gricean inferential-intentional pragmatics and from the 
code model, among them the philosophers Ruth Millikan (1984; 2005) and 
Tyler Burge (1993) and recently linguist Richard Breheny (2006).24 These the­
ories are all built on an intuition that some aspects of normal conversation are 
less complex and more direct than inferential-intentional theories propose. 
They are avowedly non-intentional, partly or fully, in that they propose, contra 
Grice, that communication need not involve a hearer’s recovery of speaker’s 
intentions.
Millikan claims that in the normal flow of conversation, utterance under­
standing is essentially a form of perception, unmediated by reasoning about 
the speaker. Breheny (2006) proposes that some communication -  ‘basic 
communication’ -  can take place in the absence of thoughts about a speaker’s 
thoughts. According to this view, speaker's meaning and hearer’s understand­
ing can be coordinated purely by attention to shared situations, in basic cases
24. I do not deal in this chapter with Francois Recanati’s view that ‘primary processing’ is a 
brute, non-inferential process. Recanati (2002a) divides pragmatic processing into two 
parts, primary and secondary, claiming that only secondary pragmatics involves inferential 
recovery of intentions. He argues that primary pragmatic processing, the understanding of 
what is said, involves only non-inferential processes: “primary pragmatic processes ... need 
not involve an inference from premises concerning what the speaker can possibly intend by 
his utterance. Indeed, they need not involve any inference at all: communication, I argue, is 
as direct as perception.” (Recanati, 2002b, p. 105)
But Recanati thinks that what the hearer recovers by primary processes is what is said in 
a Gricean sense, that is, a hypothesis about part of speaker meaning. I therefore reserve con­
sideration of Recanati’s theory to chapter 4 below, where I consider the nature of inferences 
in Gricean communication.
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at least. Breheny claims that this renders explicable the communicative ability 
of young children who are incapable of reasoning about each other’s states of 
mind.
Both Millikan’s theory and Breheny’s basic communication are intended 
as radical alternatives to intentional theories of pragmatics25 and part of the 
stated motivation in both cases is dissatisfaction with the explanatory status 
of a broadly Gricean theory of communication.
1.3.3 EXPLANATORY STATUS OF GRICEAN PRAGMATICS
The worry about Gricean explanations is that a crucial aspect is reasoning of 
some complexity about speaker’s intentions, and the status of such explana­
tions is in doubt if, as it seems, hearers do not explicitly reason in this way. As 
Millikan says, “Mere behaviors don't explain anything. Only their underlying 
causes are explanatory.” (2005, pp. 203, note 6.) (See also Breheny, 2006, pp. 
101-102, for similar concerns.)
This point about explanation is central to this thesis. I will argue that in­
ferential-intentional reasoning is explanatory, even when the processing does 
not mirror the argument. A major purpose of this thesis is to spell out how a 
broadly Gricean account is explanatory without postulating that processing is 
so complex as to make implausible demands, not just on young children, but 
also on finite agents in general. Anticipating the discussion somewhat, I want 
to make two points about non-Gricean theories.
The first is that such theories may not be entirely non-inferential (contrary 
to the theorist’s intentions) if the output of processing is represented as speak­
er’s meaning (or some component of it such as ‘what is said’). A fast, automat­
ic process for arriving at speaker’s meaning is, in my view, a fast, automatic 
process for performing a certain kind of inference.
A process of this kind might automatically take into account such useful 
cues as direction of gaze for fixing reference. It might also have a rule that
25. Both think that some communication requires hearers to make inferences about speaker's 
intention. For Millikan this only occurs when the normal flow of conversation is disturbed in 
some way. Breheny proposes basic communication to account for the communicative abilit­
ies of children he thinks too young to carry out inferences about communicative intentions. 
It is not clear to me what he thinks is the division of labour in adult hearers between basic 
communication and inferences about communicative intentions.
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makes the search terminate as soon as a coherent interpretation is found. 
Such factors would make a process non-algorithmic, that is, heuristic, but 
they do not make it non-inferential. A procedure for finding meaning quickly 
might not explicitly represent the beliefs of the speaker, but if it works out 
speaker meaning on the basis of reliable (albeit fallible) cues to a speaker’s 
mental state such as her direction of gaze, and it builds in some way of reject­
ing a trial interpretation as unsatisfactory then it is inferential.
In fact, I would argue that this is just how we should expect a very basic 
heuristic for inferring a speaker’s meaning to work -  such as, presumably, the 
comprehension procedure employed by young children. It should pick up on 
clues that are offered by modules that operate from infancy, such as gaze de­
tection. If it is to be as computationally simple as possible, we should expect it 
to accept any solution that seems good enough, that is, to satisfice. (I discuss 
satisficing heuristics in chapter 3). We would expect it not to perform elabor­
ate checks on the adequacy of the solution found. Thus for example if the 
speaker says "He’s spiny”, a young child might simply assign as the referent of 
the pronoun “he” whatever the speaker seems to be attending to, as long as it 
is plausibly semantically countable, singular and male. (This account receives 
some support from evidence that early vocabulary acquisition makes use of 
gaze detection. For example Paul Bloom thinks that the child automatically 
checks speaker’s direction of gaze before assigning reference (Bloom, 2000, 
ch.3).)
Sperber suggests that young children in the first developmental stage of 
pragmatic ability -  which he calls naive optimism  -  accept the first interpreta­
tion that occurs to them that meets their expectations of relevance, that is, the 
first one that seems to deliver enough cognitive effects for the effort put in. 
(Sperber, 1994; see also Sperber & Wilson, 1987a where this kind of strategy 
was first suggested). This strategy is very simple, but inferential nonetheless.
A distinct view is that the hearer simply takes as correct the first inter­
pretation that occurs to him. In this kind of theory, the interpretation is fixed 
by the facts about accessibility: for example, the salience of a referent in the 
context. In chapter 4 I discuss Recanati’s view that the explicit meaning of ut­
terances (‘what is said’) is derived this way by hearers.
3 4
A  v ita l p o in t fo r an in fe ren tia l th e o ry  o f speaker m ean ing  is th a t the result 
o f the procedure o r procedures used is represented  as speaker m ean ing 26, so 
th a t utterance in te rp re ta tio n  is a m a tte r o f  a rriv in g  at a hypothesis th a t m eets  
certa in  standards about th e  speaker’s m ean ing . By th is c rite rio n  M ill ik a n ’s 
th eo ry  seems to be genuinely n o n -in fe ren tia l. She claim s th a t the linguistic  
item s used in  utterances cause beliefs in  the h earer d irec tly  and th a t the be­
liefs caused are about w hatever the sentence o r sentences used are about, not 
about the speaker’s m ean ing . This, as fa r as it  goes, is a n o n -G ric e a n  account.
1.3 .4  m il l ik a n ’s p e r c e p t io n  t h e o r y  o f  u t t e r a n c e  c o m p r e h e n s i o n
Millikan’s view that utterance interpretation does not involve inference about 
intentions, nor indeed any thoughts about speakers’ intentions, being more 
like perception than reasoning, is a long-standing alternative to the Gricean 
view of utterance interpretation as abductive inference about the speaker’s in­
tentions (Millikan, 1984; a useful recent summary is in Millikan, 2005). Ac­
cording to Millikan, “Speech is a form of direct perception of whatever speech 
is about. Interpreting speech does not require making any inference or having 
any beliefs ... about speaker's intentions” (Millikan, 1984, p. 62). This makes 
the distinction clear, although it is worth noting that the difference between 
this view and inferential-intentional theories is less than one might suppose, 
since Millikan’s opinion is that perception is “itself not all that direct” (Jary, 
2005, p. 93). Perception fills in gaps. Millikan gives the example of seeing part 
of a cat in long grass. A similar point was made by Hume:
Suppose I  see the legs and thighs o f  a person in  m o tion , w hile  som e in te r­
pos’d object conceals the rest o f  his body. H e re  ‘tis certain , the im ag ina ­
tio n  spreads out the w ho le  figure. I  give h im  a head and shoulders, and  
breast and neck. These m em bers I  conceive and believe h im  to  be pos­
sess’d of. N o th in g  can be m o re  evident, th an  th a t this w ho le  o pera tio n  is 
perfo rm 'd  by the thought o r im ag ina tio n  alone. (H u m e , 2003, p. 445)
26. Deirdre Wilson (p.c., 11/2006) pointed out to me the importance of this issue to the ques­
tion of whether a theory is inferential.
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In chapter 5, I argue that perceptual processing is not inferential (see also 
Wilson, 2005, pp. 303, footnote 1; Sperber & Wilson, 1986, pp. 12-13), since 
the input is not conceptual. That discussion is about the process that takes as 
input activations on the retina, or the analogue representations transduced 
from them, and produces as output a three-dimensional model of the scene. 
Millikan and Hume’s examples go further than this, and it is possible that 
some genuine inference is involved in concluding from glimpses of cat ears 
that there is a cat present, as there is in inferring the same thing from a mi­
aow. If the claim is that arriving at speaker meaning is only as direct as this I 
would not necessarily disagree. However, Millikan means something much 
stronger: that the result of processing an utterance is knowledge about the 
world, unmediated by thoughts about the speaker’s mental states.
There are two components to Millikan’s theory: the claim that utterance 
understanding is direct perception, and a separate theoretical framework for 
language which treats individual constructions and lexical items as having 
functions.
Millikan thinks that linguistic items and linguistic forms (she uses the 
term ‘linguistic device’ to cover both) have purposes by virtue of which they 
continue to exist. For her, linguistic devices may be lexical items, surface syn­
tactic constructions, phonological items such as a particular pattern of stress 
or intonation and even orthographic elements, such as punctuation systems: 
essentially all “significant surface elements that a natural spoken or written 
language may contain” (Millikan, 1984* P- 3)- For Millikan, the purposes of lin­
guistic devices involve direct modification of the thoughts of the hearer. For 
example, the word ‘elephant’ has the purpose of evoking thoughts of elephants 
(Millikan, 2005, p. 191); and indicative sentences have the purpose of 
“effect[ing] production of a true belief having whatever propositional content 
the various other aspects of the sentence are designed to impart.” (Millikan, 
2005, p. 190).
This account is grounded in a claim that the kind of purpose that linguist­
ic devices have is their evolutionary stabilising direct proper function. 
(Millikan, 1993, gives definitions of these terms.) W hat Millikan means by this 
is that serving a particular purpose is what keeps a linguistic device in being. 
The stabilizing direct proper function of a linguistic device is the production
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of its conventional meaning in hearers (by conventional meaning, Millikan 
means something similar to Grice’s ‘timeless meaning’ (1968), or ‘linguistic 
meaning’ in Sperber and Wilson’s work (1986) and in this thesis).
Speakers have purposes too, which, according to Millikan, may differ from 
the purposes of linguistic items. This is Millikan’s characterisation of the di­
fference between linguistic (‘conventional’) meaning and speaker meaning. A 
speaker using the word ‘elephant’ metaphorically is using it with a purpose di­
fferent from its stabilizing function. Irony and other figures of speech are to 
be accounted for in the same way. In conversational implicatures, “what the 
speaker means either conflicts with the stabilizing function of the form or has 
some additional purpose beyond.” (Millikan, 2005, p. 191)
I have three criticisms of Millikan’s theory. First (and least important 
here), it is not clear what explanatory work Millikan’s notions of convention 
and function do in linguistics. Unless it can be shown that the notion of func­
tion in her sense is useful in explaining linguistic data, it is hard to see what 
role it plays in theorising about language. (See Millikan, 2003; Chomsky, 2003, 
pp. 308-315.)
Secondly, Millikan’s theory gives the hearer the task of determining with 
what purpose a linguistic device has been used on a particular occasion. Since 
there are very many purposes that a linguistic device might have (derived or 
direct), utterance interpretation in Millikan’s theory is a matter of resolving 
massive ambiguity (Origgi & Sperber, 2000). But how, without reasoning 
about which meaning the speaker intended? Until there is an explanation, 
Millikan has not made the case that analogies with perception are any more 
than that.
The task of a theorist is not finding (for example) considerations that 
render it “not surprising that when someone calls that they are ready, one gen­
erally knows for what they are ready.” (Millikan, 2005, p. 211) The task is to ex­
plain how the hearer works out what the speaker is saying she is ready for.
Thirdly, I also share Origgi and Sperber's suspicion that Millikan’s model 
is a version of the code model, “in that it explains communication by the sys­
tematic pairing of linguistic stimuli and responses”, even though, as they say, 
“the responses she envisages are closer to perception on one side, to action on
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the other side, than the more abstract responses envisaged by standard [code 
model] accounts.” (Origgi & Sperber, 2000, p. 149)
There are two further important lines of argument against non-inferential 
and non-intentional theories of pragmatics. The first is that inferential-inten­
tional pragmatic theories have made considerable progress. That progress 
tends to support the truth of their central assumption27 -  that utterance un­
derstanding involves the recovery of a particular intention of the speaker -  
particularly in the absence of competing research programmes in pragmatics.
The second point is that a motivation which Millikan and, particularly, 
Breheny give for non-intentional theories seems to me to be less compelling 
than they claim. They both draw the conclusion from the literature on ‘theory 
of mind’ or ‘mindreading’ that young children lack the ability to attribute and/ 
or reason about other agents’ mental states.
According to Millikan, in the normal flow of conversation at least, “there are 
many ways of grasping the content that the specific speaker intends to convey 
without employing a theory of mind” (Millikan, 2005, p. 187) -  in other words, 
without needing to take into account any mental states of the speaker, such as 
the speaker’s intentions or beliefs. This would be an advantage for Millikan’s 
theory, if, as many psychologists have thought over the last twenty years or so, 
young children cannot fully grasp others’ mental states. (Millikan raised this 
point in her comments on early relevance theory (Millikan, 1987, p. 726). 
Sperber and Wilson’s response is at Sperber & Wilson, 1987a, p. 737.) How­
ever, I think that the evidence now available suggests that while young chil­
dren are not able to discuss others’ intentions, desires and beliefs, they do 
sometimes take them into account, particularly in communicative situations.
27. Sperber and Origgi make this point:
The whole of modern pragmatics is predicated on this assumption, and its findings are 
arguments in favour of it. Of course, this does not make the assumption right, but those 
who deny it, are, in effect, implying that pragmatics as currently pursued is a discipline 
without an object, somewhat like the study of humours in ancient medicine. Surely, the 
burden is on them to show how pragmatics fails, and what is a better alternative to ex­
plain comprehension. (Origgi & Sperber, 2000, p. 156)
1.3-5  PRAGMATICS AND MINDREADING
In the well-known Sally-Anne or false belief task, a participant and a doll 
called Sally see an object hidden in location a. Sally then leaves, and the object 
is moved by Anne, in sight of the participant, to location b. Sally comes back 
and the participant is asked where Sally will look for the object. Participants 
younger than about four years old (and many autistic participants) mostly say 
that Sally will look in location b, i.e. where the participant knows the object to 
be. From around 4 years old, participants generally say that Sally will look in 
location a. This has been taken to indicate that from this age, children’s re­
sponses are based on a representation of another’s mental representation, di­
fferent from their own. The ability to infer and represent other’s mental states 
(and act on that basis) is called Theory o f M ind , or mindreading. (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001. See Bloom & German, 2000, pp. 2-3, for a sketch of the history of the 
task.)
Mindreading ability seems then to emerge around four years old, if 
passing the false belief task is used as the criterion. However, younger children 
are at least somewhat competent with aspects of utterance understanding and 
production (notwithstanding their limited linguistic and attentional abilities). 
On an inferential-intentional theory this requires attribution of intentions or 
beliefs. The anti-inferentialist conclusion is that normal communication, at 
least in basic form, cannot be dependent on the ability to make inferences 
about a speaker’s mental states.
However, advocates of inferential-intentional theories can argue that it is 
highly plausible that 1) we are particularly good at reasoning about people’s 
communicative and informative intentions, 2) an innate ability to reason 
about such intentions would be especially useful and might be expected to 
come online very early in children, perhaps before a more general ability to 
reason about agents’ beliefs, desires and intentions in other domains. As 
Wilson (2005) writes, “there is good reason to think that pragmatic interpret­
ation is not merely an application of general mind-reading abilities to a partic­
ular (communicative) domain” (p. 306-7). Children capable of communica­
tion might fail false belief tasks because 1) they have abilities for reasoning 
about agents’ mental states, but it is harder for them to use them outside the
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communicative domain; or, 2) they have acquired the specific ability to reason 
about intentions involved in communication but have not yet acquired the 
more general ability required to pass the false belief task. A combination of 
the two explanations is also possible.
The mindreading and developmental pragmatic evidence do not at all rule 
out dedicated abilities for reasoning with intentions in communication. Origgi 
& Sperber (2000, p. 163) point out that attributing speaker meaning in a 
Gricean framework and passing the false belief task are quite different abilities 
which require different mental resources. Representing a speaker’s meaning 
involves the ability to entertain a second-order metarepresentation (at least) 
of a specific type:
(3) “She intends 
me to believe
that it is time to go home” (Sperber, 1994, p. 186)
On the other hand, to pass the false belief task a child must predict behaviour 
on the basis of the evaluation of another’s belief, a first-order metarepresenta­
tion, as true or false. The metarepresentation is of the form:
(4) She believes
the cat is in the green box.
A failure to pass the false-belief task could be due to a) misevaluation of the 
belief in question, b) failure to predict behaviour following from the falsity of 
the belief, or c) failure to represent another’s belief in the first place. Children 
lacking in any of the relevant abilities might still be capable of constructing 
the very specific type of second-order metarepresentations that are needed, 
according to inferential-intentional theorists, to represent speaker meaning.
In my opinion, opponents of inferential pragmatic theories should specify 
the kind of representation that they believe children come to have as a result 
of understanding an utterance. As noted above, Millikan has made the bold 
claim that the representation is a representation of whatever it is the sentence
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uttered is about: a hearer processing an utterance about a cat on a mat ends 
up with a belief about a cat and a mat and (generally) no mental representa­
tions involving the speaker or her intentions. If a theory of communication 
along these lines were tenable (and 1 do not believe it is, for the reasons I have 
given above), then non-inferentialists could claim that young children can 
communicate before passing the false-belief task because they are incapable of 
metarepresentation in any domain.
However it is worth considering whether children younger than four years 
old are indeed devoid of mindreading and metarepresentational abilities for 
general tasks or for communication.
Recent developments
While children less than about 4 years old do not pass the standard false-be- 
lief task, there is evidence that young children can and sometimes do take 
others’ mental states into account. Opinions differ as to how capable children 
are of reasoning about others’ mental states. But evidence is mounting that 
well before passing the false belief task, and perhaps from as early as can be 
tested, children have expectations about others’ mental states and act on that 
basis. Summarising this work recently, Enfield and Levinson write that “A 
number of researchers ... believe that children grasp the nature of the other as 
an intentional agent from about nine months” (2006, p. 16).
Bloom and German (2000) contrast 3-year-old children with older autistic 
individuals. Autistic children may really lack theory of mind, they argue, but 
they are very different from three-year-old typically-developing children, in 
that “Normal 3-year-olds are far superior with regard to communicative and 
linguistic skills, the ability to pretend and understand the pretence of others, 
and the ability to engage in, understand and manipulate the actions of others.” 
(Bloom & German, 2000, p. B29) They conclude that three year olds fail the 
false belief task because the task is too demanding, because they do not grasp 
false belief, or both,
But they surely have a ‘theory of mind) in the general sense of having a
sophisticated ability to reason about the mental states; this is precisely
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why they differ from autistic individuals in the social, communicative and 
linguistic domains. (Bloom & German, 2000, p. B29)
There is direct evidence that young children do keep track of others’ false be­
liefs. Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) found evidence that 2-year-olds 
“correctly anticipate an actor's actions when these actions can be predicted 
only by attributing a false belief to the actor” (p. 587).
It has been known for some time that very young children understand 
others’ goals, desires or intentions (Wellman, 1990; Woodward, Sommerville, 
& Guajardo, 2001). This tallies with interesting findings in first-language ac­
quisition. Cross-linguistically, children use predicates expressing volative 
modality, such as ‘want’, before words expressing alethic modality, such as 
‘believe’ (Tsimpli & Smith, 1998, p. 197)-
Commenting on the work of Woodward et al, Malle, Moses and Baldwin 
write that “infants as young as 9 months understand the goal-oriented quality 
of some intentional actions” (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001, p. 11) and that:
at this early age infants already use information external to the behaviour 
stream to determine the relevance of a goal object. For example, previ­
ously provided information about an agent's interest in the contents of a 
box led infants to construe a subsequent box-grasping action as goal-ori­
ented; in the absence of such prior information, infants failed to register 
the action’s goal-oriented quality. (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001, p. 11)
Corroboration that nine-month-olds grasp intentions comes in work from 
Behne and colleagues who found that children from this age up were more 
impatient with an adult’s unwillingness to perform an action than with failure 
through inability (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005).
A great deal of work has been done on imitation. Children’s imitation of 
others’ actions is apparently aimed at reproducing the physical behaviour 
from birth, but it is reoriented to the goal of that behaviour from around 18 
months. For example, if the experimenter has his hands full and uses his head 
to turn on a light, the child turns it on with his hand, imitating the goal rather 
than the means used thus indicating an understanding of another’s intentions 
(Meltzoff, 1988; Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001, p. 13).
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Returning to children’s knowledge of others’ beliefs, Onishi and Baillar- 
geon (2005) found that children as young as 15 months seem to keep track of 
where an agent thinks an object is, reacting with surprise when an adult looks 
in a place to which the child, but not the agent, has seen the object moved. 
These results suggest that children as young as it is possible to test are keeping 
track of some mental states of others.
While Onishi and Baillargeon note a possible alternative explanation -  
that children keep track of what others have seen, rather than what they be­
lieve, and expect them to look for an object where it was last seen -  they 
prefer the explanation that children keep track of others’ beliefs. They have 
some evidence for this view:
Recent results of ours have indicated that infants can predict where an 
actor will search for a hidden toy even when she does not see it disappear 
but must infer its location based on various (useful or misleading) cues. 
(Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, p. 257)
Surian, Caldi and Sperber (2007) found that 13-month-olds watching agents 
search for objects were surprised when search was effective if and only if the 
agent had not had access to relevant information. As they say, this “supports 
the view that infants possess an incipient metarepresentational ability that 
permits them to attribute beliefs to agents.” (p. 580)
One can imagine the two types of explanation for such results coming 
apart in circumstances where it is obvious that an agent would not expect to 
find the object in the place where she last saw it. Would a child be surprised if 
an agent did not look for a cork where she left it in a stream, for example? I 
suspect not.
Here, too, a determined opponent of a representational theory might be 
able to resist the conclusion that children keep track of others’ beliefs, but 
only by postulating increasingly complex (and ad hoc) rules of thumb that 
govern children’s expectations, so that they act as though they kept track of 
beliefs without actually doing so.
The best current alternative for those who resist crediting infants with the 
ability to act on others’ knowledge appears to be the theory that they under­
stand that behaviour is aimed at goals, and they expect agents to attempt to
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achieve those goals in a direct way, that is, “Teleological understanding, in 
which behavior is understood as being due to goals and external circumstance 
(true beliefs), and a rationality assumption is made that the most efficient 
means of achieving the goal are taken.” (Ruffman & Perner, 2005, p. 462). 
Gergely and colleagues (2002) reinterpret Meltzoff’s findings about imitation 
in this way. There is recent evidence that does not fit easily with this theory, 
however, from work on communication.
It has been known for some time that communicative tasks can be a facilitat­
ing factor for behaviour that takes into account others’ mental states. It is true 
that young children give the wrong referent on a modified false-belief task 
with referring expressions (the ‘message-desire discrepant task’) (Mitchell, 
Robinson, & Thompson, 1999), but very young children have been known for 
some time to modify their communicative behaviour to take account of the 
knowledge of others (O’Neill, 1996).
Tomasello and colleagues argue that humans, unlike the other apes, share, and 
that this extends to communication: we share information as naturally as we 
share objects such as food (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; 
see also Enfield & Levinson, 2006, p. 26). Sharing of information starts young 
and takes into account the knowledge and goals of the hearer (Carpenter, 
Nagell, Tomasello, Butterworth, & Moore, 1998).
In a series of experiments (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, &
Tomasello, 2004; Liszkowski, 2005; Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, Sc
Tomasello, 2006; Liszkowski, 2006; Liszkowski, Carpenter, Sc Tomasello, 
2007), Liszkowski and collaborators have shown that year-old children point 
to establish shared attention to a referent, that is, to communicate. W hat is 
more, if the experimenter appears to misunderstand, the child will point 
again, repeatedly. As Enfield and Levinson comment:
This is a spectacular finding, because t o m  literature standardly suggests 
that the ability crucial to this account (i.e., knowing that the other does 
not know something) is a much later achievement in development, com­
ing not at 12 months but at four years. In Liszkowski's studies, the child is 
clearly using pointing for informing, one of the main motivations for
communication. (Enfield Sc Levinson, 2006, p. 16)
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Not all theorists agree that the results to date demonstrate that infants share 
information (see Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007 for a recent de­
fence of this interpretation), but there is some consensus, even among some 
who oppose this view, that year-old children do engage in genuinely commun­
icative acts intended to direct attention (Southgate, van Maanen, & Csibra, 
2007). If the general tendency of these results is borne out, one motivation for 
non-intentional theories of communication will be weakened or removed.
In their response to Millikan’s comment about mindreading, Sperber and 
Wilson (1987a) acknowledged that whether young children have mindreading 
abilities is open to further investigation. I think, to summarize, that while that 
is still true twenty years on, there is increasing evidence that young children 
do keep track of others' mental states and take account of them in their ac­
tions in various ways. Their abilities do not extend to passing the rather elab­
orate verbal false-belief task, nor to “conscious metacognitive inferences” or 
the ability to “articulate a conception of beliefs as truth-evaluable mental 
states” (Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007, p. 585), but they do involve, even at a 
very young age, tailoring utterances so that they are suitable for a hearer given 
what the child knows about the speaker’s goals and what the speaker has seen.
Even sceptical theorists now accept infants have rather complex abilities, 
including a working assumption that goals will be achieved efficiently, and a 
means of keeping track of what others have seen. If in fact communicative 
ability in infants makes use of abilities of this sort, even to the exclusion of ex­
plicit representations of others’ beliefs, then it can be seen as inferential, as 
long as we grant that simple heuristics, such as working on the assumption 
that an agent knows what she has seen, can play a role in inference processes.
Pragmatic development
There is a further question for anti-intentionalists. The assumption is that 
young children do not have mindreading ability, but can communicate. There­
fore theorists postulate communication ability that does not require theory of 
mind. This form of communication would be rather basic, so infants might be 
able to perform reference assignment and disambiguation, but not to work 
out implicatures.
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However, children’s pragmatic abilities fall well short of adults’ until much 
later than four years old, the point at which they pass the false-belief task. 
Adult levels of performance with metaphor and idiom, for example, come 
much later. Mitchell and colleagues write that, “Considerable development in 
the ability to distinguish between literal and intended meaning seems to occur 
around the age of 6-8 years” (Mitchell, Robinson, & Thompson, 1999, citing a 
number of studies). According to Winner and colleagues, the ability to choose 
a metaphorical versus a literal interpretation increases from 6 to 9 years old 
and again from 9 to 14. (Winner, Engel, & Gardner, 1980; Winner, Rosentiel, & 
Gardner, 1976; Winner, 1988)
A second example is ability with so-called ‘scalar’ implicatures. Utterances 
of sentences such as the one in (5a) can convey a meaning like the one in (5b):
(5) a) Some of the linguists danced, 
b) Some and not all o f the linguists danced
Noveck (2001) has shown that on tasks probing this ability children answer 
semantically rather than pragmatically: they would take (5a) to mean that 
some (and possibly all) o f the linguists danced. They are still below adult per­
formance at ten years old.
Therefore explanations are needed for lower-than-adult performance on 
pragmatic tasks for children up to ten or even fourteen years old. Such ex­
planations might also be capable of explaining pragmatic deficits in children 
younger than four. So it is not clear that it is necessary to invoke lack of 
mindreading abilities to explain pragmatic deficits in young children.
Another way of putting this point is to say that the developmental prag­
matics literature as a whole does not support the theory that there is a radical 
discontinuity in children’s pragmatic abilities around four years old. Instead 
there is a long, slow increase in children’s pragmatic performance, with, on 
the one hand, the ability to tailor utterances to hearers in infants as young as 
can be tested and, on the other, some studies showing difficulties with figurat­
ive speech as late as the mid-teens.
Pragmatic processing depends on world knowledge (by definition), on 
processing and attentional capacity, and on strategies for dealing with inform­
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ation. Children certainly develop all of these from infancy, continuing into 
their teens. Increasing processing capacity and incremental adjustment of 
memory, together with an innate ability to represent speakers’ meanings and 
other mental states seems as promising an explanation as any for the data. Of 
course, the gradually accumulating knowledge and strategies that this picture 
suggests need not be conscious or explicitly mentally represented. Much of 
the increase in pragmatic ability could be due to adjustment of accessibilities 
of concepts from lexical items and other pieces of information. I comment 
further in chapters 3 and 5 on the role of this kind of attunement to the prob­
lem domain in heuristic searches.
1.4 SUMMARY
In this introductory chapter I have sketched out the thesis that I intend to de­
fend and some of the assumptions that I make in doing so. The thesis con­
cerns the role of rationality in utterance interpretation and utterance 
production. I accept the broad outlines of Grice’s picture of language use as a 
rational activity. An utterance brings about an interpretation by triggering a 
reasoning process in the mind of the hearer. The process seeks an explanation 
for the utterance (and the way it is made in a particular context) in terms of 
the speaker’s intentions, reaching a representation similar to the one in ex­
ample (3) above.
I have already raised the question of the status of explanations like this. 
For a psychological theory to be explanatory it must deal with the causes of 
behaviour, as Millikan says. That is, it must give an explanation in terms of 
mental processes and mental states.
Realistic theories of human cognition propose that much of it involves fast 
and frugal shortcuts. This must also be true of pragmatic processing. I agree 
with Sperber and Wilson, who wrote two decades ago that:
... if there is one conclusion to be drawn from work on artificial intelli­
gence, it is that most cognitive processes are so complex that they must be 
modelled in terms of heuristics rather than failsafe algorithms. We as-
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sume, then, that communication is governed by a less-than perfect 
heuristic. (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 44)
Gricean inference schemas resemble logical arguments, not heuristic short­
cuts, however. Is there a problem here? It has certainly seemed so to many 
theorists. One way of seeing this is as a clash between the demands of ecolo­
gical rationality -  how well suited a procedure is to a particular type of prob­
lem -  and more traditional notions of rationality. In this introduction I have 
set aside alternatives that would lead away from this knot, particularly non-in­
ferential theories of utterance interpretation, but also non-mentalist theories 
of thought.
In the next chapter, I outline a traditional view of rationality and reason­
ing according to which reasoning ability is the ability to make reason-pre­
serving transitions. This might be thought to deepen the explanatory gap, but 
I argue that a theory of this kind is compatible with the view that much reas­
oning is carried out a ‘quick way’ (as Grice puts it). In chapter 3 I look in some 
detail at the reasons for theories of rationality as bounded, then show that 
heuristic search is a good candidate for the quick way of reasoning in the case 
of inference to the best explanation.
I return to inferential-intentional theories of communication in chapter 4 
and the details of my view of reasoning in pragmatic processing (primarily ut­
terance interpretation) emerge there and in the final chapter.
My view of how broadly Gricean pragmatics is realised in the mind is es­
sentially a version or interpretation of Sperber and Wilson’s relevance-theor­
etic comprehension procedure. What is new here is the attempt to show that 
on current views of pragmatics and of reasoning, options are limited, and a 
heuristic with many of the properties of the relevance-theoretic comprehen­
sion procedure is a natural conclusion.
It is worth noting that I hold a somewhat different view to Sperber 
(Sperber, 2000; Sperber, 2001) on what reasoning is. In my opinion it is not 
necessarily a metalevel process, but any process that takes conceptual input 
and aims at the preservation of rational value. On my view reasoning (usually 
fast) is the ordinary business of many central processes, rather than some­
thing reserved for a module that represents the output of such processes.
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Chapter 2 • Rationality and inference
when most of us talk of reasoning, we think of an occasional, conscious, 
difficult, and rather slow mental activity. W hat modern psychology has 
shown is that something like reasoning goes on all the time -  uncon­
sciously, painlessly, and fast (Sperber, 1995 , P - 195)
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In chapter 1, 1 discussed the view of pragmatics that I want to establish, setting 
out some initial reasons for seeing utterance comprehension as thoroughly ra­
tional yet performed by heuristics. In chapters two and three, I look in more 
depth at two competing visions of rationality, classical and bounded rational­
ity, aiming to develop a view of what kind of rationality should be attributed to 
people and how it might be understood scientifically. The aim is not a full 
definition of rationality, a notoriously slippery and fundamental concept, but 
enough of a characterisation of the area to work with when discussing utter­
ance understanding as a rational activity.
This project has a good deal in common with Grice’s investigation of ra­
tionality (Grice, 2001). The main goal of the next two chapters is to integrate 
on the one hand Grices views that a necessary condition for rationality is a 
certain minimum reasoning ability, and that reasoning should be character­
ised as an activity that aims at value-preserving transitions between inputs 
and outputs, with, on the other, views of rationality and reasoning as bounded 
by human cognitive limitations of time, effort and working memory capacity, 
and other limitations on mental representations or mental processing. (Such 
views are held by Simon (1957b), Cherniak (1986), Sperber and Wilson (1986), 
and Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g. Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999)). This is more a 
matter of bringing out certain possibilities in Grice s account than of disagree­
ing with it, since Grice allows that reasoning is generally not spelled out labor­
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iously step by step, as mentioned in the introduction and discussed further 
here. Both of these views are necessary for a realistic inferential-intentional 
view of pragmatics as outlined in the introduction and discussed fully in 
chapter 4.
Human reasoning has received a great deal of attention from psycholo­
gists, particularly since the move to cognitive psychology in the second half of 
the twentieth century. Two long-standing debates in the psychology of reas­
oning are relevant. They are briefly introduced here and discussed further in 
the body of this chapter. One is the debate about whether systematic and re­
producible errors on reasoning tasks put in doubt the traditional idea that hu­
mans are rational. The arguments have been heated, but it seems that a con­
sensus is emerging that humans are neither systematically irrational nor as 
normatively rational as some once assumed (Samuels, Stich, & Bishop, 2002; 
Samuels & Stich, 2004). The conclusions we reach are not always warranted 
and we do better or worse depending on the form of the task and how inform­
ation is presented. In many cases, what is striking is how well we manage in a 
short time with limited information and mental resources.
The second relevant debate in the psychology of reasoning is the contro­
versy about whether deductive reasoning is carried out by following rules of 
derivation akin to those used in logical derivations (Braine, 1978; Braine, 
Reiser, & Rumain, 1984; Braine & O'Brien, 1998; Rips, 1983; Rips, 1994; Rips, 
1997). or whether the method used is the construction of mental models of 
states of affairs, which yield conclusions on examination (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Johnson-Laird, 1999; Johnson-Laird, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 2003) -  or neither 
of these. I tentatively follow Sperber and Wilson’s endorsement (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986, pp. 102-103) of a mixed picture, with some deductive, truth- 
preserving inference rules sensitive only to logical form, some rules based on 
conceptual information (meaning postulates) and some additional inferential 
procedures, perhaps including mental models.
This debate has mainly focussed on deductive reasoning with a closed set 
of premises and on performance on certain reasoning tasks (this is stated 
explicitly as the aim in Braine, 1978; and noted by Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 
97). However, it is plausible that the resources available for deduction are put 
to use in the distinct task of generating inferences from new (or newly presen­
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ted) information (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 97). If further information from 
working memory or the environment can be introduced as additional 
premises, then non-demonstrative inference can be modelled with no need 
for special non-demonstrative ‘inference rules’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, pp.
107-117)'
I reserve for chapter 4 discussion of a third debate about reasoning which 
has received a great deal of attention in recent years: whether explicit, con­
scious reasoning and unconscious reasoning rely on qualitatively different 
mental processing.
Thus far, I have assumed that accounts of human reasoning ability can and 
should rely on a realistic view of mental representations. That is, it is assumed 
that 1) the mind is (among other things) an information-processing system in 
which information is mentally represented, and that 2) the form in which a 
piece of information is represented in the mind has a strong effect on what 
can be done with it and what is likely to be done with it. The form of a mental 
representation determines what other pieces of information it can interact 
with28 and therefore what further information can be derived from it. That is, 
something like29 Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind (r t m ) (Fodor, 1975) 
is presupposed. I examine the reasons for working with a view of reasoning of 
this kind.
It is a well-known irony that Fodor’s theory has been applied to central 
processes and non-demonstrative reasoning, areas in which Fodor believes no 
progress can be made in this (or any other current) framework (Fodor, 1983, p. 
107). Fodor justifies his scepticism by pointing out that central belief forma­
tion is sensitive to ‘global factors! No one knows, he claims, how such factors 
affect the process. (Fodor, 1983, p. 129) (See Fodor, 2000; Fodor, 2005 for 
Fodor’s continuing scepticism about the cognitive science of central pro­
cesses.) I will call the question of how central cognition, particularly abductive
28. W hat other pieces of information it actually does interact with is presumably partly de­
termined by the accessibility and activation of those other pieces of information, and partly 
by what other processing is competing for mental resources.
29. 1 write 'something like’ Fodor’s theory because his theory also comes with a particular view 
of the semantics of concepts in the language of thought. I avoid this issue.
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inference, can be modelled computationally Fodor’s problem (following 
Carruthers, 2003).30
I believe that such deep pessimism is unwarranted. In section 3 of this 
chapter, I discuss r t m  and suggest that one reason for Fodor's scepticism is 
his exclusive stress on the propositional (or logical) in reasoning. This neglects 
another important stream of research on reasoning particularly stressed by Si­
mon: reasoning as problem-solving (Simon, 1990, pp. 11-13), which models 
reasoning as sequential generation and assessment of trial solutions. Both are 
indispensable, I argue, for some aspects of central cognition, including those 
involved in abductive inference, such as the inferential aspects of utterance 
understanding.
The short timescale of utterance interpretation and the fact that commun­
icative inputs generally come from a helpful source (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 
pp. 66-67), and the tight fit between the structure of the environment and the 
heuristic applied are further considerations bearing on Fodor’s argument as it 
relates to pragmatics. I return to these points in chapter 5 in which I put into 
practice some of the consequences of the discussion of rationality in the next 
two chapters, considering the degree to which pragmatic processing can be 
both modular and central.
In the next section of this chapter, however, I put aside the issues of utter­
ance interpretation and of mental representation, focussing on a traditional 
view of rationality endorsed and refined by Grice.
2.2 RATIONALITY AND REASONING
if, as it seems not unreasonable to suppose, reason is, as of its nature, the 
faculty which is manifested in reasoning, then it would be a good idea to 
investigate what reasoning is. (Grice, 2001, p. 5)
I adopt Grices suppositions (1) that rationality is the possession of reasoning 
ability and (2) that reasoning is an activity aimed at making value-preserving 
transitions, so that reasoning leads from premises to conclusion like a logical
30. 1 avoid the name Fodor uses, the ‘frame problem’, because that is arguably the name of a di­
fferent problem (Hayes, 1987).
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argument. Among philosophers, the second of these views, although tradi­
tional, is controversial. More neutral characterisations are often given. Gilbert 
Harman, for example, has advocated a broader picture of reasoning as ‘change 
in view’, emphasising the conceptual distinction between laws of inference (lo­
gical) and rules or procedures for reasoning (psychological) (Harman, 1984; 
Harman, 1986). Reasoning, according to this account, is much more than 
stringing together truth-preserving transitions. I follow Grice in attempting to 
set aside this kind of objection by considering inferential ability as the core of 
reasoning, albeit not the whole story (see section 2.2.3 below).
A more pressing concern, in my opinion, is that a traditional view of reas­
oning may not translate well into a realistic theory of cognition, given that 
what actually happens in reasoning must often make use of heuristic short­
cuts rather than truth-preserving rules. According to this objection, reasoning 
is often less than stringing together truth-preserving transitions. I think that 
the evidence is indeed compelling that heuristics play a key role in reasoning, 
and that -  therefore -  the treatment of reasoning in cognitive science needs 
to take account of this. I argue that Grice’s picture of reasoning, although per­
haps agnostic about mental representation, provides a way of answering this 
criticism. The idea is that some episodes that skip many of the required truth- 
preserving steps are nonetheless reasoning, due to the intended resemblance 
of the activity to the construction or rehearsal of an argument. (See section 
2.2.5 below.)
A central element of Grice’s picture of reasoning, which I comment on but 
do not commit myself to, is connected to the traditional distinction between 
theoretical and practical reasoning. Grice wanted to make plausible the idea 
that there is a close parallel between reasoning about what is true and reason­
ing about what is to be done, that is, between theoretical and practical reason­
ing (and perhaps also other types of reasoning, if there are such). Grice 
sketches out a unitary account according to which reasoning in all domains is 
value-preserving, where the value preserved may be different for each do­
main: truth in the theoretical domain and practical goodness in the practical 
domain. In this thesis I am mainly concerned with theoretical reasoning, but 
below I outline the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning
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and comment briefly on its relevance to pragmatics, and on Grice’s attempted 
unification.
The value that theoretical reasoning is usually seen as attempting to pre­
serve is truth, since that is the value possessed by propositions and preserved 
by deductive inferences. There are two ways in which this assumption might 
need to be relaxed. Sperber and Wilson make a convincing case that in cognit­
ive science it is necessary to allow for inferences operating over representa­
tions that are syntactically well-formed but semantically incomplete in the 
sense that they fall short of propositionality (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 72O. 
These inferences can be made with the same rules that are truth-preserving 
when applied to fully propositional thoughts.
Not every belief is held with certainty, and a second relaxation to the 
model of reasoning may need to be made to accommodate this fact. Reason­
ing from two or more beliefs that are less than certain generally yields a con­
clusion that is also less than certain. Inferences from uncertain knowledge can 
still be treated as value-preserving where the value preserved is warrant 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. io8ff). A belief is supported to a certain degree by 
the beliefs it is deduced from. How much support is provided depends on the 
certainty of the premises. The degree of certainty can be seen as ranging from 
one (certain) to zero (certainly false). Then, logically, the support provided for 
a deduced conclusion is the product of the warrant of each premise31. A con­
clusion is at least as warranted as the support it receives from its premises in­
dicates -  perhaps more, because there may be other evidence in its favour, but 
not less.
These facts about warrant are no bar to a picture of reasoning as ability 
with truth-preserving inferential rules. Inferential rules that meet Grice’s cri­
terion that they preserve truth if the inputs they operate on are true will pre­
serve warrant when used with beliefs that are less than certain.
31. 1 am not suggesting that we assign a numerical probability to each belief that we hold. That 
is implausible a priori and not supported by experimental evidence. 1 agree with Sperber 
and Wilson that we are able to make non-numerical estimations of the degree of certainty 
we assign to propositions (such as certain, highly probable, possible, unlikely, and certainly 
false)', and that estimates of probability are not generally comparable across domains 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986, pp. 77-81).
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2 .2 .1  REASONING AS VALUE-PRESERVING TRANSITIONS
Let us, then, take as a first approximation to an account of reasoning the 
following: reasoning consists of the entertainment (and often acceptance) 
in thought or in speech of a set of initial ideas (propositions), together 
with a sequence of ideas each of which is derivable by an acceptable prin­
ciple of inference from its predecessors in the set. (Grice, 2001, p. 5)
The idea that reasoning involves making steps that preserve truth, as in a valid 
logical argument, is, as remarked above, quite traditional. A recent paper by 
Michael Smith (2004) attributes a view of this kind to Hume32. Thomas Reid 
had similar views on this subject:
In all reasoning ... there must be a proposition inferred, and one or more 
from which it is inferred. And this power of inferring, or drawing a con­
clusion, is only another name for reasoning: the proposition inferred be­
ing called the conclusion, and the proposition or propositions from which 
it is inferred, the premises.
Reasoning may consist of many steps; the first conclusion being a premise 
to the second, that to a third, and so on till we come to the last 
conclusion.” (Reid, 1855, P- 424)
Harold Brown (1988) outlines a related “classical theory of rationality” (as a 
contrasting background to his own views) whose essential feature is that reas­
oning makes use of algorithms, procedures that are guaranteed to arrive at the 
right answer, given the right input.
The theory is that, in correct reasoning, the beliefs that a reasoner starts with 
logically support the belief or beliefs he reaches, in just the same way as the 
premises support the conclusions of a valid argument.
Suppose that I begin by believing that p, and believing that if p  then q, and 
on the basis of these beliefs, come rationally to believe that q. The obvious
32. Fodor might disagree with this attribution. He attributes to Hume the view that mental 
states cause other mental states through laws o f association (Fodor, 1983, pp. 27-8, 31). On 
this view, Hume’s theory was realist about mental causation but lacked the technology (laws 
of natural deduction) needed to make such a theory work. See section 2.4 below for more on 
this.
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explanation of the rational transition between my beliefs, is that, inter 
alia, there is an isomorphism between their relations and the logical rela­
tions between the propositions I believe, that is, the propositions that give 
the reasons why q ... (Smith, 2004, p. 77)
On this view, reasoning essentially involves constructing -  or rehearsing -  se­
quences of states that parallel valid arguments. A simple example is given in 
table 1.
Table 1 (Smith’s 5.1): Parallel between psychological and logical inference
Of course, reasoning can be much more complex than simple application of 
modus ponens. According to the present view of reasoning, greater complexity 
in reasoning is primarily due to the joining together of simple steps, in just the 
same way that a complex logical argument can be built up from repeated ap­
plications of the rules of natural deduction. Since the rules of natural deduc­
tion preserve truth (by definition) the output of the reasoning process will be 
true if the input was true. The reasoner will not go wrong in believing the out­
put proposition, then, if he was not wrong in believing the input propositions.
More generally, as noted above, one could try to extend this picture into 
other domains of reasoning by the postulate that in all domains the transitions 
preserve value of some kind: truth in the theoretical domain, and other kinds 
of value in other domains. I return to this point in the discussion of theoretic­
al and practical rationality below.
I also noted above that some generalisations of this sort may be necessary 
even in the theoretical domain, since it seems that what is entertained in reas­
oning may include thoughts that fall short of being propositional and beliefs 
that are less than certain. Thoughts which are not fully propositional, while 
well-formed, would be semantically incomplete in the sense of lacking truth-
conditions and thus truth-values. It cannot be, then, that truth is preserved in 
reasoning from such thoughts. However, as suggested above, there is no con­
tradiction with the spirit of Grice’s account since no special rules or proced­
ures are needed, just standard inference rules that are truth-preserving when 
given fully propositional input. I reserve further comment on this issue to sec­
tion 2.4 below, since it is easier to discuss the need for this generalisation in 
the context of a realistic theory of mental representation33, which the present 
discussion does not presuppose.
Reasoning with beliefs that are less than certain can fall under the value- 
preserving generalisation as long as there is some kind of value preserved by 
valid inferences from both certain and uncertain beliefs. As noted above, this 
value is warrant. If a rule is truth-preserving then it is also, ipso facto, war­
rant-preserving. An inference using truth-preserving rules from a set of be­
liefs held with varying degrees of certainty provides some support for a con­
clusion or conclusions, in proportion to how certain each initial belief is. In 
the special case when all of the initial beliefs are certain then the conclusion 
or conclusions are also certain.
Just as it is traditional to see the rationality of human beings as centrally 
involving the possession of reasoning ability, it is also traditional to see it as 
centrally involving the ability to work with reasons. As Grice remarks, “the 
connection between the two ideas is not accidental” if one accepts the present 
view of reasoning as entertaining or generating chains of thoughts linked by 
value-preserving transitions (Grice, 2001, p. 5). According to the theory that 
reasoning involves only steps that preserve acceptability, if a reasoner starts 
off with reasons for accepting the initial set of thoughts, then he has reasons 
for accepting the conclusions which are derived from those thoughts.
It is worth commenting briefly on the history of the view of reasoning I 
have been setting out. It is hard to overstate how traditional this view is. Both 
Boole and Mill, in their classic works on logic, aimed to contribute to under-
33. That is, a theory that claims that mental representations are real and that they are perfectly 
respectable entities to appeal to in scientific accounts, a view mentioned in chapter 1. I dis­
cuss and endorse this theory as applied to conceptual representations in section 2.3 below. I 
am not committed to another sort of realism about mental representations which claims 
that conceptual and/or perceptual mental representations have intentional properties. In 
other words, I use the term ‘representation’ in Chomsky’s broad sense.
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standing of the laws of thought, where ‘laws of thought’ is understood in the 
strong sense of the laws that thought follows, rather than normative laws of 
logic that attempts at reasoning can be measured against. Boole set himself 
the task (in the first paragraph -  and in the title -  of his ‘Investigation of the 
Laws of Thought'), ‘‘to investigate the fundamental laws of those operations of 
the mind by which reasoning is performed” (1854), and to draw more general 
conclusions about the mind if possible: “to collect from the various elements 
of truth brought to view in the course of these inquiries some probable intim­
ations concerning the nature and constitution of the human m ind” Mill’s ob­
jectives were similar: “Our object, then, will be, to attempt a correct analysis 
of the Intellectual Process called Reasoning or Inference, and of such other 
mental operations as are intended to facilitate this...” (1856, p. 7) Both works 
aimed at developing formal systems, to be sure, but this was to be accom­
plished by investigation of the way we actually think34 3S.
Against this background, Frege made a clear distinction between logic and 
psychology. Logic is the study of the laws of truth, whereas psychology is the 
study of the laws of thought, including reasoning. Logic does not depend on 
psychology, but psychology has to heed logic, since logical laws are normative 
for reasoning, given that reasoning aims at truth: “Like ethics, logic can also 
be called a normative science. How must I think in order to reach the goal, 
truth? We expect logic to give us the answer to this question” (Frege, 1979. P- 
128).
The comparison with ethics needs to be put in context. It seems that Frege 
did not ultimately think that logic was normative in the same way as ethical 
laws:
The word ‘law’ is used in two senses. When we speak of moral or civil laws 
we mean prescriptions, which ought to be obeyed but with which actual 
occurrences are not always in conformity. Laws of nature are general fea­
34. The roots of this approach are to be found in “the common eighteenth-century equation 
between logic and grammar” (Wallace, 1980, p. 341), itself with roots in the perfect language 
tradition (Walker, 1972; Land, 1974). Coleridge’s early nineteenth century work on logic and 
the philosophy of language (for which see Wallace, op cit.) looks back in this direction and 
forward to Boole and Mill.
35- Gigerenzer and HofFrager (1995) provide a brief survey of the related Enlightenment con­
ception of laws of probability as laws of the mind. See chapter 3 for more on this.
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tures of what happens in nature, and occurrences in nature are always in 
accordance with them. It is rather in this sense that I speak of laws of 
truth. Here of course it is not a matter of what happens but of what is. 
From the laws of truth there follow prescriptions about asserting, think­
ing, judging, inferring. (Frege, 1984, p. 35i)
According to this view, logic, like physics, mathematics and psychology, is 
normative in its own field: each of these subjects tells us how certain kinds of 
things are, and therefore how we ought to think about those kinds of things. 
Macbeth summarises Frege’s “considered view”:
Any science that aims to discover laws rather than facts (for example, the 
facts of natural history) is normative in a sense: insofar as it discovers laws 
governing what is, it also sets out prescriptions governing our thoughts, 
judgments, and inferences regarding what is. (Macbeth, 2005, p. 23)
The rules of logic are more general than the rules of (e.g.) physics, though. 
Whereas the laws of physics tell us how we must think about physics, the laws 
of logic “are the most general laws, which prescribe universally the way in 
which one ought to think if one is to think at all”. (Frege, 1964* pp-12-13)-
There may have been a tension in Frege’s thought between two ways of 
seeing the laws of logic. One is to see them as the laws of truth: they tell you 
how to think if you want to think true thoughts. The other is as the laws of 
truth-preservation: they tell us which inferences preserve truth, and thus they 
tell you how to think if you want your conclusions to follow from your 
premises. Since this thesis is not concerned to define logic, I adopt the latter 
view with no further comment.
Granting Frege’s point that facts about psychology do not determine facts 
about logic, it is tempting to wonder whether the general acceptance of this 
point had a damping effect on the study of the psychology of reasoning, at 
least within philosophy. Once it was unfashionable to see logic as the gram­
mar of thought, attempting to discover the laws of logic by investigating how 
people reason was less attractive. Braine, following Henle (1962) in this re­
spect, claims that “this change of stance reflected a changed intellectual cli­
mate, not any fresh insight into the nature of reasoning” (Braine, 1978, p. 2). 
Further examining this claim about the history of philosophy would require
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too lengthy a digression for this thesis. In any case, the debate has since partly 
shifted into the psychology of reasoning and become partly empirical -  or one 
might say that logic, the psychology of reasoning and philosophical treat­
ments of rationality have become established as three separate fields. Within 
the psychology of reasoning, the mental logic programme can be seen as the 
revival of aspects of the traditional view. This programme presupposes a real­
ist view of mental representation (which I share: see footnote 33 above). I re­
turn to this issue in section 2.3 below. In the current section I continue to ex­
plore the Gricean version of the traditional theory.
It is perhaps a consequence of the traditional picture of reasoning that the 
words we use to speak about reasoning and about logical inference are not 
clearly distinguished. We find it at least as natural to apply the words ‘deduc­
tion’ and ‘inference’ to instances of reasoning as to derivations of logical se- 
quents. Logicians call the rules employed in syntactic derivations of logical se- 
quents the Taws of natural deduction’, but that is also a good name for the 
psychological rules of a mental logic. In ordinary speech we use ‘conclusions’ 
to refer to the propositions derived from a process of reasoning as readily as 
to refer to propositions entailed by some premises (and the verb ‘conclude’ 
also works in both contexts)36. From these informal observations about mean­
ing and usage, of course, nothing follows for the truth of the traditional pic­
ture, but they are at least indicative of its familiarity.
2 .2.2 NON-MONOTONICITY, ABDUCTION AND INDUCTION
There is room for doubt about whether this picture of reasoning has much 
generality. Notoriously, only deductive reasoning could be purely a matter of 
making truth-preserving transitions. Deductive reasoning can be defined as 
reasoning that aims to work out what necessarily follows from a closed set of 
propositions. Given the parallel with deductive logic, which is the study of lo­
gical necessity, it is not entirely surprising that deductive reasoning seems to 
fit the traditional picture. However, even within deductive reasoning there are 
cases where the parallel is not so clearly preserved.
36. The word ‘premise’, on the other hand, is more at home in logic than in talk about reason­
ing. This is presumably related to the fact that it is a more technical word than ‘conclusion’.
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One reason to doubt the neat connection between deductive logic and de­
ductive reasoning is what is sometimes called the non-monotonic character of 
reasoning. Work on defeasible logics and non-monotonic reasoning is motiv­
ated by the observation that the conclusions of some ordinary deductive infer­
ences are typically withdrawn when new information is presented. One is told 
that “If the switch is down, the light is on” and “The switch is down” and one 
concludes that the light is on, but would withdraw this conclusion if told that 
there is a power cut. One might (but might not) withdraw the conclusion if 
told that it is true that “If there is not a power cut then the light is on”.37 The 
initial reasoning parallels the logical rule of modus ponens, but the revision of 
the conclusion is not so easily explained in these terms, since it is a property 
of logical inferences (in classical logic) that adding an extra premise to the set 
of premises does not (that is, cannot) remove any conclusions from the set of 
conclusions. This property can be called monotonicity. Defeasible logics, and 
their instantiation in research in computer science on non-monotonic reason­
ing (e.g. Antoniou & Williams, 1997), are formal solutions that aim to preserve 
the parallel between logic and reasoning by doing without the property of 
monotonicity.
Despite the formal work, however, there is no settled theory of how 
people revise conclusions in the light of extra information. As the psycholo­
gist of reasoning Johnson-Laird says, “Philosophers and artificial intelligencers 
formulate such systems of ‘defeasible’ or ‘nonmonotonic’ reasoning but psy­
chologists do not know how people reason in this way.” (Johnson-Laird, 1999, 
p. 112). One obvious avenue to explore is that deductive inferences are made 
in accordance with classical, monotonic logic and that when conclusions of 
such deductions are withdrawn in the light of new information this is because 
the new information casts doubt on the premises. This view, which I support, 
contrasts with the view of reasoning as non-monotonic. According to the 
non-monotonic-reasoning view, the withdrawal of the conclusion is because 
the new information, when added to the original premises, undermines the 
inference itself. I think that consideration of examples suggests that new in­
37. In the psychology of reasoning this phenomenon is known as the Suppression Effect (Byrne, 
1989; Byrne, 1991). particularly when the conclusion is withdrawn in the light of an extra 
conditional.
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formation undermines belief in the original premise(s) rather than in the in­
ference. In the example given above, the conclusion ‘the light is on’ is with­
drawn because the new information ‘If there is not a power cut then the light 
is on’ causes the reasoner to doubt the original premise ‘If the switch is down, 
the light is on’.38 Byrne, Espino and Santamaria (1999; 2000) and Politzer and 
Bourmaud (2002) have given related explanations (although slightly different 
from each other) of the withdrawal of the conclusion of a deductive inference.
These approaches share a presumption with work on non-monotonic 
reasoning that logic and reasoning should be kept in step with each other. A 
different way of proceeding is to deny the traditional view that reasoning is 
primarily a matter of truth-preserving steps. Advocates of this alternative can 
also point to more glaring differences between logic and non-deductive 
reasoning.
The most striking disanalogy of this type concerns non-demonstrative in­
ference. Abductive reasoning and inductive reasoning both aim at reaching 
conclusions that are not logically entailed by the starting points taken as 
premises, that is, they both involve non-demonstrative inference. Abductive 
reasoning is inference to the best explanation of some observation or fact; in­
ductive inference makes a generalisation from several observations or facts to 
a covering law or regularity.39
The close parallel between a logical argument and the reasoning process 
seems to break down for these forms of reasoning. In non-demonstrative in­
ference, by definition, the propositions that one starts out believing do not en­
tail the proposition that one ends up believing. As Smith puts it: “the hallmark 
of inductive reasons -  reasons such as those provided by the consideration 
that something or other is the best explanation of some aspect of our experi­
ence -  is precisely that they do not logically entail the conclusions that we 
think they are reasons for”40 (Smith, 2004, p. 79). For example the proposition
38. The mechanism might be reductio ad absurdum, particularly in the case when one is told 
that there is a power cut. In the context, being told that there is a power cut implicates that 
if there is a power cut the light is not on, since the information would be irrelevant and mis­
leading otherwise. Then a contradiction can be derived: the light is on and the light is not 
on; so the first conditional (if the switch is down the light is on) is discarded, and along with 
it, the proposition that the light is on.
39. Abduction is sometimes regarded as a species of induction.
40. As the quotation indicates, Smith does not distinguish in the cited paper between induc-
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that the barometer is falling  does not entail the proposition that it will rain to­
morrow. Nor is the proposition that it will rain tomorrow entailed by the pro­
positions that the barometer is falling and that the best explanation for the ba­
rometer falling is that something is happening that means it will rain tomorrow 
(Smith, 2004, p. 79).
Thus there is an obvious disanalogy between the laws of natural deduction 
in logic and the steps taken in inductive and abductive reasoning. In order to 
preserve the parallel in the domain of non-demonstrative reasoning it might 
seem that there would have to be transitions in this area which meet Grice’s 
criteria. That is, what we are looking for are:
forms of transition, from a set of acceptances to a further acceptance, 
which are such as to ensure the transmission of value from premisses to 
conclusion, should such value attach to the premisses. (Grice, 2001, pp. 
87-88)
In other words, there would have to be laws of non-demonstrative inference 
whose application to some input yields output that preserves the rational ac­
ceptability possessed by the input. There are no such transitions that are gen­
erally accepted: “There is no well-developed system of inductive logic that 
would provide us with a plausible model of the central cognitive processes.” 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 67)
It is often said that this contrast with deduction is the explanation of 
Hume’s well-known scepticism about inductive reasoning (Cohen, 1992; 
Smith, 2004)41. Cohen writes:
Hume assumed the only valid standards of cognitive rationality were ... 
deductive, mathematical or semantical42. Induction was not a rational 
procedure, on his view, because it could not be reduced to the exercise of 
reason in one or another of these three roles. (1992, p. 417)
Given a picture of reasoning as essentially involving transitions that preserve 
truth, it is certainly harder to accommodate abduction or induction than de-
tion and abduction.
41. Smith also explains Hume’s scepticism about practical reasoning in these terms.
42. By ‘semantical’, Cohen means inferences that depend on non-logical lexical items: from 
Teddy is a cat to Teddy is a mammal, for example.
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duction. Thus, one might think that if we accept such a picture we should be 
sceptical about the viability of non-demonstrative reasoning, as Hume fam­
ously was.
Similar doubts have been raised by critics of Grice. In a review of Grice, 
2001, Harman writes:
Reasoning may sometimes involve constructing an argument, but not al­
ways because one is reasoning from the premises of that argument. The 
argument is often an explanatory argument, and one is reasoning from 
the conclusion of that explanatory argument to a conclusion that is a 
premise of the argument. (Harman, 2003)43
I think Grice’s picture of reasoning and rationality is worth defending against 
this kind of objection. In fact, since I also accept Grice’s characterisation of 
the fundamentals of communication, I need to show how some abductive 
reasoning at least is compatible with the traditional picture of reasoning. As I 
explained in chapter 1, in a broadly Gricean account of communication, hear­
ers reason from (facts about) utterances to speaker’s intentions, where the in­
tentions are explanations for (the facts about) the utterance. The process is 
inherently non-demonstrative, as Sperber and Wilson say:
even under the best of circum stances,... communication may fail. The ad­
dressee can neither decode nor deduce the communicator's communicat­
ive intention. The best he can do is construct an assumption on the basis 
of the evidence provided by the communicator’s ostensive behaviour. For 
such an assumption, there may be confirmation but no proof. (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986, p. 65).
Grice must have been well aware of the kind of difficulty raised by Harman for 
his picture of reasoning, particularly given that his work on meaning and 
communication is founded on inference to the best explanation44. Part of his 
preferred solution may have been to explore the possibility of non-demon­
43. Like Smith, Harman also thinks that this picture of reasoning does not adapt well to prac­
tical reasoning.
44. This kind of explanation is abductive rather than inductive: the explanations are not lawlike 
generalisations formed by reflecting on several instances, but propositions about the partic­
ular utterance.
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strative inference rules that meet his criterion of preserving some kind of 
value linked to rational acceptability. In his work on reasoning he mentions 
non-demonstrative rules more than once (Grice, 2001, pp. 5> 6, 10, 22, 46), 
without going into great detail about what the rules of non-demonstrative in­
ference might be. Such rules would differ from demonstrative ones in that an 
acceptable transition from true premises might produce a false conclusion. 
Thus reasoning could “go wrong ... through the perverseness of the world in 
refusing to conform to the conclusion of an impeccable non-demonstrative 
inference.” (Grice, 2001, p. 6)45
I think that a promising approach, and one that can be pursued regardless 
of whether there turn out to be any rules of non-demonstrative inference, is to 
look at how deductive inference may be involved in non-demonstrative reas­
oning, particularly abductive reasoning. It is true, as Harman says, that in 
reasoning that seeks the best explanation for an observation, the conclusion of 
the reasoning process, the explanation, does not stand in relation to the ob­
servation or fact explained as the conclusion of a logical argument does to its 
premises. This shows that deductive inference cannot be all there is to non­
demonstrative reasoning, but it does not establish that deductive inference 
plays no role in non-demonstrative reasoning. As Sperber and Wilson say, “By 
its very definition a non-demonstrative inference cannot consist in a deduc­
tion” but that leaves open the possibility that a non-demonstrative inference 
can contain a deduction "as one of its sub-parts” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 
69). Indeed deductive reasoning ability may be central to abductive reasoning 
since in abductive reasoning, the explanation found, taken together with back­
ground knowledge, should logically support the observation it is supposed to 
explain.
Instead of looking for value-preserving non-demonstrative rules that gen­
erate an explanation from the observation that it is meant to explain, one can 
develop a picture of non-demonstrative reasoning according to which non­
demonstrative reasoning is divided into hypothesis formation and hypothesis 
testing or confirmation. Deductive inference might play a role in hypothesis
45. This is because non-demonstrative inference rules do not guarantee that value is preserved: 
“inference rules ... pick out transitions of acceptance in which transmission of satisfactori­
ness (including where appropriate truth) is guaranteed or (in non-deductive cases) to be ex­
pected” (Grice, 2001, p. 22, my italics).
formation or hypothesis checking or both. Sperber and Wilson outline a the­
ory of spontaneous non-demonstrative inference of this type (1986, pp. 69-70, 
108-117).
Theories in which non-demonstrative reasoning is divided into two parts 
are relatives in psychology of Popper’s hypothetico-deductive theory of sci­
entific discovery (Popper, 1959). However, in important respects the psycho­
logy of non-demonstrative reasoning differs from Poppers theory. Popper, 
whose interest was the logic of scientific discovery, can say of hypothesis 
formation that it is a non-logical, psychological process and largely leave it at 
that, concentrating on the logic of hypothesis testing. For a cognitive scientist, 
the processes involved in hypothesis formation are to be explained, just as 
much as the processes involved in testing hypotheses. Moreover, in areas of 
cognition that are typically fast and automatic, not much testing may occur, so 
the burden of explanation is shifted towards the account of hypothesis 
formation.
On either account, hypothesis formation is guesswork, partly a matter of 
intuition and inspiration, but for Sperber and Wilson it is “suitably con­
strained guesswork” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 69), and part of what con­
strains it is the use of deductive inference rules: “Deductive rules, we will ar­
gue, play a crucial role in non-demonstrative inference... Hypothesis 
formation involves the use of deductive rules, but is not totally governed by 
them.” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 69) The idea is that new information, a set 
of propositions P; interacts with information from the context, including 
background knowledge and assumptions, a set of propositions C; to generate 
a contextual implication Q. P and C taken together logically imply Q since Q 
is generated from P and C by standard deductive inference rules. Q does not 
follow from either of P and C individually. Thus Q is not demonstratively in­
ferable from the new information, P, but it is arrived at because this new in­
formation is processed according to deductive rules (in the context of back­
ground information). This process can be seen as non-demonstrative 
inference from P to Q, and as the hypothesis-formation stage of non-demon­
strative reasoning.
This is the pith of Sperber and Wilson s account of non-demonstrative in­
ference. There are further important details I have not explained here, some of
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which I go into below in the section on mental logic, and some of which I re­
turn to in chapter 4, in discussion of utterance interpretation.
A key difference with a hypothetico-deductive theory of science is that 
Poppers theory concerns non-demonstrative reasoning (primarily) in the 
context of scientific hypotheses. In the present chapter I am commenting on 
reasoning in general, but my interest in reasoning in this thesis is focussed on 
its involvement in utterance interpretation. The ways that hypotheses are gen­
erated may vary from domain to domain and it may be much harder to come 
up with hypotheses in some domains -  scientific investigation of nature is the 
obvious example -  than in others, such as utterance interpretation. In some 
domains, and here scientific theorising is a paradigm case, conscious use of 
rules of thumb for discovery -  e.g. “try to imagine the simplest possible sys­
tem with the properties that are of interest” -  may commonly be part of the 
process (heuristics in one sense of the word: see chapter 3), but no guarantee 
of success. In other, limited, domains, it may be that true hypotheses are more 
likely to come to mind than false ones, or that, as Sperber and Wilson write, 
“of the assumptions that come most spontaneously to a human mind, those 
that are true are more likely to be [or seem] relevant than those that are false”. 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 117) This would mean that if the cognitive system 
judges a conclusion to be relevant then that is an indication, post hoc, that the 
assumption or assumptions which led to it are likely to be true.46
In domains in which humans are disposed to have good hunches, hypo­
thesizing is less likely to feel effortful and laborious. Utterance interpretation 
plainly falls into this category. In typical cases the hearer is not aware of any of 
the working out that underlies his interpretation of the utterance. Still there 
must be mental activity involved: just because something is below the water­
line does not mean it is not there. I think that a significant part of the explana­
tion lies in what Herbert Simon calls recognition. Through considerable exper­
ience one's cognition comes to be set up so that when one encounters a new 
situation which is similar to previous ones, in conversation, as in chess (one of 
Simon's examples), relevant facts are automatically brought to mind on that
46. In the same way, and for the same reasons, that corroboration of a scientific hypothesis 
lends support to the assumptions that it rests on.
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basis47. Part of this picture is that it is more likely, when there is a good fit 
between cognition and the domain, that relevant assumptions come more 
readily to mind than irrelevant ones. Another part of this picture may be 
heuristics that jump from observations to hypothesised conclusions, or from 
situations to judgments. Such heuristics blur the line in interesting ways 
between hypothesis formation and non-demonstrative inference rules.48
I have sketched out a way, derived from Sperber and Wilson, that non­
demonstrative inference can be split into hypothesis formation and hypothes­
is testing, and that hypothesis formation can involve rules of deductive infer­
ence. Sperber and Wilson see hypothesis confirmation, conversely, as a non- 
logical process: a process not involving rules of deductive inference. They say 
that confirmation of hypotheses is “a by-product of the way assumptions are 
processed, deductively or otherwise.” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 69) As 
already explained, the idea is that an assumption gains support from post hoc 
strengthenings. If an assumption turns out to be fruitful then it is 
strengthened, because the chances are that an arbitrary assumption would not 
have led to interesting or useful results.
I think that whether one sees the construction of the chain of deductive 
inferences as part of the hypothesis-formation stage or as an aspect of hypo­
thesis testing may depend on one’s point of view as a theoretician: that is, 
whether it is the assumption that is regarded as the hypothesis, or the as­
sumption together with contextual conclusions. In cases where what is of 
primary interest is the assumption, rather than the contextual conclusion, one 
might argue that hypothesis formation is limited to the non-logical process of 
constructing or retrieving an assumption, and that the deductive processing 
that follows is part of hypothesis testing. In either case, I have outlined in this 
section a way that non-demonstrative inference can involve value-preserving 
transitions.
47. Note that while Simon calls this phenomenon recognition, there is no requirement that a 
mental representation be formed of the fact that this situation is similar to one previously 
encountered.
48. This is something that Deirdre Wilson pointed out to me in discussion of these topics (p.c.).
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2 .2 .3  A RIVAL VIEW  OF RATIONALITY
There are influential opponents of views of rationality as the ability to make 
value-preserving transitions, among them Gilbert Harman and Richard Foley. 
We have already seen two of Harmans objections: 1) that reasoning is often 
not from logical premises to conclusions, an objection I have tried to deal 
with in the previous section; and 2) that it is wrong to suppose that reasoning 
is simply a matter of applying laws of entailment. The second objection 
amounts to the claim that definitions of reasoning like Grice’s confuse rules of 
reasoning, which are psychological, with laws of derivation, which are logical. 
Harman writes:
Logical principles are not directly rules of belief revision. They are not 
particularly about belief at all. For example, modus ponens does not say 
that, if one believes p  and also believes i f  p  then q, one may also believe q. 
Nor are there any principles of belief revision that directly correspond to 
logical principles like modus ponens. (Harman, 1 9 8 4 ;  P - 1 0 7 )
I agree with Harman on the first point (disagreeing, therefore, with Dummett, 
1973 and Hacking, 1979) that syntactic laws of logic are conceptually distinct 
from psychological rules of reasoning, but not on the second, that there are no 
reasoning rules corresponding to logical rules, as I discuss in section 2.3.
As well as the conceptual point, there are other reasons to doubt that 
rules of reasoning are in some way isomorphic with logical laws. One consid­
eration is that there are plenty of rules of reasoning that do not resemble laws 
of natural deduction. For example, there may be rules of reasoning which 
should be applied when two or more beliefs are inconsistent. One possibility 
is: abandon the belief which is less (or least) certain, then check to make sure 
that the remaining beliefs are consistent. There are other possibilities, but the 
details do not matter in this connection. The point is that none of these rules 
is parallel to a law of natural deduction, unlike a rule for reasoning such as i f  
you believe something o f the form  if p then q, and you believe p, then you 
should conclude q.
Harman suggests another reason why rules of reasoning cannot simply be 
read off from laws of logic: that there would be an explosion of inferences in 
any reasoner who tried to work through all logical entailments of all of his be-
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liefs. As he says, even if one can validly deduce a conclusion from beliefs held 
and that conclusion is not in conflict with other beliefs:
there may simply be no point to adding it to one's beliefs. The mind is fi­
nite. One does not want to clutter it with trivialities. It would be irrational 
to fill one's memory with as many as possible of the logical consequences 
of one's beliefs. That would be a terrible waste of time, leaving no room 
for other things. (Harman, 1984, P-108)
I think that this objection becomes serious and interesting in the context of a 
theory of cognition that is realist about mental representations and in which 
rules are applied automatically if their input conditions are met. If there is no 
clear account of what it is for the mind to have a belief or form a new one, 
then it is not clear how costly it is to do so, or indeed that it is costly at all in 
the theory49. And if the rules only amount to advice about good reasoning, 
then the problem does not arise because they need not be followed mechanic­
ally50. I examine a version of this argument in the section below on mental lo­
gic, where the criteria for this to be a serious problem are met.
Provisionally setting aside, then, the question of whether there is a rule of 
reasoning corresponding to each syntactic law in logic, I agree that reasoning 
is not simply a matter of following truth-preserving steps. This point goes 
beyond what has been said (in section 2.2.2) about the division of non-demon­
strative reasoning into hypothesis formation and hypothesis testing and the 
role of deductive rules in either phase. There is more to reasoning than either 
deductive inference, or non-demonstrative inference construed as postulation 
and confirmation of assumptions. Reasoning involves the abilities to detect
49. Harman makes a distinction between explicit and implicit beliefs. It is explicit beliefs that 
one should not multiply needlessly, on the assumption, “that there is a limit to what one can 
believe explicitly” (ibid). With a realist view of mental representation and a view of reason­
ing as computation over these representations, it is natural to say that while there are limits 
on how many beliefs can be stored, there are much more strict limits on the time and effort 
that is available for processing.
50. If the rules are supposed to have a strong normative force, i.e. one should not fail to follow 
them or one may correctly be judged irrational, then the problem would be that this is an 
unrealistically strong, unbounded set of normative requirements. That would not show that 
there is anything wrong with the rules construed as descriptive of some of the capabilities of 
the reasoning system.
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and resolve contradictions or weaknesses, the ability to see things from a new 
perspective, some ability to make guesses or to hypothesise, and perhaps oth­
er abilities too. W hat is more, episodes of reasoning involve not only the exer­
cise of these abilities, but much else besides. However, I think that one can 
concede all of this without agreeing with Dancy’s contention that “Grice is 
wrong to link rationality so directly to inferential competence” (Dancy, 2003, 
p. 277)51.
It is intuitively plausible that a great deal of what we do when we reason is 
not a matter of making value-preserving steps. The theoretical points made by 
Harman and others, as well as consideration of real examples of reasoning, 
suggest that episodes of reasoning have what we can call extra-logical fea­
tures. Grice gives the example of someone who has agreed to give a series of 
lectures and is asked for the titles of the individual lectures before he has be­
gun to think about the series. He may do a number of things which do not fit 
the simple version of Grices model: think of cancelling the lectures, remem­
ber similar previous occasions, panic, decide to try to write at least the first 
four lectures before the course starts and so on (Grice, 2001, p. 18).
Such considerations motivate a broader view of rationality, competing 
with Grice’s conception, as M orton explains:
Readers of Harman or Foley will be very sceptical that in believing p one 
acquires a commitment to believe consequences of p, even conditional on 
holding on to p. Sometimes one should and sometimes one should not, 
depending on many factors. To be rational and intelligible is to try to re­
vise one’s beliefs in the right ways, to be sure, but these right ways are 
subtle and extremely hard to describe. (Morton, 2006, p. 779)”
Similarly Harman characterises reasoning as a kind of ‘change in view’ which 
aims at coherence and simplicity (Harman, 1999, ch.s 1 & 3). It is easy to agree
51. Dancy’s remark is made more in the context of practical reasoning than theoretical reason­
ing. I do not take a position on whether practical reasoning ability is, at base, the ability to 
make transitions that preserve practical value.
52. A similarly broad characterisation of reasoning is given by Stenning and Monaghan but in 
terms that are realist about mental representation:
Reasoning happens when we have representations of information about some situation, 
and we transform those representations in ways that lead them to rerepresent informa­
tion about the same situation. (2004, p. 132)
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with such claims, while noting that they are compatible with a Gricean/tradi­
tional picture since they are much broader or less specific, and that a Gricean 
picture would be preferable if found to be tenable precisely since it is more 
specific. Of course, views of this type are only compatible with a Gricean pic­
ture of reasoning if 1) they are not meant in the strong sense that reasoning is 
not mainly, or at all, a matter of constructing or rehearsing arguments, and if 
2) it is possible to relax Grice’s picture somewhat, so that the ability to make 
value-preserving transitions, while at the heart of reasoning ability, does not 
exhaust it. Grice saw the need for just such a broadening of his picture of 
rationality.
2 .2.4 FLAT AND VARIABLE RATIONALITY
Grice’s suggested solution is to distinguish between a basic notion of flat ra­
tionality -  “the capacity to apply inferential rules” (Grice, 2001, p. 27) -  which 
any agent who can reason to a certain minimal standard53 would possess by 
definition, and a variable notion according to which agents who reason better 
are more rational than others. The concept of variable rationality would then 
be derivable from the concept of flat rationality together with the fact that flat 
rationality is used to solve problems. (The goal-directed nature of reasoning -  
which has already been mentioned -  is examined further in the next section). 
Grice also considers, but decides against, the possibility that the concept of 
flat rationality is derived as a limiting case of variable rationality. I explore the 
distinction between flat and variable rationality, then show how it can be put 
to use in dealing with objections like Harman’s.
As noted in chapter 1, Grice’s distinction somewhat resembles the com­
petence/performance distinction in modern linguistics, although Grice calls 
flat rationality a ‘capacity’54 and variable rationality ‘a competence’. It also re­
sembles a distinction that Christopher Cherniak (1986) makes between min­
imal descriptive and minimal normative rationality. Minimal descriptive ra­
tionality is the threshold level of reasoning ability that must be possessed by
53. Or ‘Rational Being’ in Grice’s terminology.
54- On p. 27 (see the quotation in the previous paragraph). On p. 30 Grice talks of an “unfailing 
competence with respect to certain rudimentary inferential moves.” See the discussion of 
this point in this section, below.
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any rational agent, by definition (i.e. qua rational agent). Minimal normative 
rationality sets a level that rational beings should aim for. The similarity is that 
if someone falls short of Cherniak’s minimal normative rationality, or pos­
sesses little of Grices variable rationality, perhaps overlooking a relevant and 
straightforward inference because of confusion, then that person is not as ra­
tional as he should be. People who behave this way, and behaviour of this 
kind, are often called irrational. On the other hand, an agent who fails to make 
any simple inferences even in favourable circumstances is apparently not cap­
able of rational thought. In Cherniak’s terms a being not capable of any infer­
ences falls short of minimal descriptive rationality; in Grice’s it fails to exhibit 
flat rationality and would not be a rational being. A being55 of this sort is more 
aptly called a-rational or non-rational than irrational.
Grice calls variable rationality an ‘excellence’ as well as a competence. Var­
iable rationality is something that it is good to possess more of, if you are ra­
tional at all. In the same way it is good for any minimally rational agent to ap­
proach normative rationality. According to Grice, a person possessed of a high 
variable rationality quotient would have strengths in areas not strictly neces­
sary to reasoning, but helpful for good reasoning. Grice mentions several such 
properties, including clear-headedness, a sense of relevance, flexibility, invent­
iveness, thoroughness and ‘nose’ (intuitiveness) (Grice, 2001, p. 31, including 
footnote 3)- An interesting comparison can be made with desiderata for good 
reasoning that are sometimes given in the context of teaching people to reas­
on better. A typical example is the list of “Abilities, qualities and propensities 
that good reasoners are likely to possess” provided by Nickerson (2004). This 
list includes several kinds of knowledge and motivational factors, including 
domain-specific knowledge, self knowledge, a strong desire to hold true be­
liefs, and curiosity/inquisitiveness (Nickerson, 2004, p. 415), all of which, to 
my mind, are still further from the core of reasoning ability than the proper­
ties Grice lists. I think that some aspects of variable rationality, particularly 
those on Grice’s list which concern intuition and instinct, may be best ex­
plained in terms of the ways that a cognitive system is well tuned to the do­
main (or domains) in which it operates. As mentioned above, intuition in 
complex tasks may be partly a matter of having enough experience in the rel­
55- Cherniak’s view seems to be that such a being is neither an agent nor rational.
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evant domain so that suitable knowledge is quickly brought to bear. The other 
side of the same coin is that good, quick performance depends on ignoring the 
vast majority of potentially relevant information. I comment further on this in 
the section on heuristics in chapter 3. Other aspects, such as the degree and 
extent of someone’s motivation, seem to me likely to lie beyond what it is pos­
sible to investigate scientifically at present.
We now have a refinement of Grice's original suppositions: rationality is 
split into a core capacity for value-preserving inference plus more peripheral 
attributes relating to intuition, and perhaps also still more peripheral features 
to do with motivation or knowledge of certain domains. Does this view allow 
good responses to Harmans criticisms? The criticisms are rooted, I think, in 
an observation and a conceptual point. The observation, which is also Grice's 
starting point for complicating his picture with a distinction between flat and 
variable rationality, is that episodes of reasoning involve much more than fol­
lowing inference rules. The conceptual point is that logical laws and psycholo­
gical rules are quite different types of thing. I think that the conceptual objec­
tion can be granted but set aside. No doubt it is true that there is a difference 
between logical laws, with a status similar to laws of mathematics, and rules of 
the working of the mind. However, that does not exclude the possibility that 
some psychological rules are isomorphic with rules of logical inference in the 
way proposed by the traditional view of reasoning. It is an empirical matter to 
find out which, if any, psychological rules for reasoning are isomorphic with 
laws of deduction and to investigate which other psychological rules or pro­
cedures there are to augment them or to shortcut them: for example, rules for 
resolving contradictions, for building mental models and perhaps for shifting 
focus.
Turning to the observation that episodes of reasoning can involve much 
more than value-preserving transitions, the separation of flat from variable ra­
tionality has the advantage of explaining how this can be, while reasoning 
ability is essentially the ability to effect such transitions. We can see that a 
reasoner with excellent variable rationality in addition to the basic flat capa­
city might have made less of a meal of the lecture crisis, remaining focussed 
on the task of deciding what to do, in the light of the situation and his aims. 
Another reasoner might be intimidated by the situation but still quick to intu­
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it (‘nose out’) a solution. The important point, in the context of the criticisms 
made by Harman, Dancy and others, is that there is no difficulty in seeing that 
a basic capacity for value-preserving inference is compatible with the posses­
sion or non-possession of intuitions, motivation to reason and abilities such 
as those for resolution of contradictions and recovery from contradiction.
Returning to the concept of ‘flat rationality) endorsing the view that flat 
rationality comes before variable rationality (in order of derivation), has the 
consequence -  congenial to a cognitive scientist, although Grice saw it as em­
barrassing -  of committing oneself to the view that “there is a specifiable min­
imal competence held by all RBs [rational beings]... [this view] seems to in­
volve attributing to all rational creatures, as the core of their rationality, an 
unfailing competence with respect to certain rudimentary inferential moves.” 
(Grice, 2001, p. 30)56
There is a kind of ambiguity in this statement (hinging on the scope taken 
by ‘certain’). Grice might mean that any rational being must have a compet­
ence in some inferential moves or other, perhaps different ones for different 
rational beings, with no common core of inferential moves that any being 
must possess in order to count as a rational being. Perhaps it is more plausible 
that what was meant is that there are some particular inferential moves, the 
possession of which is a necessary condition of rationality. (The use of ‘certain’ 
rather than ‘some’ suggests this was Grice’s intended meaning, I think, as does 
the analogy he makes with chess-playing ability57.)
Grice does not discuss this aspect of the core of rational competence fur­
ther, but there is discussion of just this point in Cherniak (1986, chapter 2) 
(without reference to Grice). Cherniak rejects the view that there are particu­
lar inferential moves which all rational beings, as rational beings, must be 
competent in, but endorses the weaker thesis that a rational being must be 
capable of making some inferences. An agent with an “inverted feasibility or­
56. Either way, it might be that what Grice found embarrassing was that the competence would 
need (or so he thought) to be unfailing (Deirdre Wilson, p.c.). I do not think that the priority 
of flat rationality over variable rationality would entail infallible performance with any infer­
ence rules.
57. Someone who does not know how each type of piece moves in chess does not know the 
game, and cannot be called a chess player, even if, improbably, he were to have some grasp 
of higher level principles such as tactics in the endgame.
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dering” of inferences -  inverted relative to human abilities, that is -  might 
find it easier to infer VxFx —» VxGx from 3xVy(Fx —> Gy) than to perform 
modus ponens (Cherniak, 1986, p. 34)- Is an agent of this type possible? Cher­
niak argues that such an agent could exist. A being that has no memory for 
theorems that it has derived would have to make all inferences by reference to 
a static body of knowledge, a deductive system of axioms and rules. Any infer­
ence corresponding to one of the rules or axioms would be easy for this agent, 
regardless whether the rule looks complex to us, such as the inference rule 
(VxFx —■► VxGx) t- (3xVy(Fx  —• Gy)) or is an apparently simple one like 
P - Q , P h Q .
I think that, accepting a Gricean picture of rationality, it is hard to avoid 
the conclusion Cherniak reaches, that a being is rational as long as it has a 
core competence with some truth-preserving transitions, and there could be 
rational beings which would surprise us by failing to make inferences that we 
find obvious, such as modus ponens or and-elimination. Finding that a being 
does not have some particular inference rule in its repertoire does not, I think, 
justify the conclusion that the being in question is non-rational. This may be 
just as well, since the evidence is that modus tollens is not psychologically ba­
sic for human beings (see §§2.3 & 3.2). Related evidence supports the conclu­
sion that human beings possess a small set of deductive inference rules, al­
though it is a matter of debate which ones. In my view it would be surprising 
if the deductive inference rules available for spontaneous inference differed 
greatly from person to person, so I think that it is true that there are particular 
inferential moves that all humans are competent in, barring pathology, even if 
some other -  imaginary -  rational beings could be rational in virtue of com­
petence in a different set of basic inference rules.
2 .2 .5  t h e  h a r d  w a y  a n d  t h e  q u i c k  w a y
In the introduction to this chapter I said that one aim was to show the com­
patibility of a Gricean view of rationality with the apparent psychological real­
ity that reasoning makes use of shortcuts and heuristics: that, in other words, 
reasoning is not fully explicit and the transitions made may be unsound. Here 
I explain what I mean by ‘heuristic’ and ‘shortcut’ and set out the conflict with 
the traditional view of reasoning. Full exploration of the evidence for heurist­
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ics and shortcuts in reasoning and of the varieties of heuristics and shortcuts 
in use is left for the next chapter. In this section I use examples that Grice 
provides to illustrate the point that reasoning is not fully explicit.
It appears hard to reconcile the Gricean view with research that shows 
that a good deal of cognition involves heuristics. Heuristics are ‘rules of 
thumb’: rules that work well enough most of the time in their intended do­
main but do not invariably produce correct output from correct input. Some 
heuristics are like inference rules in that they perform transitions from input 
information to conclusions58, but unlike them in that they do not guarantee 
that the transitions are value-preserving. An inference performed by such a 
heuristic is, by definition, unsound, in contrast to the inferences performed by 
according to the rules we have been considering, which are sound, also by 
definition. As an example consider the rule of thumb that birds can generally 
fly, which could be used to make an unsound but often correct inference from 
x is a bird to x flies.
Some other shortcuts are value-preserving, but share with heuristics the 
property of inexplicitness. Both skip over steps that a fully explicit derivation 
would include59. It is intuitively plausible that much of reasoning is performed 
by heuristic or otherwise not fully explicit shortcuts, as some examples given 
by Grice suggest. Evidence from psychology of reasoning also provides strong 
support for this view.
Thus there appears to be a clash with the traditional or Gricean picture set 
out so far. This is a different issue from the observation that a good deal of 
reasoning involves much more than chains of deductive inference, discussed 
in the previous section. The problem here is rather that if reasoning often or 
typically involves shortcuts, then it often or typically does not involve steps 
that parallel logical inferences, and this is apparently in direct contradiction to 
the model of reasoning that I am advocating.
58. Some heuristics work at a different level, regulating which procedures are followed, rather 
than performing (or mandating the performance of) particular transitions.
59. Roberts (2004) suggests that the psychologically more interesting category is shortcuts 
rather than heuristics. The idea is that what matters is for psychology is the distinction 
between fully explicit reasoning and reasoning in which some steps are omitted. This dis­
tinction is important, but for my purposes at least, the distinction between sound and un­
sound rules is important too.
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Grice did not think that reasoning in general was always explicit. He gives 
the example of a six page proof or sketch of a proof by Georg Kriesel (whom 
he gave the pseudonym Botvinnik) which was later expanded to a more com­
plete proof of eighty-four pages. The long proof contains many steps that are 
left implicit or glossed over in the original. Consideration of this and simpler 
examples makes it clear that we skip steps as far as our conscious train of 
thought is concerned. It is not just that Kriesel did not write out all of the 
steps of the expanded proof: it is highly unlikely that he was aware of all of 
them even as he worked the proof out.
We might try to extend Grice’s model to incomplete reasoning by saying 
that examples such as Kriesel’s proof are reasoning (or good reasoning) be­
cause one could complete them by supplying extra premises to make a de­
ductively valid argument. This also works for simpler cases: if I reason from 
Jack is an Englishman to Jack is brave, we can make the reasoning complete by 
supplying as a missing premise, All Englishmen are brave. (Grice, 2001, pp. 8 - 
10).
An argument with a missing premise is traditionally called ‘enthymematic’. 
Most arguments presented in speech are enthymematic, presumably because 
it would usually be pointless to outline premises that the hearer can infer for 
himself60, and, given that fact, counterproductive to do so, because it suggests 
to the hearer that there was a reason for spelling out the premise explicitly, 
and this is liable to send him off on the wrong track in interpreting the infer­
ence. (On arguments incomplete in this way,.
The proposal is that an argument which is enthymematic or otherwise in­
complete is informally valid if and only if there is a complete argument which 
is valid and is identical to the incomplete argument except for the addition of 
propositions. The extra propositions supplied may be premises, intermediate 
stages in the argument, or even conclusions.
There is, however, a problem with this way of rescuing the traditional pic­
ture. Almost any sequence of propositions can be seen as a valid argument if 
one is allowed to supply additional premises without constraint. (On this
60. Davidson (1963) makes a similar point about the reasons we give for actions : e.g. I  pressed 
the switch because I wanted to turn the light on. There is usually no need to add: and I be­
lieved that pressing the switch would turn the light on.
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point, see Mill, 1856, p. 527.) So this criterion would make it impossible to dis­
tinguish between good reasoning and bad reasoning or non-reasoning. Grice 
gives the example of Shropshire, a budding philosopher who claimed that the 
fact the chickens run around after decapitation proves the immortality of the 
soul. It is not clear that one would want Shropshire’s performance to count as 
reasoning, but one can expand his two-proposition sequence into a sequence 
that is canonically valid, as Grice demonstrates (2001, p. 11). (See Appendix I 
for Grice's expansion of Shropshire’s argument.)
One way of making the desired distinction would be to suppose that in 
reasoning that appears to be incomplete, although the individual steps are not 
spoken, written or consciously entertained, they are part of the mental process 
by which the conclusion is reached. Then the distinction between reasoning 
or non-reasoning would be that in reasoning all of the steps are present, either 
consciously or subliminally, whereas in non-reasoning, there is no complete 
chain of steps in the mind between the premises and the conclusions. In good 
reasoning the steps would be value-preserving. Bad reasoning might involve 
steps that are presented as, or thought to be, value-preserving but are not. 
However, I do not think that this amendation is promising because it is im­
plausible that all steps in reasoning are explicitly made, whether consciously 
or otherwise. Before explaining this criticism, I consider another criticism 
that I do not find convincing.
I take it that the following complaint about inferentialism, made by Audi, 
is aimed at theories of reasoning of the traditional kind:
One error [that philosophers make in accounting for rationality] is infer­
entialism: the tendency to posit far more inferences than we usually make 
or -  unless inference is reduced to a mere brain process as opposed to a 
mental operation -  even can make in the rational conduct of our lives. 
(Audi, 2001, p. viii)
There is an implication that the upper limit on the amount of inference that 
we can perform is known. It may be that Audi is relying here on introspective 
evidence: we do not, even when we introspect carefully, find that we are aware 
of performing all the inferential steps that would be part of completely worked 
out versions of complex arguments. This is not a decisive objection, however,
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since, as suggested above, these steps might be going on without (‘beneath’) 
our awareness. It is a commonplace in psychology and cognitive science that 
introspection is not always reliable, and another commonplace in these sub­
jects and in linguistics that we are not aware of all the processes that go on in 
our minds, that some processing is, in fact, completely inaccessible to con­
scious introspection. An objection based on the fact that we do not, when we 
introspect, find that all the steps posited by inferentialism are available, would 
need to be coupled with an argument that such steps, if they happen at all, 
must (unlike linguistic or visual processing) be introspectable. Recanati has 
offered an argument of this kind as part of his reason for distinguishing 
between non-inferential primary pragmatic processes and genuinely inferen­
tial secondary processes. I consider his views in chapter 4-
I do not want to advocate this kind of inferentialism, however, for a differ­
ent reason (which may have been Audi’s reason too). I think that considera­
tions of time and processing effort make it clear that the mind must use short­
cuts during inferential processing rather than spelling out each value- 
preserving step of each inferential chain. Since I do not think, however, that 
fully explicit inferential steps are necessarily conscious, I think that the two is­
sues are orthogonal. That is, I think that there are two separate questions: (1) 
whether inferences are performed by fully explicit truth-preserving rules or by 
shortcuts; and (2) whether the mental steps involved are conscious or not. I 
think, in fact, that all four logical possibilities are instantiated: (1) conscious, 
fully explicit reasoning; (2) conscious use of shortcuts in reasoning; (3) reas­
oning which involves mental representation of each step of a logical deduction 
but in which some steps are not conscious; and (4) reasoning which is inexpli­
cit in that it skips steps and is also not consciously available. I give examples of 
each type in chapter 3, where I discuss heuristics at greater length.
If at least some reasoning involves shortcuts which are not filled in expli­
citly ‘behind the scenes’ in the mind, then the proposed refinement to the 
Gricean picture will fail to distinguish in a principled way between good reas­
oning and bad or non-reasoning. Another way of making the distinction is 
needed. Grice provides two suggestions, both involving the intention with 
which reasoning is performed. One proposal is that incomplete or informal 
reasoning counts as reasoning because it is intended to be value-preserving:
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we could say ... that x reasons (informally) from A to B just in case that x 
thinks that A and intends that, in thinking B, he should be thinking some­
thing which would be the conclusion of a formally valid argument, the 
premises of which are a supplementation of A (Grice, 2001, p. 16, his 
emphasis).
The second proposal brings us back to shortcuts and heuristics:
“We have... a ‘hard way’ of making inferential moves; [a] laborious, step- 
by-step procedure [which] consumes time and energy... .A substitute for 
the hard way, the quick way, ... made possible by habituation and inten­
tion, is [also] available to us, and the capacity for it (which is sometimes 
called intelligence and is known to be variable in degree) is a desirable 
quality”. (Grice, 2001, p. 17)
The important point here is that the ‘quick way’ of making inferential moves 
counts as reasoning in Grice's model. Grice is quite clear about this61. Reason­
ing ability is centrally the ability to perform valid transitions between 
thoughts, but the transitions need not all be explicitly spelled out in any given 
episode of reasoning. The idea is that if a certain transition (or kind of trans­
ition) is made repeatedly, then a shortcut may be found. In future reasoning 
the shortcut is used with the intention that it leads where fully explicit steps 
would have led: to a valid conclusion.
Grice’s two proposals have in common this appeal to intentions. This ap­
peal is also partly motivated by the fact that there are canonically valid strings 
of inferences that are not good examples of reasoning. What such examples 
share is that the inferences in these strings do not seem to be directed, as the 
following example illustrates:
Suppose ... that I were to break off the chapter at this point, and switch 
suddenly to this argument: “I have two hands (here is one hand and here 
is another). If I had three more hands, I would have five. If I were to have 
double that number I would have ten, and if four of them were removed
61. In his introduction to (Grice, 2001), Warner concurs: “Kriesel’s quick way leaps over the 
vast majority of [the] steps [in the complete proof], but it is still reasoning, still an exercise 
of the ability to make reason-preserving transitions.” (Warner, 2001, p. xxxiii)
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six would remain. So I would have four more hands than I have now.” Is 
one happy to describe this performance as reasoning? There is, however, 
little doubt that I have produced a canonically acceptable chain of 
statements. (Grice, 2001, p. 16)
Examples like this suggest that a string of inferences, even one that is canonic­
ally valid and complete, is not reasoning (or only barely so) unless it is some­
how directed. Aimless inferring will not do. Conversely, the production of a 
sequence of propositions that is going somewhere and which is related in the 
right way to a canonically valid sequence is reasoning:
A mere flow of ideas minimally qualifies as reasoning, even if it happens 
to be logically respectable. But if it is directed, or even monitored (with 
intervention should it go astray, not only into fallacy or mistake, but also 
into such things as irrelevance), that is another matter. (Grice, 2001, p. 16)
It is an extension of this point to suggest that the production of incomplete se­
quences of thoughts is still reasoning if it is accompanied by the right 
intention.
In order to make the pervasive use of shortcuts (some of which are merely 
heuristic) compatible with the traditional picture of reasoning, it seems we 
must adopt something like Grice’s modification of the picture, according to 
which a flow of ideas completely isomorphic with a logical derivation is 
neither sufficient nor necessary for reasoning, since it is necessary to have the 
right intention, and some incomplete sequences of thoughts are also reason­
ing, if accompanied by suitable intentions.
Bringing in intentions might seem to be a dangerous manoeuvre, making 
our picture of reasoning dependent on the resolution of difficult issues in the 
philosophy of action, where a great deal of attention has been paid to the con­
nections among beliefs, desires, intentions and actions (e.g. Davidson, 1963; 
Bratman, 1987; Mele, 1997b). Here I look at one problem that arises and sug­
gest that a better solution might be to say, more neutrally, that inference must 
be goal-directed to count as reasoning.
One apparent problem with the view that shortcuts count as reasoning 
because they are intended to preserve the truth of the premises, is that when 
reasoning is quick and inexplicit it is unlikely to be accompanied by any con­
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scious, explicit intention that the output is correctly related to the input. We 
would need to say, then, that the intention can be implicit. So this claim about 
reasoning would depend on the view that one does not need to be saying to 
oneself, ‘My intention in doing x  is to accomplish y\ or to be conscious that 
one has intention x, or even that one is attempting y, to be truly said to have 
intention x. This might be acceptable -  certainly one can do something inten­
tionally without any conscious intention to do whatever it is. However it is not 
clear that doing something intentionally necessarily involves intending to do 
it. (This is what Michael Bratman (1984) calls the ‘Simple View! It has been 
much debated. Nadelhoffer, 2006, is a useful recent summary.) These are diffi­
cult and controversial issues62. Fortunately, I think that there is no need to re­
solve them here. There is a further consideration against bringing in 
intentions.
For some types of inference that I would like to regard as reasoning, it 
seems that there need not be any intention to reason correctly or to achieve a 
certain goal. In the case of hearing an utterance it is, at best, odd to say that 
one intends to understand or intends to try to understand it. It is very odd in­
deed to say that the inferences involved in working out what a speaker meant 
were accompanied by an intention that they be valid inferences, since a hearer 
is not typically aware of making any inferences at all in understanding an 
utterance.
A reason for the oddity might be that intentions, or talk about intentions, 
is at what is sometimes called the person level. When we talk about intentions 
we see them as properties of a person. The reasoning that I am concerned 
with, however, particularly when it is quick and subliminal, seems to be con­
ducted by mental subroutines: dedicated modules or processes. Can an inten­
tion also be effectively a property of a module, strategy or process? I would 
rather not say that. Can we say, instead, that a module has a goal or a func­
tion? Stanovich and West (2004) say that it cannot:
62. On the ‘Simple View’, much of the debate has been about folk psychology or about the 
meanings of the words involved, not always clearly distinguished, rather than about the role 
of mental states in behaviour. See Nuti, 2003 for distinctions between the study of psycho­
logy, of folk psychology and of semantics in discussions of belief, intention etc.
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we do not think the question of whether a certain (internal) strategy is ra­
tional or irrational is well formed. We do not believe the term rationality 
applies to subpersonal entities. ... One could ... talk of a submodule that 
chose strategies rationally or not. ... [the question would arise] what are 
the goals of this subpersonal entity -  what are its interests that its ration­
ality is trying to serve? This is unclear in the case of a subpersonal entity. 
(Stanovich & West, 2 0 0 4 ,  p. 532).
My suggestion is that it does make sense to talk about the goals or functions 
of at least some subpersonal' processes. These goals are effectively hardwired 
into their structure, either by evolution, or by learning. A bicycle-riding mod­
ule would be an example of a learned module with a learned function; an ut­
terance interpretation module is apparently an innate module with a function 
given innately, as is the language-parsing module. The bicycle-riding module 
consists of procedures that serve the dual purpose of getting the rider where 
he wants to go while keeping him on the bike. An utterance interpretation 
module has the purpose of constructing correct interpretations of utterances.
Thus, in ordinary language terms, in normal circumstances it is strange to 
say that I  try to understand an utterance: I find myself understanding it, or 
not, and if not, then I might subsequently try to understand it by ruminating 
or seeking further information. On the other hand, my pragmatics module 
can be said, loosely speaking, to try to find a correct interpretation for an ut­
terance. It has (speaking less loosely) the function of assigning interpretations 
to utterances: its goal on receiving input relating to an utterance is to arrive at 
the correct interpretation, or one that is near enough to correct for current 
purposes. It is plausible that the module obeys certain regulatory principles 
which can be seen as directing deductive steps and heuristic processes to that 
end. One principle that would seem to be essential, if utterance interpretation 
is inferential at all, is that inferential steps taken are generally value- 
preserving.
My proposal is that a goal-directed sequence of steps will count as reason­
ing, even if the steps do not entirely mirror a logical deduction, just as long as 
the steps are directed towards being value-preserving. There may be many 
central modules and procedures which meet this requirement. In chapter 4, 1 
return to consideration of utterance interpretation along exactly these lines.
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Not all modules or mental procedures with functions perform reasoning, 
though, since they do not all perform inference. The input to some, particu­
larly modules for perception, is not in a suitable form for inference. Those that 
do perform inference, however, can be seen as performing reasoning -  in the 
sense of inference that involves, at its core, transitions that aim at being value- 
preserving, in pursuit of a goal. I say more later in this chapter and in chapter 
4 about the distinction between real inference, performed by central (concep­
tual) processes, and pseudo-inference, performed by peripheral (non-concep- 
tual, often perceptual) processes. If this distinction, and the notion of func­
tions of some sub-personal cognitive components, can both be sustained, as I 
think they can, then Grices view of reasoning as goal-directed inference will 
accommodate the utterance interpretation module.
There are some caveats that need to be mentioned. One is that this way of 
defining reasoning allows us to include inferences accomplished largely by 
heuristics, but it will only work for some transitions involving heuristics. It 
will not work, for example, for conscious use of heuristics that are known to 
the user to be so inaccurate that they could not be intended to be value-pre­
serving.63 That is as it should be, I think. Making judgements by deliberate use 
of a rule of thumb that one knows full well consistently fails should not count 
as reasoning.
On the other hand, heuristics that are accurate within a domain will fit the 
revised definition. One can certainly rationally intend to use such a heuristic 
to reach a canonically correct (i.e. value-preserving) answer within a domain 
to which it is well-fitted, since within that domain, the heuristic generally is 
value-preserving. Similarly, such a heuristic can be said to be serving the fun­
ction of a module or process within that domain.
A second caveat is that I have written as though intentional behaviour and 
goal-directed behaviour can play a similar role in a definition of reasoning, ex­
cept that intentions are plausibly only attributable to people, whereas mental 
modules or processes can have functions that direct them towards goals. 
There is another difference, however. Some intentional behaviour is not direc­
63. Conversely, manoeuvres of this kind may not be needed where procedures use shortcuts 
that are in fact value-preserving or algorithmic. I look at some examples of algorithmic 
shortcuts in chapter 3.
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ted towards any goal beyond itself. Things that one might intend -  or do in­
tentionally -  with no goal beyond doing them include whistling in the kitchen 
and drinking a can of paint (the former example is from Mele (2001, p. 28), the 
latter is Davidson’s (1963)). I do not consider this question here.
2.2 .6 THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, it is usual in philosophy to make 
a distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, where “theoretical 
rationality is concerned with what to believe ...[whereas] practical rationality 
is concerned with what it is rational to do or to intend or desire to do.” (Mele 
& Rawling, 2004a, p. 3) The former is the rationality exhibited (or not) by be­
liefs or by the process of arriving at a belief, or by a person insofar as his be­
liefs are rational. The latter is the rationality applicable to actions or the 
intentions to perform actions, or to the process involved in arriving at inten­
tions, or, again, to a person whose intended actions are rational. Practical 
reasoning ability is the ability to respond to practical reasons, that is, reasons 
to do or to intend to do something. These are generally thought to be supplied 
by beliefs and desires or plans. If I have a fixed plan to improve the appear­
ance of my neighbourhood and I believe that mowing the lawn will help bring 
that about, then I have a reason to mow the lawn. Theoretical reasoning abil­
ity, on the other hand, is the ability to deal with theoretical reasons, that is, 
reasons to believe something, and these reasons are to do with the support for 
a proposition -  whether it is true or evidenced -  as discussed above. The dis­
tinction is generally clear, although perhaps not in some special cases which I 
do not discuss here.64
Although it is traditional to divide rationality into practical and theoretic­
al, finer subdivisions are certainly possible. Cohen, for example, identifies nine 
types of rationality, including deductive reasoning, mathematical reasoning, 
semantic reasoning, inductive reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, reasoning
64. One that Harman raises is that one can have practical reasons for beliefs; so practical reas­
oning could lead to the possession of certain beliefs (Harman, 2004). If God punishes non­
believers then one has a practical reason to believe in God, for example. This kind of com­
plication might be dealt with by noting that those reasons are not directly reasons for be­
liefs, but reasons to intend to do something: to form a certain belief.
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about the means required to bring something about, reasoning about the ends 
that action should serve, and Gricean reasoning about utterances (Cohen, 
1992). Deductive and non-demonstrative theoretical reasoning have been 
dealt with in previous sections. Mathematical reasoning can be brought with­
in the traditional picture as involving value-preserving transitions (Grice’s 
‘hands’ example above is of mathematical inference that is value-preserving in 
this way) but it is outside the scope of this thesis to expand on that claim or 
defend it. I comment briefly on the relation between deductive reasoning and 
semantic (or conceptual) reasoning in the section below on mental logic. I 
consider probabilistic reasoning in some detail in the next chapter.
In this section I look briefly at the prospect of bringing practical rational­
ity under the traditional theory expounded above, then make some remarks 
about the reasoning involved in making (rather than interpreting) utterances.
As mentioned above, Grice proposed that practical reasoning, like theor­
etical reasoning, is value-preserving; here the value preserved is practical 
value or ‘goodness’ (Grice, 2001, pp. 87-88). For Grice, the common factor 
between the values preserved by reasoning is satisfactoriness, which really 
amounts to rational acceptability. Theoretical rationality preserves truth: thus 
if it is rationally acceptable to believe some premises then it is rationally ac­
ceptable to believe a conclusion validly derived from them. Similarly for prac­
tical reasoning, which Grice wanted to treat as preserving practical value: if 
there are things it is rationally acceptable to intend or to do, then practical 
reasoning from them should lead only to other intentions or actions that are 
rationally acceptable.
For Grice, this was connected with a theory of equivocality of the modal 
terms, words like ‘ought’, ‘must’, ‘may’ and ‘should’ as in example 6 . Grice 
thought that the two senses of such expressions derive from a common core 
meaning.
(6 ) John should be here by now.
There is an alethic sense of the sentence, meaning something like: on the basis 
of the evidence available, one can infer with probability that John is here by 
now. This sense is analysed in (7).
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(7) Acc + I- + John be here by now
There is also a practical sense, meaning something like: it is rationally re­
quired -  according to some rule or standard -  that John is here by now. This 
sense is decomposed as in (8)65:
(8) Acc + ! + John be here by now
The assertion sign and the exclamation mark stand for ‘moods’ (or ‘modes’ -  
Grice altered his terminology when informed that his use of the word ‘mood’ 
clashed with the standard use in linguistics). The formula in (7) can be read as 
“It is rationally acceptable that it is true that John be here by now”. The for­
mula in (8) can be read as “It is rationally acceptable that let it be that John be 
here by now”. I do not know whether the Equivocality Thesis is correct or 
whether an account of practical reasoning in terms of value-preserving trans­
itions is viable.
In the remainder of this thesis I largely put aside issues concerning prac­
tical rationality. One exception is the discussion of decision theory's concep­
tion of rationality as applied to preferences (in chapter 3). I include this be­
cause decision theory is the key example of a theory where rationality is 
reduced to global consistency, and because standard game theory, founded in 
the decision-theoretic axioms, has been used to model the theoretical reason­
ing involved in utterance interpretation (Parikh, 1991; Parikh, 2001; Benz, 
Jager, & van Rooij, 2006). (I have raised doubts about the tenability of the 
model in Allott, 2006.)
On the face of it, a theorist concerned with utterance interpretation needs 
to consider both theoretical and practical rationality. Utterance interpretation 
involves forming beliefs about speaker's meaning on the basis of features of 
the utterance that warrant such belief, and making an utterance involves hav­
ing a particular kind of intention. One way of seeing this would be that inter­
65. There has been considerable work on casting practical statements in terms of optatives, 
sentences of the form: Let it be that p, including Hare, 1952; Kenny, 1963; Goldman, 1970 as 
well as Grice, 2001.
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preting utterances involves theoretical reasoning while making utterances 
requires practical reasoning.
However, the important part of the process of utterance formation for 
pragmatic theory to explain is not how the basic intention to convey some 
particular meaning is formed66, but how the intention arises to do so by cer­
tain means: using a certain form of words, for example. The part of utterance 
production that is most amenable to theoretical description, I suggest, will be 
the part that takes for granted personal preferences and a rough characterisa­
tion of the intended meaning and explains how the speaker comes up with a 
particular utterance (which she thinks will convey the desired meaning). This 
is a rather specific kind of reasoning about means, and it comes down to reas­
oning about what conclusions a hearer will reach, as I explain in chapter 4.
This completes my survey of what I have called a traditional theory of ra­
tionality. In the remainder of the chapter I look at efforts to investigate ration­
ality in cognitive science in mentally realistic terms. In the next section I look 
at mental logic, the theory that there are rules of reasoning parallel to the syn­
tactic rules of logic, along with a rival, mental model theory.
2.3 MENTAL LOGIC AND MENTAL MODELS
2 .3 .1  INTRODUCTION
Mental logic theories propose that deductive reasoning is carried out by the 
operation of psychological rules that are isomorphic to laws of derivation 
(syntactic rules) in logic (some key works are Braine, 1978; Braine, Reiser, & 
Rumain, 1984; Braine & O'Brien, 1998; Rips, 1983; Rips, 1994; Rips, 1997). This 
programme67 can be seen as a way of fleshing out the view that I have been 
presenting, that reasoning is performed by value-preserving rules. Mental lo­
gic extends this idea with a realistic view of mental representation and pro­
cessing. The assumption is made that representation and processing are
6 6 .1 assume that this question lies outside of pragmatic theory, and perhaps outside of science 
in general (see chapter 4).
67. Braine and O’Brien’s and Rip’s theories differ but share core commitments. They can be 
seen as two ways to pursue the same research programme, in Lakatos’ sense of the term 
(Lakatos, 1970).
separate aspects of the mechanics of cognition. Reasoning is then a transition 
or series of transitions between mental representations in working memory, 
where the mental representations are, like sentences in natural language or 
formulae in propositional or predicate calculus, sets with hierarchical struc­
ture. The transitions that are possible are those which correspond to certain 
syntactic rules of logic. Rips summarises thus:
I assume that when people confront a problem that calls for deduction 
they attempt to solve it by generating in working memory a set of sen­
tences linking the premises or givens of the problem to the conclusion or 
solution. Each link in this network embodies an inference rule ... , which 
the individual recognizes as intuitively sound. (Rips, 1994, p. 104)
A further assumption is made that processing is costly. An inference that in­
volves several inferential steps will be more costly, i.e. more effortful and diffi­
cult, than one with fewer steps. If we postulate a set of basic rules, then we 
can make predictions about the relative difficulty of inferences. Conversely, if 
it is found experimentally that a certain inference is relatively difficult, then 
one can infer that that inference requires several steps. An inference of this 
form is not a basic inference accomplished in one step by using one rule from 
the set of mental inference rules (or ‘mental logic’).
This picture of reasoning should seem familiar. It is essentially the tradi­
tional picture that has been outlined and advocated above, although it does 
not explicitly take account of the refinements discussed above that a) reason­
ing may involve more than inferential transitions, and that b) reasoning may 
on occasions be accomplished by shortcuts that bypass inferential transitions. 
In my view, mental logic theory describes the core of reasoning ability. I dis­
cuss in chapter 3 the possibility that sound mental rules for deduction and 
heuristics can coexist.
The major rival to the mental logic programme is the theory of mental 
models. According to this theory, the mechanism behind reasoning is the con­
struction of mental models of states of affairs, which yield conclusions on 
examination (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1999; Johnson-Laird, 
Girotto, & Legrenzi, 2003).
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The input, typically a sentence or sentences, is parsed into a form suitable 
for the construction of mental models. Then mental models are generated by 
the listing of states of affairs compatible with the proposition expressed by the 
sentence or sentences. This stage is like the generation of truth-tables for for­
mulae in propositional logic, but with the difference that cases that are false 
are not explicitly represented in the basic models.
For example, suppose that the input is the sentence, “The book is on the 
table or the pen is on the floor” and that is followed by the sentence “The pen 
is not on the floor”. The representation for the first sentence is given in table 2:




(book on_table) (pen on_floor)
Adding the information given by the second sentence rules out the models on 
the second and third lines of the table, leaving only the model in the first line. 
Thus the state of affairs described by the first model is selected as a 
conclusion.
Not all of the models mandated by an input need be built. Mental model 
theorists suggest that only one model is built in spontaneous, implicit infer­
ence, and agents do not search for alternatives unless evidence is encountered 
for them (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 127; see also Johnson-Laird, 2004, p. 188).
In some cases, reasoning may continue beyond the first conclusion 
reached. After a first mental model is constructed and a possible conclusion is 
read off the model, the conclusion can be tested. To do this, more mental 
models can be generated and examined. If none contradict the conclusion 
then it is kept; if one or more are in conflict with it, then another conclusion, 
compatible with all the models, is sought.
Both schools of thought claim that their theory has been well-tested and 
found to be supported, posing an interesting, if familiar, problem for philo­
sophers of science. (See Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993 (ch. 2) for discussion
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of the evidence and (ch. 3) the theoretical debate). O ’Brien summarises the 
evidence for mental logic:
The theory [Braine and O’Brien’s version of mental logic] has predicted, 
successfully, which logical-reasoning judgments people make easily and 
which they find difficult, which inferences are made effortlessly during 
text comprehension, and which judgments differ from what should be ex­
pected if people were using standard logic instead of mental logic. 
(O'Brien, 2004, p. 205)
Equally, Johnson-Laird  believes th a t th e  evidence is th a t th e  inn ate  d eductive  
co m p etence o f  ‘naive reasoners’ is based on m e n ta l m odels (Johnson-Laird , 
1999, P -130). The c la im  here too is th a t the th e o ry ’s p red ic tion s ab o ut the re l­
ative d ifficu lty  o f  inferences have been  co rrob o rated . A  fu rth e r c la im  is th a t 
th ere  is evidence th a t people m ake certa in  unsound inferences w h ich  m e n ta l 
m o d e l th e o ry  pred icts , b u t w h ich  m en ta l logic does n o t. These inferences are  
in te res ting  fo r th is thesis because th ey  show  th a t the procedure set o u t in  
m e n ta l m o d e l th eo ry  is actually  a h euristic , in  the strong sense th at it  so m e­
tim es produces false conclusions fro m  tru e  prem ises. ( I  discuss this la te r in  
th is  section.)
The debate betw een  the tw o  theories is ab o ut w h e th e r the m en ta l p ro ­
cessing involved  in  deductive reasoning is s im ila r to  syntactic proofs in  clas­
sical log ic o r to  sem antic proofs. These positions have in  co m m on  the p ostu la ­
t io n  o f  “universal princip les fo r deductive  com petence” (Evans, E llis, &  
N ew stead , 1996, p. 1088) based on p roperties o f  classical logic. That is, the lo ­
gical fo rm  o f the in p u t propositions and o f  the m enta l representations is w h a t  
plays th e  cruc ia l ro le  in  d e te rm in in g  w h at conclusions are reached. O th e r  th e ­
ories o f  reasoning c la im  th a t the co nten t o f prem ises plays a ro le in  d e te rm in ­
ing  w h a t conclusions are d raw n. These theories, som e o f  w h ich  I  lo o k  at in  
m o re  d e ta il in  the next chapter, inc lude the heuristics and biases p ro g ram m e, 
w h ic h  postulates sim ple heuristics fo r d ed uctio n  w h ich  m ay be sensitive to  
th e  fo rm  o r co n ten t o f prem ises and conclusions; and O aksfo rd  and C h a te r ’s 
w o rk  on  p robabilis tic  o ptim isation , agnostic about the u nd erly in g  m e n ta l re p ­
resentations o r processes. O th e r possibilities w h ich  have been  suggested in ­
c lude the th e o ry  th a t conclusions are selected p u re ly  o n  th e  basis o f p laus ib il­
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ity, with no regard to the support provided to them by the premises; and 
deduction carried out according to a mixed bag of strategies (Schaeken, De 
Vooght, Vandierendonck, & D'Ydewalle, 2000).
It is worth mentioning that some logicians claim that the debate between 
advocates of mental models and mental logic has been carried out at the 
wrong level of abstraction. Stenning and Monaghan (2004) argue that mental 
models, mental logics and certain other systems for representing and manipu­
lating propositions are all mutually translatable. Comparing the predictions 
for syllogistic reasoning of mental logic, mental models and a method of infer­
ence using Euler circles, they say that, “for every stage in using the representa­
tions in one method there is a comparable stage in each of the other methods.” 
(Stenning & Monaghan, 2004, pp. 153-154) Agreeing with this, however, I do 
not agree with the conclusion they draw from it, that “This means that, in 
terms of the externally observed behaviour of people mentally solving syllo­
gisms, it is impossible to say which method they are using.” (Stenning & 
Monaghan, 2004, p. 154)
Stenning and Monaghan distinguish between the model theory level, at 
which the representations of mental logic, mental models and other systems 
are mutually translatable; a proof theory level; and the level of a theorem 
prover. I agree with this conceptual taxonomy: the vocabulary and syntax of a 
representation system are distinct from the rules that say what transitions 
between representations are allowed (the ‘proof theory’) and both are distinct 
from what strategies are used to determine which transitions to apply in 
which order in order to derive conclusions (the ‘theorem prover’). Mental lo­
gic theory and mental model theory involve not just wellformedness rules for 
mental representations and lists of allowed transformations between them, 
but also strategies for forming the initial mental representations and for ap­
plying the translations. W hat prevents the theories from being notational var­
iants is that they postulate different strategies, and that different transitions 
are claimed to be basic. One important sign of this divergence is the property 
of mental model theory mentioned above that it produces certain unsound 
inferences.
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2 .3 .2  SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS
As Braine has said (1978), mental logic theory draws on Gentzen’s work in lo­
gic, which shifted the emphasis in logic from axioms to inference schemas, 
that is, from logic as a system built on a collection of foundational proposi­
tions, to a system which preserves truth. Gentzen was concerned that the in­
ference schemas be psychologically real, reflecting “as accurately as possible 
the actual logical reasoning involved in mathematical proofs” (Gentzen, 1964, 
p. 291). According to Braine, the significance of Gentzen’s work for the psy­
chology of reasoning was not realised until decades later and was then the 
seed for mental logic:
Gentzen's work went essentially unnoticed in psychological studies on 
reasoning until quite recently when a number of psychologists [Braine 
cites Johnson-Laird, 1975; Osherson, 1975b; Osherson, 1975a] have inde­
pendently come upon it in the course of developing the essentially similar 
concept that proofs and chains of reasoning by human beings consist in 
the serial application of inference rules, and thus that a logical model for 
deduction should consist of a set of inference rule schemata (Braine, 1978, 
P- 3).
Both mental logic and mental model theory are concerned to show how in 
reasoning local consistency can be preserved while conclusions are generated. 
The solution that they give is that propositions are derived from other propos­
itions in ways that resemble the rules of classical logic, either -  in the case of 
mental logic -  the syntactic rules of natural deduction, or, -  for mental model 
theory -  the semantic rules of truth-table proofs.
There are various dimensions on which such systems can vary. Two of the 
important ones are soundness and completeness. The transitions allowed by a 
system can be sound -  truth-preserving -  or merely heuristic. A system can 
be complete in that all logical entailments of a set of premises are deducible in 
the system, or incomplete, so that some logical entailments are not derivable 
using the rules available.
Mental logic is truth-preserving ex hypothesi since all transitions are gov­
erned by valid rules of inference. A mixed system is possible, however, with 
the addition to a mental logic of rules that are not truth-preserving. These
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heuristic rules might be domain-specific and sensitive to the content of the 
mental representations they operate on.
Mental models (to Johnson-Laird’s surprise (1997a, p. 431)) sometimes 
generate false conclusions from true premises. (Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1996; 
Johnson-Laird, 1997b; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 2000; 
Johnson-Laird, 2004, pp. 179-181, 191. See also discussion in Rips, 1997, pp- 
416-417 and the reply, Johnson-Laird, 1997a.) The examples that have been 
discussed in the literature involve disjunctions and conditionals, where the 
non-representation of what is false leads to models from which false conclu­
sions can be drawn.
(9) There is a pen or a book on the table, or else a book and a cup on the table. 
There is a book and a cup on the table.
Is it possible that both assertions could be true at the same time? (this 
example and discussion are adapted from Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, & 
Legrenzi, 2000)
The mental models of the first premise, the exclusive disjunction, are as 
follows:





T he second assertion has one m enta l m odel, w h ich  is the same as th e  last lin e  
above. Therefore m enta l m o del th eo ry  predicts th a t p artic ip an ts  should  an ­
sw er th a t the tw o  assertions are com patib le . The m istake is m ade at the stage 
o f  fo rm a tio n  o f m en ta l m odels fo r the first assertion. The m odels fo rm e d  do  
n o t co ntain  as m uch  in fo rm a tio n  as the propositions th ey  represent.
To see th a t the tw o  assertions are incom patib le , assume th a t th e  first 
clause o f  the first prem ise is tru e . In  th a t case the second clause is false (tak in g
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‘or else’ as an exclusive disjunction), so the second assertion, which is identical 
to the second clause of the first assertion, is false. Now suppose instead that 
the first clause of the first premise is false. In that case, there is neither a pen 
nor a book on the table, so the second assertion is false. So whether the first 
clause of the first assertion is true or false, the second assertion must be false: 
the two assertions must be incompatible, therefore.
Mental model theory also predicts illusory inferences with some disjunc­
tions (inclusive or exclusive) containing embedded conditionals, as in the fol­
lowing example (based on an example in Johnson-Laird, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 
2003):
(10) If there is a pen on the table then there is a book on the table, or if there isn’t 
a pen on the table then there is a book on the table.
There is a pen on the table.
What, if anything, follows?
The prediction is that participants will say that it follows that there is a book 
on the table. An informal version of the procedure for working out what fol­
lows from these assertions according to mental model theory is as follows: the 
first assertion is interpreted as meaning that there are two types of situation. 
These are situations in which there is a pen on the table and situations in 
which there is not a pen on the table, and in both these types of situations 
there is a book on the table. The second assertion then tells the reasoner that 
the actual situation is the first one. In this situation the book is on the table, so 
it is concluded that it follows from the two assertions that the book is on the 
table. This conclusion does not follow, however, because the first assertion is a 
disjunction, so that from its truth one cannot infer the truth of either disjunct. 
Thus it is not necessarily true that if there is a pen on the table then there is a 
book on the table, so the situation where there is a pen on the table and no 
book on the table is consistent with the two assertions. It cannot, therefore 
follow from the assertions that there is a book on the table.
I think that this example can also be dealt with in terms of utterance inter­
pretation followed by the operation of a mental logic. The utterance of the
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first sentence conveys something like There is a book on the table whether or 
not there is a pen on the table -  which is truth-conditionally equivalent to Q: 
There is a book on the table -  rather than the tautology that the sentence lit­
erally expresses, (P — Q) V (->P — Q). Tautologies are not informative, so as­
suming that the speaker aims to convey something relevant, uttering a sen­
tence that is tautological in form must be presumed to be intended to convey 
something other than the tautology itself. In this particular case, another way 
of seeing the conveyed meaning is that the ‘or' is narrowed to ‘and’: 
( P - Q ) & ( - . P - Q )  = Q.
Examples of this sort show that the procedures proposed by mental model 
theory are unsound, that is, merely heuristic. In general terms, this unsound­
ness results from the loss or non-representation of certain information about 
which possibilities exclude which others when the mental models are formed.
Mental models are also lossy68 when representing propositions which in­
volve quantification, and more obviously so. The model constructed from the 
representation/parsing of a sentence with quantificational elements will have 
specific instantiations of possible configurations of entities rather than vari­
ables. For example, according to the theory, “all xs are equal to the sum of 
some y  and some z is first parsed to give (All x)(some y)(some z)(x = y + z). A 
model is then constructed by iterative choice of arbitrary values for the vari­
ables, constrained so that they fit the formula, for example [8 6](i 6 4 2X7 7 2 
2 44 ) .  (This example is from O'Brien, 2004, p. 226). The model is a particular 
instantiation of the formula, and does not capture its full meaning, so the for­
mula could not be reconstructed from the model. The square brackets around 
8 and 6 do not symbolize universality; and the model does not include the in­
formation that it is only one among infinitely many that could be created from 
the formula.
Although the reasoning procedure postulated in mental model theory can 
lead to invalid conclusions, it often leads to valid conclusions, at least when all 
the possibilities are represented as mental models. Thus mental models with 
exhaustive generation and search are close to algorithmic. Mental models 
with a stopping rule that terminates generation of mental models early would
6 8 . The term lossy is from computing. A lossy process (e.g. a compression algorithm) is one 
that loses information irretrievably. The opposite is ‘lossless’.
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be a less accurate b u t m o re  fru g al heuristic . A t  th e  m o st ex trem e, the genera­
tio n  o f on ly  one m o d el, as proposed by Johnson-Laird  fo r spontaneous d ed uc­
tion , is a sim ple, fast, frugal, and ra th er inaccurate h eu ris tic .
Conversely, although the rules of a mental logic are sound, the theory can 
also account for erroneous conclusions, so to refute the theory it is not 
enough to show that people do not always reason correctly. It is puzzling then 
that “claims against the existence of a mental logic typically consist merely of 
showing that judgements of research participants have failed to correspond to 
some feature or other of a standard logic” (O'Brien, 2004, p. 207)
There are several reasons w h y  th is k in d  o f  evidence is a t best inconclusive. 
First, m enta l log ic m ig h t d iffe r fro m  standard classical log ic , so th a t som e in ­
ferences th a t are unsound in  classical logic are sound in  m e n ta l log ic. I  do  n o t 
pursue this line. Secondly, reasoners m ay m ake p erfo rm an ce  errors due to ca­
pacity lim ita tio n s  o f  th e  system, interference fro m  o th e r m e n ta l systems, o r  
d isru p tio n  by n o n -m e n ta l causes like  blow s to  the head. T here  are o th e r pos­
sible sources o f  erro r, som e o f  w h ich  w ere  discussed by H e n le  and  adopted  by  
Braine in  his earliest w o rk  on m en ta l logic:
Henle argued that deductive ‘error' is due -  not to illogicality -  but to 
premises being omitted or interpreted in an unintended way, to the intro­
duction of outside knowledge as an additional premise, or to a failure to 
accept the logical task. Thus, logical principles govern the movement 
from one step to another in an argument, but the ‘effective’ premises (the 
ones actually used by the subject) may not be the ones that the problem- 
setter intended (Braine, 1978, p. 2).
I  have already expla ined  in  th is chapter how  the o p era tio n  o f  d ed uc tive  ru les  
can lead to  contextual conclusions w h ich  are n o t en ta iled  by the presented  in ­
fo rm a tio n  w hen  extra  prem ises are in troduced  by th e  reasoner. In  d ed uc tive  
reasoning experim ents , the instructions typ ica lly  specify th a t w h a t is o f in ­
terest is w h a t log ically  va lid  conclusions can be d ra w n  fro m  the prem ises  
provided , so it  is requ ired  th a t one keep to w h a t fo llow s fro m  the prem ises. In  
everyday reasoning, reasoners use all available in fo rm a tio n , and  the h ab it is 
probably  hard  to  break, so one w ou ld  expect p a rtic ip an ts  in  reasoning  e x p e ri­
m ents to  freq u en tly  reach conclusions th at are n o t en ta iled  by the prem ises
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given. There is evidence that “more reflective and engaged reasoners will be 
more likely to affirm the axioms that define normative reasoning” (Stanovich 
& West, 1998, p. 293) and to obtain normative responses on reasoning prob­
lems. One can distinguish between natural reasoning using the reasoner’s full 
range of knowledge, and analytic reasoning which uses only the special collec­
tion of attitudes, procedures and, perhaps, rules, that are applied to reasoning 
problems but not to everyday problems. (This terminology for the distinction 
comes from Braine, 1990).69
There is a second difference between the two modes of reasoning. Much 
depends on how the task is understood, in two distinct ways. The first consid­
eration is how the information given is understood and mentally represented. 
In ‘analytic’ reasoning the premises must be interpreted as expressing the 
minimum possible commitment, so that, for example a sentence of the form 
‘if p, q’ must be understood as a conditional, rather than a biconditional. In 
certain contexts, however, contextual factors may make it highly likely that the 
interpretation reached is biconditional. A more complex case is example (10) 
above. I have suggested that the ‘illusory inference' generated in processing 
example (10) is due to pragmatic enrichment followed by the operation of de­
ductive rules. This kind of consideration means that normative performance 
on reasoning tasks often depends on the ability to disregard implicatures or 
other pragmatically derived material that would normally be intended. A 
second interpretive factor is that the way the task is explained and set out will 
suggest how it should be attempted (which might include taking a non-de- 
ductive approach). I comment further in the next chapter on the way that 
pragmatic factors affect the tasks that participants attempt in reasoning 
experiments.
We have seen that systems that are logically sound, as well as systems that 
are logically unsound, are compatible with the observation that people often 
reach conclusions unsupported by the premises presented. Another difference 
between systems for inference is whether they are complete (in the logical 
sense). An incomplete system cannot itself generate all logical entailments of a
69. Braine originally (1978) referred to these two modes as practical and formal reasoning. This 
use of the term ‘practical’ is not the one usual in philosophy, for reasoning about what is to 
be done (see section 2.2.6 above).
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set of premises. Here mental logics vary. Some of the inference rules that 
would have to be included for completeness are implausible as psychologically 
basic rules. For example, most people are reluctant to endorse as valid an in­
ference from a proposition p  to a disjunction of that proposition with an arbit­
rary second proposition, p  V q (Rips, 1983; see also discussion of this point in 
Sperber & Wilson, 1986, pp. 99-100). The inference is valid but apparently not 
psychologically basic.
Rips’ p s y c o p  (Psychology of Proof) system is incomplete (Rips, 1997, pp. 
418-419). It could be made complete by the addition of the inference schema 
in (11). Rips has said that this schema should not be considered part of the de­
ductive system because it is not intuitively obvious (Rips, 1994; see also the 
discussion in Rips, 1997; Johnson-Laird, 1997b; Johnson-Laird, 1997a).
(11) NOT (IF P THEN Q)
P AND NOT Q
A second argument against the inclusion of a complete set of rules has been 
given by Sperber and Wilson (1986). Any complete set of rules includes some 
introduction rules, such as and-introduction (&I) and or-introduction (VI) 
(although not necessarily these particular rules). If we assume that the rules of 
a deductive system apply automatically to input of the correct form then in­
troduction rules will lead to open-ended generation of trivial inferences70 (on 
this point see also Johnson-Laird, 1997b, p. 392), rapidly overwhelming the 
computational resources of the deductive system, as in (12)71:
(12) a. P I-*, P & P (-*, P & P & P hw ... 
b. P hVI P V Q hVI P V Q V R H VI...
Sperber and Wilson make the bold suggestion that the deductive system for 
spontaneous inference includes a mental logic with no introduction rules, 
where ‘introduction rule’ is defined as “a rule whose output contains every
70. There may be some other tacit assumptions involved, as Uchida (2007) argues.
71. This is a formal version of Harman’s concern about trivial inferences, mentioned above.
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concept contained  in  its in p u t assum ption(s), and  at least one fu rth e r  
concept.” (Sperber &  W ilso n , 1986, p. 9 6 ) T h e n  the co m p u ta tio n a l explosion  
cannot occur.
Three other ways of dealing with this difficulty have been proposed. John­
son-Laird (1975) and Braine and O'Brien (O'Brien, 2004, p. 2ioff) suggest sys­
tems in which some rules can only operate if they feed core rules, that is, if 
their output would be in the correct form for the core rules to operate on. In 
Braine and O’Briens system, the core rules, which operate automatically on 
any representations in working memory with the right form, include modus 
ponens, double-negation elimination and inference rules that eliminate dis­
junctions and conditionals; the feeder rules for propositional logic are and-in- 
troduction and and-elimination.72 In Rips’s p s y c o p  system, there are back­
ward inference rules in addition to forward inference rules. The problematic 
inference rules are confined to backwards inference chains. Both of these pro­
posals solve the problem without banning and-introduction, but at the cost of 
needing a substantive extra assumption in the theory, dividing inference rules 
into two or more classes, only one of which applies automatically to the con­
tents of working memory. Braine earlier (1978) adopted a set of inference 
schemas (based on Gentzen’s schemas) without and-introduction or or-intro- 
duction, but with other schemas that replicate their effects.
Barwise (1993) suggested that theories of reasoning must be logically com­
plete. In a similar vein, Uchida (2007) argues that the inference system for 
pragmatics should be ‘fully deductive’, and that consistency requires complete­
ness as well as soundness. Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory is complete. 
Braine’s original system is complete (1978, pp. 1 6 -1 8 ) , as is Braine and O’Bri­
en’s later system of mental logic (Braine, Reiser, & Rumain, 1984; Braine & 
O'Brien, 1998); Rips’ p s y c o p  system is nearly complete, as noted. Sperber and
72. The division is into 'core schemas' and 'principal feeder schemas'. (There are also 'incompat­
ibility schemas' and 'supposition schemas'.)
Both &1 and &E are principal feeder schemas. These "are restricted so that they are ap­
plied only when their output provides for the application of a core schema." (p. 216)
In contrast, core schemas are "applied most freely by the reasoning program. [They are 
applied] so long as the propositions required for their application are conjointly considered 
in working memory."(ibid.)
The core schemas include a) DN elimination, b) if px or p2 or ... pn then q; pi therefore q, 
c) px or p2 or ... pn, not p*, therefore pi or p2 or p(i.i) or p(i+i)... pn, d) MPP and others.
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Wilson’s deductive rules for spontaneous inference are less complete, in the 
intuitive sense that there are more entailments that the system cannot derive.
Two further considerations play a role in the theorist’s decision to postu­
late a complete or incomplete system. One is whether the system is seen as 
defining the semantics of the logical connectives. A second consideration is 
whether the system is intended to account for all reasoning, or some limited 
subset of reasoning.
It is not necessary to take either mental logic or mental models as provid­
ing a kind of procedural semantics for logical operators in natural language, 
pace O’Briens “the basic assumption of mental logic theory [is] that the 
meaning of a logic term is provided by its inference procedures” (O'Brien, 
2004, p. 231). There is a clear conceptual distinction between the syntax of a 
logical language and an inventory of psychologically real rules that are logical 
in the sense that they preserve truth. All that is necessary for soundness is 
that each rule or schema in the mental logic is consistent with the semantics 
of the logical operators involved. The operators’ semantics can be defined sep­
arately. There are some deep philosophical issues involved which I do not at­
tempt to cover fully here73, but it is worth saying that assuming that the se­
mantics of logical operators is defined by the role they play in logical inference 
comes uncomfortably close to the psychologism that Frege opposed.
A further dimension of variation among theories of reasoning is the do­
main that they attempt to cover. Is the theory an attempt at an account of all 
kinds of reasoning, or at least, all types of theoretical reasoning? Or is the do­
main restricted to conscious effortful reasoning, or again to reasoning that is 
purely deductive? The area that interests me primarily, like Sperber and 
Wilson, is the spontaneous processing of information according to deductive 
rules, including abductive inference, since this is the domain of most u tter­
ance interpretation.
I agree with Braine that what is of primary interest is untrained reasoning, 
or at least the largely innate capacity for reasoning that all developmentally 
normal adults share. This clearly includes some facility to draw inferences that 
depend on logical connectives: “it is obvious that logically untrained subjects
73. See Horsey, 2006, for thorough discussion of the relation between inferential and external­
ist accounts of the semantics of the connectives.
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are able to reason with the English connectives, and it is this competence that 
a natural logic must capture.” (Braine, 1978, p. 4)-
The domain of reasoning in general (even restricted to theoretical rather 
than practical reasoning) seems too large and varied to be encapsulated in one 
set of rules, particularly given that there is good evidence that strategies can 
be learned and consciously applied. One can change how one reasons con­
sciously by some combination of the following factors: applying learned 
strategies and shortcuts; effort of will; and using pencil and paper rather than 
doing it all in the head. As one would expect, research in psychology of reas­
oning shows that some of these factors change the results of reasoning. Exper­
iments with protocols that allow participants to use pencil and paper or to re­
port on their reasoning at the time may probe learned reasoning rules and 
strategies more than they probe the workings of natural deductive abilities. I 
think therefore that it is particularly problematic to place the emphasis on the 
investigation of conscious, effortful reasoning (which some theorists see as 
the only type of reasoning: see chapter 4 for Recanati’s espousal of this view 
and its application to pragmatics).
2.3.3 c o n c l u s io n s
Like Sperber and Wilson (1986) and O’Brien (2004), I tentatively adopt a 
mixed picture with a basic reliance on rules for reasoning isomorphic to the 
syntactic rules of logic, but with roles for heuristics that shortcut deductive 
rules, heuristics that direct reasoning, meaning postulates, and perhaps m ent­
al models. I do not think that any of the arguments that a mental logic must 
be complete are convincing, and I tentatively adopt Sperber and Wilson’s as­
sumption that introduction rules are not used in spontaneous inference. I as­
sume that as well as rules of logical entailment, there are also meaning 
postulates: inference rules that allow the derivation of valid inferences based 
on conceptual content, such as the inference from M r Teeny is a monkey to 
M r Teeny is an animal. Indeed there is no reason not to see psychological de­
ductive inference rules such as psychological modus ponens, and-elimination 
and so on as concept-based inference rules dependent on the logical information
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associated with the concepts of logical operators74. (On the parallel between lo­
gical and conceptual entailment see Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 84.)
I also assume that it is possible to adopt other strategies, including mental 
models, through direction of attention or learning. As Rips says:
There is no doubt, for example, that people can learn devices like Euler 
circles or Venn diagrams and can use them to test syllogisms by searching 
for counterexamples. With practice, they can learn to manipulate these 
diagrams mentally, just as they can learn to do mental multiplication. 
(Rips, 1997, pp- 419-420)
Intuitively, mental models seem more likely to be used, perhaps as the basic 
mode of reasoning, in certain kinds of spatial problems. Empirical evidence 
for this thesis is mixed, however (Gilhooly, 2004, pp. 57-8, 66-71)75.
Mental models might also be used, even in the absence of training, to 
check consistency when the mental logic used on its own gives no direct an­
swer. In the absence of introduction rules, certain entailments will not be de- 
ducible. For example it will not be possible to deduce something of the form 
P & (Q  V -1Q) from something of the form P. Reasoners might nonetheless be 
able to work out that P & (Q V ->Q) is true given that P is true by attempting 
and failing to find a model compatible with P but incompatible with 
P & (Q V -1Q). O'Brien mentions some related uses for models:
The ability to imagine a model that provides a counterexample to a sup­
position or to a possible inference made on extralogical grounds, for ex­
ample, would be a valuable addition to one’s reasoning skills. So also 
would be a strategy for proving the undecidability of a conclusion, which 
seeks two plausible alternatives that both are consistent with the 
premises, but with one being consistent with the conclusion and the other 
not. (O'Brien, 2 0 0 4 .  p. 228)
74. This amounts to unification of the aspects of rationality which Cohen (1992) refers to as de­
ductive and semantical.
75- Note that evidence that indicates that spatial representations are imagistic is not necessarily 
evidence in favour of mental models, which, while not propositions, are not images either.
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These uses of mental models are procedural heuristics, rules of thumb that 
amount to discovery procedures. Similar rules of thumb might govern the use 
of deductive rules. One example is the procedure which Sperber and Wilson 
give for showing validity of an argument not derivable by deductive rules. To 
show that an argument is valid, it suffices to show that the premises are incon­
sistent with the negation of the conclusion. If the deductive device finds that 
there is an inconsistency between, for example, three propositions in working 
memory of the forms p, q and ->(p & q), then it has established that the pro­
positions of the forms p, q entail the one of the form p  & q (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986, p. 102).
In addition to heuristics that govern the use of deductive rules, I have sug­
gested that there are heuristics that take their place. Such heuristics are effect­
ively unsound inference rules which may be used to make inferences that, 
while unsound, are useful.
A theory that human reasoning competence includes mental logic is nat­
ural if one accepts that there is a logical format for mental representations, as 
O'Brien says (O'Brien, 2004, P- 206). I look at the case for a logical, symbolic 
representation format in the next section.
2.4 EXPLANATION AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION
2 .4 .I  REPRESENTATIONAL-COMPUTATIONAL THEORIES OF MIND
... if you admit that it’s a matter of fact that some agents are rational to
some degree, then you have to face the hard question of how they can be.
(Fodor, 1985b)
one true inference invariably suggests others (Conan Doyle, 1892a, p. 12)
In chapter 1, 1 endorsed the neo-Cartesian, Chomskian view of the mind/brain 
as a device that processes information from perception, generating mental 
representations. In perception these representations are of the object per­
ceived. In the linguistic component of utterance interpretation the mind gen­
erates representations of the phrase uttered. In the current chapter I have 
endorsed a view of rationality as reasoning ability, and reasoning ability as
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p rim a r ily  the ab ility  to  m ake tru th - o r w arran t-p res erv in g  transitions. I  have 
also loo ked  at th e  m e n ta l logic research p ro gram m e, w h ic h  takes the v iew  that 
reasoning involves the co nstruction  o f  chains o f  va lid  inferences as the basis 
fo r a psychologically and co m p u ta tio n a lly  realistic  account o f reasoning. In  
th is section I  focus on  the thesis th a t central co g n itio n  relies on m an ip u la tio n  
o f representations in  a s truc tured  sym bol system. T he d o m ain  o f  en q u iry  is 
broader th an  e ith e r deductive in ference o r spontaneous inference. H e re  the  
d o m ain  is cen tra l cog n ition  as a w hole, the area o f  th o u g h t b eh in d  ra tio n al be­
hav io ur and in te llig e n t action.
T here  are th ree  com ponents to  th e  hypothesis, all fa m ilia r  fro m  th e  dis­
cussion above on  m e n ta l logic. The first is th a t there are m e n ta l representa­
tions w ith  a p ro po s ition a l fo rm at, s tructured  so th a t th e  fo rm  o f each m enta l 
representation  reflects the logical s tructure o f  the p ro p o s itio n  it  expresses. 
Thus th e  representations have p red ica te /a rg u m en t s truc ture  and com p o un d  
struc ture  so th a t log ical operators can be app lied  to  constituents representing  
propositions and  perhaps to sub-propositiona l constituents, as w ell. A s O ’B r i­
en  says, the m e n ta l log ic p ro gram m e shares w ith  Fodor and  w ith  w o rk  in  a r t i­
fic ia l intelligence:
an ep istem ological assum ption th a t in  o rd er fo r a declarative m e m o ry  to  
exist, there m u st be a fo rm a t fo r the storage o f p ropositional in fo rm a tio n  
... This fo rm a t m u st be capable o f  representing  p ro perties  and the en tities  
th a t have these properties , and to  keep track o f w h ich  entities have w h ich
p roperties and  w h ich  properties go w ith  w h ich  en tities  In  o ther w ords,
the mind must have some basic logical predicate/argument structure. Fur­
ther, the mind should have some ways of representing alternatives among 
the properties and among the entities that have those properties, as well 
as conjunctions, suppositions, and negations both of properties and of 
entities ...(O'Brien, 2004, p. 206)
T he second co m p o nent o f  the idea is th a t in te lligence is due to  the m a n ip u la ­
tio n  o f  these m e n ta l representations according to th e ir  form al (o r syntactic,) 
p ro perties , ra th e r th an  th e ir sem antic ones. The first tw o  assum ptions are  
shared by m u ch  w o rk  in  psychology, artific ia l in te lligence and  co m p u ter sci­
ence, and are at th e  core o f  F o d o r’s R epresentational T h e o ry  o f M in d  (Fodor,
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1975) and Newell and Simon’s Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (Newell & 
Simon, 1976, p. n6ff; Simon, 1990, p. 3ff)76- The third component of the hypo­
thesis is that although the processes manipulate mental representations ac­
cording to their forms only, they can be such as to preserve the semantic value 
of the input representation. Fodors version of the thesis is stronger than this: 
for him, the transitions between mental representations must preserve se­
mantic value. There are two reasons for the weaker formulation that I have 
used. One is that much of cognition may be accomplished by heuristic short­
cuts, as previously mentioned. I amplify on this below. A second reason is 
suggested by the work of Newell and Simon. For Fodor, firmly in the proposi­
tional (or logical) camp, reasoning, or intelligent thought, is the tokening of a 
series of propositional mental representations where the transitions between 
representations preserve truth, just as in mental logic theory.77 Newell and Si­
mon, concerned with problem-solving in a more general sense, do not neces­
sarily require the symbol strings at each stage to have truth-values. One can 
see why by looking at the problems in computer science that they list as 
amenable to the Physical Symbol System approach:
... puzzles and games, operations research problems of scheduling and al­
locating resources, simple induction tasks..., chess..., systems that handle 
and understand natural language in a variety of ways, systems for inter­
preting visual scenes, systems for hand eye coordination, systems that 
design, systems that write computer programs, systems for speech 
understanding (Newell & Simon, 1976, p. 119).
Some of these problems are to do with perceptual rather than conceptual pro­
cessing; some are arguably conceptual in a weak sense, but non-propositional, 
such as natural language parsing and chess-playing.
Since the focus of this thesis is the inferential component of utterance un­
derstanding, and I maintain that the input and output of this process must be
76. Similar programmes have been given such names as the ‘symbolic systems hypothesis’ (by 
Rockwell), g o f a i  (Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence) (by Haugeland) and ‘High 
church computationalism' (by Dennett) (Rockwell, 2005)
77. Fodor intends his hypothesis to cover what I would regard as non-inferential operations 
such as generation and transformation of phrase markers for sentences. (Fodor, 1987, pp. 
144-145) I discuss his broad view of inference in chapter 5.
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a conceptual representation or logical form (even if not always fully proposi­
tional)78, it is possible to set aside non-conceptual processing. I will operate 
with a variant of Fodor’s stronger hypothesis, generalized as discussed above 
so that it is value that is preserved, in line with Grice’s suggestion that in prac­
tical and theoretical reasoning the aim is to preserve practical value and truth 
respectively (Grice, 2 0 0 1 , pp. 57-58), and Sperber and Wilsons point that ma­
nipulation of conceptual representations or logical forms should preserve 
warrant, in the same way that manipulation of propositions should preserve 
truth. Thus broadened, the hypothesis may be slightly narrower in its applica­
tion than some theorists would prefer. As an example, consider a definition 
given by Gilhooly: “‘reasoning’ involves explicit sequential thought processes 
that are effectively equivalent to the application of a sequence of rules of some 
formal system” (Gilhooly, 2 0 0 4 ,  pp. 5 1 -5 2 ) ,  where formal systems include “de­
ductive logic, mathematics, statistics, probability, decision theory... inductive 
and deontic logics” (Gilhooly, 2 0 0 4 ,  pp. 5 1 - 5 2 ) .  If my thesis were concerned 
with mathematical reasoning, then it might be better to broaden the hypo­
thesis in this way. But it is important to keep sight of the points that 1) the 
rules applied in any of these formal systems are syntactic rules, that is, rules 
which operate on representations purely by virtue of the form of the repres­
entations, and 2 ) the rules generally respect semantic entailment, so that if the 
input is good (rationally acceptable), then the output is good (rationally ac­
ceptable) too.
The first of the three assumptions I have listed motivates the second and 
third: “Given the assumption that there is a logical representation format, one 
would also expect there to be some logical inferential processes” (O'Brien, 
2004, p. 206) because intelligent creatures must be able to “make inferences 
that go beyond the presented information, and there ought to be some ways to 
ascertain which of these inferences are coherent.” (O'Brien, 2004, p. 206) Lo­
gic serves the function of ensuring that “false propositions are not drawn from 
true premises” (O'Brien, 2004, p. 206) so one would expect that some of the 
rules for transitions preserve entailments79.
78.1 attempt to justify the idea that the input to pragmatic processing is conceptual in chapter 
4-
79. See, however, Sperber’s recent work (2000; 2001), in which he argues that reasoning
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The key ideas are first, th a t “m en ta l processes are causal sequences o f  m e n ta l 
states” (Fodor, 1985b, p. 91) and secondly, th a t th e  sequences are n o t s im p ly  
causal, b u t th at th ey  share w ith  log ical argum ents the p ro p e rty  th a t each re p ­
resentation  preserves the w a rra n t o f  the ones th a t precede it. This m eans th a t 
tra ins o f th ou gh t can be iso m o rp hic  to  logical argum ents (Fodor, 1985b, p. 91). 
A s an exam ple, Fodor cites a passage fro m  th e  Sherlock H o lm es  s to ry The 
Speckled Band-.
I  instantly reconsidered my position when, however, it became clear to me 
that whatever danger threatened an occupant of the room could not come 
either from the window or the door. My attention was speedily drawn, as I 
have already remarked to you, to this ventilator, and to the bell-rope 
which hung down to the bed. The discovery that this was a dummy, and 
that the bed was clamped to the floor, instantly gave rise to the suspicion 
that the rope was there as a bridge for something passing through the hole 
and coming to the bed. The idea of a snake instantly occurred to me, and 
when I coupled it with my knowledge that the doctor was furnished with 
a supply of creatures from India, I felt that I was probably on the right 
track. (Conan Doyle, 1892b)
H e re  the thoughts th a t cause b e lie f in  a p ro position  are reasons fo r b e liev in g  
th a t p roposition . M a n y  theorists have th ou gh t th a t explanations fo r h u m a n  
b eh av io ur cannot be causal (e.g. W in c h , 1958; von W rig h t, 1971), in  p a rt b e ­
cause explanations are given in  term s o f reasons fo r th a t behaviour, and  reas­
ons and causes have d iffe ren t properties . F irst, to  act as an exp lan a tio n  fo r  
behaviour, a reason m ust be understood  by the agent. There is no such re s tr ic ­
tio n  on causal explanations. Secondly, reasons ju s tify  the b ehav iour th a t th ey  
cause; causes do not. W h a t is at stake is w h e th e r the ju s tifica to ry /ex p lan a to ry  
ro le  o f reasons precludes th em  fro m  also playing a causal role. D av id so n ’s 
w e ll-k n o w n  argum ent th a t it  does n o t (D avidson, 1963) is th a t a reason is n o t  
an explanation  o f  an action, no m a tte r h ow  m uch  it  m ig h t ju s tify  the ac tio n , i f  
i t  w as n o t the operative reason. I  m ig h t have a good reason fo r b u y in g  a fast, 
n ew  com puter: to  get m y thesis fin ished faster, fo r exam ple. B u t i f  th e  actua l
evolved under evolutionary pressure to assess the veracity of interlocutors, rather than to 
maintain coherence in the reasoner’s own thought.
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reason why I bought it was to play computer games, then the first reason is 
not an explanation of my action. The reason that explains the action is the one 
that was causally involved.80 The symbol-system hypothesis can be seen as a 
way of incorporating this point into cognitive science. As Fodor says, “the syn­
tactic theory of mental operations provides a reductive account of the intelli­
gence of thought.” (Fodor, 1985b, p. 98) Holmes’ monologue is an example:
What connects the causal-history aspect of Holmes’ story with its plaus- 
ible-inference aspect is precisely the parallelism between trains of thought 
and arguments: the thoughts that effect the fixation of the belief that P 
provide, often enough, good grounds for believing that P. (Fodor, 1985b, p. 
92)
Holmes is engaging in ‘reconstructive psychology’ and his description of the 
train of thoughts amounts here to an argument for the conclusion reached. 
This distinguishes reasoning from another kind of train of thought, associative 
connections. As Fodor says, in an associative train of thought there is mental 
causation but not reasoning.81
Of course it is possible to reason about someone else's associative train of 
thoughts, as in a (rather fanciful) passage in one of Poe’s detective stories 
(1841). Dupin, the detective, walks silently with a friend for some time, and 
then makes a comment on a subject that the friend has been silently consider­
ing82. Here the idea is that the two know each other so well that one of them 
can successfully infer what thoughts will be occasioned in the other by seeing 
a certain person and can also infer what mental associations will follow -  and 
which will follow those, and so on, for several minutes. This example makes 
very clear the distinction between reasoning and a chain of thoughts driven
80. See chapter 4 for more on Davidsonian causalism.
81. In fact Fodor says something stronger: that associative sequences of mental representations 
are not thinking. I think that this use of the word defines thinking too narrowly -  or we 
would not call an associative series of mental representations a train of thought.
82. “ ‘He is a very little fellow, that's true, and would do better for the Theatre des Varietesl
‘There can be no doubt of that,’ I replied unwittingly, and not at first observing (so much 
had I been absorbed in reflection) the extraordinary manner in which the speaker had 
chimed in with my meditations. In an instant afterward I recollected myself, and my aston­
ishment was profound.” (Poe, 1841)
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largely by associations. Here is part of Dupin’s explanation of his own reason­
ing about his friend’s thought processes:
I knew that you could not say to yourself ‘stereotomy’ without being 
brought to think of atomies, and thus of the theories of Epicurus; and 
since, when we discussed this subject not very long ago, I mentioned to 
you how singularly, yet with how little notice, the vague guesses of that 
noble Greek had met with confirmation in the late nebular cosmogony, I 
felt that you could not avoid casting your eyes upward to the great nebula 
in Orion, and I certainly expected that you would do so. (Poe, 1841)
Here Dupin’s own train of thought meets Fodor’s criteria: each step follows lo­
gically from the previous one, given certain supplementary premises about his 
friend’s knowledge of various subjects. Equally, the description implicitly 
presents each step as caused by the previous one. On the other hand, his 
friend’s train of thoughts -  at least if Dupin’s description is accurate -  is 
largely driven by associations. A thought about atomism gave rise to, indeed 
caused, a thought about stellar nebulae because of an association created, or 
reinforced, by a recent discussion.83
In stressing the difference between associative and logical trains of 
thought I do not want to suggest that any train of thought is in practice purely 
associative or purely logical. As discussed above, a great deal of inference in­
volves the supplying of implicit premises, perhaps suggested by the context. 
Explanations for the storage and retrieval of this material postulate essentially 
associative links. Equally, any train of thought more structured than day­
dreaming will involve some inferential steps.
Nor do I want to say that no principles apply to both associative and infer­
ential trains of thought. General principles of cognition will apply to both. For 
example, Sperber and Wilson propose that there is a cognitive principle of re­
levance: cognition is geared so as to tend to produce the greatest returns for 
the least effort by allocating resources to the contextual assumptions or im­
83. It is true that cosmology does have something to do with particle physics (see, e.g., Collins, 
Martin, & Squires, 1989) but that does not mean that (the content of) the narrator’s thought 
about atomism in any way implied (the content of) his thought about nebulae. (Of course 
the links Dupin and friend discussed in the mid 19th century are unlikely to be much like the 
links now understood to exist.)
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plications that seem most relevant. If this is so, then both types of trains of 
thought will fall under that generalisation, the difference being that in a logical 
train of thought “the most relevant-seeming assumptions/implications hap­
pen to add up to a discursive argument”, (Wilson, p.c.) whereas in an associat­
ive train of thought they do not.
2 .4 .2  FURTHER MERITS OF THE HYPOTHESIS
In this thesis, then, I adopt the RTM/symbol-system hypothesis on the basis 
that it provides a psychologically realistic account of cognition, including an 
explanation for the property of trains of thought in reasoning that there is a 
parallelism between the train of thought and a logical argument. The hypo­
thesis has further advantages. It explains how information from the various 
senses, from memory and from utterance comprehension can be integrated. 
The proposal is simply that the information is all put into one format.
One traditional view is that natural language plays the role of integrating 
information. To the extent, though, that non-linguistic creatures such as non­
human animals and pre-linguistic infants are able to reason, to make infer­
ences, or to think intelligently, there is a need to explain how intelligent 
thought can occur without natural language. A structured symbol system for 
cognition, that is, a Language of Thought, is a useful explanation.
There are strong arguments against the idea that intelligent thought is lit­
erally conducted in natural language. It would be odd to import phonological 
(p f ) features into reasoning and into other aspects of thought that are not 
subject to the constraints of the p f  interface. Another consideration is that 
natural language sentences often underspecify the proposition they express. 
Indeed many theorists would say that they do not express any proposition. At 
the least, a natural language sentence would have to be disambiguated and 
have reference assigned to its indexical elements before it was suitable for use 
as a representation of fully propositional thoughts. The thought that a speaker 
expresses by uttering an ambiguous sentence is not itself ambiguous. The idea 
that we think in natural language, minus p f  features, plus annotations mark­
ing disambiguations and reference assignment, is effectively a variation of the 
Language of Thought hypothesis. However it is not an especially plausible
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one, given the double dissociation between linguistic ability and general 
intelligence.84
It is one of the virtues of the standard Language of Thought hypothesis, 
where the Language of Thought is not a version of natural language, that it ac­
counts elegantly for this double dissociation. If central cognition were mostly 
conducted in natural language (or a disambiguated, reference-assigned, un­
pronounced version of it) then one would expect linguistic impairment to pat­
tern with general cognitive difficulties. In fact, there is a well-evidenced 
double dissociation between intelligent thought and linguistic ability. As 
Smith and Tsimpli write, “language can be impaired in someone of otherwise 
normal intelligence, and -  more surprisingly -  someone with intelligence im­
paired by brain damage may nonetheless have normal, or even enhanced lin­
guistic ability” (Smith & Tsimpli, 1995, p. 3). Impairment of language together 
with normal intelligence is seen in Specific Language Impairment. Most aut­
istic savants also have impaired linguistic ability, together with highly de­
veloped abilities in specific domains such as music, calendrical calculation, or 
drawing. Impaired intelligence together with normal or greater than normal 
linguistic ability is possessed by Williams syndrome children, ‘chatterbox' 
children, Laura, and hyperlexics, “all of whom have great linguistic ability in 
the presence of severe cognitive deficits” (Smith & Tsimpli, 1995, p. 3). The 
subject of Smith and Tsimpli’s study, Christopher, has poor general intelli­
gence: he is unable to work out how to win at noughts and crosses and does 
not conserve number, but is highly gifted in the domain of language. His Engl­
ish is “essentially normal” (Tsimpli & Smith, 1998, p. 193). In addition he 
speaks, reads and writes twenty or more languages, several fluently. He ac­
quires new languages rapidly, particularly their lexis and morphosyntax, with 
little practice.
84.1 am not committed to the idea that all concepts in the Language of Thought are innately 
specified, and I do not think there is any a priori reason why speakers of different languages 
should not have different concepts available to form mental representations with. Logical 
concepts such as conjunction, predication, negation and universality are presumably avail­
able to all, but they are presumably also expressible in all natural languages, so they need 
not be innately specified separately. It is also relevant that there are strong constraints on 
the meanings of newly coined words. The double dissociation evidence, however, suggests 
that the link between natural language and the Language of Thought is less direct.
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2 .4 -3  REALISM AND EXPLANATORY POWER
Fodor and Newell and Simon both trace back to Turing and early computer 
science the history of the idea that cognition should be explained through 
computations over the syntactic properties of symbolic representations. The 
roots of the idea are in the formalization of logic of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries with its new stress on syntactic rules and formal 
symbol manipulation (Newell & Simon, 1976, p. 117)- In various versions it 
emerged as the way of doing computer science and psychology in the nine­
teen-fifties and nineteen-sixties.
One can take the idea as an empirical hypothesis, as Newell and Simon 
do, or as a core assumption of a research programme85, as it seems to me. Per­
haps there is no great difference between the two views. Newell and Simons 
examples from the history of science of generalisations with similar status to 
the Physical Symbol System suggest so, since in each case they are hypotheses 
that are at the core of research programmes: the germ theory of disease, the 
atomic hypothesis in chemistry, the cell doctrine in biology, and plate tecton­
ics in geology. (Newell & Simon, 1976, p. 115) Newell and Simon describe these 
as “laws of qualitative structure.” (1976, p. 115) Simon (Simon, 1990, p. 2) calls 
them “some of the most important invariants in science”. They are qualitative 
rather than quantitative, and have many exceptions. Their function is to tell 
the scientist what type of explanation to look for:
For example, the germ theory of disease, surely one of Pasteur’s major 
contributions to biology, says only something like: “If you observe patho­
logy, look for a microorganism that might be causing the symptoms.” Sim­
ilarly, modern molecular genetics stems from the approximately correct 
generalization that inheritance of traits is governed by the arrangement of 
long helical sequences of the four DNA nucleotides. (Simon, 1990, p. 2)
W hat Newell and Simon, and Fodor would agree on is that -  in Fodor’s ter­
minology -  the RTM/symbol system hypothesis is currently the only game in 
town.86 If we wish to explain intelligence or rationality there is no well-de­
85. In the sense of Lakatos (1970).
86. Not everyone agrees, of course. See Rockwell, 2005 for a recent attempt to develop an 
alternative.
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veloped alternative to a theory of manipulation of mental representations ac­
cording to their syntactic properties.87
Explanatory power in psychology lies in having theories about the mechan­
isms that underlie behaviour, that is, having realist rather than instrumentalist 
theories. This criterion rules out such well-known alternative programmes as 
behaviourism and Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’.88 No one ever showed how 
the theoretical apparatus of behaviourism could in principle account for intel­
ligent thought. Furthermore, no one modelled, or even worked through, the 
details of any reasoning process in the behaviourist idiom (Newell & Simon, 
1976).
Ryle’s views are typical of the mid-twentieth century anti-mentalist 
tendency:
Underlying all the other features of the operations executed by the intelli­
gent reasoner there is the cardinal feature that he reasons logically, that is, 
that he avoids fallacies and produces valid proofs and inferences, pertin­
ent to the case he is making. He observes the rules of logic, as well as 
those of style, forensic strategy, professional etiquette and the rest. But he 
probably observes the rules of logic without thinking about them.” (Ryle, 
1949, p. 48)
All of this is true, but does not support the implied conclusion that there is no 
need for an explanation of intelligent thought in terms of mental representa­
tions. Intuitively, it seems true that (for most reasoning) a reasoner (even an 
intelligent one!) observes the rules of logic without thinking about them, al­
though sometimes a reasoner may think about, or even reason on the subject 
of the rules of logic. (And metalogicians reason about principles constraining 
the rules of logic.) But Ryle avoids the question which is important for a sci­
entist: why does a reasoner obey the rules of logic? That is: what is it about hu­
mans beings which causes them to follow the rules of logic (when they do)?
There seem to be two answers possible in principle. Either (1) the rules of 
logic are known to the reasoner i.e. they are mentally represented. They might
87. Fodor has provided arguments against connectionist alternatives (e.g. Fodor, 1987), which I 
agree with but do not discuss here.
88. Newell and Simon make the same point about Gestalt psychology (Newell & Simon, 1976, p. 
120).
or might not be consciously accessible: that is not what is at stake here. 
Chomsky’s view that the principles of syntax are known (or ‘cognised’) is an 
example of a theory or research programme that postulates that mental activ­
ity according to certain principles is due to explicit (although not conscious) 
representation of the principles in the mind. Alternatively, (2) the rules of lo­
gic are not mentally represented but some properties of the reasoners mind 
mean that when it works it follows the rules of logic. This second kind of ex­
planation has also been given in the study of natural language syntax.89 For ex­
ample, van de Koot and Neeleman argue that:
the grammar and the performance systems are theories of the same ob­
ject, but at different levels of description: the cognitive and computational 
level, respectively. More precisely, the language faculty consists of encod­
ing and decoding devices and the grammar is the code they adhere to. It 
can be shown that, if well-organized, the computational level is unlikely to 
contain a separate knowledge base. Rather, grammatical principles can be 
seen as emergent properties of natural language computations. 
(Neeleman & van de Koot, 2004, p. 1)
I am not committed either way on the status of the rules governing transitions 
in central cognition. The mental representations that the theory insists on are 
the thoughts in the sequences of thoughts that form valid arguments. The 
rules governing these transitions might be mentally represented, or they 
might be emergent properties of the reasoning system, only represented expli­
citly in our scientific theories of reasoning. Some of the rules, meaning postu­
lates, for example, may be mentally represented and some not, perhaps
89. Ryle, of course, also denied that mental rules are causally involved in linguistic activity, 
offering the consideration that “a foreign scholar might not know how to speak grammatical 
English as well as an English child, for all that he had mastered the theory of English gram­
mar” (Ryle, 1949, p. 41). A similar passage is:
I could not now read a Greek sentence, if I had not formerly learned Greek grammar, 
but I do not ordinarily have to remind myself of any rules of Greek grammar, before I 
construct a Greek sentence. I construe according to these rules, but I do not think of 
them. (Ryle, 1 9 4 9 , P - 315)
As with Ryle’s comment in the text about rationality, all of this is true (at least if ‘think of’ 
means something like ‘think about’ and if mastering the ‘theory of grammar’ for a language 
is a matter of knowing a description that is not generative), but does not support Ryle’s in­
tended conclusion.
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including the core logical rules. It might be an emergent property of our reas­
oning systems that we are disposed to reason from P & Q to P, but an expli­
citly represented rule that ‘x  is a monkey’ entails lx  is an animal! The rules 
must play a causal role, but they might do so in the way that instructions in a 
computer program do, or in the way that the law of gravity does.
The criterion that a causal explanation is sought militates against 
Dennett’s ‘intentional stance! as Fodor argues (Fodor, 1985b, pp. 79-81). For 
Dennett, talk about beliefs and desires is not to be taken as describing the in­
ternal structure of agents, but as adopting a stance towards them, treating 
them as though they had such mental states (Dennett, 1971; Dennett, 1987). 
The contention is that this provides a basis for understanding the behaviour of 
agents, including predicting how they will act, even though they do not actu­
ally have such states.
Dennett’s instrumentalism about such mental representations as beliefs 
and desires seems to be based on a classical version of rationality (Cherniak, 
1981, pp. 162-163). The idea is that to explain behaviour in terms of beliefs and 
desires we need to assume that the agent is fully rational (i.e. rational in a clas­
sical, unbounded sense). An unboundedly rational agent has a consistent set 
of beliefs, a consistent set of preferences, and acts to maximize his returns. 
Real agents are not unboundedly rational, as I discuss in the next chapter. On 
the other hand, Dennett thinks that agents’ behaviour must be close enough 
to rationality for evolutionary reasons: thoroughly irrational creatures would 
have been selected out. So explanation in terms of beliefs and desires will be 
close enough for predictive purposes even though it is not actually true 
(Fodor, 1985b, pp. 79-80). Thus, Dennett says, we think about other people 
(and other agents) as i f  they had beliefs and desires. This might be a good ex­
planation of what people do when explaining others’ behaviour, but our in­
terest is not in explaining people’s explanations of intelligent behaviour, but in 
explaining the behaviour itself. To do that we cannot simply say that because 
of evolutionary pressure people’s behaviour will be rational, or mostly ration­
al: we have to attempt to explain the behaviour in terms of mental structures.
There is a marked similarity with Simon’s criticism of ‘as if’ theories in 
economics and other social sciences, specifically decision theory and rational
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choice theory90. Rational choice theory assumes that humans choose the best 
action given their preferences and the choices available. Thus to know what an 
agent will do it is sufficient to know what it is best for him to do, given his 
preferences and the environment in which he is choosing. Simon argues, on 
the contrary, that what is necessary for theoretical understanding of intelli­
gent behaviour are theories that attempt to describe the mental mechanisms 
responsible (Simon, 1990, p. 6ff). I discuss this line of argument in more detail 
in chapter 3, where I discuss optimising theories as a species of classical 
rationality.
2.4.4 f o d o r ’s p e s s im is m  a b o u t  c r e a t iv e , u n b o u n d e d , c e n t r a l  t h o u g h t
In this thesis, then, I assume that central cognition, including reasoning, 
should be thought of as involving a series of mental representations in which 
one representation (or set of representations) causes the next in virtue of its 
form and that in these chains of transitions, accomplished by purely syntactic 
means, semantic entailment is mostly preserved. As previously remarked (in 
section 2.2.2), though, the particular central system which this thesis attempts 
to understand is not a purely deductive reasoning system, since it performs 
non-demonstrative inferences. I have argued there that the picture of a series 
of mental representations linked by rules isomorphic to rules of derivation 
cannot be the whole story, but that it is a part of the story. Deductive steps, 
from the premises supplied taken together with contextual information, lead 
to contextual inferences.
It is because of the differences between analytic, deductive reasoning and 
synthetic, non-demonstrative reasoning that Fodor is pessimistic that central 
cognition can be understood in terms of his Representational Theory of Mind. 
He takes scientific theorising to be a paradigm central cognitive activity, and, 
as remarked above, an important part of scientific theorizing is coming up 
with hypotheses which explain and predict but (famously) do not logically fol­
low from observational data. That is, a key part of scientific theorizing con­
sists in abductive inference, inference to the best explanation. Some other
90. There are some historical connections between rational choice theory and behaviourism. 
Homans, a pioneer in bringing rational choice theory to the social sciences beyond econom­
ics, espoused a behaviourist psychology (Scott, 2000, p. 127).
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central processes appear to be similar in this respect. Mindreading involves 
postulating explanations for others’ behaviour in ways that go beyond the 
data. If I see my flatmate heading for the fridge late at night, I may infer that 
he is hungry and looking for a midnight snack. My observation somehow trig­
gers my forming a hypothesis about his behaviour, but the hypothesis is not 
entailed by the behaviour observed. That the same goes for utterance inter­
pretation was an important part of Grice’s message, as discussed in chapter 1. 
Any observations a hearer may have made of an utterance fall short of logic­
ally entailing the meaning of that utterance. So the speaker meaning which the 
hearer arrives at is a hypothesis and the process is inference to the best 
explanation.
Now abductive inference clearly involves a creative element over and 
above any creativity demanded by deductive inference. Deductive inference is 
somewhat creative. In such forms of deduction as proving logical sequents by 
inference rules, there is an element of creativity in that a choice must be made 
at each step as to which rule to apply.91 In abductive inference the involve­
ment of creativity is qualitatively much greater. It is not just a matter of how to 
manipulate the information one starts with. Seemingly unrelated information 
must be brought in. In the example given, my flatmate’s mental representa­
tions of the contents of the fridge are invoked as part of the explanation for his 
behaviour. Scientific explanation provides many examples in which there was 
a considerable creative leap involved in hypothesising a causal link. In chem­
istry and in thermodynamics, for example, the properties of solids, liquids or 
gases are often explained in terms of statistical generalisations about prim a  
facie unrelated properties of small objects that they are composed of. The cre­
ative leap involved is considerable given that the smaller objects had not been 
observed when the theories were formulated. Abductive explanations can be 
tested once they exist. But in order to come up with them, certain leaps must 
be made.92 This kind of creativity is presumably at least part of what Fodor
91. In propositional logic the process of deduction can be mechanised, but in other forms of lo­
gic, including first-order predicate calculus, there is no determinate procedure for proofs of 
sequents (Lemmon, 1978, p. 91; Gamut, 1990, p. isof): a theorem prover may not terminate 
in a finite number of steps.
92. Generally, problems that are undecidable, or too computationally expensive to solve by 
brute force methods (most interesting problems have both properties) must be solved by
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means when he says “what is most characteristic, and most puzzling, about 
the higher cognitive mind93 [is] its nonencapsulation, its creativity, its holism, 
and its passion for the analogical” (Fodor, 1985a, p. 4)
Central systems responsible for tasks such as mindreading and utterance 
interpretation take input from peripheral systems and reason from it, access­
ing memory, in order to provide explanations for the perceived phenomena. 
This process of generating explanations is non-demonstrative and highly 
dependent on the associative or analogical processes which generate candid­
ate hypotheses (Fodor, 1983, p. 107). Fodor calls this aspect of cognition 
‘Quinean’ and 'isotropic', where by ‘isotropic’ he means approximately94 that in 
principle any information may be relevant to the outcome of a conceptual 
process (Fodor, 1983, p. 105) and by ‘Quinean’ he means that the criteria that 
are relevant to judging the goodness of a hypothesis are global properties such 
as the simplicity of one’s belief system (Fodor, 1983, pp. 107-108).
Simon recognised that many thought that these areas provide the most 
serious challenge for a symbol theory of cognition, but thought that the prob­
lems had been solved in principle. The solution involves a second hypothes­
is -  or Taw of qualitative structure’ -  about intelligent thought: that problem 
solving is a matter of heuristic search, some combination of trial and error. To 
find a solution that solves a problem, an intelligent system generates solutions 
and tests them, one by one. The problem of intelligent creativity is the prob­
lem of doing better than one would do generating solutions at random. How is 
it that, in certain domains, cognition is tuned to provide fruitful postulates? 
There are several parts to this solution of this problem, at least as it relates to 
many tasks, including utterance interpretation95. One is that the generator
some combination of trial and error:
why not simply generate at once an expression that satisfies the test? This is, in fact, 
what we do when we wish and dream. “If wishes were horses, beggars might ride.” But 
outside the world of dreams, it isn't possible. To know how we would test something, 
once constructed, does not mean that we know how to construct it -  that we have any 
generator for doing so. (Newell & Simon, 1976, p. 121)
93. By the higher cognitive mind, Fodor means those mental faculties (or that mental faculty) 
that deal(s) with conceptual rather than perceptual mental phenomena, i.e. central 
cognition.
94. Fodor writes, “It is notoriously hard to give anything approaching a rigorous account of 
what being isotropic and Quinean amounts to.” (1983, p. 105)
95. Another problem for which the first two elements are important is choosing a chess move.
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effectively has built into it some of the tests that the solution should satisfy. In 
this way, only solutions that will pass the tests are generated: there is trial, but 
not much error. In the case of utterance interpretation, one such incorporated 
test is that the implicated premise(s) and explicit meaning of an utterance to­
gether logically support the implicatures. This property is built in to the gen­
erator because it makes use of deductive rules to generate implications. The 
second part of the solution is what Simon calls ‘recognition. The idea is that 
reasoners store rich and extensive data about the problem domain, and that 
knowledge of patterns can be substituted for search.
The question of creativity can be seen as the question of how to reduce 
the portion of the problem space that is actually searched. The solution may 
involve canonical deductive rules guided by heuristics, and sometimes short­
cut by heuristics. The process must rapidly generate and evaluate solutions. 
The starting point of search may be close to the solution because the first trial 
solution is fed by domain-sensitive recognition of patterns. The way to see if a 
model of this sort works is to take a particular area of reasoning, e.g. inference 
to the best explanation for utterances, and see if it can work there, as I do in 
chapters 4 and 5 below.
In this last section of this chapter I have set out one law of qualitative 
structure for cognitive science: the RTM/symbol system hypothesis. Towards 
the end, I have sketched a way to answer some of Fodor’s scepticism about ex­
plaining central cognition in these terms by adopting a second law of qualitat­
ive structure, heuristic search, which I return to in more detail towards the 
end of the next chapter. There is no reason to think that in practice, quick, 
automatic abductive reasoning is Quinean or isotropic. In principle, any in­
formation might be relevant, but in practice, for certain tasks at least, cogni­
tion is tuned so that only information that is likely to be relevant is used. 
Again, in principle, one might judge the goodness of a solution by its coher­
ence with one’s entire belief system, but in practice the criteria are more local, 
defined by the task.
Good players rely on recognition, storing perhaps 50,000 distinct patterns (Newell & Simon, 
1976, p. 125), and only potentially good moves (and only legal moves) are considered.
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Chapter 3 • Classical and bounded rationality
The question is how you arrive at your opinions and not what your opin­
ions are. (Russell, 1983. p- 9i)
In the introductory chapter I claimed that utterance interpretation is a 
boundedly rational process. Bounded rationality is a tendency in theorising 
about rationality which recognises the fact that “humans are in the finitary 
predicament of having a fixed limit on their cognitive capacities and the time 
available to them” (Cherniak, 1981, p. 165) and stands in opposition to another 
tendency: classical rationality. As mentioned above, advocates of bounded ra­
tionality try to explain judgements and choices in terms of heuristics: proced­
ures which amount to shortcuts. They also stress the finding of solutions 
which are good enough, rather than optimal, i.e. that satisfice (in a broad 
sense). These two aspects of the programme are separable: not all heuristics 
find solutions that are ‘good enough’ -  some do not do well enough, and some 
may overachieve relatively, finding optimal solutions with minimal search. In 
addition, logically one could satisfice by thoroughly examining all alternatives 
and picking one that is good enough but sub-optimal, so satisficing does not 
require heuristic shortcuts. W hat is more, some heuristics are fast and frugal 
and others may be lengthy and costly.
The key idea of a programme of bounded rationality is that not all of the 
problem space is searched. Problems are solved by generation and assessment 
of trial solutions, typically sequentially. Frugal heuristics make use of recogni­
tion of the type of situation to limit the number of solutions tried. Some such 
heuristics may approach the limit of frugality, at which the first solution gen­
erated will usually be chosen. In section 3.3 I look at several classes of 
boundedly rational procedure along the lines set out here.
However, before moving on to examination of types of boundedly rational 
procedure, I discuss some reasons for adopting the bounded rationality pro­
gramme in the first place, looking at the competition, classical theories of ra­
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tionality. The programme of bounded rationality is a reaction (originally by Si­
mon 1947; 1969; 1982; 1983; 1990) to previous work which presents as a 
received view an idealised picture of rationality in philosophy and, particu­
larly, in economics.
It is convenient to refer to this latter type of model of rationality as ‘clas­
sical! There is some risk of inaccuracy in speaking this way, since philosophers 
and economists have tended to idealise rationality in somewhat different 
ways, and, as one would expect, within each of these broad disciplines there 
have been different views of rationality. There are common elements however, 
across and within disciplines, which make classical visions of rationality simil­
ar to each other and distinct from bounded rationality.
Classical visions of rationality assume that a rational agent has consistent 
beliefs and consistent preferences, and finds solutions that are both logically 
or probabilistically normative and also optimal. This view faces difficult theor­
etical and empirical questions. The empirical evidence has been taken to show 
that humans do not have even basic logical competence. In section 3.2, 1 argue 
that this bleak view is unjustified. The evidence is that we are capable of good 
reasoning, within the limits one would expect of finite creatures. In the first 
section of this chapter, I look at theoretical arguments which also suggest a 
bounded view of rationality.
3.1 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The classical vision of rationality emphasises consistency and optimisation, in 
contrast to the focus of theorists of bounded rationality on simple procedures 
and satisficing. Consistency is a property of a system, for example the agent’s 
belief system, or his system of preferences, or his beliefs and intentions taken 
together as a system. The ideal of consistency is context- and content-inde­
pendent, applying across domains. A classically rational agent is one who sat­
isfies consistency conditions on beliefs and preferences such as the following: 
do not believe propositions p  and not-p; do not simultaneously prefer out­
come a to outcome b, outcome b to outcome c, and outcome c to outcome a; 
do not rate the conjunction of two events, x  and y, as more likely than either 
one occurring.
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Optimisation, on the other hand, is a constraint on aims or outcomes. A 
requirement to optimize is a requirement to find the best solution to a prob­
lem, to make the best choices, and generally to do as well as it is possible to 
do. Optimisation is not independent of context and content, since the best 
judgement will always depend on what is available. However it is generally in­
sensitive to context and to the specific content of the problem. To be sure that 
the best outcome is reached it is necessary -  in the general case -  to weigh up 
all possible outcomes, in the light of all information that might be relevant. 
Thus a classical optimizer would generally have to carry out exhaustive search, 
regardless of the context.
There are links between these two pillars of classical rationality. One con­
nection is that the requirement that an agent’s beliefs are all consistent with 
each other is a requirement for a form of optimisation. As we shall see, meet­
ing this requirement is computationally impractical, so it is an unrealistic cri­
terion for rationality.
A second link between optimisation and consistency is fundamental to 
decision theory. Decision theory (and much of economics, and related work 
in other social sciences96) views rational agents as those which have consistent 
preferences and maximize their utility (or their expected utility). In a widely 
prevalent interpretation of decision theory, maximisation (of expected utility) 
follows from internal consistency of preferences as long as the agent chooses 
what he prefers. Here maximisation of expected utility is an optimization: ra­
tional agents are supposed to make the best choices, that is, those that bring 
them the greatest possible returns. This requirement to optimize need not be 
stated as an axiom of rationality, however. Rather it emerges from the require­
ment that an agent’s preferences are consistent in a certain way. “On certain 
decision theoretic approaches... rationality requires only that one’s prefer­
ences meet certain ordering criteria” (Mele & Rawling, 2004a, p. 4). Prefer­
ences that meet these criteria automatically maximize, as long as the agent 
acts according to his preferences, i.e. chooses what he prefers.
96.1116 field of work in which the framework of decision theory is applied to (e.g.) sociology 
and political science is called ‘rational choice theory’. See Scott, 2000.
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It is not immediately clear whether this theory is descriptive or normat­
ive.97 Is the theory a description of the behaviour of people, or a standard that 
people should aim at? Saying that ‘a rational agent’ behaves in a certain way al­
lows for either interpretation, or some blend of the two. Daniel Ellsberg, who 
showed that not all uncertainty can be reduced to (quantifiable) risk, summar­
ised the consensus against which he was arguing:
The propounders of these axioms tend to be hopeful that the rules will be 
commonly satisfied, at least roughly and most of the time, because they 
regard these postulates as normative maxims, widely-acceptable prin­
ciples of rational behavior. In other words, people should tend to behave 
in the postulated fashion, because that is the way they would want to be­
have. At the least, these axioms are believed to predict certain choices 
that people will make when they take plenty of time to reflect over their 
decision, in the light of the postulates. (Ellsberg, 1961, pp. 645-646)
Since the work of Kahneman and Tversky, however, it has been generally ac­
cepted that human behaviour deviates in certain ways from the classical pic­
ture. For example, people are generally risk averse and prefer to reduce risk 
even at the cost of lowering expected returns (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 98 
The tendency in philosophy has been to see classical rationality as primar­
ily normative. According to this way of thinking about rationality, rationality 
is largely a matter of the conformity, or otherwise, of one’s beliefs, desires, in­
tentions and other mental attitudes to certain standards. Beliefs should be jus­
tified and consistent with each other; intentions should be compatible with 
one’s beliefs and desires, and one should try to maximize their fulfilment.99
97. This is a general problem for economics. Thus, for example, Hausman (2006), places “Posit­
ive versus normative economics” at the head of his list of methodological problems faced by 
economics.
98. Ellsberg had earlier demonstrated another deviation from maximisation of expected utility, 
ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961). The paradox Ellsberg uses to demonstrate this was 
known to Keynes (Keynes, 1921, pp. 75-76, 315 fn 2).
99. Consistency requirements are sometimes presented as conceptual necessities. For example, 
Davidson gives a rather Quinean argument in support of transitivity of preferences:
I do not think that we can clearly say what should convince us that a man at a given 
time (or without a change of mind) preferred a to b, b to c and c to a. The reason for 
our difficulty is that we cannot make good sense of an attribution of preference except 
against a background of coherent attitudes. (Davidson, 1980b, p. 237)
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Agents are rational to the extent that they meet these standards. It is compat­
ible with this view that in reality most agents fall short in one way or another 
from time to time100, although it is a fairly recent development to stress as 
Cherniak does that real humans cannot meet these idealised standards:
Until recently, philosophy has uncritically accepted highly idealised con­
ceptions of rationality, But cognition, computation, and information have 
costs; they do not just subsist in some immaterial effluvium (Cherniak, 
1986, p. 3).... the pervasively and tacitly assumed conception of rationality 
in philosophy is so idealized that it cannot apply in an interesting way to 
actual human beings (Cherniak, 1986, p. 5).
A further difference with classical rationality in economics is that decision 
theory is generally concerned with consistency and optimisation as they apply 
to preferences and choices rather than to systems of belief, whereas classical 
rationality as set out by philosophers concerns both.
Regardless of differences of this sort, a strict division between philosoph­
ers’ and economists’ conceptions of classical rationality would be artificial. 
Philosophers have made substantial contributions to debates in choice theory 
(in particular, Nozick, 1973; Nozick, 1974), and economics has always drawn 
on philosophical conceptions of rationality. Indeed much of economics and 
(more recently) game theory can be seen as detailed attempts to answer “an 
old hypothetical question” (Sen, 1977, p. 319) debated since at least the eight­
eenth century by philosophers and theologians as well as economists, 
“namely, in what sense and to what extent would egoistic behavior achieve 
general good?” (Sen, 1977> P- 321).
Against such Quinean arguments, which are also made about the attribution of incon­
sistent beliefs, it is worth noting that correct interpretation of a person’s utterances may 
(pace Quine) attribute inconsistencies (and falsehoods) to him (Cherniak, 1986, p. 56). There 
are examples (noted by Sperber & Wilson, 1986, pp. 197-200) in which an implicated 
premise is needed to make sense of the utterance. The implicated premise may be false or 
thought by the hearer to be false, inconsistent with some of the speaker’s other beliefs or 
thought by the hearer to be inconsistent with some of the speaker’s other beliefs.
100.lt is often said that there is a minimum standard, as well. More as a matter of definition 
than description, a system or being will not count as an agent if its beliefs and actions do not 
meet minimal standards of consistency.
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In recent decades, ideas about rationality have tended to flow from deci­
sion theory, economics and game theory to philosophy and to social sciences. 
The common perception is that substantial progress has been made in those 
fields with the assumption of a particular view of rationality; and this view of 
rationality has become influential outside these fields as a result. In particular 
there has been widespread interest in what game theory says about interacting 
agents and its explanation of the way that individually rational behaviour can 
lead to socially sub-optimal outcomes. In a recent philosophical survey of ra­
tionality (Mele & Rawling, 2004b), almost a third of the papers, seven of the 
twenty-two, discuss decision theory, economics or game theory. There are as­
sumptions in the air that if a situation involves interactions between agents, 
then a game-theoretic treatment is a natural move, and in any situation where 
the preferences of individuals are to be investigated the axioms of decision 
theory should apply.
Thus in a discussion of the current state of the classical view of rationality, 
even as it bears on utterance interpretation, it is important to give some space 
to the decision-theoretic view of rationality. Even though decision theory is 
more concerned with preferences and actions than beliefs, and utterance in­
terpretation is an exercise of theoretical rationality, many would assume that a 
game-theoretic treatment of utterance interpretation is natural. I have given 
specific arguments against such a treatment elsewhere (Allott, 2006). Here I 
look at problems with the classical, idealised view of rationality at the root of 
these views.
A further reason for looking at decision theory is that it renews an old 
challenge to psychological realism as a methodological commitment. Classical 
conceptions of rationality sit more easily with a methodology that is agnostic 
about mental representation than bounded rationality does. Bounded ration­
ality stresses the processes involved in reasoning and decision making, while 
for classical rationality what matters most is that decisions and judgements 
are optimal and consistent: how they are reached may be abstracted away 
from. Decision theory and game theory make this aspect of the classical vis­
ion very clear. As I explain below, decision theory is methodologically agnost­
ic about the mental representations behind choices, stressing instead the 
formal properties of the preference relation. It hardly needs saying that it is
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more of a live research programme than behaviourist psychology. It is contro­
versial here, as it is not in psychology, to argue that the form of mental repres­
entation and the procedures used in reaching judgements cannot be ignored.
In the end, I argue, advocates of a bounded view of rationality have con­
vincingly shown that classical visions of rationality are not descriptively cor­
rect. People could not and do not possess or maintain completely consistent 
systems of beliefs, intentions or preferences. For quick, everyday decisions, 
people could not and do not optimize in the classical sense, acting as though 
they actively considered (or considered whether to consider) all possible solu­
tions to a problem and all potentially relevant information. However, it is not 
so easy to show that classical rationality is not the normative standard for ra­
tional agents: even if no one is classically rational, classical rationality might 
still have a normative force. There would be something strange, however, 
about a norm that no one met, or could meet. If we adopt a vision of rational­
ity as bounded, there will be consequences for our view of rationality as a 
standard for people s reasoning and behaviour.101
Instead of optimization, advocates of bounded rationality stress econom­
ical processes which reach answers that are good enough, where what is good 
enough depends on the task and the context. The emphasis is on how proper­
ties of the process enable it to reach good answers for a given task rather than 
on formal properties of the system or the outcome. Instead of seeing consist­
ency as the key property of systems of belief or preferences, they see it as, at 
most, one among other properties. For example, Gigerenzer argues that con­
sistency is at most only a secondary criterion for good decision making, com­
ing well behind “accuracy, speed, frugality, cost, transparency, and 
justifiability” (Gigerenzer, 2001, p. 3007).
The positive programme of bounded rationality set out by Simon, and 
considerably advanced recently in the work of Gigerenzer and colleagues, 
aims to show how rational decisions can come out of psychologically plausible 
mechanisms, where to be psychologically plausible a mechanism must be
101. Gigerenzer writes, “even critics have generally retained the beautifully simple principles 
drawn from logic and probability theory as normative, albeit not descriptively valid -  that is 
as definitions of how we should reason.” (2000, p. 202) Gigerenzer thinks that they should 
be given up as norms as well.
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computationally tractable. Generally consistency and maximization will only 
be local properties, if they are present at all, because global checking and 
global search are computationally intractable, and therefore psychologically 
implausible.
In the next section I look at some internal criticisms of decision-theoretic 
version of classical rationality, including the views of Amartya Sen. Although 
Sen is not an advocate of the positive programme of bounded rationality -  
satisficing and a focus on procedures -  his work is is akin to bounded ration­
ality in that he rejects consistency and optimization as the central pillars of a 
theory of choice.102 In particular, Sen criticises the idea that agents must have 
consistent preferences, regardless of context.
3.1.1 DECISION THEORY AND GLOBAL CONSISTENCY
Leibniz’s dream was of a formal calculus of reasonableness that could be 
applied to everything. Modern variants tend to go one step further and 
assume that the calculus of rationality has already been found and can be 
imposed in all contexts. (Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 2002)
The classical tendency in economics assumes that rational agents obey the 
laws of logic and probability (Gigerenzer, 2000, p. vii), so, for example, agents 
have transitive desires and their choices are internally consistent (Gigerenzer, 
2000, p. 202). Economists place less stress than some philosophers do on the 
external justification of desires: a rational agent in economics is one whose 
preferences are internally consistent and who acts so as to fulfil his or her de­
sires to the greatest degree possible, whatever those desires may be. Such a 
position is often called Humeanism or Humean instrumentalism by philo­
sophers, because of remarks in Hume such as “reason is and ought only to be 
the slave of the passions” (Hume, 2003, p. 295). The idea is that one can, given 
goals or desires, reason about how best to fulfil them, but that one cannot by 
reasoning alone reach any decision about what one’s goals or desires should 
be. This is, of course, a controversial position; and to be a decision theorist 
one does not have to agree with it. Decision theorists are methodological
102. Sen’s positive programme is related. He wants economics to investigate how properties of 
choice and preference are driven by aims, beliefs etc.
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H u m ean s in  th a t th ey  look on ly  at the c o n fo rm ity  o f  th e  p reference re la tion  to  
axiom s, n o t h o w  th e  agent arrived  at th a t p reference re la tio n  (n o r h o w  i t  is 
m e n ta lly  represented o r m enta lly  processed).
For m ost econom ists and decision theorists , it  is m a x im isa tio n  o f  (expec­
ted ) u tility  th at is the h a llm ark  o f a ra tio n a l agent: i t  is assum ed th a t ra tio n al 
agents m ake choices w hich  are m a x im a lly  fu lfillin g  o f  th e  desires th a t th ey  
have, w hatever those happen to be. This is because, fo r a decision th eo ris t, a 
ra tio n al agent is an agent w ho  makes sure th a t h e r preferences co n fo rm  to  the  
axiom s o f choice theory: “Insofar as decision th e o ry  has any n o rm ative  ju d g ­
m ents to  m ake, any advice to give, it  is best to  th in k  o f  i t  as te llin g  us to  co n ­
fo rm  o u r preferences to  its axioms.” (D re ier, 2004, p. 160) These inc lude the  
requ irem ents th a t the ordering  o f preferences is co m p lete , and th a t th e  p re fe r­
ence re la tion , R, w h ich  holds b etw een  any tw o  a lternatives , x  and  y  -  so xR y  
m eans 'y is n o t p referred  to x ’103 -  is an tisym m etric , re flex ive  and trans itive. 
For any agent fo r w h o m  all the axiom s hold , th a t agent’s preferences are co n ­
sistent and coherent, and there is a fam ily  o f  expected u t il ity  fu nctio n s w h ich  
express those preferences. So the axiom s provide a standard  fo r ra tio n a lity  as 
fa r as preferences are concerned, and this standard stresses coherence104. A c ­
cord ing  to  this p ic ture  o f rationality , “ [a ra tio n al agent] never has to  try  to  
m a x im ize  her expected u tility. I f  her preferences co n fo rm  to  th e  axiom s, th en  
the m axim isa tio n  o f  her u tility  w ill take care o f itse lf (as long  as she chooses 
w h a t she prefers!)” (D reier, 2004, p. 160).
There are m ethodologica l and fo rm a l advantages to  th is v ie w  o f  ra tio n a l 
agents. M ethodolog ically , one can find  o u t w h a t an agent values by seeing  
w h at he or she m axim izes , subject to  the assum ptions th a t it  is expected va lue  
o f one sort o r o ther th at is m ax im ized , and th a t the ax iom s o f  decision th eo ry  
h o ld .105 I f  an agent consistently chooses bananas ra th e r th an  apples, o r in ­
103. i-e. either the agent prefers x to y  or is indifferent between them: as far as that agent is con­
cerned, the desirability of x is greater than or equal to the desirability of y.
104. Not every economist who accepts the axioms sees them as criteria for internal consistency 
of choice. They can be seen as following from the requirement that expected utility be max­
imized rather than the other way around. See Sen’s remarks on the pioneer of revealed pref­
erence theory, Samuelson (Sen, 1993, p. 497, fn 5).
105. The methodological advantage is obtainable only at the expense of a certain simple- 
mindedness theoretically, as Sen points out:
If you are observed to choose x, rejecting y, you are declared to have ‘revealed’ a prefer-
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creased leisure rather than longer working hours with more pay, then we can 
infer the agent’s preferences without any need to ask him what he prefers. The 
formal advantages include the possibility of proving certain results about an 
agent who conforms to the axioms: one such result is the consequence men­
tioned above, that the agent’s preferences are expressed by an expected utility 
function. Another way of seeing this advantage is that decision-theoretic ra­
tional agents are ‘known quantities’. Therefore one can show (indeed prove) 
what they will do if they interact, as in mainstream economics and game 
theory.
Criticisms
There have been powerful criticisms of the decision-theoretic vision of ration­
ality. Some of the criticisms, such as Simon’s attack on optimising and ‘as if’ 
theories, challenge the plausibility of this picture of rationality as a whole. As I 
have indicated, I find these criticisms compelling. I discuss them below and 
return to the alternative picture of rationality offered by Simon and Gigeren­
zer and colleagues in some detail in section 3.3. There have also been powerful 
internal criticisms of aspects of the picture, that is, criticisms from econom­
ists and from philosophers sympathetic to decision theory. I briefly review 
two of these criticisms first.
The core commitment of decision theory is that rational agents’ prefer­
ences conform to the axioms. It is not surprising, then, that internal criticisms 
of decision theory focus on the tenability of some of these axioms. Amartya 
Sen has challenged the idea that a rational agent’s preferences must be intern­
ally consistent (Sen, 1993)- Another prominent criticism is that the theory as it 
stands does not take account of the fact that people’s preferences are not all 
commensurable and thus cannot be put into any one preference relation.
Sen's attack on the limitations of the decision-theoretic picture of ration­
ality is rather wide-ranging:
ence for x  over y. Your personal utility is then defined as simply a numerical representa­
tion of this ‘preference,’ assigning a higher utility to a ‘preferred’ alternative. With this 
set of definitions you can hardly escape maximizing your own utility, except through 
inconsistency. (Sen, 1977, p. 322)
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A  person is g iven one preference o rd erin g , and  as and w h en  the need  
arises th is is supposed to  re flect his interests, represent his w elfare , sum ­
m arize  his idea o f  w h a t should be done, and describe his actual choices 
and behaviour. C a n  one preference o rd erin g  do all these things? A  person  
thus described m ay be ‘ra tio n a l’ in  the lim ite d  sense o f  revealing  no incon ­
sistencies in  his choice behavior, b u t i f  he has no use fo r these d istinctions  
betw een  d iffe ren t concepts he m ust be a b it o f a fool. T he  purely  econ o m ­
ic m an  is indeed  close to  being a social m o ro n . E co n om ic  th e o ry  has been  
m uch p reoccupied  w ith  this ra tional fool decked in  the g lo ry  o f  his one 
a ll-pu rp o se preference ordering. To m ake ro o m  fo r th e  d iffe ren t concepts  
re lated  to  his b eh av io r w e need a m ore elaborate s truc ture . (Sen, 1977, PP- 
335- 336)
O n e  aspect o f  Sen’s c ritiq u e  o f  consistency is the u nd en iab le  log ical p o in t th at 
bits o f b ehav iour are n e ith e r logically consistent n o r log ica lly  inconsistent. 
A n y  set o f  p ro positions is consistent or inconsistent, b u t a set o f  choices does 
n ot by itse lf have any such property:
The alleged requ irem en ts  o f ‘in te rn a l consistency’ are co n d ition s  th a t de­
m and  th a t p a rtic u la r in te rn a l correspondences h o ld  b etw een  d iffe ren t 
p arts o f  a choice fu nctio n . The foundational d ifficu lty  w ith  such co n d i­
tions relates to  th e  fact th at choices are not, by them selves, statem ents  
th a t can o r ca n n o t be consistent w ith  each o ther (Sen, 1993, p. 514).
There is m o re  to  th e  c r itiq u e  th an  this, however. Sen does n o t th in k  th a t m a x ­
im isation  should be a consequence o f the axiom s o f ra tionality . H e  is n o t o p ­
posed to the idea th a t people som etim es try  to  m a x im ize  th e ir  re turns , b u t he  
argues that w h e th e r one seeks to  m a x im ize  depends on o ne’s aim s, in ten tio ns  
and so on in  a w ay th a t is sensitive to the context.
I  do n o t w an t to  go in to  all the details o f Sen’s critiq u e , b u t one p o in t w o rth  
m akin g  clear is th a t his w o rk  n o t on ly  attacks the idea th a t h aving  one p re fe r­
ence re la tion  w h ich  conform s to the axiom s o f  decision th e o ry  is suffic ient fo r  
ra tionality , as suggested in the quotation  above, b u t also suggests th a t having  
such a preference re la tion  is n o t necessary fo r ra tio n a lity 106. H e  argues against
106. 1 suspect that Sen would not formulate his objections in quite this way, given his claim that
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what could be called a methodologically behaviourist107 or extensional econ­
omics, where all that is -  or needs to be -  known about a agent is the prefer­
ence relation. Without knowing the reasons for an agent’s preferences one 
does not know whether they should (rationally) prevail over those of other 
agents in case of conflict (Sen, 1976) or whether they should be internally con­
sistent (Sen, 1993). Here I discuss Sen’s criticism of the axiom of internal con­
sistency of preference.
In te rn a l consistency o f  choice m ay be fo rm u la te d  as ‘P ro p erty  a ’ (Sen, 
i993)» defined as follows:
(13) x(S) and * ( T ) ,  where S and T  are sets of alternatives, and x(S )
means that alternative x  is chosen from set S. (Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 202)
The fo rm u la  in  (13) says th a t i f  x  is chosen fro m  a set o f  a lternatives , S, th en  it  
m ust also be chosen fro m  a sub-set o f S, T. This m eans th a t choice is insensit­
ive to  context and m uch  else. A s  G ig eren zer com m ents, “N o  reference is m ade  
to  anyth ing  external to choice -  fo r instance, in te n tio n a l states such as 
people’s social objectives, values and m otivations.” (G igerenzer, 2000, p. 203) 
In d eed  this is the sense in  w h ich  axiom s o f in te rn a l consistency are ‘in te rn a l’: 
“They are ‘in te rn a l’ to  the choice fu n c tio n  in  the sense th a t th ey  re q u ire  co r­
respondence betw een  d iffe ren t parts o f a choice fu nctio n , w ith o u t invo k in g  
anyth ing  outside choice (such as m otivations, objectives, and substantive  
principles).” (Sen, 1993, p. 495)
“There is not much merit in spending a lot of effort in debating the “proper” definition of 
rationality.” (Sen, 1977, p. 343)
107. These is not Sen’s term, but it is no exaggeration to use the term ‘behaviourist’, as his dis­
cussion of the history of the dominant interpretation of decision theory makes clear:
Hicks ... became persuaded by the alleged superiority of the new [revealed preferences] 
approach, and warmly endorsed the study of human beings “only as entities having cer­
tain patterns of market behavior; it makes no claim, no pretense, to be able to see inside 
their heads”.
In the same spirit, Ian Little gave his stamp of methodological approval to this ap­
proach: “the new [Samuelson's revealed preference] formulation is scientifically more 
respectable [since] if an individual’s behavior is consistent, then it must be possible to 
explain the behavior without reference to anything other than behavior”. (Sen, 1993, p. 
497)
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Sen elsewhere explains the reasons for the rejection of reference to any­
thing other than the choices an agent makes for understanding an agent's de­
sires. An agent is assumed to reveal (to use the decision-theoretic term) his 
preferences by his choices:
The rationale of this approach seems to be based on the idea that the only 
way of understanding a person's real preference is to examine his actual 
choices, and there is no choice-independent way of understanding 
someone's attitude towards alternatives. (Sen, 1977, p- 323)
The trouble with the axiom is that it seems to be false that agents have intern­
ally consistent preference orders. No consistent preference order can be given 
to someone who chooses x, rejecting y, on one occasion, but chooses y, reject­
ing x, on another occasion108, unless we assume that the agent’s preferences 
have changed between the two occasions. Of course, such an agent might 
simply have changed his mind or might not be a rational agent at all. The chal­
lenge for an opponent of property a is to show cases in which a rational agent 
whose preferences are stable, nonetheless fails to exhibit property a.
Sen (1993) gives examples where the addition of another alternative 
changes the situation so that it is intuitively plausible that an agent might 
choose differently. In one example, a diner offered x, an apple, or y, nothing, 
takes nothing because taking the last apple would be impolite. The addition of 
a second apple to the alternatives would have allowed the diner to take the 
original apple. This diner’s choices contravene property a because he chooses 
y  (nothing) over x  (the apple) in the absence of z  (a second apple), but x  over y  
when z  is an alternative. There is no good reason to think that this agent is ir­
rational, but his preferences do not conform to the axioms of decision theory.
In an example given by Gigerenzer (2000), the presence of an alternative 
provides a clue to the agent about which situation he is in. The agent, again a 
guest at dinner, chooses nothing over snacks that are offered to him, anticipat­
ing a later offer of dinner. When he is also subsequently offered tea and cakes 
he chooses the original snack, since he infers that dinner will not be offered.
108. By ‘chooses x, rejecting y\ I mean that the agent strictly prefers x  to y. Obviously an agent 
who is indifferent between x  and y  could choose x  on one occasion and y  on another without 
contravening any axiom of consistency.
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Again, the addition of an alternative -  tea and cakes, this time -  reverses the 
agent’s previous choice. This agent, like the previous one, is rational, but does 
not come up to the standards required of rational agents by decision theory. 
Such examples provide strong considerations against the contention that con­
formity with the axioms of internal consistency of choice is a hallmark of a ra­
tional agent.
Examples of this kind are, effectively, thought experiments which demon­
strate that axioms of internal consistency as formulated in decision theory are 
not necessarily applicable to the preferences of rational agents. As Sen shows 
(i993> p- 502), there are several kinds of factors which carry more weight than 
internal consistency. As well as “positional choice” illustrated by the apple ex­
ample, and the “epistemic value of the menu”, illustrated by the tea and cakes 
example, there are also cases in which rational agents exercise their “freedom 
to reject”, as in fasting, exhibiting “a desire to violate, deliberately, the standard 
conditions of consistent behavior.” (Sen, 1993, p- 502)
Another fundamental assumption of the decision-theoretic view of ra­
tionality is that an agent has a complete preference relation, where the de­
sirability of any two alternatives is commensurable. This is the property of 
continuity. Contrary to the assumption, it is fairly clear that our preferences 
are not in fact all commensurable. This fact may be easier to accommodate 
within decision theory than it is to accommodate the previous objection that 
sets of preferences are not generally internally consistent. Nonetheless it is 
worth looking at this second criticism because it illustrates one of the central 
problems with classical theories of rationality: global consistency is not a 
plausible requirement.
The requirement of continuity can be expressed as one of the ‘lottery’ ax­
ioms: if there are three alternatives, x, y  and z, x  strictly preferred to y, which 
is strictly preferred to z, then there must be a lottery between x  and z which is 
ranked equal as a choice with y. A lottery is just a list of outcomes (mutually 
exclusive, in this case), each with a probability. Thus if x  is €1000, y  is €500 
and z  is €0, an agent might accept that flipping a coin to decide between x  and 
z  is as desirable as simply receiving y, or he might prefer the chance of x  to be 
higher, say 0.6 or 0.7. W hat is required by the axiom is that there is some
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probability p  < 1, such that a lottery between x  with probability p  and z  with 
probability l - p  is neither preferred to nor rejected in favour of y.
There are plenty of choices of x, y  and z for which intuitively this is false. 
As Simon comments, “all of the available evidence seems to suggest that 
people do not have consistent utility functions, even at a single point of time, 
over all conceivable baskets of goods” (Simon, 2000, p. 37). Dreier (2004) 
gives as an example the choices in (14). In normal circumstances109 no rational 
agent would accept a lottery in which instant death was one of the outcomes.
(14) x: gain a banana, no other change; 
y: no gain or loss; 
z: instant death.
Such examples demonstrate that rational agents do not typically have global 
preference relations over all outcomes. Indeed, with a bit of thought, it is easy 
to find pairs of outcomes which are both desirable but which belong to such 
different spheres that it is hard to know how to say which is preferable. I think 
that, for example, peace in Sudan and a postdoctoral position for me are both 
highly desirable, but I have no idea which I prefer. I suspect that I have no 
stable preference, and that attempts to get me to value them both in some 
common currency (money, for example) would fail because my preference 
would be context sensitive, depending on mood, the background information 
presented with the question and other considerations.
Dreier suggests that non-continuity could be accommodated by having di­
fferent orders of goods. If this kind of solution were pursued, there would be a 
preference relation conforming to the axioms within each order. This amounts 
to partitioning the preferences, or to introducing extra dimensions of prefer­
ence. This kind of partitioning concedes a great deal to bounded rationality, 
since it brings into the model a recognition that rationality does not require 
global consistency. Real rational agents do not make decisions by lining up all
109. This is intended to exclude unusual circumstances in which the agent has such a compel­
ling reason for preferring x  to y  that it is worth risking death to obtain x; also circumstances 
in which the agent rationally prefers death.
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outcom es and going fo r the global m a x im u m . W e  get by instead by m aking  
choices w ith in  lim ite d  areas. Since w e ra re ly  i f  ever have to  choose betw een  
career advancem ent and w o rld  peace it  does n o t m a tte r i f  w e  have no settled  
or consistent preferences over such alternatives.
This discussion illustrates S im o ns p o in t th a t “the c r itic a l scarce fac tor in  
decis ion-m aking  is n o t in fo rm atio n  b u t a tte n tio n . W h a t  w e  a ttend  to, by p lan  
o r by chance, is a m a jo r d e term in a n t o f o u r decisions.” (S im o n , 1997. p. 124) 
W e  m ake choices fro m  the lim ite d  range o f options th a t w e  are considering  at 
any m o m ent. The reason fo r this is n o t a lack o f  in fo rm a tio n  ab o ut th e  value  
o f o ther choices, b u t the lack o f  ab ilities re q u ire d  to  consider and w eigh  up  
sim ultaneously all the things th a t one could  choose to  do. The sam e goes fo r  
theoretica l reasoning: w e do n o t generate and w eigh  up  a ll possible solutions  
to  a problem . D oes th is m ean th a t w e miss good choices o r good solutions?  
The answ er is th a t it  m ust, b u t n o t as m u ch  as one m ig h t im ag ine , since (a) 
the best so lution, o r at least a very  good one, is o ften  in  th e  d o m a in  being  co n ­
sidered; and (b ) th ere  are m echanism s w h ich  can m a ke  th is k in d  o f  local 
search broader i f  necessary and i f  tim e  allows. I f  none o f  th e  options is good  
enough, and th ere  is tim e, none w ill be chosen and n ew  candidates w ill be  
considered, perhaps fro m  a d ifferen t area o r d om ain . I f  I  can n o t find  a good  
fla t in  Lon d on  a fte r some effort, fo r exam ple, I  m ig h t give up  on flats and con­
sider o th er form s o f  shelter, o r I  m ig ht stop loo kin g  in  L o n d o n  and start lo o k ­
ing in  Tokyo. I  am  u n like ly  to look in b o th  places sim ultaneously.
3.1 .2  CONSISTENCY OF BELIEFS
Philosophers have generally  assumed th a t it is n o t ra tio n a l to  have log ically  in ­
consistent beliefs110. F ro m  any tw o  inconsistent propositions, such as som e  
proposition, p, and its negation, -1/7, any a rb itra ry  p ro p o s itio n  fo llow s log ic­
ally. In  psychologically realistic term s, then, a danger posed by inconsistency  
is th at a system fo r generating va lid  inferences, fed a co n trad ic tio n  as in p u t,
110. Without this assumption the much discussed ‘preface paradox’ (Makinson, 1965) loses its 
bite. The idea is that the common practice of acknowledging in the preface to a work that 
the work contains false statements, “appears to present a living and everyday example of a 
situation which philosophers have commonly dismissed as absurd; that it is sometimes ra­
tional to hold logically incompatible beliefs.” (Makinson, 1965, p. 205)
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may reach any conclusion whatever. Consistency is sometimes given as a min­
imum criterion for rationality, as in Elster’s ‘thin theory of rationality':
Consistency, in fact, is what rationality in the thin sense is all about: con­
sistency within the belief system; consistency within the system of desires; 
and consistency between beliefs and desires on the one hand and the ac­
tion for which they are reasons on the other hand. (1983, p. 1)
In fact this criterion is very strong. As previously noted, there are two ways 
that a theory of rationality can be intended or taken. It can be either norm at­
ive or descriptive. A normative theory says what a rational agent should do. A 
descriptive theory tells us what rational agents actually do, either in purely de­
scriptive terms, or in terms of the natural laws that govern them as rational 
agents. There are strong reasons to think that real agents do have inconsistent 
beliefs. Anecdotally, it seems that we often hold beliefs that are inconsistent 
over considerable periods of time, perhaps discovering their inconsistency 
only when it is pointed out. It makes sense theoretically that we should have 
inconsistent beliefs, because we could not check the consistency of our belief 
systems even if we wanted to. As O’Brien says:
... ordinary reasoning would seem to have very little interest in assessing 
the consistency either of large premise sets or of large sets of potential 
theorems, and people often believe in contradictory propositions simul­
taneously without realising that they are doing so. (O'Brien, 2004, pp. 
208-209)
The main theoretical argument that real agents do not check their belief sys­
tems for consistency is that there is no way that they could without computa­
tional explosion. Inconsistency is a property of a set of propositions as a 
whole. One can have direct inconsistency between two propositions in the set 
(e.g. p  and ->p). But there are also inconsistent sets of more than two proposi­
tions in which no two propositions are inconsistent111. Some of these sets are 
such that if any one proposition is removed from the set, the remaining pro­
positions are consistent, as in examples (15) and (16):
111. Cherniak calls such cases ‘tacit inconsistencies’ (1986, p. 16).
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(is) A is taller than B.
B is taller than C.
C is taller than D.
D is taller than A. (Johnson-Laird, 2004, p. 191)
(16) If not A then B 
If B then C
Not A and not C. (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 2000, p. 531)
Such examples establish that in order to ensure that a set of propositions such 
as a belief system is consistent, it is in principle necessary to check the whole 
set for consistency. The trouble with this is that checking a set of propositions 
for consistency is very computationally expensive for anything other than very 
small sets. Using the truth-table method to check the consistency of a set of n 
propositions, a table with 2n rows is required (van Dalen, 2004, p. 20). An 
agent with only one hundred beliefs, checking ten complete rows per second, 
would take more than four thousand billion billion (4 x 1021) years to check its 
belief set for consistency (see Appendix II). The fundamental problem, which 
cannot be finessed by more computationally efficient algorithms, is that the 
task of consistency checking grows exponentially with the number of 
propositions.
In practice, the need for global consistency testing is avoided by (a) se­
gregation of beliefs, (b) the way that cognition is set up so that we are more 
likely to form and store true than false beliefs, and (c) the distinction between 
long-term and short-term memory. There is no general need to check that be­
liefs in different domains are consistent, since they are unlikely to interact, 
and our intuitions reflect that: “You know, or you think you know, that this be­
lief has no bearing on that belief. Your belief, say, that George Bush won the 
2000 presidential election is, you suppose, independent of your belief that wa­
ter contains oxygen.” (Johnson-Laird, 2004, p. 191) There is also no good reas­
on to expend effort in checking the consistency of beliefs if one is reasonably 
confident that they are true, since all true propositions are, of course, consist­
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ent with each other. Given that consistency checking is prohibitively costly, 
one would expect evolved (or well-designed) rational agents to be set up so 
that they mostly avoid storing false beliefs in the first place. Human percep­
tion is mostly veracious, and propositions that come from inference, specula­
tion or testimony from others can be subjected to limited consistency check­
ing before being stored in long-term memory112.
There are differences in what we expect from a rational agent as far as 
consistency is concerned, depending on whether the beliefs are in long-term 
or short-term memory, as Cherniak (1986) points out. It is a common as­
sumption that there are two kinds of memory: long-term memory, a large- 
scale storage area, in which beliefs are stored but not acted on; and short-term 
memory, into which small amounts of information from the senses, from 
long-term memory and from inference is placed for short periods and in 
which active processing occurs. Given that long-term memory is inactive, 
some inconsistency is inevitable between beliefs in long-term memory. This is 
related to the fact that we do not strongly expect people to draw even obvious 
inferences from beliefs in long-term memory. If an agent knows p  -*■ q and 
later learns p, we are not certain that he will conclude q unless the belief p  —• q 
‘comes to mind) i.e. is retrieved into short-term memory.
Rational agents should draw obvious inferences from beliefs in short-term 
memory (Cherniak, 1986, p. 59), and therefore there is good reason for some 
consistency checking of these beliefs to avoid the drawing of arbitrary conclu­
sions. Even for short-term memory, though, it is unlikely that consistency 
checking is exhaustive. Given a short-term memory that holds (e.g.) six pro­
positions, the truth-table method requires a table with sixty-four rows. It is 
more likely that propositions in short-term memory are monitored for direct 
contradiction, so that if two propositions, one of which is the negation of the 
other, are present then the inconsistency is flagged and resolved. Sperber and 
Wilsons deductive device for spontaneous inference works like this (Sperber 
& Wilson, 1986, p. 95). Braine and O’Brien’s mental logic has a rule that flags
112. Testimony can also be assessed on the reliability of the source, but checking the internal 
consistency of what is asserted must often play a role. Sperber has even argued (2000; 2001) 
that the evolutionary function of reasoning ability is its use in evaluating others' assertions 
and the arguments they present to back them up.
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such pairs as inconsistent and in addition a rule that registers inconsistency 
when confronted with pairs of propositions of the forms p, V ...  V  pn and 
-.pl A ... A  ->pn (O'Brien, 2 0 0 4 ,  p. 212).
If the requirement to maintain a completely consistent set of beliefs is 
taken as normative, it is still questionable. Why should an agent eliminate all 
inconsistency? A standard answer might be: because it is irrational to believe 
something that one knows is false, and if one’s belief set is inconsistent then 
the conjunction of all of one’s beliefs is false. But it is not necessary to accept 
that if it is rational to hold each of the beliefs currently in one’s belief set, then 
it is rational to believe the conjunction of one’s beliefs (the ‘Conjunction 
Principle’113).
A reason that might seem more pressing is the aim of eliminating the risk 
of deriving arbitrary conclusions, but there are other ways to avoid this 
danger. W hat is more, since it is impossible in practice for any being that 
works at a finite speed and has more than a handful of beliefs to check the 
consistency of its complete belief set, the norm would be unachievable. There 
are well-known philosophical problems concerning normative rules which it 
is completely infeasible to conform to. I do not know whether !should’ implies 
1can’ is correct as a general rule, but it is at least worth bearing in mind. Per­
haps the correct normative rule is something like: a rational agent should 
eliminate inconsistencies in his belief set when they might be harmful and can 
be detected without undue effort i.e. when it is likely to be worth doing.114
In the preceding sections I have discussed strong consistency require­
ments. I have indicated that there are strong links between global consistency 
and a requirement to optimize or maximize. In the next section, I discuss op­
timisation and maximisation in decision theory and in classical rationality in 
general.
113. The Conjunction Principle has been discussed in the literature on the preface paradox, for 
example in Ryan, 1991; Douven & Uffink, 2003.
114. Cherniak suggests a weaker ‘minimal consistency condition’ as a necessary condition for 
agenthood: “If A has a particular belief-desire set, then if any inconsistencies arose in the 
belief set, A would sometimes eliminate some of them.” (Cherniak, 1986, p. 16)
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3 .1 .3  OPTIM ISATION, M AXIM IZATION AN D CONSTRAINED M AXIM ISATION
Maximizing expected utility is one way of optimizing. Roughly, maximizing 
means making some quantity as large as it can be: for example getting the 
highest return, or acting so as to get the highest expected return. Optimizing 
means doing the best that one can, so in a sense is broader than maximiza­
tion.115 Optimising might require simultaneously maximising several vari­
ables, for example. Sometimes the distinction is not clear or non-existent. The 
norm of classical rationality according to which all beliefs should be consist­
ent can be seen as a requirement both to maximize and to optimize 
consistency.
Although philosophers have placed less stress on maximization of returns 
than decision theorists, many agree with economists that rational agents max­
imize returns, rather than satisfice, moved by considerations like the follow­
ing: If one has reached a satisfactory outcome but could achieve more, it is ra­
tional to do so, all else equal. Sorenson pithily sums up this view: "... 
rationality demands opportunism. Imagine that you are well off but could 
double your fortune merely by lifting a finger. Is it rationally permissible to 
forego lifting a finger?” (Sorensen, 2004, p. 261) This question arises when one 
considers whether a rational agent can constrain his or her future behaviour 
in advance, if doing so would maximize overall returns, but only at the ex­
pense of adopting a principle that requires the agent to turn down the most 
desired option at some point in the future. (McClennen, 1990; Dreier, 2004, 
pp. 163-165; Sorensen, 2004, pp. 260-263)
One reason that this issue has been considered is that there are situations 
in which everyone does better (in the sense that all receive greater returns) if 
individual agents can resist the temptation to maximize at each moment. 
‘Prisoner’s dilemma’ situations are those in which both (or all) participants are 
better off when they both (all) cooperate with each other, than when they both 
(all) do not cooperate, but each agent is better off if he does not cooperate 
when the other one does. The name ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ derives from the 
situation in which two criminals have been captured, both are facing impris­
115. As I discuss below, Simon attacks optimization rather than maximization. I think that the 
reason is that optimization is the broader category.
142
onment, and both are offered a shorter sentence as an incentive to give evid­
ence against the other. If only one gives evidence he is pardoned or receives 
only a token sentence, while the other gets the full sentence for the crime; but 
if both give evidence they both receive heavy sentences. If neither gives evid­
ence then both will receive lighter sentences than if both confess (since it will 
only be possible to convict them of a lesser crime). According to standard 
game theory, a rational agent will not cooperate with the other prisoner in 
such a situation because non-cooperation (giving evidence) makes him better 
off if his opponent cooperates (keeps silent) and better off if his opponent 
does not. The apparent paradox is that both criminals would be better off if 
they both remained silent, receiving the short sentence for the lesser crime, 
but if they are rational by the standards of game theory and decision theory 
they will both confess because doing so maximizes expected utility.
A constrained maximizer (Gauthier, 1986) is an agent who acts according 
to a principle that, were it adopted by others, would make all better off. In 
games of prisoner’s dilemma, a constrained maximizer will cooperate and may 
do much better overall than someone who maximizes at each moment (a 
straightforward maximizer). Some have argued that it is rational to be a con­
strained maximizer (Gauthier, 1986) since constrained maximizers do better 
overall in prisoners dilemma situations. Others have rejected this claim on 
the basis that rational agents must decide what to do on the basis of expected, 
i.e. future  return (Sorensen, 2004), or that a so-called constrained maximizer 
is really just an unconstrained maximizer who happens to prefer cooperating 
and is thus still behaving strictly in accordance with his aim of maximising his 
utility given his preferences when he does so (Dreier, 2004).
What advocates of constrained maximisation and of straightforward max­
imisation agree on, evidently, is the idea that rational agents maximize. The 
mainstream view is that the rational thing to do is to fulfil one’s desires to the 
greatest extent possible, putting aside the issue of whether one’s desires are ra­
tionally justified, that is. So the debate between constrained and straightfor­
ward maximizers is an internal dispute, in contrast to the more fundamental 
disagreement between bounded and classical rationality.
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3.1 .4  ‘a s  if ’ t h e o r ie s  o f  c o g n i t i o n
Simon dubs optimising theories ‘as if’ theories of cognition, since they assume 
that agent’s judgements and choices are as they would be if all solutions were 
somehow considered in the search and accurately assessed in the light of all 
relevant information so that the best is reliably found. As we have seen, ad­
vocates of optimization do not propose procedures that could perform this 
feat. Simon has a useful analogy: optimising solutions model problem solving 
as though it fitted the environment perfectly, like jelly being poured into a 
mould. If you want to know what shape the jelly will be once set, it suffices to 
know the shape of the mould. Similarly, to know what an optimizing system 
will do, it is not necessary to consider the properties of the system. An optim­
izing system will always find the best solution or solutions (the highest point 
once the jelly is turned out), so it is only necessary for the theorist to determ­
ine what these are in order to know what the system will do. This is how a 
great deal of work in economics has been carried out (with the notable recent 
exceptions of developing programmes of research in behavioural economics 
and in cognitive economics). As we have seen, decision theory is an ‘as if’ 
solution in that it treats agents as if they knew everything relevant about the 
problem of what to choose and took it all into account. The claim is that it is 
not necessary to consider how they do this, nor whether they do.
In sum, unbounded rationality suggests “building models that perform as 
well as possible with little or no regard for how time consuming or informa­
tionally greedy such models may be” (Gigerenzer, Czerlinski, & Martignon, 
2002, p. 149). These models will therefore be poor models of human reason­
ing. The alternative is to “design models specifically to fit the peculiar proper­
ties and limits of the mind and the environment” (Gigerenzer, Czerlinski, & 
Martignon, 2002, p. 149), that is, to embark on the programme of bounded 
rationality.
If we assume bounded rationality, then we cannot assume that a system is 
powerful enough to consider the whole space of solutions. Therefore we have 
to consider how the space is explored: what is it that determines which solu­
tions are considered, and in what order? The correct analogy then is not a jelly 
filling an indented surface, but a point object tracing a path across the surface
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(assuming search is serial: it would be two point objects for parallel search; 
several for multiply parallel search).
Then we have to answer the questions: what path is followed, and when 
does search stop? A stopping rule is needed because a search that has unlim­
ited time is unrealistic -  and amounts to optimisation, since the entire surface 
can be explored. What path it is best to follow depends on the structure of the 
environment. In the example given in the introduction of catching a ball, ex­
perienced catchers all attempt to follow a particular path (or rather one of a 
bundle of similar paths) through the problem space, and thus in this case also 
through real space.
A good deal of what counts in some problems may be the point at which 
the search is started: where on the surface the probe is positioned initially. As 
we will see, in some cases, the fastest and most frugal heuristics, the starting 
point is near enough to the stopping point, so search ends after one decision. 
In these cases, much of the work is done by recognition: recognition of the 
type of problem, and therefore which heuristic to apply, and recognition of 
the few important clues in the mass of available information. In other proced­
ures, the path followed and the stopping rule are more important than where 
search starts.
I consider these questions about how to implement bounded rationality in 
section 3.3. Before this, I examine a considerable body of empirical evidence 
that human reasoning widely deviates from the norms of classical rationality.
3.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
3.2.1 OVERVIEW
As well as the strong theoretical considerations in favour of a view of rational­
ity as bounded, there is considerable empirical evidence. In the psychology of 
reasoning and of judgement116, a substantial body of research over the last 
four decades has established that participants in widely differing tasks give re­
116. The usual division in the literature is between reasoning tasks -  those which require logical 
deduction or abduction -  and judgement tasks -  which are intended to test abilities with 
probability and classification. There is also literature on ‘choice’, which might be called the 
psychology of economic decisions.
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sponses that systematically deviate from logical and probabilistic norms of ra­
tionality. (e.g Wason, i960; Wason, 1968b; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; 
Evans, 1989; Manktelow & Over, 1993; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994 is a popular 
survey; Shafir & Leboeuf, 2002 is a recent scholarly survey). (See section 3.2.2 
below for descriptions of experimental tasks.) Participants give answers that 
seem to fly in the face of basic principles of logic and probability theory, 
reaching conclusions that do not follow from the information presented, and 
failing to take into account all of the evidence. The robustness of the results in 
the face of various debiasing techniques such as explicit instruction and re­
duction of cognitive load suggests that the explanation must lie at the level of 
competence, not performance.117 This has been widely taken to have “bleak 
implications for human rationality”. (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975, coined the 
phrase. Their work concerned base-rate neglect in probabilistic reasoning.) It 
is claimed that the results reveal pervasive mental biases best accounted for in 
terms of a strong tendency to use inappropriate non-logical rules or heurist­
ics. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1996; Evans, 1972; Evans, 1984; Evans, 1989; Evans, 2006) There is a 
suggestion in the air, although not made explicitly by those in the heuristics 
and biases school, that the rules of logic and probability are not part of human 
reasoning competence.118 This view, according to Gigerenzer, “has become the 
common wisdom in and beyond psychology” (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, p. 
684).
However, it has also been shown that performance on some reasoning 
tasks can be considerably improved by altering the format of the task without 
changing its logical form. Participants are apparently sensitive to the content 
and context of tasks. Some theorists have argued that this is because the 
format or subject matter of a task may call up dedicated mental machinery. A 
famous example is the proposal that there is a domain-specific adaptation for 
reasoning about social contracts (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Gigerenzer and 
colleagues (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991; Gigerenzer &
117. Although Cohen (1981) argues that such conclusions logically cannot be drawn from such 
experiments.
118. This opinion can be found in popular works, e.g.: “Tversky and Kahneman argue, correctly 
I think, that our minds are not built (for whatever reason) to work by the rules of 
probability” (Gould, 1991, p. 469).
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Hoffrage, 1995; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999) have proposed that working with 
probabilistic data in the form of frequencies evokes different concepts, mental 
models and calculations from those evoked by data encountered as percent­
ages or fractions. Thus under specified circumstances, tasks which use fre­
quency data will receive more accurate answers, possibly reflecting cognitive 
adaptation to the format in which probabilistic data were encountered during 
human evolution.
Gigerenzer and colleagues have also shown, building on work by Simon, 
that computationally simple heuristics can provide answers to some complex 
choice and judgement problems and that the strengths and weaknesses of the 
heuristics match well with human performance. These heuristics are fast and 
frugal, ignore much of the provided information, often involve canonically in­
valid shortcuts, do not obey classical constraints of consistency or transitivity, 
and satisfice rather than maximize.
A factual convergence between the view of rationality provided by the 
psychology of reasoning on the one hand, and by work on simple heuristics 
and on domain-specific abilities on the other, has been noted, for example by 
Samuels, Stich and Bishop (2002; see also Samuels & Stich, 2004). There is a 
consensus that to understand reasoning one has to look at the processes in­
volved: the aim is “to understand the cognitive processes that produce both 
valid and invalid judgments” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996, p. 582, cited with 
agreement in Gigerenzer, 1996, p. 592). These processes are often fast and 
simple and the results they produce cannot be predicted by assuming that 
cognition will find logically normative answers or a perfect match to the en­
vironment. Reasoning is, in a word, bounded.
A sign that the debate has largely been won by proponents of bounded ra­
tionality is that much discussion has shifted to other areas. One question 
which has attracted considerable attention over the last decade is whether 
there are two reasoning systems, one more classical and one ‘quick-and-dirty’. 
It has been proposed that there is a correlation with the machinery used, so 
that analytical, normative reasoning is conscious and effortful, and distinct 
from non-canonical fast, subconscious (or unconscious) reasoning processes 
(Evans, 1984; Evans, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 1998; Evans, 
2003). (See chapter 4.)
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In a way, this latter work has been an attempt to see how bounded ration­
ality arises, as well as, more obviously, to explain how it fits with our intuitions 
about logical norms. In various schools of thought it is now assumed that hu­
man reasoning is bounded and to be investigated in terms of the procedures 
and mental representations it employs. In the simple heuristics school, work 
continues on finding heuristics that apply to different tasks and finding com­
mon elements of heuristics (tools from an ‘adaptive toolbox’) that apply across 
domains (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 2000). As discussed in the 
previous section, there are signs that economics is beginning to come to terms 
with bounded rationality (Conlisk, 1996 argues that it must). In contrast with 
these fields, cognitive psychology, since the inception of an information pro­
cessing model, has always been an investigation into the properties of mental 
processes as processes, rather than into properties of their outcomes, as Simon 
(2000) points out. Work here is several decades deep119, even if in the sub- 
field of psychology of reasoning models of rationality are only now being ad­
apted to fit. Psychologists have also, ironically, been more concerned than 
economists with the tradeoff between costs of decision making and accuracy 
(Conlisk, 1996, p. 671) (although plenty of psychological models are 
unbounded (Gigerenzer, 2004)120).
Disagreement remains over the appropriateness of answers that do not 
match normative criteria. Some commentators continue to view the results as 
a bleak indication that normative standards are not met. Thus in a review art­
icle, Shafir and Leboeuf claim that "research on reasoning has continued to 
document persistent and systematic shortcomings in reasoning abilities,” 
(2002, p. 494) and “people often violate tenets of rationality in inadvisable 
ways,” (2002, p. 491). There is agreement on the experimental results, but still 
considerable disagreement over their interpretation. Although Samuels et al.
119. Although some processing models in which mental processes mirror classical norms have 
been proposed in recent decades, for example, mental logic for deductive reasoning (dis­
cussed in chapter 2) and broadly Bayesian learning mechanisms such as weighted associative 
networks as the basis of probabilistic judgements (e.g. Lopez, Cobos, Cano, & Shanks, 
undated).
120. “Optimization, with or without constraints, has also spread beyond economics. Psycholo­
gists often propose models of cognition that assume almost unlimited memory, storage ca­
pacities, and computational power. That is, many psychologists also build ‘as if’ models of 
behavior.” (Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 391)
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show convincingly that the heuristics and biases school, pace Gigerenzer, is 
not committed to the view that the rules of logic and probability are not part 
of human reasoning competence, real disagreements remain. On one side we 
have Shafir and Leboeuf: “People use intuitive strategies and simple heuristics 
that are reasonably effective some of the time but that also produce biases and 
lead to systematic error” (2002, p. 493)- On the other is Gigerenzer:
The study of cognitive errors has been dominated by a logical definition of 
errors. But this narrow norm tends to mistake forms of human intelli­
gence that go beyond logic for stupid blunders, and consequently fails to 
unravel the laws of mind. (2005, p. 3)
The disagreement is not merely a matter of temperament and outlook. There 
is substantive disagreement over the appropriateness of applying context-in­
dependent norms to human reasoning. Gigerenzer has criticised research 
which is content to show systematic deviations from norms by eliciting re­
sponses which diverge from normative answers without proposing specific 
models of how participants reason. Without knowing what mental formats 
and processes are involved one cannot tell what rules (normative or other­
wise) are being used. The mental processes and formats employed by parti­
cipants depend on the format, context and content of the task, so research 
should be sensitive to these factors.
If the content and context of a task is recognised as important, then the 
participant’s interpretation of the communicative acts involved must be seen 
as playing a fundamental role, as Cohen recognised (Cohen, 1981). The reason 
is that “content-blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which 
humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and prag­
matic inferences.” (Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999, p. 275, see also Gigerenzer, 
1996). The interpretation of the communicative acts involved in reasoning 
tasks is of fundamental importance to what the task is, and what conclusions 
are seen as worth deriving, and therefore to the performance of participants 
on the task (and to the assessment of their performance). Equipped with a 
pragmatic theory and some general assumptions about cognition -  much of 
the work along these lines has used the tools of relevance theory -  one can 
show, first, that reaching conclusions that are not deducible from the premises
1 4 9
on their own is not illogical or irrational, and secondly, that it is to be expec­
ted that participants will infer conclusions that are relevant in preference to 
ones that are true but trivial or absurd, even if extra premises must be sup­
plied to do so. These aspects of performance are, in particular, compatible 
with a theory that has it that reasoners seek relevant conclusions under the 
constraint that their conclusions are logically warranted by the presented 
premises together with some other information or principles. Thus we return 
to the Gricean themes that much reasoning involves unstated premises and 
that (some) reasoning, working fast, nonetheless aims at canonical validity.
3 .2 .2  BLEAK IMPLICATIONS FOR RATIONALITY?
As an example of the work in psychology of reasoning that has been seen as 
having bleak implications for rationality, consider first Wason’s selection task 
(Wason, 1966; Wason, 1968b). Four cards are presented, for example those in 
figure 1, together with a conditional statement ‘If a card has a 6 on the front it 
has an E on the back!
6 4 E A
Figure 1: Wason selection task
The participant is asked which of the cards should be turned over to check the 
truth of the conditional statement. The normative response is 6 and A. If the 
card with a 6  on it does not have an E  on the back then the proposed rule is 
falsified. The proposed rule has the structure: IfP  then Q. For the first card, we 
know that P is true (a 6 is printed on one side of the card), so if the rule holds, 
then by modus ponens, Q must be true -  there must be an E printed on the 
other side of the card. If there is no E on the other side then we have not-Q  
and we must give up P or i f  P then Q (or the rule of modus ponens). We have 
the evidence of our eyes for P, so the proposed conditional must be given up. 
Similarly, for the fourth card -  the card with an A  on it -  if there is a 6 on the 
other side then the rule cannot be true. To repeat, the rule is of the form: I fP
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then Q. We know that the negation of Q is true, since there is an A on the 
card, not an E. Assuming the truth of the rule, then by modus tollens we have 
not-P. If the card actually has a 6 on it (P) then we have inconsistency and will 
have to drop our supposition that the proposed rule holds.
Another way of seeing the same point is to note that since the rule is of 
the form If P then Q, the only possible configuration that a card could have 
that is incompatible with the rule is P and not-Q. Thus the P  card should be 
chosen, to see whether it has not-Q  on the other side, and the not-Q  card 
should be chosen to see whether it has P on the other side.
The normative answer is typically given by only a small percentage of par­
ticipants. The rate at which it has occurred is not significantly different from 
the chance percentage of 6.25 (Noveck & O'Brien, 1996). The P card is chosen 
on the majority of trials, but the not-Q  card is generally not chosen. More of­
ten the Q card is chosen, although it is logically irrelevant to testing the pro­
posed rule: from Q and ifP  then Q neither P  nor not-P  follows, so whatever is 
on the other side of the card, this card will be compatible with the proposed 
rule.
These results have been reproduced many times with numerous variations 
on the task and materials. For the abstract version of the selection task (i.e. 
with abstract material such as letters and digits printed on the cards) the res­
ults have been rather robust121. Similarly poor performance has been observed 
in other experiments intended as tests of logical reasoning, such as the 2-4-6 
task and relational problems (see below for descriptions). (For reviews see 
Manktelow, 1999; Johnson-Laird, 1999.)
Equally striking deviation from norms of rationality has been seen in ex­
periments in which participants are asked to work with probabilities. In the 
Linda task, the so-called ‘conjunction fallacy’ is exhibited. Participants are giv­
en a description of a woman, Linda, and asked to rate various propositions 
concerning her in order of their probability. The relevant propositions are 
‘Linda is a bank-teller’ (A), ‘Linda is active in the feminist movement’ (B), and 
‘Linda is a bank-teller and active in the feminist movement’ (A and B). The de­
121. The exception is the manipulations of relevance carried out by Sperber et al. (1995). The ab­
stract form of the deontic-rule selection task often elicits normative answers, but this is a 
distinct task (see below), as Griggs and Cox (1993) argue.
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scription does not entail any of these, but makes it clear that Linda’s politics 
are liberal or progressive. Most participants rate the option A and B as more 
likely than A on its own. This ranking apparently violates the principle of 
probability theory that the probability of a conjunction of events cannot be 
greater than the probability of any one of the events: P(A and B) < P(A)122 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
The judgment-heuristics school of thought has stressed the negative im­
plications of experiments like these for human rationality. (See Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982, for the heuristics and biases programme.) The claim is 
that such results show that participants use simple non-logical heuristics, 
rather than normative rules of logic, to reach their judgements. For example, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) proposed that in the Linda task, the proposi­
tions are ranked according to a ‘representativeness heuristic’, where represent­
ativeness is a measure of the correspondence between the description and the 
proposition in question. The idea is that being a feminist is representative of 
the description given about Linda, whereas being a bank clerk is unrepresent­
ative. Being both is somewhat representative and somewhat unrepresentative 
and is therefore ranked more likely than being a bank clerk but less likely than 
being a feminist.123
Generalising, the idea is that non-logical considerations such as the simil­
arity between evidence and conclusions (‘representativeness’), what comes to 
mind easily (‘availability’) and what is presented first (‘anchoring’), collectively 
take precedence over such factors as the logical structure of the conclusions, 
their logical relation to the evidence and the confidence with which evidence 
is known. This kind of account has gained wide acceptance as an explanation 
for various deviations from norms in probabilistic reasoning, including parti­
cipants’ overconfidence (and occasional underconfidence) in their own judge­
122. This law is a special case of a more general principle which can be seen as concerning im­
plication or extension: if the extension of X  is a subset of the extension of Y, i.e. X  implies Y, 
then P(X) S P(Y) (Politzer & Noveck, 1991, p. 90; Bonini, Tentori, & Osherson, 2004, p. 
200).
123. A similarly structured problem is as follows: estimate the probabilities of a) a flood some­
where in North America during 1983, in which 1000 people drown; b) an earthquake in Cali­
fornia during 1983, causing a flood in which 1000 people drown. Since the b events form a 
subset of the a events, b cannot be more likely than a, but participants reliably rank b as 
more likely than a.
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ments, overestimation of probabilities, and the neglect of base rates (for the 
last of these see below).
In a similar vein, Evans (1972; 1998; Evans & Lynch, 1973) gives an account 
of the abstract selection task in terms of a matching bias: a tendency to choose 
as answers the cards on which the symbols match the ones in the proposed 
rule. On Evans’ account, the matching bias arises from the interaction of two 
heuristics: a ‘matching-heuristic’ that selects based purely on lexical similarity 
and an ‘if-heuristic’ that prefers material found in the antecedent of a condi­
tional to material found in the consequent.
Evans’ explanation has been attacked as little more than a redescription of 
the data124. Roberts characterises (but does not endorse) this view: “Why do 
people match? Because of the action of the matching heuristic. How do we 
know that a matching heuristic is applied? Because people show matching be­
haviour.”125 (Roberts, 2004, p. 248) In reply to such objections, Evans has 
maintained that the reasoning bias stems from, and should therefore be de­
tectable in, an attentional bias to the matching cards: that “many [parti­
cipants] decide first and think afterwards” (Evans, 1996, p. 238). He and 
Roberts and Newton have found some supporting evidence (Evans, 1996; 
Roberts & Newton, 2001), and Evans maintains that the matching-heuristic 
and the if-heuristic are predictive of behaviour and well-supported by experi­
mental evidence on the selection task and other tasks (Evans, 1999).
Despite the proliferation of studies, there is no real agreement about the 
explanations for participants’ choices on the selection task: “The selection 
task... has launched a thousand studies, but the literature has grown faster 
than knowledge” (Johnson-Laird, 19 9 9 . p. 127)- There has been less consensus 
about the matching bias account of the selection task than about Kahneman 
and Tversky's judgment-heuristic approach in probabilistic reasoning. Altern­
ative explanations have been given in terms of mental models (Johnson-Laird
124. See also footnote 128 below for similar comments from Gigerenzer, aimed at work on 
heuristics in economics as well as in psychology.
125. Compare with Nietzsche’s objection to Kant:
“How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?” Kant asked himself -  and what really 
is his answer? By virtue of a faculty... But, is that -  an answer? An explanation? Or is it 
not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? "By vir­
tue of a faculty," namely the virtus dormitiva, replies the doctor in Moliere ... But such 
replies belong in comedy... (Nietzsche, 1968, pp. 208-209)
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& Byrne, 1991), and in terms of Bayesian calculations of the probability of 
falsifying instances, on the assumption that participants see the task in terms 
of data selection for inductive hypothesis testing (Oaksford & Chater, 1993)- 
Analyses in terms of mental models, heuristics and biases and Bayesian 
inference have been also been given for other logical reasoning tasks, again 
with no real consensus reached on the mental processes involved. However 
the mainstream opinion in psychology appears to be that the mental biases 
are real, and the pessimistic conclusion is often reached that the literature es­
tablishes that human reasoning disregards basic logic and goes wrong on 
simple deductive tasks126. Shafir and Leboeuf, for example, summarise the 
work on logical (as opposed to probabilistic) reasoning tasks thus: “All told, 
research on [logical] reasoning has continued to document persistent and sys­
tematic shortcomings in reasoning abilities” (2002, p. 494)-
A more realistic assessment, in my opinion, is that the research helps to 
undermine the idea that human reasoning exhibits classical, unbounded ra­
tionality. Predictions of participants’ responses based on the idea that they 
will simply conform to rules of logic or probability theory are generally wide 
of the mark. That is, one cannot know what answers people will give to reas­
oning problems without considering the way they reason. This is not to say 
that people reason poorly, or irrationally (or not at all). Rather, the content 
and the context of reasoning tasks can reasonably affect the way that parti­
cipants tackle them.
As mentioned in the overview, one way in which these factors play a role 
is in their influence on the interpretation of the task. It is not just that parti­
cipants may pragmatically infer logically richer premises on conversational 
grounds, but more generally that what participants do and the conclusions 
they reach may very reasonably depend on what they infer about the task that 
they have been asked to perform. I discuss this line of research, including 
Sperber and colleagues’ convincing relevance-theoretic explanation of the se­
lection task, below.
126. This opinion is not necessarily shared by advocates of explanation of performance on lo­
gical tasks in terms of Bayesian reasoning. But they have not shown how such Bayesian in­
ference is actually carried out: “there is, as yet, no corresponding theory of the mental pro­
cesses underlying performance” (Johnson-Laird, 1999, p. 127)
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A (compatible) observation is that to understand reasoning, and cognition 
generally, one needs to look both at the cognitive strategies employed by the 
mind and also at the structure of the environment. These are the two blades of 
Simon's scissors: “Human rational behavior (and the rational behavior of all 
physical symbol systems) is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the 
structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the act­
or” (Simon, 1990, p. 7). Much work in the psychology of reasoning has fo­
cussed on the cognitive blade and neglected the importance of the match 
between the cognitive capacities used and the environment of the task. Thus 
the conclusion of bleak implications for human rationality has been drawn be­
cause the wrong criteria are used. Performance is compared with laws of logic 
or probability rather than the environment, but “to evaluate cognitive 
strategies as rational or irrational, one also needs to analyze the environment, 
because a strategy is rational or irrational only with respect to an environ­
ment, physical or social” (Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 397). Thus Simon’s observation 
is of considerable importance for the psychology of reasoning, cutting the 
ground out from under the ‘bleak implications' school of thought127. The ob­
servation also underpins Gigerenzer’s simple heuristics programme, which I 
return to below. Here I consider a corollary, also of importance for the psy­
chology of reasoning: “apparently stable cognitive illusions can be made to 
disappear and reappear by varying crucial structures of the environment.” 
(Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 397)
Gigerenzer and colleagues and evolutionary psychologists have stressed 
that performance seen as problematic on reasoning tasks is often much im­
proved when the information is presented differently, even if the task is form­
ally equivalent. Distinct cognitive systems may have evolved for reasoning in 
different domains, that is, for dealing with input with certain types of content, 
in a particular context. Explanations along these lines have been offered for 
success on a deontic version of the selection task. Differences might also be 
due to adaptation to certain formats of information so that, for example, it 
may be easier to reason about frequencies of events than about probabilities, 
rather as long division is harder with roman numerals than with the familiar 
base-ten format (see Dehaene, 1999, p. 98ff, on the ‘place-value principle’).
1 2 7 . Gigerenzer calls it “the study of cognitive illusions and errors” ( 2 0 0 4 ,  p. 3 9 7 ) .
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It has been known for some time that frequency data can facilitate per­
formance on probabilistic reasoning tasks. Teigen (1974) used formally equi­
valent questions asking the participant to estimate either the probability of a 
randomly chosen X (e.g. female student at the university of Bergen) being a Y 
(e.g. over 160 cm tall), or the number of Xs which are Y we would find if we 
checked a particular number (e.g. 500) of Xs, and found overestimation in the 
probability format but more realistic estimates with frequencies. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983), early in their work on the conjunction fallacy, found that 
conjunction violations occur less on frequency judgements. Further research 
has shown that frequency formats can reduce incidence of the conjunction 
fallacy considerably (from around 80% to as low as 10%) (Fiedler, 1988; 
Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999). Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbolting (1991) 
found that overconfidence in one's own answers to general knowledge ques­
tions could be made to disappear completely when judgements of the likely 
number of correct answers were elicited rather than the probability that a par­
ticular answer is correct. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995; see also Gigerenzer, 
2000, ch. 7) found that participants’ answers on Bayesian reasoning problems 
of the type that normally elicit neglect of base rates are closer to those re­
garded as normative when the probability data are presented as frequencies of 
events rather than fractions.
These results may reflect the facts that the natural way to learn about the 
probabilities of events is to observe a natural sample of events128 and tally fre­
quencies (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), and that humans are relatively good 
at processing and storing frequency data and do so with little effort:
A large literature suggests that (a) memory is often (but not always) excel­
lent in storing frequency information and (b) the registering of event oc­
currences for frequency judgements is a fairly automatic cognitive process 
requiring very little attention or conscious effort (Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 
137)
However this work goes further, proposing specific models and procedures 
for reasoning about confidence (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991)
128. A natural sample is ope that is not chosen to include or exclude certain events, so that 
event frequencies should reflect underlying probabilities.
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and for Bayesian reasoning (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995)129. Because of the 
explicit models, predictions can be nuanced and precise. Gigerenzer et al. 
(1991) predict under what conditions frequency judgements are more accurate 
than judgements of probability, but also when frequency judgements will be 
inaccurate, and explain why (Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 158). Gigerenzer and 
Hoffrage show how the calculations required for judgements of frequencies 
based on remembered numbers of events are computationally less demanding 
than those required for probability judgements. Given data in the frequency 
format, simple calculations produce Bayesian answers without the need to 
keep track of or mentally represent base rates (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995)- 
A number of theorists have proposed that humans are good at reasoning 
in specific domains. For example Cosmides and Tooby and colleagues 
(Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Cosmides, Tooby, Fiddick, & 
Bryant, 2005) propose that we have an evolved domain-specific mental mech­
anism for detecting violations of social contracts -  a so-called ‘cheater detec­
tion’ faculty. This has been taken to explain the much better performance seen 
with the selection task when it involves checking to see whether a social rule 
has been obeyed. Earlier work by Cheng and Holyoak and colleagues (Cheng 
& Holyoak, 1985; Cheng & Holyoak, 1989; Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 
1986; Kroger, Cheng, & Holyoak, 1993) offered a similar explanation in terms 
of domain-specific pragmatic reasoning schemas dedicated to reasoning 
about permission or obligation. Before Cheng and Holyoak’s work, facilitation 
had been found with descriptive (as opposed to abstract) versions of the selec­
tion task, e.g. versions which used a realistic rule about events and put de­
scriptions of events on the cards130. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) showed that
129. Gigerenzer (1996) accuses the heuristics and biases school of failing to propose specific 
models of thought:
the sheer proliferation of studies is not always identical to progress. An ever-larger col­
lection of empirical results, especially results that seem to vary from study to study in 
apparently mysterious ways, can be more confusing than clarifying. If the psychology of 
judgment ultimately aims at an understanding of how people reason under a bewilder­
ing variety of circumstances, then descriptions, however meticulous and thorough, will 
not suffice. In place of plausible heuristics that explain everything and nothing -  not 
even the conditions that trigger one heuristic rather than another -  we will need mod­
els that make surprising (and falsifiable) predictions and that reveal the mental pro­
cesses that explain both valid and invalid judgment. (1996, p. 595)
130. The first study which found facilitation using descriptive content was Wason & Shapiro,
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the facilitation was seen in an abstract deontic task but not in a descriptive 
non-deontic task. I give a typical descriptive, deontic task below. A further di­
fference from Wason’s task is that in deontic versions the task is typically to 
see whether a rule, known to be in force, is being observed, whereas Wason’s 
task asks participants to discover whether or not a proposed rule is correct 
(Griggs & Cox, 1993; see also Girotto, Kemmelmeier, Sperber, & van der 
Henst, 2001).131
Most participants give the normative P and not-Q  response (cards 1 and 4) 
to the following version of the selection task:
imagine that you are a police officer on duty. It is your job to ensure that 
people conform to certain rules. The cards in front of you have informa­
tion about four people sitting at a table. On one side of a card is a person’s 
age and on the other side is what the person is drinking. Here is a rule: i f  
A PERSON IS DRINKING BEER THEN THAT PERSON MUST BE OVER 19 
y e a r s  o f  a g e .  Select the card or cards that you definitely need to turn 
over to determine whether or not the people are violating the rule. (Griggs 
& Cox, 1982, p. 415)
Figure 2: Deontic selection task (Adapted from Griggs & Cox, 1982)
There may well be domain-specific reasoning capabilities of the types pro­
posed by Cosmides and Tooby or Cheng and Holyoak. However the results 
from the deontic selection task and other reasoning tasks do not necessarily 
support this hypothesis because there is a relevance-theoretic explanation of 
greater generality. Relevance theory explains what factors make selections of
1971.
i3i.Noveck and O’Brien (1996) carried out experiments in which the factors abstract/descript­
ive, reasoning from a rule/reasoning about a rule, and deontic/non-deontic were crossed.
158
each card more likely in both Wason’s selection task and the deontic selection 
task (see section 3.2.4 below).
3.2 .3  LIMITS OF THE EMERGING CONSENSUS
The heuristics and biases school, evolutionary psychologists and the simple 
heuristics programme all endorse the view that human reasoning is 
boundedly rational. I agree with Samuels et al ( 2 0 0 2 )  that the pictures of hu­
man reasoning given by these different schools are largely congruent and that 
some apparent disagreements are mainly a matter of emphasis or rhetoric. 
The heuristics and biases school’s claim that “people’s intuitive judgements on 
a large number of problems ... regularly deviate from appropriate norms of ra­
tionality” (Samuels, Stich, & Bishop, 2 0 0 2 ,  p. 2 4 0 ) is indeed entirely compat­
ible with the claims of the opposing school that “there are many reasoning 
problems ... on which people’s intuitive judgements do not differ from appro­
priate norms of rationality.” (Samuels, Stich, & Bishop, 2 0 0 2 ,  p. 2 4 4 ) .  There is 
also some consensus that the format or content of problems can affect the ac­
curacy of the treatment that they receive.
As Samuels et al. note, there remain serious disagreements about human 
rationality which hinge on the correct interpretation of probability theory, 
which is outside the scope of this thesis132. However I have tried to show that 
the consensus breaks down at another important point. That is the question of 
whether there is only one correct (i.e. rational) answer to the problems stud­
ied. Psychologists of reasoning generally assume that there is a unique norm ­
132. Samuels et al. discuss the role that differing theories of probability play in disagreement 
between Gigerenzer and Kahneman and Tversky. Kahneman and Tversky treat single-event 
probabilities as respectable theoretical entities. Gigerenzer endorses the frequentist inter­
pretation of probability theory on which single-event probabilities are nonsensical. Samuels 
et al. say that (regardless of which is the correct interpretation of probability theory): “evolu­
tionary psychologists cannot comfortably maintain both (a) that we don’t violate appropriate 
norms of rationality when reasoning about the probabilities of single events and (b) that 
reasoning improves when single event problems are converted into a frequentist format.” 
But I think that this is wrong. A frequentist could continue to assert (a) on the grounds that 
there are no appropriate norms which validly apply to single events, while claiming (b) that 
a frequency format improves reasoning, on the grounds that reasoning about single event 
probabilities is simply a confused attempt to reason about real probabilities (in the frequent­
ist sense) and that translating the problem into a frequentist format facilitates such 
reasoning.
159
ative answer to each reasoning problem. Gigerenzer is more concerned with 
the rationality of cognitive strategies than answers. W hether an answer is ra­
tional depends on whether the strategy or heuristic that produced it is ration­
al, and rationally applied. According to this school of thought, good perform­
ance on reasoning problems is a matter of having the right tool for each kind 
of task in one’s toolbox and using it appropriately. Some experimental tasks do 
not test the abilities they have been thought to probe. There is a sense in 
which the correct answer to Wason’s selection task is to pick the P and not-Q 
cards. But Sperber et al.’s work on the selection task shows that there are other 
cards which participants can pick, working on perfectly rational assumptions.
Before moving on to look at this and related work on the interpretation of 
tasks, I want to note that at least one so-called bias is best seen as evidence of 
participants’ possession of rationality and common sense. W hen participants 
are presented with a complete syllogism and asked to evaluate the proposed 
conclusion on the basis of the premises presented, participants are more likely 
to endorse conclusions that are believable on the basis of general knowledge 
(e.g. “some babies cry”) than conclusions that are unbelievable on that basis 
(e.g. “no babies drink milk”). It might seem that this is a failure of rationality: 
after all, as the task is set up, only the logical relationship between the 
premises and the proposed conclusion is relevant. Things are not so simple. It 
is rational to make use of general knowledge when evaluating conclusions in 
certain circumstances. One such circumstance is when a proposed conclusion 
does not follow with necessity from the premises provided, but is compatible 
with them. Here, even if the premises are accepted, the premises provide in­
sufficient information to decide whether the proposed conclusion is true, and 
it is then perfectly rational to turn to general knowledge in deciding whether 
to endorse it. On the other hand, if the proposed conclusion is incompatible 
with the premises, then it can be ruled out on that basis. It turns out that the 
belief effect is much larger when the conclusion is possible but not necessary 
relative to the premises than when it is incompatible with the premises. In­
deed when the conclusion to be evaluated is logically incompatible with the 
premises the belief effect has been found to be very small or not present at all 
(Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992).
1 6 0
An intermediate case is when the proposed conclusion follows with ne­
cessity from the premises. It could be accepted on that basis, but it is plausible 
that at least sometimes people would apply a believability filter, rejecting a 
conclusion on the basis that its clash with general knowledge is more import­
ant than its following from the premises supplied (which may themselves be 
implausible). So if participants decide rationally then there should be a large 
belief effect when the premises neither necessitate nor rule out the conclu­
sion, and a smaller belief effect when the premises necessitate the conclusion. 
That is exactly what has been found to be the case (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 
1983). One could only say that these results support the claim that there is a 
belief bias if one assumes that the best description is that participants are do­
ing poorly on the (rather obscure) task of judging what follows with logical 
necessity from arbitrary premises. The more obvious description is that it 
shows that there is a perfectly rational belief effect. Participants take the task 
to be the commonly encountered one of assenting to a conclusion (or with­
holding consent). They work out the logical relationship between the premises 
and the conclusion, and bring general knowledge to bear in precisely the situ­
ations when it makes sense to do so.
3 .2 .4  PRAGMATICS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING
Semantic inferences -  how one infers the meaning of polysemous terms 
such as probable from the content of a sentence (or the broader context of 
communication) in practically no time -  are extraordinarily intelligent 
processes. They are not reasoning fallacies. No computer program, to say 
nothing of the conjunction rule, has yet mastered this form of intelligence. 
Significant cognitive processes such as these will be overlooked and even 
misclassified as “cognitive illusions” by content-blind norms. (Gigerenzer, 
1996, p. 593)
There is now a considerable body of work showing that pragmatic factors play 
a role in reasoning experiments, including work by Politzer (1990; 2005) on 
reasoning from statements containing quantifiers; by Schwarz, Strack, Hilton 
and Naderer (1991). Macchi (1995) and Politzer and Macchi (2005) on reason­
ing with base rates; by Dulany and Hilton (1991) and Politzer and Noveck
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(1991) on the Linda problem; by Politzer & Nguyen-Xuan (1992) on reasoning 
about conditional promises and warnings; by Sperber and colleagues (Sperber, 
Cara, & Girotto, 1995; Girotto, Kemmelmeier, Sperber, & van der Henst, 2001; 
Sperber & Girotto, 2002) on the Wason and deontic selection tasks; by van 
der Henst, Politzer and Sperber (2002) on relational problems; and by van der 
Henst (2006) on the ‘2-4-6’ problem. (Hilton, 1995; Politzer, 2004 are general 
papers). The need to look into how reasoners interpret the tasks they are giv­
en was identified by Cohen (1981). As Cohen says:
it is always necessary to consider whether the dominant responses given 
by subjects in such [reasoning] experiments should be taken, on the as­
sumption that they are correct, as indicating how the task is generally un­
derstood -  instead of as indicating, on the assumption that the task is un­
derstood exactly in the way intended, what errors are being made. 
(Cohen, 1992, p. 419)
Psychologists have long been aware that one can only show that mistakes in 
reasoning are being made if participants’ mental representation of the inform­
ation given is as intended. The contribution that utterance interpretation 
makes to the way a participant represents a task has not always been appreci­
ated, however (Hilton, 1995).
At the most straightforward, the interpretation of the information presen­
ted may involve pragmatic enrichment, so that participants are not necessarily 
reasoning from some kind of literal, bare-bones interpretation of the informa­
tion explicitly given in the task. Politzer and Noveck (1991), show that on 
Gricean or relevance-theoretic grounds, participants in the Linda task might 
enrich the A response (‘Linda is a bank teller') to A and not-B (Linda is a bank 
teller and not a feminist). Thus when these participants rate the A  state as 
more probable than the A and B state, they are actually saying that A and not- 
B is more probable than A  and B. This does not contravene any rules of 
probability.
This sort of consideration is now acknowledged in the literature, so that 
researchers wanting to demonstrate mental bias now attempt to factor out 
variant interpretations, for example by explicitly including an A and not-B 
choice in conjunction problems on the assumption that that would make it
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“pragmatically impossible” to interpret the A  choice as A and not-B (Tentori, 
Bonini, & Osherson, 2004). While the manipulations attempted may some­
times be pragmatically naive133, it is clear that variation of interpretation 
depending on the circumstances of communication is at least recognised as a 
factor.
W hat has not been so widely appreciated thus far is that subtler factors to 
do with communication also need to be considered. On Gricean grounds, 
communicative acts carry a presumption that they will meet certain stand­
ards. Grice set out such standards in the conversational maxims. Utterances 
should be truthful, informative, perspicuous, relevant and so on. In relevance 
theory, similar work is done by the presumption of optimal relevance. Many 
reasoning tasks are pragmatically odd from this point of view. (See the discus­
sion of van der Henst’s work on the ‘2-4-6’ problem, below.) For example, in 
conjunction problems, to find the normative answer the participant needs to 
realise that only the form of the answer matters, and A  should be rated more 
probable than A and B. But it is pragmatically odd that an interlocutor would 
go to such lengths as in the Linda task to convey a description that she knows 
is of no relevance to the matter in hand, so the task is systematically mislead­
ing. Studies that ask participants to bet repeatedly on options with different 
content but always of the form A  and A and B (Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & 
Viale, 2002) -  or A  and A and B and A and not-B (Tentori, Bonini, & 
Osherson, 2004) -  may be even more pragmatically strange. The normative 
response is to ignore all of the content and bet on the A  option all down the 
line. But the act of uttering all of the content of the questions raises the pre­
133. For example, the paper cited in the text does not explain what makes an A and not-B inter­
pretation pragmatically impossible, and offers an odd choice between three options that are 
not mutually exclusive. Compare with the distinctly strange, ??Do you own a) a bicycle; b) a 
bicycle and a car; c) a bicycle and no car?
Sides, Osherson, Bonini and Viale (2002) assumed that the A and not-B interpretation 
could be suppressed by telling participants that their chosen response would be shown to an 
independent judge who could not read the other response. Since the judge sees only A when 
A has been chosen the judge will not have pragmatic grounds for an A and not-B interpreta­
tion. Sides et al. optimistically assume that subjects will work this out and that this will in­
fluence their own interpretation to the extent that they do not interpret A and not-B as A.
Both of these studies have a further pragmatic oddity. They ask the participants to place 
bets on a series of choices, where the normative answer is to ignore all of the content of the 
choices and bet repeatedly on the A option. See the main text for discussion of this point.
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sumption that it must be relevant to the task, rendering it unlikely that parti­
cipants will simply ignore it. Unsurprisingly, both studies found that almost 
no participants bet only on A  options.
Even some work that has focussed on the effects of utterance interpreta­
tion has understated its potential influence. Pace Hilton, the influence of u t­
terance interpretation systems on performance in reasoning tasks need not be 
confined to a “front end component that determines how the incoming mes­
sage is interpreted in its context” (Hilton, 1995, p. 249), or at least in some 
cases this ‘front end’ may do all of the work. On some tasks, the mental sys­
tems devoted to utterance interpretation may totally pre-empt domain-gen­
eral or domain-specific reasoning systems. Sperber and colleagues have 
demonstrated that performance on the selection tasks (deontic and non-de- 
ontic) can best be understood -  and manipulated -  in this way.
Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1 9 9 5 ) argue that what underlies successful per­
formance on the selection task is not a domain-specific faculty such as a 
cheater detection mechanism or a pragmatic permission schema but pragmat­
ic factors affecting interpretation of the conditional statement. They state that 
what matters is the way that the proposed rule achieves relevance.
Relevance theory is a general theory of cognition which defines relevance 
as a property of inputs to cognitive processes. Recall that the relevance of an 
input is a positive function of the cognitive effects achieved by processing it 
and a negative function of the effort required to process it. In the case of os- 
tensive-inferential communication, utterances create a presumption of optim­
al relevance: the hearer is entitled to assume that an utterance is at least relev­
ant enough to be worth processing, and what is more, is the most relevant one 
compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences. This means that the 
hearer is justified in following a path of least effort in deriving the explicit 
meaning and implications of an utterance, stopping when an interpretation 
has been reached that satisfies his expectations of relevance. This is the relev­
ance theoretic comprehension procedure. (This approach to ostensive inferen­
tial communication is set out in Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Sperber & Wilson, 
1995; the term ‘relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure’ was introduced 
in Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, i995> and discussed in Sperber & Wilson, 1995.)
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From the definition of relevance as a positive function of cognitive effects and 
a negative function of processing effort, it follows that in an experimental situ­
ation, different interpretations can be made more likely by manipulating the 
effects which will be achieved by deriving a particular conclusion or the effort 
a participant will need to expend to derive it.
Returning to the selection task, a conditional statement of the form i f  P 
then Q has a number of derivable consequences including the following: that 
the consequent Q will be true when the antecedent P is true; that P and Q will 
be true together; and that P  and not-Q will not be true together. Choosing 
cards on the basis of these interpretations leads respectively to selection of the 
P card only (6); the P  and Q cards (6 and E); or the P and not-Q  cards (6 and 
A) (see figure i). To make it likely that participants make the normative choice 
of the P and not-Q  cards the corresponding interpretation must be more rel­
evant then the others in the context. In most contexts this is not the case, but 
by manipulating the effort and effects involved Sperber et al. were able to ob­
tain a majority of correct responses. The successful scenario involved a card- 
printing machine which is supposed to comply with the conditional statement 
‘If a card has a 6 on the front it has an E on the back’ but which had malfunc­
tioned, printing As instead of £s. Here the conditional statement becomes rel­
evant by implying that the machine will no longer print cards with a 6 on one 
side and an A on the other. In this scenario, as predicted, these cards were 
preferred.
In a further experiment, Girotto, Kemmelmeier, Sperber and van der 
Henst (2001) showed that participants could be induced to select the P and Q 
cards on the deontic selection task by varying the scenario to make it relevant 
to find instances of compliance with the rule rather than rule violation. They 
also reproduced Sperber et al.’s results with the non-deontic task with new 
content. These results demonstrate that the kind of reasoning that is decisive 
in the selection task uses neither domain-general reasoning abilities, nor do­
main-specific abilities of the kind proposed by Cosmides and Tooby or Cheng 
and Holyoak. Instead, the mental apparatus which deals with ostensive stimuli 
appears to be used.
Even on types of task that do bring non-pragmatic reasoning systems into 
play, pragmatic factors will have a strong influence on the expectations and
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goals that participants have for a task, and thus on whether they will follow 
their reasoning through to a conclusion or consider any conclusion reached 
worth reporting. For example, van der Henst, Politzer and Sperber (2002) 
have shown that relevance theory successfully predicts when participants in 
indeterminate relational problems will respond that nothing follows from the 
information presented.
As mentioned above, many of the tasks in the reasoning literature, looked 
at from the point of view of pragmatics, turn out to be seriously misleading. 
Van der Henst (2006) argues that this is the case in the 2-4-6 problem and 
that participants’ behaviour is best explained in terms of their interpretation 
of what is communicated by the experimenter. The task (Wason, i960) is sup­
posed to elicit reasoning that proposes and tests hypotheses. The experi­
menter asks the participant to find out what rule is obeyed by sequences of 
three numbers. The experimenter starts off the investigation by saying that the 
sequence ‘2, 4, 6’ obeys the rule. The participant is invited to propose further 
triples to test the rule. Many participants infer rules such as consecutive even 
numbers, or arithmetical progressions that increase by 2, or sequences o f even 
numbers, increasing in size, and only propose sequences that obey these rules. 
Thus they fail to discover that the rule is simply numbers (monotonically) in­
creasing in size. Several explanations for participants’ responses have been 
proposed. One, the so-called ‘confirmation bias’, is that participants fail to see 
that they should attempt to falsify the hypothesis they have in mind (Wason, 
i960; Wason, 1968a). A second is that that they attempt to falsify but choose 
suboptimal triples -  ‘positivity bias’ (Evans, 1989). A third is that they can only 
consider an unsuitably limited range of hypotheses -  ‘restrictiveness bias’ 
(Poletiek, 2001). Despite disagreements about the mechanisms involved, the 
literature has generally considered participants’ responses to demonstrate in­
adequacy in reasoning.
Van der Henst convincingly argues that the way the task is set up, provid­
ing the sequence ‘2, 4, 6’ is misleading.134 There are some highly salient prop­
erties of this triple: the numbers are the three smallest even numbers in order 
of size; and they are the first three numbers in the two-times table. Further­
more, the triple is part of an utterance which is, as an utterance, presumed by
134. The task has been criticised as misleading since Wetherick, 1962.
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the participant to be optimally relevant; the experimenter is assumed to be 
knowledgeable and trustworthy; and the task is to discover a rule. Thus, “any 
rule-like property that easily comes to mind when processing the initial triple 
should be considered by the participant as one the experimenter wanted him 
to consider in order to discover the rule” (van der Henst, 2006, p. 236)
Information provided by an interlocutor is different in this regard from in­
formation gleaned from the environment. Such information, because it is not 
communicated, does not come with a presumption of optimal relevance. Sci­
entists are suspicious of overly neat data, considering the patterns likely to be 
coincidental and attempting to falsify the most obvious hypotheses. It is no 
surprise that van der Henst and collaborators found that when participants 
saw the triple generated by what they were told was a ‘random’ number gener­
ator, they acted more like scientists. They found the correct rule more quickly 
and more often than in the standard, communicative condition, proposing 
more triples that were not arithmetical progressions or did not increase.
It seems that at least some, and perhaps a great deal, of what has been 
taken to be accomplished by mechanisms dedicated to human reasoning, 
either domain-general or domain-specific, relies on the mental machinery for 
understanding utterances. When non-normative answers are given in reason­
ing experiments, pragmatic factors must be considered before the conclusion 
is reached that mental biases are in evidence, since the task that participants 
are attempting is likely to be different from what the experimenters think it is. 
This does not mean that cognitive biases do not exist, but in the absence of 
pragmatic analysis, these biases can easily be overestimated.
In section 3.1 I discussed theoretical considerations which suggest that 
human reasoning ability must be bounded -  limited by the finiteness of hu­
man processing power -  so that exhaustive consistency checking and exhaust­
ive search are both impossible. This undermines classical models of rational­
ity, which hold up optimisation and global consistency as norms and as 
approximate descriptions of human capabilities. In the current section, I have 
reviewed experimental evidence that has been used to argue that we entirely 
lack reasoning competence, finding that such a drastic conclusion is not justi­
fied, although there is plenty of evidence that human reasoning is neither un­
bounded nor insensitive to context. A more plausible account of the evidence
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involves taking the view that we are capable of making inferences that are val­
id, but since it is hard for us to discount information that seems relevant, in­
cluding conversational clues about the task in hand, the conclusions we reach 
often differ from those that would be reached by a purely analytic approach.
In the next chapter I return to the pragmatic faculty as an object of study 
in its own right. Before that, in the final section of this chapter, I look at the 
positive programme of bounded rationality, with its stress on understanding 
the procedures involved in rational activity and the way that they exploit fea­
tures of the environment.
3.3 BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND HEURISTICS
Bounded rationality is simply the idea that the choices people make are 
determined not only by some consistent overall goal and the properties of 
the external world, but also by the knowledge that decision makers do and 
don’t have of the world, their ability or inability to evoke that knowledge 
when it is relevant, to work out the consequences of their actions, to con­
jure up possible courses of action, to cope with uncertainty (including un­
certainty deriving from the possible responses of other actors), and to ad­
judicate among their many competing wants. Rationality is bounded 
because these abilities are severely limited. Consequently, rational behavi­
or in the real world is as much determined by the “inner environment” of 
people’s minds, both their memory contents and their processes, as by the 
“outer environment” of the world on which they act, and which acts on 
them. (Simon, 2000, p. 25)
3 .3 .1  IN T R O D U C T IO N
The study of bounded rationality starts from Simon’s claim that:
It is impossible for the behaviour of a single, isolated individual to reach 
any high degree of rationality. The number of alternatives he must explore 
is so great, the information he would need to evaluate them so vast that 
even an approximation to objective rationality is hard to conceive. 
(Simon, 1997, p. 92).
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In section 3.1, 1 looked at the theoretical debate between the bounded and un­
bounded visions of rationality. The essential points are summarised in Simon’s 
list of ways in which what he then called ‘objective’ rationality (i.e. classical, 
unbounded rationality) is an unrealistic idealisation:
Actual behaviour falls short, in at least three ways, of objective 
rationality... :
(1) Rationality requires a complete knowledge and anticipation of the con­
sequences that will follow on each choice. In fact, knowledge of con­
sequences is always fragmentary.
(2) Since these consequences lie in the future, imagination must supply 
the lack of experienced feeling in attaching value to them. But values can 
be only imperfectly anticipated.
(3) Rationality requires a choice among all possible alternative behaviours. 
In actual behaviour, only a very few of all these possible alternatives ever 
come to mind.” (Simon, i997> P- 93)
Simon’s comments are focussed on the rationality involved in choice of 
courses of action. In the case of theoretical rationality, similar considerations 
apply. Unbounded rationality would require that in making a judgement, one 
consider at least the following135:
(1) All possible solutions to each problem.
(2) All information that might be relevant in that it supports or undermines 
any possible solution. For non-demonstrative inference, absolutely any in­
formation136 might be relevant. (These first two points amount to what 
Fodor calls isotropy.)
135. One might also need to consider the best evaluation procedure for a judgement, and 
whether to start investigation at all. Each of these considerations might lead to an infinite 
regress: how to decide how to decide etc. what is the best evaluation procedure or whether 
to start investigation. See discussion in the main text below.
136. There can be no stopping point for information search, since consulting all information 
known to the thinker is not enough -  the environment is also full of information, all of 
which might have to be brought to bear on any judgment. To find truly optimal solutions a 
thinker in principle has to consider information from all sources, including libraries, advert­
isements, the internet and the memories of other people. (Sperber & Wilson, 1996, p. 530. 
See also Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000, pp. 729-730. On the role of adverts, see Stigler, 1961.)
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(3 ) The consequences fo r one’s b e lie f system o f th e  cand ida te  belie f, inc lu d in g
such global properties as overall simplicity and consistency. (This is the
claim that central thought is Quinean, in Fodor’s terms.)
In a representational-computational model of cognition, it is impossible that 
these factors could be taken into account for each inference or judgment. 
Each one of them on its own would give rise to a computational explosion. As 
discussed in chapter 2, for this reason, Fodor, committed to the Representa­
tional Theory of Mind, concludes that we have no idea how central cognition 
works since there is apparently no way to model abductive reasoning in terms 
of classical computations (Fodor, 2000, p. 77). In other words, the criteria that 
Fodor insists on for central cognition and abductive reasoning amount to a 
view of rationality as unbounded, leading to pessimism about modelling it 
computationally.
We have seen that another way to proceed if one shares an unbounded 
view of rationality is to downplay the importance of understanding how hu­
man cognition works, and assume that it finds optimal solutions, as if  it could 
take all of these factors into account, “building models that perform as well as 
possible with little or no regard for how time consuming or informationally 
greedy such models may be” (Gigerenzer, Czerlinski, & Martignon, 2002, p. 
149). I have provided some theoretical arguments against this approach and 
discussed some of the considerable empirical evidence that human reasoning 
ability is not unbounded in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
The argument is incomplete without the presentation of an alternative. In 
this section I attempt to fill in the essentials of a programme modelling 
bounded rationality through search guided by heuristics. There are several key 
ideas to this approach: the inevitability that rationality is bounded; the idea of 
problem solving through generation and evaluation of trial solutions; the use 
of heuristics to guide search; the role of stopping rules, satisficing and aspira­
tion levels; and the fit between the environment and the mind. Before consid­
ering these issues I look at an alternative, which is sometimes regarded as a 
(or the) form of bounded rationality, but is as psychologically unrealistic as 
unbounded rationality: optimisation under constraints.
Optimisation under constraints, originating in the work of Stigler (1961), 
keeps the ideal of optimisation, but factors in as constraints the costs of
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search fo r in fo rm atio n . This is a step tow ards realism  in  th a t it  does n o t as­
sum e th a t all agents are p erfectly  in fo rm e d  ab o ut w h a t choices exist, th e ir  b e ­
nefits and so on. The a im  is to  m o del solutions reached w ith o u t co n su lta tion  
o f a ll possibly re levant in fo rm atio n , in  contrast to  u nb o un ded  ra tio n ality . This  
approach is re ferred  to  by p rac titio ners  as ‘bou n ded  ra tio n a lity ’ (e.g. Sargent, 
1 9 9 3 ) (to  S im on’s great annoyance (G igerenzer, 2 0 0 4 , p. 39 i))-
Because this work keeps the requirement to optimize, it is no more com­
putationally realistic than previous models: indeed, “optimization under con­
straints can require even more knowledge and computation than unbounded 
rationality” (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 730, for this point see also Winter, 
1975; Vriend, 1996137) -  because now an optimal stopping point must be calcu­
lated, and this is computationally intensive, the more so the more constraints 
there are. It is simpler to assume that everyone knows everything than to 
model ignorance and its effects. As Sargent says, “Ironically, when we econ­
omists make the people in our models more ‘bounded’ in their rationality ... 
we must be smarter, because our models become larger and more demanding 
mathematically and econometrically.” (i993» p. 2) But in psychologically real­
istic explanation these costs must fall on agents, requiring “that the mind 
should calculate the benefits and costs of searching for each further piece of 
information and stop search as soon as the costs outweigh the benefits.” (Todd 
& Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 729)
Calculation at each stage of the costs and benefits of continuing the search 
would again lead to a computational explosion: “the paradoxical approach is 
to model ‘limited’ search by assuming that the mind has essentially unlimited 
time and knowledge with which to evaluate the costs and benefits of future in- • 
formation search.” (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 730) The problem faced by 
this kind of agent includes and is worse than the original problem: “Taking ac­
count of the fact that decision-making is a costly activity necessarily leads to a 
more complex, recta-optimization procedure that includes the basic decision 
problem plus the problem how many costly resources to allocate to that ori­
ginal problem.” (Vriend, 1996, p. 278).
137. Vriend takes arguments against optimisation under constraints to be arguments against the 
programme of bounded rationality, wrongly thinking that it falls foul of the regress dis­
cussed in the text.
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As Vriend recognises, this is a recurrence of a more general issue: how do 
we decide what to investigate? If by investigation, an infinite regress looms. 
One well-known expression of the problem is due to Ryle: “Must we ... say 
that for [an agent’s] reflections how to act to be intelligent he must first reflect 
how best to reflect how to act?” (Ryle, i949> p* 3i)-
To avoid the infinite regress, the general answer to Ryle’s question has to 
be negative.138 However, this argument provides no reason to think that cogn­
ition cannot involve a small number of layers, the earlier ones feeding the later 
ones with problems and information.139 In models of bounded rationality, 
simple categorising and recognition mechanisms narrow down the search 
space in which simple reasoning procedures operate, as I discuss below. Here 
the regress is not infinite and there need be no computational explosion as 
long as the procedures are individually frugal.
3 .3 . 2  T H E  IN E V IT A B IL IT Y  O F  B O U N D E D  R A T IO N A L IT Y
Work on bounded rationality has mostly been concerned with heuristic pro­
cesses (also known as heuristics): useful but not infallible shortcuts. Before 
examining the concept heuristic and the ways that heuristics are used, it is 
worth noting that heuristics are not a logically essential component of a the­
ory of bounded rationality. Assuming limits on processing abilities, such as 
capacity limitations on working memory and the finite speed of information 
retrieval and processing, even a system that used only infallible (algorithmic) 
procedures would exhibit bounded rationality, since the algorithms used 
might take more resources than are available, and because already limited 
time, effort and processing capacity must also be divided between tasks.
Consider, for example, a long division task, such as dividing 10,934 by 345. 
I know an algorithm for tasks of this type, but it takes time and concentration,
138. In my opinion Ryle was in not in a good position to support his own negative answer to his 
question, since he opposed psychologically realistic views of cognition. A commitment to 
cognition as computation recasts this regress as a form of computational explosion.
139. Cherniak proposes a solution of this type to Ryle’s regress, postulating:
non-conscious mechanisms of selection or guidance that do not involve reasoning pro­
cesses of any kind. These mechanisms may be acquired -  for instance, as learned ‘cogn­
itive styles’ -  or the agent may be ‘designed’ by natural selection so that, as an efficient 
organism, he undertakes particular inferences. (Cherniak, 1981, p. 169)
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so if these are not available or if other tasks require my attention, then I will 
not find the correct answer that way. An agent with limited processing re­
sources and a long-division algorithm might not produce an answer at all or 
might produce the wrong answer because of a performance error (e.g. 
memory overload causing failure to ‘carry' a digit).
Heuristics have been the subject of investigation because of their potential 
to make the best of limited resources. For example, I might reason heuristic- 
ally: 345 is a bit bigger than 333 and 10,934 is a bit smaller than eleven thou­
sand, so the answer will be slightly less than 11,000 divided by 333. Three-hun- 
dred-and-thirty-three goes into one thousand about three times; and there are 
(obviously) eleven thousands in eleven thousand, so the answer is a bit less 
than three times eleven, which is 33. This is a typical heuristic process in that 
it is less demanding than a exact calculation and in that the answer it gives is 
not guaranteed to be accurate: in this case the correct answer is 31-7- It is also 
typical of the heuristics that we use in that its answers are close enough to be 
good enough for some purposes: the answer is four percent out in this case. 
W hether that is good enough would depend on the purpose of the calculation.
The distinction between heuristics and use of algorithms under pro­
cessing limitations can be rather unclear. For example, in mental model the­
ory, if people only generate one model in spontaneous reasoning with syllo­
gisms, as Evans, Handley, Harper and Johnson-Laird (1999) propose140, one 
can ask:
Are people really applying an algorithm that constantly grinds to a prema­
ture halt, or are they applying the heuristic: More often than not, the first 
possibility considered will enable a good approximation to the correct an­
swer, and so no other possibilities ever need to be considered. (Roberts, 
2004, p. 239, his italics.)
Notwithstanding such borderline cases, the general distinction between heur­
istics and algorithms is clear enough, as I discuss in the next section. The
140. This point was discussed in chapter 2. According to the theory, first a mental model is con­
structed from the input. Subsequently counterexamples consistent with the original inform­
ation may be sought. Evans et al. say that in spontaneous inference this is the exception 
rather than the rule: “People can search for alternative models but do not necessarily do so 
spontaneously” (1999, p. 1507).
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long-division example above illustrates an advantage of heuristics over most 
algorithms: in a short time, or subject to other processing limitations, one 
may not get any answer at all by use of an algorithm. The heuristics that we 
use are shortcuts that avoid this problem.
3.3.3 H ISTO R Y  A N D  USE O F  T H E  T E R M  ‘H E U R IS T IC ’
The word ‘heuristic’ has been in English from around 1800, as an adjective for 
the first one-hundred and fifty years, and only in the second half of the twenti­
eth century as a noun. The earliest citation in the o e d  is to Coleridge:
1821 c o l e r i d g e  Let. 8 Jan. (1971) V 133, 1 am..getting regularly on with my 
l o g i c  in 3 parts..3. Organic or Heuristic ()
By ‘heuristic logic' Coleridge meant the area of logic concerned with the rules 
governing discovery or invention. This sense of heuristic is still primary in 
some contemporary dictionaries, e.g. “1. enabling a person to discover or learn 
something for themselves.” (Simpson & Weiner, 1991). By the early twentieth 
century, a connotation had accreted that heuristic meant merely useful in dis­
covery and not certain: “Einstein used the term heuristic to indicate a view 
that was incomplete and unconfirmed, but nonetheless useful.” (Marsh, Todd, 
& Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 274). Around this time, in early psychology, the word 
was used to describe “useful mental shortcuts, approximations, or rules of 
thumb used for guiding search and making decisions.” (Marsh, Todd, & 
Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 274) From here it is a short step to the second sense in 
contemporary dictionaries: “[In] Computing^] proceeding to a solution by tri­
al and error or by rules that are only loosely defined.” (Simpson & Weiner, 
1991) This definition is confused -  some heuristic procedures are precisely de­
fined and do not involve trial and error -  but it is at least clear that heuristics 
are in contrast with procedures that are guaranteed to find the correct answer, 
that is, algorithms. For this sense, and for the use as a noun, the o e d  cites two 
papers by Newell, Shaw and Simon (and see also Simon 8c Newell, 1958):
1957 a .  n e w e l l  et al. in Proc. Western Joint Computer Conf. XV. 223 A  
process that may solve a given problem, but offers no guarantees o f doing 
so, is called a heuristic fo r that problem. Ibid,. For conciseness, we will use
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‘heuristic’ as a noun synonymous with ‘heuristic process’. 1958 IBM Jrnl. 
Res. & Devel. II. 337/1 For the moment.we shall consider that a heuristic 
method (or a heuristic, to use the noun form) is a procedure that may lead 
us by a short cut to the goal we seek or it may lead us down a blind alley.
In this thesis, the word heuristic is used strictly according to Newell et al’s 
definitions. A heuristic is a procedure that, unlike an algorithm, is not guaran­
teed to reach the correct solution to a problem. Heuristics that are worth us­
ing are also shortcuts: they lead (often enough) to solutions faster or with less 
effort than algorithmic procedures. These two properties can come apart (as 
noted by Roberts (2004, p. 235)). Evidently, there could be non-algorithmic 
procedures that are not shortcuts, in that they require more resources than al­
gorithms for a given problem, or in that they lead nowhere useful141. The ones 
that are of interest for a given problem are those which combine -  in some 
proportion -  better answers than blind guessing with less effort than 
algorithms.
Some heuristics are only barely better than guessing, but appear to be 
used because they lower effort considerably. One well-known example is the 
‘atmosphere strategy’ in reasoning about syllogisms. This is the combination 
of two rules of thumb: (1) i f  either o f the premises contains the quantifier ‘some’ 
then the conclusion contains ‘some’-, and (2) i f  either o f the premises contains a 
negation -  ‘no’ or ‘not’ -  then the conclusion contains a negation. This leads to 
a correct conclusion for some pairs of premises, such as premises in the form: 
Some o f the As are Bs; None o f the Bs are Cs, where the atmosphere strategy 
correctly produces Some o f the As are not Cs. The strategy yields more wrong 
than right answers, however: it gets only 23% of the 64 combinations correct 
(although all the conclusions it produces are compatible with the premises) 
(Roberts, 2004, p. 237 including note 3). Despite this very low accuracy, the 
strategy appears to be fairly common. For example, Gilhooly and colleagues 
found around 20% of participants apparently using this strategy (Gilhooly, 
Logie, Wetherick, & Wynn, 1993).
There are also shortcuts that are in a sense algorithmic and therefore not 
strictly heuristics. Roberts gives some examples. For solving syllogisms there
141. A heuristic that has both demerits for many problems might be: consult a fortuneteller.
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are procedures that are shortcuts relative to exhaustive search, but which are 
guaranteed to give the correct answer if they are applicable at all. One is the 
‘twosomes rule’: if  both premises contain the quantifier ‘some’ then there is no 
valid syllogistic conclusion (except a restatement o f one or both of the 
premises). For example, given the pair of premises ‘Some men are mortal’ and 
‘Some penguins are mortal’ nothing additional follows, as the rule says. An­
other is the two-negation rule: if  both premises contains ‘not’ or 'no’ then there 
is no valid conclusion (distinct from  the premises). (Roberts, 2004. p. 239) This 
rule correctly predicts that from ‘No men can fly’ and ‘Penguins cannot fly' 
nothing additional follows. These rules are heuristics in the original sense of 
discovery procedures, but they are not heuristics in the strictest interpretation 
of the more modern sense since the answers they give are guaranteed to be 
correct. If one is less strict, they might qualify as heuristics in the modern 
sense in that they do not guarantee a correct answer for all syllogism prob­
lems: each gives no answers at all to problems that do not match the condi­
tions in its antecedent, and the combination of the two rules makes no predic­
tion for certain pairs of syllogism premises.
A further example is the cancellation rule for solving compass-direction 
problems. In these problems, participants are asked to say where, relative to 
the original position, one would end up after taking a step north, a step east, a 
step north, a step west, and so on. The problem can be solved by keeping track 
of the position after each step, or by the computationally easier strategy of 
cancelling out north steps with south steps and east steps with west steps and 
adding up what remains on each axis. Interestingly, many participants reject 
the cancellation strategy as invalid: that is, they think it is a mere heuristic, 
when in fact it is algorithmic (Roberts & Newton, 2003).
Heuristics guide an agent towards solutions. In the context of theoretical 
reasoning this guidance may simply direct the operation of value-preserving 
rules, or it may direct making approximations that are non-value-preserving. 
For example, in attempting to derive a sequent in propositional logic, a heur­
istic which can be used to direct operations is: if  the conclusion is a conjunc­
tion try to derive the two conjuncts separately and then use and-introduction. 
For problems in many fields, a fruitful heuristic is to work backwards from the
1 7 6
end-state142. Heuristics that direct the making of approximations are neces­
sarily specific to a domain or a type of task. In physics, such a heuristic is: 
treat the tangent o f a small angle as equal to the angle (in radians). Such heur­
istics, in contrast to value-preserving rules, are rules of thumb mandating the 
use of approximations, so that their output does not follow with necessity 
from the input.
Useful heuristics reduce the amount of processing necessary, typically by 
reducing the amount of information that needs to be taken into account in 
reasoning. Heuristics typically pick out some key features of a task to work 
with, as we have seen: for example, the angle of elevation in ball-catching; the 
presence of two ‘somes’ or two negations in the rules of thumb for syllogisms. 
Since these key features depend on the task, or the task domain, or the format 
of the task, heuristics are specific to a particular domain, task or task format. 
This is the case for non-heuristic shortcuts too, as for example for the cancel­
lation rule in compass-direction problems.
Despite this domain- or task-specificity, one cannot safely infer from the 
observation of content effects that heuristics are in operation rather than do- 
main-general forms of reasoning such as mental logic and Johnson-Laird's 
mental models. Representation of input may depend on content or context, as 
may the task attempted, as discussed in section 3.2. Nonetheless, when agents 
operate faster, more accurately or more comfortably with tasks structured in a 
particular way, it is a good rule of thumb to investigate the possibility that a 
heuristic is in operation.
3 .3 .4  HEURISTICS AN D TR IA L-A N D -ER R O R  SEARCH
Because they may not deliver the correct answer, when heuristics are em­
ployed it is often as a component in trial-and-error search. One can have trial- 
and-error search without heuristics to guide it, and heuristics can be used in 
one-shot problem solving with no element of trial and error, but the combina­
tion of the two makes good sense. Simon s picture of hum an rationality is, at 
base, trial-and-error search constrained by heuristics:
142. Some very general heuristics of this type are listed by Nickerson, including the following: 
strive to understand the problem, analyse ends and means, make assumptions explicit, work 
backward, and simplify (Nickerson, 2004, p. 422ff).
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... human problem solving, from the most blundering to the most insight­
ful, involves nothing more than varying mixtures of trial and error and se­
lectivity. The selectivity derives from various rules of thumb, or heuristics, 
that suggest which paths should be tried first and which leads are 
promising. (Simon, 1962, pp. 472-473)
The use of trial-and-error search for some problems is inevitable. There are 
many problems for which algorithms are known but computationally unreas­
onable. We have seen that there is combinatorial explosion in consistency 
testing of sets of propositions by the truth-table method. Other famous ex­
amples include the travelling salesman problem and chess. In chess, the 
criteria for a good solution are known, but at most positions it is impossible in 
practice to calculate the optimal move, even for the most powerful com- 
puters143(Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 730). There are other problems for the 
solution of which there is either no algorithm or none that terminates in a fi­
nite number of steps144. An example is proving sequents in predicate calculus 
or in higher order logics; a more complex example is abductive inference. 
There are also problems which have algorithms that are known, are computa­
tionally tractable, but nonetheless exceed human processing limitations, such 
as finding a winning strategy in draughts or solving syllogism problems. We 
do not play draughts by solving the game at each move -  although computers 
can, and it is within human limitations to play noughts and crosses this way. 
Only a few tens of diagrams, models or schemas are needed to solve all syllo­
gism problems definitively, but the evidence is that humans do not reason this 
way with syllogisms unless trained. (Roberts, 2004, pp- 234-236)
Trial-and-error search can be used for a problem if a good solution can be 
recognised when it is found. Then the way to solve a problem is to generate a
143. Human chess competence is obviously complex, but it must be a combination of uncon­
scious and conscious heuristics: it cannot be algorithmic. For most positions, even the most 
powerful computers cannot discover the optimal move with certainty. Computer chess pro­
grams, like humans, use a combination of memory and heuristic calculation. They have the 
advantages of precise recall of stored positions and fast calculation. Humans chess players 
have the advantages of better pattern recognition and intuition that certain moves are not 
worth considering.
144. Sometimes guaranteed termination in a finite number o f steps is taken as a defining cri­
terion of the term algorithm. I take no view on this aspect of the definition.
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solution and evaluate it, accepting or rejecting it accordingly. If the solution is 
rejected, and time allows, a new solution can be generated and evaluated, and 
so on, until a good enough solution is found or the search is given up145. In 
principle the generation of solutions could be random, but it is more efficient 
for search to be guided by heuristics and by indications of whether progress is 
being made:
[in trial-and-error search] the trial and error is not completely random or 
blind; it is, in fact, rather highly selective. The new expressions that are 
obtained by transforming given ones are examined to see whether they 
represent progress toward the goal. Indications of progress spur further 
search in the same direction; lack of progress signals the abandonment of 
a line of search. (Simon, 1962, p. 472)
For trial-and-error search it is essential that there be a stopping rule. Stopping 
rules can be defined precisely by the problem, or they may be be defined more 
loosely. As an example of a problem that defines its own stopping rule pre­
cisely, consider the task of finding a value of x  that satisfies an equation such 
as the one in (17).
(17) 17 = X 3 +  2X2 -  2X +2
The equation that is to be solved provides a stopping rule for the problem. 
Search can be stopped with certainty if the trial value of x  makes the equation 
true. Simon calls problems ‘well structured’ when “the goal tests are clear and 
easily applied, and when there is a well-defined set of generators for synthesiz­
ing potential solutions.” (Simon, 1 9 97 , p. 128) Many problems, lacking these 
properties, are ‘ill structured’ (Simon, 1997, p. 128). One cannot be sure of 
finding an optimal solution to a problem where the goal test is not clear or not 
easily applied, or to be sure that an optimal solution has been found if in fact 
it has. For problems like this, there has to be a stopping rule that accepts solu­
tions that are good enough. That is, it is necessary to have a stopping rule that
145. The idea of trial-and-error search proceeding one solution at a time is of course something 
of an idealisation, at least as a description of cognitive processes. There may be some 
competition between trial solutions at each stage, for example.
179
satisfices. Satisficing plays a key role in theories of bounded rationality and I 
consider stopping rules and satisficing in some detail in section 3.3.5 below.
Turning to the second property of well-structured problems, the generat­
or for potential solutions, consider the well-structured problem of finding a 
maximum of a curve (see figure 3) defined by an equation, such as (18).
( l 8)  y  =  X3 +  2X 2 -  2X +2
7.5
-2.5 2.5
Figure 3: Cubic curve: y = x3 + 2 X 2 -  2 X + 2
Any maximum must lie on the curve: it must satisfy the equation. So one way 
to constrain solutions is to use the equation as a generator, generating a point 
on the curve, assessing whether it is a maximum, and if not, generating anoth­
er point on the curve and assessing that, and so on until the solution (if there 
is one) is found. (In this case, there is a maximum at approximately x=-i.7, 
y=6.2.)
Abductive reasoning is much less well-structured, but there are similarit­
ies. Here too, to some extent the problem constrains what solutions are worth 
generating. In any solution to a problem of inference to the best explanation, 
the proposed explanation must logically support the fact that is being ex­
plained. Solutions with this property can be generated by a deductive device 
generating inferences from the input, as explained in chapter 2.
There is another way that the number of trials necessary in trial-and-error 
search is restricted. Systems for particular domains -  agents, or component
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mental systems of the agent -  accumulate expert knowledge of the types of 
problem that they encounter:
The second source of selectivity in problem solving is previous experi­
ence. We see this particularly clearly when the problem to be solved is 
similar to one that has been solved before. Then, by simply trying again 
the paths that led to the earlier solution, or their analogues, trial-and-er­
ror search is greatly reduced or altogether eliminated. (Simon, 1962, p. 
473)
There are two cognitive components behind expertise. One is the accumula­
tion and refinement of heuristics that are useful in a particular domain or for 
a certain type of task. The second is the structuring of memory and cognition 
so that novel situations are recognised as similar to ones previously en­
countered and appropriate resources are automatically ‘brought to mind’ (i.e. 
activated). Both types of expertise narrow down the part of the problem space 
in which solutions are sought, decreasing the number of trials necessary to 
reach a solution, sometimes to the point that the first solution generated is 
usually correct, as Simon suggests.
According to this picture, expert behaviour in ill-structured problems is due 
to the same kind of problem-solving activity used with well-structured prob­
lems, but fuelled by recall of a large number of stored chunks of information:
... experts in any domain have stored in their memories a very large num ­
ber of pieces of knowledge about that domain. Where it has been possible 
to measure the knowledge, at least crudely, it appears that the expert may 
have 50,000 or even 200,000 ‘chunks’ (familiar units) of informa­
tion -  but probably not 5,000,000. (Simon, 1997, p. 128)
The ‘chunks’ of information are stored in such a way that features of a situ­
ation call to mind pieces of information with similar features, and which are 
therefore likely to be relevant:
When the expert is confronted with a situation in his or her domain, vari­
ous features or cues in the situation will attract attention. A chess player, 
for example, will notice such familiar cues as an ‘open file’, ‘doubled 
pawns’, or a ‘pinned knight’. Each familiar feature that is noticed gives ac­
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cess to the chunks of information stored in memory that are relevant to 
that cue. (Simon, 1997, P-128)
All (normal) humans are experts in many everyday problem domains, includ­
ing the problem of utterance comprehension, in just this way: our memory is 
structured in chunks (so-called schemas or frames) which are recalled 
depending on features of the utterance and of the context. I expand on this 
treatment of utterance comprehension in chapter 5.
In this section, then, I have been agreeing with Simon (and with Sperber 
and Wilson, as I show in chapter 5) that there are a num ber of keys to under­
standing how limited beings solve ‘ill-structured’ problems: a) generation of 
trial solutions, followed by b) evaluation of each solution according to stop­
ping rules, where c) the solutions generated are limited by heuristics that 
guide search, and d) the possibilities explored and the heuristics used are con­
strained by expert recall of relevant stored chunks of information on the basis 
of features of the problem. For problems that are not entirely ill-structured, 
the trial solutions generated may be limited by features of the problem and the 
stopping rule may make use of the problem definition.
Consider how real agents solve a very ill-structured problem that they 
face constantly: the problem of arriving at beliefs and/or intentions given the 
superabundance of information and potential inferential explosion. The cent­
ral problem of rationality in the real world146 is that there is a huge amount of 
potentially relevant information, and we must latch onto what is actually rel­
evant and make use of it. There is a great deal of information in the input to 
our senses all the time, and we can seek out more information in long-term 
memory or in the external world. W hat should be done with all of this incid­
ent information? If all permissible inferences were performed on it there 
would obviously be an explosion of calculation. But some inferences must be 
performed, on pain of failing to recognise opportunities or dangers. So there 
are two problems at least: which information to entertain in working memory, 
and which inferences to perform on the contents of working memory.
Heuristic trial-and-error search cannot on its own be much help with this 
general problem, because the criteria for a good solution are not known: the
146. i.e. bounded, adaptive rationality. The phrase is the subtitle of Gigerenzer, 2000.
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problem is extremely ill structured. This problem must be dealt with by the 
way that cognition is set up, rather than by any one heuristic or stopping rule. 
Different processes, some heuristic, will be applied to the incoming informa­
tion according to how fruitful their application is estimated to be: not by cal­
culation, which would be a form of optimisation under constraints, but by the 
way previous experience (of the individual or the species) has set up the 
system.
3.3.5 SATISFICING
‘Satisficing’ is a term invented by Simon (Simon, 1956; Simon, 1957b; March & 
Simon, 1958)147 and used by him in different but closely related ways. It is hard 
to pick these apart definitively, but I think that there are essentially two uses of 
this term in his work148. The broader use is to denote finding solutions that are 
good enough (i.e. useful, but not necessarily optimal). The narrower use of 
‘satisficing’ denotes a specific kind of procedure by which satisficing in the 
broad sense might be carried out.
Satisficing procedures in the narrower sense are heuristic procedures of 
trial-and-error search where the stopping rule is based on an aspiration level 
regarding the object or solution (rather than a cue). They might be better re­
ferred to as sequential search with an aspiration-level stopping rule, since a) 
they can find solutions that are better than ‘good enough’ and b) satisficing in 
the broad sense of finding solutions that are good enough can be carried out 
in many different ways, and ‘satisficing’ in the narrow sense is only one of 
these. However satisficing is the term used in the literature, including the 
work of Gigerenzer and colleagues:
147. The idea, but not the term, is present in Simon, 1955.
148. Simon commented on his use of the term in a letter to Gigerenzer, reproduced in 
Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 406:
... I have used bounded rationality as the generic term, to refer to all of the limits that 
make a human being’s problem spaces something quite different from the correspond­
ing task environments: knowledge limits, computational limits, incomparability of com­
ponent goals. I have used satisficing to refer to choice of “good enough” alternatives 
(perhaps defined by an aspiration level mechanism) or “best-so-far” alternatives to ter­
minate selective search among alternatives—the latter usually not being given in ad­
vance, but generated sequentially. So one might apply “satisficing” to the “good-enough 
criterion” or to any heuristic search that uses such a criterion to make its choice.
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Satisficing takes the shortcut of setting an aspiration level and ending the 
search for alternatives as soon as one is found that exceeds the aspiration 
level, for instance leading an individual with Jack-Sprat-like preferences to 
marry the first potential mate encountered who is over a desired width. 
(Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 730)
Satisficing in this sense is in contrast with some other heuristics, in which 
search is stopped according to properties of the cue, rather than properties of 
the object selected. The ‘take the best’ heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999), for example, is used for tasks structured 
so that one chooses between two or more alternatives which are given and 
which are ranked according to a number of cues, also given. For example, one 
has to decide which of a pair of cities is larger, given such cues as whether or 
not a) each is a state capital, b) each has a premier-league football team and so 
on. Taking cues in order of subjective validity, the procedure stops with the 
first cue found that discriminates between the pair of objects. Therefore ‘take 
the best’ is a satisficing procedure in the broad sense but not the narrow one: 
when applied to a suitable problem it produces answers that while not guaran­
teed to be optimal are good enough for many purposes, but it does not do so 
by stopping search on the basis of the object found.
Satisficing in the narrow sense, sequential search with a stopping rule, is 
useful for choosing between alternatives which are not encountered all at 
once. This might be because the alternatives are spread out over space or time 
or both, as in house-hunting or job-hunting, or because the alternatives are 
solutions that are being generated sequentially, as in much product design, in 
some hypothesising and non-demonstrative inference, and (as I discuss in 
chapter 5) in utterance interpretation. In the first type of problem, the altern­
atives are discovered along the way and evaluated as they are discovered. In 
the second type of problem, the alternatives are not there to be found. They 
need to be generated, then evaluated. In both types of search, the set of altern­
atives is typically ‘ill-bounded’ (Simon, 1997, p. 126): there is no obvious natur­
al end to the alternatives that might be considered.
The procedures employed are similar for the two types of problem. In 
search involving sequentially found alternatives from the environment, there 
must be procedures that guide the search, stopping rules to determine when
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the search should end (either because the most recent find is good enough, or 
because it seems unlikely that further search is worthwhile) and procedures 
for bringing appropriate information to bear on the decision to accept or re­
ject an alternative. For example,
[A job hunter] must not only have procedures for discovering prospective 
employers, but stop rules for determining when the search should end, 
and procedures for obtaining relevant information about each employ­
ment opportunity. (Simon, i997> P-126)
In sequential search involving generation of solutions, there must be also be 
heuristics that guide the search -  in this case by guiding the generation of trial 
solutions; and as before, there must be stopping rules to determine when the 
search should end and procedures for bringing appropriate information to 
bear on the decision at each stage to accept and stop or reject and continue.
Satisficing in the narrow sense, then, is sequential search involving finding 
or generating alternatives, and evaluation of each alternative, which is either 
accepted, stopping search, or rejected, continuing search. The rule that stops 
search looks for a certain property of the object or solution being evaluated, 
and stops if the object or solution comes up to a certain standard. That is, 
there is a certain ‘aspiration level’ against which each object found or solution 
generated is compared. If the solution (or object) comes up to or exceeds the 
aspiration level then it is accepted and search is stopped. Unlike classical op­
timisation this kind of search does not involve consideration and ranking of all 
alternatives. While such search is called ‘satisficing’ it can do very well, 
depending on the suitability for the problem domain of the path followed and 
the aspiration level.
Various types of aspiration level are possible. The aspiration level may be 
set at the outset based on expectations about the domain: e.g. buy the first 
coffee you find  that is fair-trade or organic or Illy-brand. Alternatively, the level 
can be set dynamically, during the search: for example by looking at candid­
ates and setting an aspiration level. Given a set of alternatives that can only be 
accepted or rejected one-by-one (the example often used is potential mates), 
one form of strategy is to sample some proportion of the candidates, then 
choose the first encountered after that who (or which) is at least as good as
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the best encountered to that point. This is called ‘best-so-far’ search. In the 
problem of finding the best alternative from a sequence of known fixed length 
from an unknown distribution (rather unpleasantly known as the secretary 
problem  or dowry problem), it has been shown that using an initial sample of 
37% of the alternatives to set the aspiration level provides the highest likeli­
hood of picking the best (Marsh, Todd, & Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 283).
A different form of dynamic aspiration level is one set according to the 
search cost so far. One such stopping rule is: stop only when the payoff is worth 
the effort expended. In environmental search this is usually an irrational 
strategy (but intuitively not uncommon: ‘I’ve come this far, so I should press 
on’149) because the environment does not care how much effort you have put 
in -  or to put it less anthropomorphically, mostly the environment is not 
structured so that the harder you have to look for an object, the more likely it 
is to be of high value150.
In evaluation of sequentially generated solutions to a problem there is 
more to be said for a stopping rule like this. Each solution generated may 
build on previous solutions, as in a typical approach to design problems: in ar­
chitecture, for example. Ideas from rejected solutions are refined and re­
worked in the production of a new trial solution, so there is some reason to 
expect the value of new solutions to correlate with the effort put into the pro­
cess up to that point.
This may also be the case for utterance interpretation: each new prospect­
ive interpretation generated by the hearer’s pragmatic faculties is likely to be a 
refinement of one that precedes it. But in the case of search for the intended 
interpretation of an utterance there is a special reason that it is rational to use 
a stopping rule of this type. In chapter 1, I mentioned Sperber and Wilson’s 
postulate (1986) that in utterance interpretation there is a justified -  although 
fallible -  presumption that the correct interpretation will be worth the effort 
sunk into finding it. In fact, the presumption is stronger than that: the inten­
ded interpretation should be not only worth the effort the hearer has to put
149. The ‘fallacy of sunk costs’ to economists. Shakespeare has Macbeth say: “I am in blood/ 
Stepp’d in so far that, should I wade no more,/ Returning were as tedious as go o’er” (Act III, 
scene IV).
150. There may be exceptions. In competitive foraging, one might rationally expect to find 
more ripe fruit (for example) in locations that are hard to reach.
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into finding it but also provides the best return for processing effort that the 
speaker had the ability and inclination to provide. The weaker presumption 
would justify a sequential search for the intended interpretation with a rule 
that search is to be stopped when the solution is at least worth the effort put 
in thus far. The stronger presumption makes it rational to use a different stop­
ping rule: the solution must be at least worth the effort put in thus far and 
there must be no good prospect of a more valuable solution, up to the best the 
speaker was willing and able to provide. It is not clear whether a search with 
such a stopping rule should be regarded as satisficing in the narrow sense 
(albeit with a rather complicated aspiration level). It is certainly odd to call it 
that, because it typically does better than finding good enough solutions. It 
finds an optimal solution: the intended interpretation of an utterance, or 
something close to that. This is possible because it exploits a rather singular 
feature of its task domain.
As I also discuss in the next chapter, this feature, the presumption of op­
timal relevance, makes it rational to follow a least effort path for the problem 
of utterance interpretation, generating solutions in order of accessibility. As a 
general point, if (and only if) the solution lies on the least effort path, search 
that follows a least effort path is fast and frugal relative to other modes of 
search for the same problem.
A great deal of attention has recently been devoted to fast and frugal 
heuristics, particularly by Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g. Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). 
‘Take the best’, which I described above, is a fast and frugal heuristic, given 
that it consults as few cues as possible, in contrast to the classical norm for 
cue-based choice, Bayesian maximisation, which uses all cues, weighted by 
their respective validities.
As Todd and Gigerenzer comment, satisficing (i.e. sequential search with 
an aspiration-level stopping rule) and fast and frugal heuristics are “two over­
lapping but different categories of bounded rationality”:
there are some forms of satisficing that are fast and frugal, and others that 
are computationally unreasonable; and there are some fast and frugal
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heuristics that make satisficing sequential option decisions, and some that 
make simultaneous option choices (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 731).
Satisficing (in the narrow sense) is already somewhat frugal when applied to 
an appropriate problem, since it “eliminates the need to compare a large num ­
ber of possible candidates with each other, thus saving time and the need to 
acquire large amounts of information” (Marsh, Todd, & Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 
283). An agent who uses sequential search with an aspiration-level stopping 
rule does not need to examine all the alternatives and need not try to work 
out what all the possible alternatives are (Simon, 1997, P- 119)- This makes it 
possible to find solutions to open-ended search and decision problems that 
would otherwise be quite intractable. Other ways of looking at such problems 
have been previously discussed. In an unbounded approach it is as though all 
alternatives are known to the agent beforehand (and ranked in order of prefer­
ence). In optimisation under constraints the solutions found are those that 
would be found by an agent who at each stage calculates the costs of further 
exploration of the problem space. Neither approach can be implemented 
computationally in a way that is frugal.
Sequential, aspiration-level search is more frugal than these alternatives, 
but not all such procedures are particularly frugal. To be frugal, a procedure 
must terminate quickly, which in most cases rules out random search of the 
problem space. ‘Selectivity’ in Simon’s terms, in the form of problem recogni­
tion and guiding of search by appropriate heuristics, is vital for the frugality of 
sequential search since it reduces the number of trials necessary. Certain 
types of stopping rule would militate against frugality. The stopping rule must 
be computationally simple and must not require the gathering of too much in­
formation. In chapter 5 I assess the frugality of the comprehension procedure 
I have outlined above.
It has been implicit in this discussion of the overlap of sequential search 
and fast and frugal heuristics that any sequential search procedure with a real­
istic aspiration level is itself a heuristic, since it is not guaranteed to find an 
optimal solution. Such procedures also exemplify another point which I have 
left implicit until now: heuristics can be hierarchically arranged. A particular 
task in a particular domain may bring into use a certain heuristic, as for ex­
ample (I argue) the task of interpretation of an ostensive act is accomplished
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by a procedure that follows a least-effort path and has the particular stopping 
rule described above. Within a sequential search procedure, the construction 
of each prospective solution may involve further heuristics, specific to fea­
tures of the task: for example, one might learn to look for ironic interpreta­
tions of a particular speaker’s utterances whenever that speaker avoids eye- 
contact while speaking.
3.3.6 HEURISTICS AND DEVELOPMENT
An obvious question to ask about any explanation in terms of mental pro­
cesses is whether the explanation is developmentally realistic. Can we explain 
how an agent might come to have heuristics of the kinds that I have been sug­
gesting? In the case of heuristics, what Chomsky calls Plato’s Problem151 is 
rather acute. Chomsky formulates Plato’s Problem as follows (referring to Ber­
trand Russell’s later work): “How comes it that human beings, whose contacts 
with the world are brief and personal and limited, are able to know as much as 
they do know?” (Chomsky, 1986, p. xxv; Chomsky, 1988, pp. 3-4)
It is particularly difficult to explain how we are able to develop heuristics 
for tasks we cannot solve algorithmically. If one does not know how to find 
the solution to a problem, how can one come up with a simple procedure that 
finds solutions152 with the expenditure of little effort? Roberts makes this 
point (although without connecting it to the general philosophical problem):
the difficulty in explaining the origin of many shortcuts is that it is hard to 
see how this process is constrained. If a person has difficulty in solving or 
understanding a problem, it is hard to see what criteria have been used to
151. It is called Plato’s problem because it is based on the question Plato raises in the Meno:
Plato illustrated the problem with the first recorded psychological experiment (at least, 
a ‘thought experiment’). In The Meno Socrates demonstrates that an untutored slave 
boy knows the principles of geometry by leading him through a series of questions, to 
the discovery of theorems of geometry. This experiment raises a problem that is still 
with us: How was the slave boy able to find truths of geometry without instruction or 
information?’ (Chomsky, 1988, p. 4)
152. This is rather close to Plato’s own view of the problem. He has Socrates say “...if I don’t 
know what something is, how could I know what that thing is like?” Meno: 71b (in Day, 
1994)- Nehemas defines Meno’s paradox thus: “you can’t look for what you don’t know and 
don’t need to look for what you know” (Nehemas, 1994, p. 227).
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generate a useful shortcut. Why not a useless one instead that results in 
worse than chance solution rates? (Roberts, 2004, p. 264)
The answer seems likely to lie in the same area as for much of the rest of cogn­
itive science. Development is largely a matter of innately highly-constrained 
change in response to environmental triggers. It is probable that our evolu­
tionary design equips us with fairly complete sets of heuristics for the basic 
accomplishment of certain vital tasks, including, for example, utterance inter­
pretation, and also provides flexibility by allowing us to develop heuristics for 
other tasks and for sub-tasks, and perhaps to refine the innate heuristics. This 
flexibility would necessarily be constrained. Gigerenzer and colleagues’ ‘adapt­
ive toolbox’ (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001) is one form 
that an explanation of constrained flexibility in development of heuristics 
could take. They suggest that heuristics are put together from simpler ele­
ments that are innately provided -  the contents of the toolbox. The possibilit­
ies that are available, as in acquisition of concepts or of language, are those 
that can be constructed with the available building blocks, templates or para­
meters. This means that only certain heuristics will be possible.153 Sequential 
search would presumably be part of the toolbox, as would aspiration levels 
that are set by prior expectations and can be adjusted during the search.
There is some support for the prediction that only certain types of heur­
istic are developed. In the compass directions task mentioned above, parti­
cipants are occasionally found to use a last-two strategy. They ignore all the 
information up to the last two directions given, effectively assuming that all 
movement up to that point has cancelled out. This strategy seems irrational 
but has been found to do better than chance across a sample of typical task 
material -  between 10% and 15% success versus about 3% for chance (Roberts 
& Newton, 2003). It is, therefore, a fast and frugal heuristic that is inaccurate 
but better than guessing, given its low cost. W hat is interesting is that of vari­
153. Presumably other heuristics can sometimes be invented by systematic conscious effort, just 
as it is possible to invent concepts like grue (Goodman, 1954), and artificial languages with 
properties that do not conform to universal grammar. No natural language contains grue- 
type concepts: presumably humans do not form such concepts spontaneously (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986, p. 69). Languages with properties that contravene u g  are very difficult to learn 
(Smith & Tsimpli, 1995). Analogous heuristics should present similar difficulties.
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ous other logical possibilities, including a first-two strategy and a first-and- 
last strategy, none is attested (Roberts, 2004, p. 264). It may be relevant that 
these strategies would require the use of long-term memory and would there­
fore involve greater effort. Perhaps the last-two strategy is due mainly to using 
whatever is left in short-term memory at the end of the task. As a general 
point, the heuristics that are feasible will be ones that work within the limita­
tions of human memory structure and processing capacity.
3.3.7 RATIONALITY AND ADAPTIVITY
To conclude this chapter -  and the part of this thesis which deals with general 
questions about rationality -  I comment on a question that may have oc­
curred to the reader. In chapter 2 I defined rationality as the possession of 
reasoning ability, and reasoning ability as consisting essentially in the ability to 
make value-preserving transitions. In the present chapter, I have been arguing 
that rationality is bounded and I also have said that it is rational to take short­
cuts which lead to answers that are good enough, given the ‘finitary predica­
ment’ of humans. There is an apparent tension between the idea that 
rationality is at its core an ability to make value-preserving transitions, and 
the idea that rationality is largely implemented through heuristics. In particu­
lar, it might be thought that in claiming that it is rational to take shortcuts be­
cause they make good enough decisions with necessarily limited resources, 
there is a commitment that rationality reduces to evolutionary adaptivity. An­
other way of seeing this question is as a clash between two views in which 
cognition is computation over mental representations: Fodor’s view according 
to which such computation must preserve semantic value, and Simon’s (and 
Gigerenzer’s) view in which this is not of such importance as the solution of 
problems by simple means.
It is one of the main contentions of this thesis that this apparent problem 
is solvable, and that there is no contradiction between a traditional view that 
rationality is the possession of reasoning ability, which is essentially the ability 
to make transitions that preserve rational acceptability; and a view that real 
rational beings must make decisions that exploit features of the environment 
to enable them to work within their limited cognitive means. A second major 
contention of the thesis is that resolution of this apparent problem is a neces­
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sary starting point for a theory of pragmatics, since pragmatics involves find­
ing interpretations that are logically warranted by utterances, and finding 
them fast.
These two main points are reflected in two subsidiary contentions which 
both amount to exegesis of Grice’s work. I have argued that Grice was aware 
that much reasoning involved shortcuts “made possible by habituation and in­
tention” and was not thereby persuaded to abandon his claim that the core of 
rationality is the ability to make steps that preserve value. In chapter 4, 1 argue 
that the strong parallel between Grice’s views about reasoning and about the 
role of rational reconstruction in utterance interpretation means that he was 
implicitly committed to the position that utterance interpretation was a form 
of reasoning, even when the hearer is not conscious of constructing a truth- 
preserving argument.
One manifestation of the problem I am discussing here is that, perhaps 
contrary to common sense, it is not the case that if one knows rules that will 
lead with certainty to the solution of a problem, rationality demands that one 
use those rules154. This is an intuitively attractive position, but one that has to 
be rejected if the pervasive use of heuristics can be rational.
Heuristics, in the narrow sense of procedures that do not guarantee cor­
rect answers, are often used in cases where algorithms exist, in preference to 
those rules. Can their use be rational? It can, for two reasons. The first reason 
is that a heuristic may require much less time and effort than a full algorithm­
ic derivation of an answer. Having some answer, and having it quickly and 
with little effort, can be preferable to having no answer for a long time while 
an algorithm is used to work out an answer, at relatively much greater effort. 
The second reason is that a heuristic can be very accurate when applied to a 
problem with the right environmental structure. The ball-catching heuristic 
from the first chapter is a good illustration of both points.
So rationality does not demand that whenever we must solve a problem 
for which an algorithm is known we use it. It is not rational to try to play 
chess by calculating the optimal move, because the universe would end before 
that method would yield an answer. It is not rational to try to play draughts by 
calculating the optimal move, because, unless one’s life depends on winning, it
154. See Brown, 1988 for this intuition, which he also rejects, for different reasons.
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is not worth so much more effort than using less demanding heuristics. We 
have to make inferences and decisions fast enough or it will be too late, and 
we have to make them at limited cost because there are so many demands on 
our resources. Moreover there are no algorithms for certain key types of prob­
lem, such as inductive inference. In inference to the best explanation, one 
could follow truth-preserving inference rules forever with no guarantee that 
one would find an explanation for the observation that one started with.
We cannot do without heuristics, therefore. One might then ask: can we 
make do without the ability to make value-preserving transitions? The answer 
is that we cannot. We have to be able to make valid inferences because they 
tell us how things are: if some proposition p  is true and another of the form 
p  —• q is true, then the proposition q is also true. The ability to make value-pre­
serving inferences is simply the ability to recognise such things, to work out 
what follows. This ability may be put to use in the service of either algorithmic 
or heuristic procedures. Above I argued that we cannot stamp inconsistency 
out totally from our set of beliefs, because there is no computationally reason­
able way of doing so. Similarly we could not hope to reach all valid conclu­
sions that are logically supported by our set of beliefs in long-term memory in 
a lifetime, even setting aside the issue of trivial consequences. However, I am 
not arguing that failure to recognise inconsistency or failure to draw infer­
ences are harmless. On the contrary, failures of this sort can be serious. Cher­
niak gives an example:
Smith believes an open flame can ignite gasoline..., and Smith believes the 
match he now holds has an open flame..., and Smith is not suicidal. Yet 
Smith decides to see whether a gasoline tank is empty by looking inside 
while holding the match nearby for illumination. (Cherniak, 1986, p. 57)
Cherniak hypotheses that what happens is connected with the structure of 
memory and retrieval from long term storage. Smith’s belief that a match is a 
means of illumination is active, but this does not result in a check against the 
category means o f ignition since his goal at the time is illumination. So the two 
relevant beliefs about matches are not both in short-term memory simultan­
eously, and the crucial conclusion is not drawn. I would add that the problem 
in such cases is that search stopped too early, that is, that processing was in­
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ap p ro pria te ly  shallow. The cognitive m echanism s loo kin g  fo r relevance have 
fa iled , since th ere  w as a h ig h ly  re levant conclusion to  be derived  fro m  a 
slightly longer search and  reasoning process.
Cherniak’s point is that given that we are finite beings, memory must be 
structured, and this means that it is inevitable that we will sometimes make 
mistakes when we do not recall information that would have been highly rel­
evant. But this example can also be seen as demonstrating why we need the 
ability to make truth-preserving transitions. If the relevant beliefs were re­
called to short-term memory and the conclusion was not drawn, this would 
be a more serious failure of rationality. If there were a creature that never 
drew logical conclusions from beliefs in its short-term memory, then it would 
not be rational at all (this is Cherniak’s minimal inference condition (1986, p. 
57)).
To recapitulate, my claim is there is no clash between the views of ration­
ality presented in chapter 2 and chapter 3. Both aspects are necessary for a full 
theory of human rationality. We have to be able to make inferences or we are 
not rational at all. On the other hand, we have to make inferences fast enough 
or it will be too late. This is a non-trivial problem given that we are very lim­
ited beings and that abductive inferences are of particular importance in un­
derstanding the world around us. The superabundance of information com­
pounds the problem further.
I said above that there is a question about whether the rationality of a 
creature or a procedure reduces to how well adapted it is. The position I have 
adopted (in chapter 2) about the definition of rationality is that we are rational 
beings in that we have some ability to perceive or discover logical relation­
ships, in particular, logical consequences of our beliefs, by constructing chains 
of inferences. Creatures that can do this are rational. Creatures that cannot 
are a-rational or non-rational.
O n e  o f  the th ings th a t o u r reasoning ab ilities a llo w  us to  see is th a t 
creatures have to  behave in  certa in  ways i f  th ey  w a n t to  survive and  prosper. 
W e  can see that creatures have to m ake good enough choices fast enough, or 
th ey  w ill n o t ten d  to do  w ell. W e  can see (o r w o rk  o ut) th a t th is  applies ju s t as 
m u ch  to  creatures w h ich  have the h ig h er-leve l ab ilities  invo lved  in  ra tio n ality : 
abilities  to  m an ip u la te  p ro po sition a l representations accord ing  to  th e ir form s.
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From this perspective one can agree with Gigerenzer and colleagues that “the 
ultimate test of the ‘rationality’ of a heuristic can be found in its fitness con­
sequences relative to real constraints and real environmental structures.” 
(Marsh, Todd, & Gigerenzer, 2004, p. 275), including heuristics for reasoning.
That is, we can call adaptive behaviour rational; and we can also call the 
heuristics or other processes or faculties that generate it rational. It is import­
ant to bear in mind that this is hypothetical rationality of this form: I f  you 
want to survive and prosper, you should behave like this’, or I f  you want to sur­
vive and prosper, it makes sense to have the abilities required to behave like 
this. There is nothing wrong with talk of the rationality of component systems 
of creatures, including decision-making systems, from the perspective of an 
imagined designer (Grice’s ‘genitor’ (1974)). It is rationally acceptable that a 
creature be equipped with such and such a capability, from the genitor’s point 
of view, and this applies just as much to equipment for flying or navigating by 
sonar as to reasoning.
However it would be a confusion to say that creatures that are well-adap­
ted are thereby rational. It would also be a confusion to say that the faculties 
that contribute to a well-adapted creature’s adaptedness are rational, except in 
this hypothetical sense: it is rationally acceptable that they have such faculties, 
given that they face the problem of survival.
The message of chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis is that if we want to under­
stand an inferential reasoning process within cognitive science, it is inevitable 
that we bring together ecologically plausible assumptions about rationality 
with the kind of logical-causal picture needed for a psychologically realistic 
version of reasoning and inference. It is rational (from the genitor’s point of 
view) that a creature that is rational (in the straightforward sense that it can 
reason) should be able to reason fast enough and well-enough that its reason­
ing abilities are useful to it.
In the next chapter I return to pragmatics, applying my view of rationality 
to an inferential-intentional theory of utterance processing.
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Chapter 4 • Reasons, reasoning and meaning
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In chapters 2 and 3 I have set out my view of rationality. I have claimed that to 
be rational (at least in the theoretical realm) is, essentially, to possess reason­
ing ability, where reasoning ability is the ability to make transitions that pre­
serve a certain type of acceptability. In theoretical reasoning such transitions 
preserve truth, or at least warrant. A second aspect of rationality follows from 
the demand that explanations in science be explanatory. I have argued that 
this means, first, that central cognition, including reasoning processes, should 
be seen as computations over representations, and secondly that these com­
putations must be tractable, and in many cases fast and frugal. I have tried to 
show in general terms how these criteria can be met. In the present chapter I 
move from the general to the specific, attempting to cast in this mould the 
pragmatic processes involved in utterance production and, particularly, utter­
ance interpretation.
In chapter one I set out the fundamentals of a broadly Gricean view of 
pragmatics, according to which making an utterance involves providing evid­
ence to the hearer of certain intentions, on the assumption that the hearer is 
rational and will be able to infer the intentions from the evidence. This means 
that interpreting an utterance is a matter of attempting to infer a speaker’s 
meaning, that is, certain of the speakers intentions, from the evidence 
provided. This is a form of inference to the best explanation. I discussed some 
alternative views according to which either inference or the speaker’s inten­
tions, or both, need not be involved. While I do not return to those alternative 
views here, the business of this chapter can be seen as the construction of a ri­
poste to one of their motivations. As I showed in chapter 1, one motivation for 
such views is a concern that a Gricean picture of utterance interpretation is 
psychologically unrealistic. Gricean pragmatics relies for its explanatory force 
on quite elaborate schemas for the hearer’s inference about the speaker’s in-
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tentions. The worry raised by theorists such as Millikan is that such schemas 
are just rational reconstruction with nothing to do with the processes actually 
involved in utterance interpretation.
It should be clear that my intention in exploring Grice’s distinction 
between the ‘hard way’ and the quick way’ of reasoning in chapter 2 was to es­
tablish that a theory of reasoning as purposeful value-preserving transitions is 
compatible with the claim that in much actual reasoning shortcuts are used. 
In the third section of this chapter I look at the Gricean picture of pragmatics 
in more detail. I claim that utterance interpretation is reasoning, regardless of 
whether it is carried out the hard way or the quick way. I also maintain that 
Grice was implicitly committed to this position, given the similarity between 
what he says about calculability in pragmatic inference and about what counts 
as reasoning.
Most pragmatic inference is carried out quickly, and largely uncon­
sciously. However, it seems that the inference can be reconstructed after the 
fact, if the input (the utterance and context) and output (the interpretation 
reached) are known. Francois Recanati (2002b; 2004) has argued that the con­
scious availability to the inferrer of pragmatic inferences (and their inputs and 
outputs) is essentially connected with their status as inferences, or as cases of 
reasoning. I argue that this is not correct, and reject the distinction he finds 
on this basis between associative, ‘primary’ and inferential, ‘secondary’ prag­
matic processes. It is my position, first, that all of speaker's meaning must be^ 
grasped inferentially, notwithstanding the Gricean point that implicatures are 
inferred from what is said (in some sense of the phrase), and, secondly, that it 
is better not to put too much stock in whether a particular process is con­
scious or not when trying to understand its properties.
In the fifth chapter, I look in more detail at how utterance interpretation is 
achieved in a computationally tractable, psychologically realistic way. The 
broadly Gricean view of pragmatics that I take defines the problem that the 
utterance interpretation system must solve. It shows what kind of inferences 
the pragmatic inference system must achieve. However, as mentioned in 
chapter 1, I do not adopt the specifics of Grice’s explanation of how im­
plicatures are derived, the cooperative principle and maxims. Communication 
is not a cooperative, but a coordinative endeavour; and Grice’s system of im-
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plicatures arising from both violations and non-violations of maxims does not 
appear promising as a computationally tractable, psychologically realistic 
account.
In section 4.2, effectively a prologue to the current chapter, I look at an 
objection to the study of the use of language, particularly utterance produc­
tion. According to this point of view, which is sometimes attributed to Chom­
sky, there is no way to scientifically study, in terms of mental causation, prob­
lems that involve free choice guided by reasons. I suggest the division of 
utterance production into two components, one amenable to study, one ap­
parently not.
4.2 DESCARTES’ PROBLEM AND PRAGMATICS
4 .2.1 CHALLENGES TO A REASONS-BASED VIEW OF UTTERANCES
As soon as questions of will or decision or reason or choice of action 
arise, human science is at a loss. Noam Chomsky, in a television 
interview.155
The idea of scientifically investigating the processes involved in production of 
utterances and in interpretations of utterances might be challenged from two 
perspectives at least. One line of argument, exemplified in Ryle, 1949, is that 
talk about mental entities is superfluous or meaningless. This point of view 
has been mentioned and countered in the introduction and in chapter 2 since 
it provides a preemptive challenge both to cognitive science as a whole and to 
the idea of treating central cognition and reasoning in terms of computations 
over mental representations.156
A second objection has been attributed to Chomsky. This is the idea that 
language use does not form a suitable domain for scientific enquiry, since it
155. Chomsky has made similar remarks in published work. Compare, for example, “The tradi­
tional issues of will and choice remain off the agenda of empirical enquiry.” (Chomsky, 2003, 
p. 262)
156. Ryle would have regarded these approaches as mired in what he called the ‘intellectualist 
legend’ (Ryle, 1949, p. 29)
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involves poorly understood questions about human creativity, free will and 
agency.
4 .2 .2  CHOMSKY AND PRAGMATICS
As noted in the introduction, Chomsky is one of the fathers of modern cogn­
itive science, famous for his opposition to views such as Ryle’s that outlaw talk 
of unseen mental events or states. In Chomsky’s view, modern cognitive sci­
ence takes off from the ‘second cognitive revolution' of the mid-twentieth cen­
tury, which “is concerned with states of the mind/brain and how they enter 
into behavior” (Chomsky, 1991a, p. 5). On the face of it, the study of the infer­
ential component of communication in terms of a computational theory of 
mind is a natural application of this approach.
However the view has been attributed to Chomsky that an explanation of 
language use and the understanding of utterances in terms of “states of the 
mind/brain and how they enter into behavior” is problematic and perhaps im­
possible. The attribution is made (by, for example, Carston (2000), McGilvray 
(2005) and the present author (2005) among others) because of remarks that 
Chomsky has made about the problem of free will and creativity, or 
‘Descartes’s problem’ as he calls it. Gricean pragmatics, at least in psycholo­
gically realistic forms, involves study of how a speaker's reasons are causally 
effective in production of an utterance. Some of Chomsky’s remarks strongly 
suggest that he regards it as impossible to study the causes of intentional be­
haviour, including language use. However, Kasher has argued that this is a 
misinterpretation of Chomsky’s views on pragmatics. The problem of lan­
guage use, he says, can be divided into two parts, one of which can be ap­
proached scientifically. I agree with this view of the substantive question, re­
serving judgement on the correct interpretation of Chomsky’s remarks.
Given a conception of having or knowing a language as a cognitive state, 
Chomsky says that three fundamental questions arise (Chomsky, 1991a, p. 6). 
The first is Humboldt’s problem: “what constitutes knowledge of language?” 
(Chomsky, 1991a, pp. 6, 7) The second is the question of how such knowledge 
is acquired. This is an instance of Plato’s problem (Chomsky, 1991a, p. 15), 
which was discussed in chapter 3, above, in relation to the acquisition of heur­
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istics. The th ird  question  is h o w  such know ledge is p u t to  use. This is 
Descartes’ p rob lem  (C hom sky, 1991a , pp* 17-20).
Chomsky uses the term Descartes’ problem for the problem of explaining 
the use of language because of Descartes’ view157 that, “normal human speech 
is unbounded, free of stimulus control, coherent and appropriate, evoking 
thoughts that the listener might have expressed in the same way -  what we 
might call ‘the creative aspect of language use.’” (Chomsky, 1991b, p. 40)158 The 
argument, which goes back to Chomsky’s dismissal of behaviourism in his re­
view of Skinner (Chomsky, 1959) depends on the observation that what a lan­
guage user might say is not predictable from the circumstances she is in.
This p roblem  is one aspect o f a “general p ro b lem  co n cern in g  h u m a n  ac­
tio n ” (Chom sky, 1991b, p. 40) th a t arises i f  w e seek to  u nd erstan d  h u m a n  ac­
tio n  in  term s o f co m putations over representations. I f  you k n o w  the in te rn a l 
state o f a co m p u tation al system, an au to m ato n  in  Descartes’ term s, an d  its en ­
v iro n m en ta l inputs, th en  you k n o w  w h a t it  w ill do, because its b eh av io u r is a 
fu n c tio n  o f its state, perhaps acting  on in fo rm atio n  fro m  the e n v iro n m e n t. 
C hom sky takes the v iew  th at hum ans d iffer fro m  co m p u ta tio n a l systems in  
th is respect because th ey  are on ly  “inc ited  and in c lin ed ” tow ards c e rta in  ac­
tions, n ot “com pelled” to  p erfo rm  th em . (Chom sky, 1991b, p. 40). Thus tru ly  
creative activity, o f the sort th at springs fro m  and exem plifies free  w ill, m ay  be  
“beyond the pow ers o f any au tom aton” (Chom sky, 1991b, p. 40). Q uestion s o f  
h u m an  creativ ity  m ay therefore lie beyond h um an  investigation: in  C h o m s k y ’s 
term s they m ay be m ysteries ra ther th an  problem s, w here  p ro b lem s are “ques­
tions th a t w e seem to be able to  fo rm u late  in  ways th at a llo w  us to  p ro ceed  
w ith  serious in q u iry  and possibly to  atta in  a degree o f  u n d ers tan d in g ”
157. Descartes’ view was couched as a thought experiment about the capabilities of perfect 
automata. They “could never use words or other signs arranged in such a manner as is com­
petent to us in order to declare our thoughts to others: for we may easily conceive a machine 
to be so constructed that it emits vocables, and even that it emits some correspondent to the 
action upon it of external objects which cause a change in its organs ... but not that it should 
arrange them variously so as appropriately to reply to what is said in its presence” 
(Descartes, 1912, pp. 44-5, Discourse V). This led him to conclude, in the terms of his dual­
ist ontology, that “the faculty responsible for language must be a faculty of an immaterial 
substance -  matter could not account for the infinite flexibility and creativity manifest in 
language use” (Antony & Hornstein, 2003).
158. On the creative aspect of language use, see also Chomsky, 1964; Chomsky, 1966; Chomsky, 
1986; Chomsky, 1988.
200
(Chomsky, 1991b, p. 41) while mysteries are “questions that seem to elude our 
grasp, perhaps because we are as ill-equipped to deal with them as a rat is 
with a prime number maze” (Chomsky, 1991b, p. 41)-
A different way of making essentially the same point rests on the assump­
tion that the study of language use requires some scientific understanding of 
human intentions. Chomsky’s view is that “General issues of intentionality, in­
cluding those of language use, cannot reasonably be assumed to fall within 
naturalistic inquiry” (Chomsky, 1995, p. 27). Remarks of this sort have led, nat­
urally enough, to the interpretation that I mentioned above -  that Chomsky 
may hold the view that scientific pragmatics is impossible:
Chomsky and at least some other generativists are sceptical about the 
feasibility of pragmatics, where pragmatics is conceived of as an account 
of utterance interpretation. Such a pragmatics is generally taken to involve 
the inferential recognition of speaker’s intentions ... and for Chomsky, 
matters involving human intentions may well lie beyond the scope of sci­
entific enquiry (Carston, 2000, p. 28; citing Chomsky, 1995)
However Kasher rejects this interpretation of Chomsky’s views, for reasons I 
return to later in this section:
A couple of times recently, we have heard the view that pragmatics is im­
possible being ascribed to Chomsky, on grounds of his attitudes towards 
‘Descartes’s Problem.’ ... this is a misguided ascription, resting on a confu­
sion of ‘Descartes’s Problem’ with the pragmatic problem. (Kasher, 1991, 
pp. 143, note 16)159
In his exposition of Chomsky’s views on creativity and language, McGilvray 
makes clear that in his view the claim is that it is the creative, unbounded 
nature of language production that makes it an unsuitable subject for sci­
entific study. As an example, Gertrude, during a conversation about computer 
chips, might suddenly say:
159. See the main text of (Kasher, 1991) for discussion and references relating to Chomsky’s re­
marks on language use, especially pp. 123-4.
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(19) I’m going to join the Canadian bobsled team. (McGilvray, 2005, p. 221)
As McGilvray says, “Her environment does not cause the sentence. She need 
not say anything at all, and could have said any number of things.” Granting 
this, it is not clear that we must reach the conclusion that language use cannot 
be fruitfully studied. The key problem with that contention is that although 
language use is unbounded and not caused by input from the environment 
alone, it is typically “appropriate and coherent to circumstances”, as McGilvray 
notes (2005, p. 221). Speakers generally have reasons for what they say, and in 
my opinion these reasons have causal efficacy (although they may very well 
not have reflected consciously on those reasons), as I discuss in section 4.3. As 
McGilvray explains:
Perhaps [Gertrude] is letting her companions know she is bored and 
wants to talk about something else, or reminding them that their meals 
are getting cold. Perhaps she really wants to join a bobsled team. So while 
circumstances do not cause her sentence, it is appropriate to them: she 
has a reason -  perhaps several -  to say what she does. (McGilvray, 2005, 
p. 221)
Pragmatics attempts the systematic study of the way that a speaker’s reasons 
and purposes lead to her saying what she does in the way that she does, and 
the way that hearers work these reasons out from their product, utterances. 
Of course it is possible that while speakers have reasons for their utterances, 
those reasons and any causal role they play are not suitable for scientific study. 
McGilvray’s remarks echo comments that Chomsky has made which suggest 
that this may be his view, for example:
Human action is coherent and appropriate, but appropriateness to situ­
ations must be sharply distinguished from the causal effect of situations 
and internal states. There is little reason to suppose that human behaviour 
is caused, in any sense of the word we understand. (Chomsky, 1991b, p. 41)
The position on language use that has been attributed to Chomsky is that, al­
though speakers have reasons for their uses of language, we can only usefully 
study the language system that they use, ncft the ‘production problem’: the
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reasons why they use it in a particular way and how their uses of language 
come to be coherent and appropriate. Indeed, Chomsky believes that the pro­
duction problem may be a mystery for humans (Chomsky, 1991b, p. 41).
In  m y  view, it  is clear th a t as tasks fo r the m in d /b ra in , the speaker’s task is 
n ot sym m etrica l w ith  a hearer's com prehension o f  a speaker’s use o f  language. 
I t  is n o t the case th a t speaker and hearer are just doing  th e  sam e th ings, b u t in  
the opposite order. W h ile  a speaker is, in  a sense, free to  say an yth ing  at a ll (o r  
to  m ake no utterance), a hearer has a m uch less o p en-end ed  task. The h e a re r’s 
task is to  assign an in te rp re ta tio n  -  w h ich  m ust be n ear enough  to w h a t the  
speaker in tended -  to  an u tterance once it  is m ade (b y  in fe rr in g  w h a t the  
speaker m ean t by h er u tterance, in  G ricean  theories).
Therefore one m ig h t suppose th at C h o m sky’s sceptical rem arks  ab o ut the  
study o f  language use are m ean t to  apply on ly  to  the speaker’s creative task  
ra ther than  the m o re  constra ined  task o f  the hearer. There  is som e reason, 
though, to suppose th a t C hom sky believes th a t scientific investigation  o f  the  
w ay a hearer arrives at an  in te rp re ta tio n  is also hopeless. H e  says th a t la n ­
guage com petence and  parsing can be studied, b u t that:
There is also a fu rth e r p roblem , w hich  w e can fo rm u la te  in  vague term s  
b u t w hich  cannot be studied in  practice: n am ely to  co n stru ct an  ‘in te r ­
p re te r’ w h ich  includes the parser as a co m ponent, a long  w ith  all o th e r ca­
pacities o f the m in d  -  w hatever they m ay be -  and  accepts n o n -lin g u is tic  
as w ell as lingu istic  in p u t. This in terpreter, presented w ith  an u tterance  
and a situation, assigns some in te rp re ta tio n  to  w h a t is b e ing  said by a p e r­
son in  th is s ituation . The study o f co m m un ica tio n  in  th e  ac tua l w o r ld  o f  
experience is the study o f  the in terpreter, b u t th is is n o t a to p ic  o f  e m p ir ­
ical en q uiry  fo r the usual reasons: there is no such to p ic  as th e  study o f  
everyth ing. ... The p ro p e r conclusion is n o t th a t w e m u st ab an d on  c o n ­
cepts o f language th a t can be p ro du ctive ly  studied, b u t th a t th e  to p ic  o f  
successful co m m un ica tio n  in  the actual w o rld  o f experien ce is fa r too  
com plex and obscure to m e rit  a tten tio n  in  em p iric a l in q u iry . (C hom sky, 
1992, p. 120)
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According to this point of view, the problem of ‘perception’160, which “is con­
cerned with the process by which a person assigns a structural description to 
a presented expression in a particular situation”161 (Chomsky, 1991a, p. 18) 
subdivides into the study of the parser and the study of the full interpreter. 
The motivation for this subdivision is seeking “to isolate elements of the prob­
lem that can be subjected to inquiry, under appropriate idealisations, their ap­
propriateness determined, as always, by the explanatory success achieved by 
using them.” (Chomsky, 1991a, p. 6) O n  this view, the parser is “a feasible sub­
ject of inquiry” (Chomsky, 1991b, p. 40) (although in Chomsky’s opinion the 
concept is not as clear as might be wished; certainly not as clear as the 
concept of linguistic competence). The full interpreter on the other hand “may 
not be a feasible subject of inquiry... : it is a too-many-factor problem” 
(Chomsky, 1991b, p. 40)
I  c la im  th a t w e can study n o t on ly  the hearer's inferences ab o ut th e  speak­
e r ’s in tend ed  m ean ing , b u t also the reasons th a t th e  speaker has, g iven a 
m ean in g  th a t she w ants to  convey to  the hearer, fo r m ak in g  one u tterance  
ra th e r than  another. This p o in t was, o f course, m ade by G rice  in  his w o rk  on  
m ean ing .
I  w ou ld  like  to  suggest th at the ‘p ro b lem  o f language use’ should be 
b ro ken  in to  tw o  parts . There is the question o f  w h a t a speaker m ig h t w a n t to  
co m m un ica te  in  a p a rticu lar situation. H e re  I  agree w ith  C h o m sky  (and  
Descartes) th a t th is question is n o t am enable to  scientific  study in  te rm s o f  
p roperties o f  autom ata , o r the m o d ern  equ ivalen t, co m p u tation s over m en ta l
160. 1 do not regard arriving at speaker’s meaning as part of perception. That is because it has 
an inferential component. One does not perceive what the speaker means, one works it out. 
(It is not relevant that in ordinary use one talks of ‘seeing’ a speaker’s meaning, since we talk 
this way about inferences generally: e.g. Now I see how he did it - he introduced the snake 
through the window.)
161. In fact it is not just a structural description of the presented expression we are after but 
also of the explicit meaning it expresses and the implicatures it carries in the context. On an 
inferential view, the structural description from parsing must be part of the input into the 
process which infers speaker’s meaning.
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representations (at present, a t least),162 perhaps because i t  is b o u n d  up w ith  
questions about free w ill.
There is also the g roup o f  questions about a speaker’s reasons fo r p ro d u ­
cing a p articu la r u tterance to  convey a given in tended  m ean ing  in  a certa in  
situation, and the in ferences a h earer w ill  m ake about in tend ed  m ean ing , g iv­
en an utterance. This second group o f questions, on the face o f it, is m uch  
m ore approachable. The speakers a im  is given. W h a t is to  be investigated is 
h o w  she chooses m eans th a t are ra tio n a lly  appropria te  to  achieve it. The h ear­
e r’s in te rp reta tive  task is also, and perhaps m ore obviously, an exercise o f  
rationality .
A  fu ll-b lo w n  scepticism  ab o ut the study o f language use w o u ld  re ly  on n o t  
seeing the tw o  groups o f  questions as separable, o r perhaps on  th in k in g  th a t 
the second group is no m o re  approachable than  the first. In  m y  o p in io n , 
G rice ’s w o rk  on m e an in g  can be seen as iden tify in g  this second group o f  ques­
tions and show ing h o w  th ey  m ig h t be m ade tractable in  te rm s o f  general co n ­
siderations about ra tionality .
Kasher had made essentially this point (1991) some years before I made 
this suggestion (2005)163:
The m ore w e exp la in  pragm atic  facts in  term s o f  a general in te n tio n a l ac­
tio n  th eo ry  as app lied  to  instances o f language use, th e  closer w e com e to  
solving parts o f  ‘D escartes’s p ro b lem ’. C rea tive  use o f  language can be  
factored  in to  (a) creative choice o f ends and (b ) ra tio n a l p u rsu it o f  those  
ends. Factor (b ), o f  the ra tio n al pursu it o f given ends, seems to  be am e n ­
able to explanations in  term s o f  general ra tio n a lity  p rinc ip les , w h ich  are  
parts o f a general in te n tio n a l action  theory. H o w e v e r fac to r (a), o f  the c re ­
162. Questions of this kind may be amenable to scientific investigation in statistical terms, as 
for example in the social psychology literature where it has been found that certain stimuli 
prime actions -  they make certain types of behaviour more likely. (Bargh, 2006, is a recent 
survey of priming of representations and behaviour.)
163. I was not aware of this paper by Kasher at that time. I would like to take this opportunity 
to acknowledge his priority on this point.
Kasher’s views on this issue are expressed somewhat differently from mine since he ad­
vocates a competence theory of pragmatics. I agree with him that what pragmatics studies in 
utterance production is “the conditions which constrain ‘what we say’ in a context” rather 
than “an understanding of the creative aspects of ‘what we say and why we say it” (Kasher, 
1991, p. 127), but not that it is the study of the knowledge of those conditions.
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ative choice of ends, does perhaps constitute an unsolvable problem, a 
mystery.” (Kasher, 1991, p. 141)
Of course, any view that language use is unlikely to yield to naturalistic en­
quiry faces the problem that pragmatics appears to be a successful scientific 
research programme judging by the usual standards. Among other merits, it 
offers unified explanations of phenomena previously thought unconnected; it 
inspires experimental work; and its conceptual foundations cohere with those 
of other branches of cognitive science. In the next section I look at the 
Gricean foundations of modern pragmatics in some detail, with particular 
stress on how considerations of rationality are central to the picture.
4 .3  GRICE, REASONING AND PRAGMATICS
the use of language is one among a range of forms of rational activity 
(Grice, 1989b, p. 341)
In the Retrospective Epilogue to a selection of his papers (Grice, 1989c), Grice 
picks out eight ‘strands’ from his philosophical writings. This section (and in­
deed, this thesis as a whole) readdresses part of his Strand Six: “the idea that 
the use of language is one among a range of forms of rational activity and that 
those rational activities which do not involve the use of language are in vari­
ous ways importantly parallel to those which do” (Grice, 1989b, p. 341), which 
flows from his work on meaning (Strands Four and Five).
4 .3 .I  GRICE, PRAGMATICS AND EXPLANATION
One of Grice’s contributions to pragmatics was to focus attention on its con­
nections with rationality, inference and reasoning. He suggested that talking 
might be seen “as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, beha­
viour” (Grice, 1975. P- 47) and that aspects of a speaker’s meaning which go 
beyond sentence meaning must be inferred (in effect making the point that 
they cannot be decoded, as I discussed in chapter 1).
For Grice, communication involves reasoning in at least two ways. The 
first connection is that communication of implicatures depends on rational
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interaction164 between speaker and hearer, and implicatures must be derivable 
by a reasoning process. Grice called this property calculability165. Secondly, 
Grice earlier argued that the analysis of speaker meaning more generally in­
volves an appeal to reasons. For something to count as the meaning of an ut­
terance, it must be a response that the hearer has to the utterance because of 
the intention behind the utterance, both in the sense that the recognition of 
the intention causes the response and in the sense that it provides a reason to 
have that response. Thus the link between the recognition of the speaker’s in­
tention and the hearer’s interpretation of the utterance is a causal process that 
preserves rational acceptability: a reasoning process as defined in chapter 2. I 
discuss each of these connections in greater detail below. The key point is that 
reasons and reasoning are important foundations of Grice’s work on commu­
nication and meaning, just as they are central to a great deal of Grice’s 
philosophy.
Grice was committed to understanding humans as rational agents, that is, 
as beings who have reasons for their actions and attitudes. This meant that he 
would try to understand actions and attitudes partly in terms of the reasons 
people might (or should) give for them and the reasoning they might (or 
should) follow to work out which attitude to adopt or action to take. Richard 
W arner identifies this as “a key feature of Grice’s philosophical methodology”:
Given the task of providing a philosophical account of some kind of at­
titude or action, or some other psychological aspect of life (for example, 
intending to catch the 5*01 train, doing one’s duty, living a happy life), 
Grice would ask, “How would a person explicitly reason his way to that at­
titude, action, or realization of that aspect in his or her life?” (Warner, 
2001, p. x)
This way of proceeding is exemplified in Grice’s work on communication. The 
Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims can be seen as Grice’s an­
swer to a question he posed for himself: supposing that people are rational 
agents, how should one expect them to behave in conversation and other situ­
164. Specifically, for Grice, cooperation: see chapter 1.
165. It is only conversational implicatures that must be calculable, for Grice. I do not discuss 
conventional implicatures.
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ations in which they have the goal of communicating? His conjecture is that 
they would cooperate, to some extent, and their communicative behaviour 
would be governed by certain rules or principles:
I would like to be able to show that observance of the Cooperative Prin­
ciple and maxims is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: that 
anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/com- 
munication ... must be expected to have an interest, given suitable cir­
cumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only 
on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the 
Cooperative Principle and maxims. W hether any such conclusion can be 
reached, I am uncertain. (Grice, 1975, p. 49)
My view is that Grice’s Cooperative Principle and maxims are not compatible 
with reasonable assumptions about rationality and the communicative situ­
ation. I have given some reasons in chapter 1 to think that communication is 
coordinative rather than cooperative in Grices sense. I make some mention 
below of the shortcomings of his system of maxims. In my opinion it is the 
other connections between a Gricean picture of reasoning and Grices work 
on communication and meaning that form the foundations of inferential the­
ories of communication.166
As Sperber and Wilson say, Grice’s analysis of meaning could be used as 
the starting point for a theory of meaning or “as the point of departure for an 
inferential model of communication” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 21). Taking it 
the second way, and exploring the role of inference, reasons and reasoning in 
Grice’s account of the way speaker’s meaning is arrived at, the intimate links 
between Grice’s work on meaning and his work on conversation and im- 
plicature become clear. On the relation between Grice's work on meaning and 
his work on a theory of conversation, I can do no better than to agree with 
Stephen Neale, who writes that:
166. As Grice says of his Strand Six, the thesis that language is a rational activity:
This thesis may take the more specific form of holding that the kind of rational activity 
that the use of language involves is a form of rational cooperation; the merits of this 
more specific idea would of course be independent of the larger idea under which it 
falls. (Grice, 1989b, p. 341)
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There is no doubt that Grice’s work on language and meaning constitutes 
a more powerful and interesting contribution to philosophy and linguist­
ics when it is not seen as comprising two utterly distinct theories. It is at 
least arguable that the “Theory of Conversation” is a component of the 
“Theory of Meaning”. And even if this interpretation is resisted, it is un­
deniable that the theories are mutually illuminating and supportive, and 
that they are of more philosophical, linguistic and historical interest if the 
temptation is resisted to discuss them in isolation from each other (Neale, 
1992, pp. 511-512).
I  endorse the v iew  th a t th e  th e o ry  o f  im p lic a tu re  d eriva tio n  is (o r at least 
should be) a co m p o nent o f  an in fe ren tia l th e o ry  o f  co m m u n ica tio n . There  are  
tw o  po in ts  th at I  w an t to  u n d erlin e  ab o ut in fe re n tia l-in te n tio n a l pragm atics in  
th is  section:
(1) A key to Grice’s work on meaning is that the intentions behind speak­
ers’ utterances play a causal role in hearers’ inferring speaker’s meaning. In 
terms of Grice’s taxonomy of reasons, this means that personal, or justificat­
ory-explanatory reasons are the kind of reason hearers have for their inter­
pretative responses to what speakers utter. On currently standard assump­
tions about actions, speakers' intentions also rationalise and cause their 
utterances, given the meaning they intend to convey.
(2) I  argue that making sense of utterances counts as reasoning, whether it 
is conscious or not, and whether it involves heuristics or not. I  suggest that an 
implicit commitment to this view on Grice’s part is indicated by parallels 
between Grice’s discussion of calculability and his view that reasoning can 
take place quickly and implicitly.
As I explained in chapter 2, Grice did not think that inference or reason­
ing is always conscious and explicit. There is a “‘hard way’ of making inferen­
tial moves” which is “[a] laborious, step-by-step procedure [that] consumes 
time and energy”, and there is “A substitute for the hard way, the quick way,... 
made possible by habituation and intention” (Grice, 2001, p. 17).
It is my thesis that pragmatic processing is full-blown reasoning even 
though it typically proceeds the ‘quick way! In this chapter, I put to use the 
claim made in chapter 2 that reasoning is inference undertaken in pursuit of a 
goal. This, I argue, is how pragmatic interpretation proceeds. Pragmatically
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derived material is mostly arrived at ‘the quick way’, where the quick way in­
volves heuristic processes and, often, shortcuts. This is nonetheless reasoning, 
since it is still inference towards a goal directed by a purpose. In this case, the 
purpose is to work out what the speaker meant by her utterance. The pursuit 
of this goal is ‘wired in’ to the systems used for utterance interpretation.
My opinion is in contrast with views according to which reasoning or in­
ference is necessarily conscious in some sense. If one holds this opinion and 
wants a Gricean story about pragmatics, then one has four options. One could 
claim that the processes involved in inferential pragmatics are typically con­
scious and explicit. The evidence, however, is that we are not generally aware 
of making step-by-step Gricean derivations. This leaves three alternatives, all 
of which recognise that pragmatic processing is at least often fast and sublim­
inal. (1) One can take Gricean explanations as constraints on the interpreta­
tions reached, but without any pretension to be descriptions of the process by 
which the interpretation is derived. (2) One can say that only conscious prag­
matic processes are properly inferential, and that unconscious processes are 
merely heuristic, routinised versions that mostly proceed as i f  they were infer­
ential. (3) One can say an agent need not be aware of reasoning at the time it 
takes place, but it is characterised by its availability to consciousness. That is, 
reasoning can always be reconstructed after the fact, and Gricean explana­
tions are such reconstructions. This last is Francois Recanati’s view. I return to 
consideration of these alternatives in section 4-3-3, after considering the role 
of reasons in Grice's theory of meaning.
4.3.2 REASONS AND CAUSES
Reasons and Grice’s theory o f meaning
Meaning is grounded in reasons in Grice’s work. For a speaker, S, to mean 
proposition p  by addressing an utterance x  to a hearer A, S has to intend that 
A comes to think that S believes p, and that A comes to think this at least in 
part because of S’s utterance of x. What this ‘because’ comes down to is that 
S’s utterance of x  must provide A with reason(s) to think that S believes x. In 
this section I analyse this theory, drawing on Stephen Schiffer’s detailed and
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carefu l account o f  G rice s  view s (in  Schiffer, 1972) as w e ll as G ric e ’s o w n  
exposition .
As Schiffer says, th ere  are tw o  co nditions w h ic h  m u st be m e t fo r an u tte r­
ance x  to  m ean som ething  in  G rice ’s sense. T he firs t is that:
S m ust in tend  to produce [response] r  in  [the hearer] A  “by m eans o f” A s  
reco gn itio n  o f  S’s in te n tio n  to  produce r  in  A . (Schiffer, 1972, p. 10)
H e re  r  is the h eare r’s response to the u tterance. For o rd in a ry  assertions, the  
response a im ed  at is the b e lie f th at the speaker believes p 167, b u t G rice ’s fo r­
m u la tio n  is general enough to  a llow  fo r o th e r possibilities, p ro v id in g  consider­
able flex ib ility  in  the type o f  m eanings th a t im p era tives  and interrogatives, as 
w ell as assertions, m ig h t have. The first co n d itio n  m akes th e  c la im  th a t recog­
n itio n  o f  the speaker’s in te n tio n  plays a causal ro le  in  b rin g in g  the hearer to  
his in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  utterance, as Schiffer explains.
I f  w e a llow  th a t reasons are causes, w e m ay say th a t S in tends r to  be p ro ­
duced in  A  by v irtu e  (at least in  p art) o f  A s  b e lie f th a t S u tte red  x  in te n d ­
ing to  produce r  in  A  just in  case S u tte red  x  in te n d in g  th a t A ’s b e lie f th a t 
S u ttered  x  in ten d in g  to p roduce r  in  A  be (a t least) a necessary p art o f  a 
sufficient cause o f  A ’s response r. (Schiffer, 1972, p. 10)
I  explore the p o in t th a t this k in d  o f exp lanatio n  involves b o th  jus tifica tio n  and  
causation, th a t is, reasons th a t are also causes, below . This plays a crucial ro le  
in  the second condition:
The o ther res tric tio n  is th a t A ’s b e lie f th a t S u tte re d  x  in ten d in g  to  p ro ­
duce r  in  A  m ust n o t m erely be in tend ed  to  be a cause o f  A ’s response r, it  
m ust also be A ’s reason, o r p art o f  A's reason fo r A ’s response r  ... (Schiffer, 
1972, p. 10)
This m eans th a t arriv in g  at speaker’s m ean ing  is a m a tte r o f a rriv in g  by reas­
o n in g  -  this comes fro m  the second re s tric tio n  -  a t th e  speaker’s in tend ed  
m ean ing , and the process is set in  tra in  by re co g n itio n  o f  th e  in te n tio n  b eh in d  
th e  u tterance. The pattern  th at the in ference fo llow s is set o u t by Schiffer:
167. In a mental-representation theory, a mental representation of the speaker representing p  
as true.
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W hat Grice had in mind was simply this: sometimes the fact that a certain 
person believes (or believes he knows) a certain proposition to be true is 
good evidence that that proposition is true, and sometimes the fact that a 
certain person intends (or wants) another to believe that a certain propos­
ition is true is good evidence that the former person himself believes (he 
knows) that that proposition is true. (Schiffer, 1972, p. 11)
So if Bertrand says to Ludwig: “The cat is on the mat”, then Ludwig may recog­
nise that Bertrand intended him to believe that he (Bertrand) believes that the 
cat is on the mat; and that may be good enough evidence for Ludwig to infer 
that Bertrand believes that the cat is on the mat. This much is certainly part of 
communication, in the strict sense. Ludwig may then go on to infer that the 
cat is on the mat, depending on his attitude towards Bertrand’s beliefs and 
general epistemic state. This may or may not be part of the communication, 
depending on Bertrand’s intentions. If Bertrand only intends to ‘exhibit’ his 
belief that the cat is on the mat (and let Ludwig draw his own conclusions 
about whether that state of affairs actually holds) then the utterance was ‘ex- 
hibitive’. If, on the other hand, the response that Bertrand (primarily) intended 
to produce in Ludwig was the belief that the cat was on the mat, then the ut­
terance was ‘protreptic!168 W hether any particular assertion is protreptic or 
exhibitive, and whether assertions generally belong to one class or the other, 
are interesting questions which I pass over here. Either way, this picture of 
communication is essentially inferential: the hearer’s response is derived by 
reasoning from the speaker’s intention. This is in contrast with such theories 
as Millikan’s non-inferential view, mentioned in chapter 1, according to which 
the hearer comes to believe that (e.g.) the cat is on the mat, but this belief is 
reached in a way that does not depend on the speaker’s intentions at all, being 
in that respect more akin to perception than reasoning.
Grice’s central point is that recognition of the intention behind an utter­
ance is -  at one and the same time -  evidence that the speaker thinks p, (i.e.
168. Grice made a distinction between exhibitive utterances “utterances by which U M-intends 
to impart a belief that he (U) has a certain propositional attitude” and protreptic utterances 
“utterances by which U M-intends, via imparting a belief that he (U) has a certain proposi­
tional attitude, to induce a corresponding belief in the hearer” (1989c, p. 123) this is from 
chapter 6, originally published as (Grice, 1968).
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provides reason to  th in k  th a t the speaker th in ks  p) and  is the cause o f the  
hearer's co m in g  to  b elieve th a t the speaker th in ks  p. As G rice  w ro te  in  his first 
published  paper on the subject, "... in  som e sense o f ‘reason’ th e  recogn ition  o f  
the in te n tio n  b eh in d  [an utterance] x  is fo r th e  audience a reason and not 
m ere ly  a cause.” (G rice , 1957» p- 385)
This formulation rules out certain cases where an utterance produces an 
involuntary response in the hearer, as Grice explained at the time. (See also 
Schiffer, 1972, p. 8.)
Suppose I  d iscovered som e person so constitu ted  th a t, w h e n  I  to ld  h im  
th a t w hen ever I  g ru n ted  in  a special w ay I  w an ted  h im  to  b lush  o r to  in cu r  
som e physical m alady, th ereafte r w henever he recogn ized  th e  g ru n t (and  
w ith  it  m y  in te n tio n ) he d id  blush o r in c u r the m alady. (G rice , 1957, p. 385)
As Schiffer says, the blush would not count as the meaning of the grunt. 
“Should he then grunt, we should not, Grice thinks, want to say that he 
thereby meant something.” (Schiffer, 1972, p. 8) Taking Grice's theory as the 
foundation of an inferential account of communication, we can say that this 
strange state of affairs would not be a case of communication. Communica­
tion is limited to cases where the intention behind a speaker’s utterance justi­
fies the hearer’s response as well as causing it.
O n e  m ig h t ask h o w  G rice  th ou gh t th a t th e  in te n tio n  b eh in d  an u tterance  
was to  be recognised. T h e  answ er is th a t it  can be w orked  out, based p artly  on  
the usual m ean ing  o f  th e  w ords and expressions used, and p artly  on the  
context:
in  cases w h ere  th e re  is doubt, say, about w h ich  o f  tw o  o r m o re  th ings an  
u tte re r in tends to  convey, w e tend to re fer to  the co n text (lingu istic  or 
o therw ise) o f th e  u tterance and ask w h ich  o f  the alternatives w o u ld  be re l­
evant to  o th e r th ings he is saying o r doing, o r w h ich  in te n tio n  in  a p a rtic ­
u la r s itu ation  w ou ld  f it  in  w ith  some purpose he obviously has (e.g., a m an  
w h o  calls fo r a ‘p u m p ’ at a fire  w ou ld  n o t w a n t a b icycle p u m p ). N o n - lin -  
guistic  parallels are obvious: context is a c r ite rio n  in  settling  th e  question  
o f  w h y  a m an  w h o  has ju s t p u t a c igarette in  his m o u th  has p u t his hand  in
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his pocket; relevance to an obvious end is a criterion in settling why a 
man is running away from a bull. (Grice, i 957> P- 387)
In this passage is the germ of Grices work on inferring implicatures of utter­
ances, itself the starting point for modern inferential pragmatics. As discussed 
in chapter 1, for almost every utterance of any phrase there will indeed be two 
or more things (generally many more) that a speaker might have intended to 
convey, so ‘recognition’ of the intention behind an utterance must be an infer­
ential affair, guided by context and, in most cases strongly aided by the hear­
er’s knowledge about “what is normally conveyed” (Grice, 1957, p. 387) by the 
expressions used.
For Grice, then, the intention behind an utterance is inferred from the ex­
pressions used and the context, and is both a cause of and a reason for the 
hearer’s interpretation. I suggest below that this second point means that the 
kind of reasons needed for Grice’s theory of meaning are those he described 
as personal or justificatory-explanatory reasons in his later work on 
reasoning.
Causalism
There is a link to Donald Davidson’s well-known work on intentional actions 
(1963; 1980a), and the related causal theory in epistemology. The key point 
that Davidson was trying to establish was that an agent’s reasons for an action 
are causally effective: there is no bar on identifying something as both a reas­
on for and the cause of an action, and indeed for intentional actions the oper­
ative reasons are distinguished by the causal role they play in the action from 
other reasons that there might be for that action.
Causalism about actions makes two claims. First, “An event’s being an ac­
tion depends on how it was caused” (Mele, 1997a, pp. 2-3), and, secondly, ac­
tions are to be explained in terms of psychological or mental events such as 
beliefs, desires, intentions (Mele, 1997a, pp. 2-3).
This is hardly a modern theory. According to Aristotle, “the origin of ac­
tion -  its efficient, not its final cause -  is choice, and that of choice is desire 
and reasoning with a view to an end.” (Aristotle, 1998, p. 139:1139a, 31-2) Aris­
totle’s theory is that the choice of an action is a causal explanation of the ac­
tion, rather than a directly teleological explanation -  an explanation in terms
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o f w h a t makes an ac tio n  happen, w h a t brings it  ab o ut, ra th e r th a n  d irec tly  in  
term s o f  w h a t purpose it  serves. There is, how ever, a te leo log ica l aspect to  th is  
k in d  o f causal exp lanation , since th e  causes it  posits fo r actions are choices  
w h ich  derive fro m  reasoning about goals. T h a t is, g iven a desired  outcom e, 
choice o f  action comes fro m  reasoning about the k in d  o f  ac tio n  th a t is like ly  
to  achieve it. A ristotle 's  was an account o f  ac tion  in  te rm s o f  causes w h ic h  are  
founded in  an agent’s reasons fo r action.
Causalism has become the “standard theory of action” in recent decades 
(Schlosser, 2007, p. 187), largely on the basis of Davidson's argument that there 
has to be some way of distinguishing between reasons that an agent has for an 
action (possibly without being aware of them) but does not act on, and the 
reasons that are actually operative169. Assuming that both sides of the debate 
accept that when agents act intentionally they act for reasons, Davidson’s 
challenge to non-causalists was to provide “an account of the reasons for  
which we act that does not treat those reasons as figuring in the causation of 
the relevant behaviour” (Mele, 1997a, pp. 11, his italics)
Causes for beliefs
The related causalist theory about beliefs has also become standard in philo­
sophical accounts of belief-formation and of reasoning. The account of reas­
oning as value-preserving transitions developed in chapter 2 is of this type: in 
reasoning the premise mental states give rise to subsequent conclusion mental 
states. Ralph Wedgwood summarizes causalist views of epistemology in a re­
cent paper:
I f  yo u r reason fo r fo rm in g  a ce rta in  b e lie f is ‘represented ’ by som e o f  yo u r  
antecedent m en ta l states, th en  yo u r fo rm a tio n  o f  th a t b e lie f is -  as ep i-  
stemologists o ften  p u t it  -  ‘based on’ those an tecedent m e n ta l states. L ike  
m ost co n tem p o rary  epistem ologists, I  take this ‘basing re la tio n ’ to  be a 
kin d  o f causal re la tion: fo r yo u r fo rm a tio n  o f th is n ew  b e lie f to  be based
169. Also on the basis of Davidson’s devastating replies to standard objections to causalism, 
among them (1) the idea that such explanations are flawed because causes are not logically 
distinct from the actions they cause and (2) that one cannot provide causes of action that are 
both necessary and sufficient. Schueler, himself a non-causalist, thinks that these arguments 
were demolished by Davidson (Schueler, 2001, pp. 263, fn 3).
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on those antecedent mental states, you must have formed that new belief 
precisely because you were in those antecedent mental states -  where this 
is the ‘because’ of ordinary causal explanation. (Wedgwood, 2006, p. 661)
The Gricean account of the hearer’s end of the conveying of speaker meaning 
fits squarely with what has come to be the modern orthodoxy: the hearer’s re­
cognition of the speaker’s intention causes the response in the hearer that is 
the speaker’s meaning. On the speaker’s side, we may say that for the speaker, 
making the utterance she did, in the way that she did, her intention to evoke a 
certain response (which we take as given, as discussed in section 4.2 above) 
was both a reason for and a cause of her action.
Two frequently raised problems for causalist accounts need not worry us. 
The first is the much-discussed question of deviant causal chains. It is import­
ant for causalist theories to be able to distinguish a reason that is a cause (for a 
belief, an action or an intention) in the right way, from other reasons for ac­
tion that are causally effective in other ways. A belief p  that is a reason for 
forming belief q might causally lead to its formation, but in a way that has 
nothing to do with justifying it. Holmes might have come to believe that a 
snake was the cause of death because his belief that the hole, the whistling 
sound and the bell-pull were significant led him to write a despairing letter to 
his brother Mycroft, who wrote back with the solution to the case. Here 
Holmes’ belief that the snake was the means of death is caused by a set of pri­
or beliefs that constitute evidence, but not in the right way for that belief to be 
his reason for that conclusion (cf Wedgwood, 2006, p. 663).
We already have a solution for this kind of problem. The ‘right way’ for a 
cause to rationalise a belief is via a reasoning process with the reason as the 
input and the belief as the output, so that they are related as premise and con­
clusion in an inference (demonstrative or non-demonstrative). (Wedgwood, 
2006 is a detailed attempt to show that an account of reasoning of this kind 
deals with the problem of deviant causal chains for beliefs.) A belief p  which 
causes belief q via such a process is an operative reason for belief q. This cri­
terion, as I have noted in chapter 2, rules out associative connections. Sup­
pose Holmes’ belief that the whistle was significant reminded him of a pub 
called The Pig and Whistle, and thinking about pigs reminded him of a differ­
ent piece of evidence that he had forgotten and that was a reason to believe
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that the cause of death was a snake, and he came to believe so on that basis (cf 
Wedgwood, 2006, p. 667). The connection between the original belief about 
the whistle and the conclusion reached is not by reasoning, and so our ac­
count of reasoning allows us to rule that while the original belief is part of the 
causal chain leading to the correct conclusion, and a (potential) reason for 
reaching it, it was not an operative reason.
If, as Grice suggested, practical reasoning is also primarily a matter of 
value-preserving transitions, then a similar story can be told for the way that a 
speaker’s intended meaning leads to her utterance. Whatever one might think 
of the prospect of this kind of explanation holding for practical reasoning, this 
is not a problem specific to a theory of communicative action, and it is per­
haps too much to expect it to be solved within pragmatics.
A second question for causalist accounts which has attracted a fair 
amount of recent debate is whether a reason is a mind-independent fact or a 
mental state. Wedgwood’s solution, which I happily adopt, is to use the fruit­
fully ambiguous formulation that a premise mental state represents the reason 
for a conclusion mental state. The ambiguity cannot matter. Whether, strictly 
speaking, the fact that there is water on the ground is the reason for an agent’s 
belief that it rained last night, or it is the agent’s belief that there is water on 
the ground that plays that role, one must still have had the premise belief to 
have reached the conclusion.170
According to causalism about actions, any intentional action has a cause 
that is a reason for that action. Similarly, causalism about beliefs claims that a 
belief reached by reasoning will have a cause that also is a reason for that be­
lief. Davidson called an explanation of action in terms of the agent’s reason for 
doing what he did a rationalisation. Davidson argues that giving an agent’s 
primary reason for an intentional action is a way of explaining the action 
causally: “rationalization is a species of causal explanation” (Davidson, 1963, p. 
3).171 Every rationalization justifies, in what Davidson calls an “irreducible -
170. 1 have changed the example from Wedgwood’s -  frost as a reason to believe it was freezing 
last night -  since frost is evidence that it is freezing now.
171. This use of the word is in contrast to its dominant normal use, where a rationalization is an 
explanation that a person concocts for his action after the fact, giving a reason because it 
would be convenient if that reason had caused the action, rather than because that reason 
was actually operative. Spurious explanations given by participants in hypnosis for actions
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though somewhat anaemic -  sense” (Davidson, 1963, p. 9). That is, “from the 
agent’s point of view there was, when he acted, something to be said for the 
action.” (Davidson, 1963, p. 9) -  generally that it was believed to be a means to 
the realisation of some goal towards which the agent had a ‘pro-attitude’ (a de­
sire, yen or similar). Rationalisations also explain. Rationalisation is a type of 
causal explanation, “distinguished from other causal explanation by possess­
ing the property of justification” (Davidson, 1963, p. 9)-
According to a Gricean theory, rationalisations of this sort are a key as­
pect of pragmatics, since, as discussed above, the hearer’s recognition of the 
intention172 behind an utterance is both the cause of and a reason for the hear­
er’s response.
Justificatory-explanatory reasons
The notion of a cause which is also a reason is also one of the clearest links 
between Grice’s work on meaning and his work on reasoning, where he dis­
tinguishes three different types of reason: pure explanatory, justificatory and a 
third, hybrid, type, justificatory-explanatory. (Grice, 2001, ch.s 2 & 3) It is the 
third type, the justificatory-explanatory or personal use, I think, that is the 
kind of reason Grice works with in his theory of meaning.
Type 3 reasons can be expressed in sentences of the form “X’s reason(s) 
for A-ing was that B (to B)”. (Grice, 2001, p. 40) For example, “John’s reason 
for thinking Samantha to be a witch was that he had suddenly turned into a 
frog.” (Grice, 2001, p. 40)
Type 3 reasons are simultaneously explanatory and justificatory: “they ex­
plain, but what they explain are actions and certain psychological attitudes” 
(Grice, 2001, p. 41, his italics). They are justificatory, in the sense that B seems 
to X to justify A (B may or may not actually justify A) (Grice, 2001, p. 41)- 
That is, they are justificatory precisely in Davidson’s anaemic sense.
Grice discusses whether type 3 reasons are causes “of that for which they 
are reasons” (Grice, 2001, p. 44). He points out that the debate is about causal 
explanation, and suggests that an objection to that theory based on ordinary
carried out under post-hypnotic suggestion are examples.
172. Note that Grice’s phrase is usefully non-committal on whether it is a mental state or a 
mental event which plays the role of rationalising cause.
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usage of the word ‘cause’ is beside the point (Grice, 2001, p. 41). In ordinary 
use type 3 reasons are not causes, he claims. For example, “My love of cricket 
may cause me to neglect my work, but did not (in the vernacular sense of 
“cause”) cause me to play yesterday.” (Grice, 2001, p. 44) Grice is of course 
well-known for arguing that usage does not map simply onto word meaning, 
although he did not do so explicitly in this instance. It may be that one would 
not say “My love of cricket caused me to play yesterday” because it is odd to 
say so in those terms, rather than because it is false.
W h a t is m o re  im p o rta n t is w h e th e r a co rrec t exp lanation  o f  the ac tion  
w o u ld  include the love o f  c ricke t (a p ro -a ttitu d e , in  D avidso n ’s term s) as a 
cause:
the debate is not really about whether reasons are causes in the vernacular 
sense; it is about whether to specify a type (3) reason as the explanation of 
an action is to give a “causal explanation” of the action, in a sense of “caus­
al explanation” which is none too clear to me, and which (I sometimes 
suspect) is none too clear to the disputants. (Grice, 2001, p. 44)
T here  is a fu rth e r p o in t o f congruence b etw een  w hat G rice  says ab o ut typ e  3 
reasons and w h a t he says about reasoning as it  relates to  m ean ing . C o m p re ­
hension  o f speaker m ean in g  is o ften  accom plished w ith o u t conscious, ex p lic it  
reasoning. So i f  type 3 reasons are, as I cla im , the k in d  o f reasons th a t hearers  
have fo r the m eanings th ey  derive fro m  utterances, they m u st be capable o f  
acting  as personal reasons unreflectively. T h a t is, it  m ust be possible to  com e  
to  a p a rticu lar und erstan d in g  o f an u tterance ow ing  to  a type 3 reason, th a t is, 
w ith  one’s in te rp re ta tio n  jus tified  som ehow  by the in te n tio n  b eh in d  an u tte r ­
ance and caused by it , b u t w ith o u t necessarily being explic itly , consciously  
aw are that the in te n tio n  justifies the in te rp re ta tio n . G rice ’s discussion o f  typ e  
3 reasons m entions jus t this k in d  o f  p ossib ility173:
... i f  X ’s reason fo r A -in g  is th a t B ... i t  is necessarily th e  case th a t X  re ­
garded (even if  only momentarily or subliminally) the fac t th a t B in  ju s tify ­
ing h im  as A -in g . (G rice , 2001, p. 41, m y em phasis.)
173. Although Grice does not relate this point to his work on utterance interpretation.
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4-3-3  GRICEAN INFERENCE A N D  EXPLANATORY POWER
Calculability o f conversational implicatures
W e  have seen th a t G rice  was co m m itte d  to understan d in g  use o f  language as a 
ra tio n a l activ ity, in  w h ic h  a h eare r’s in te rp re ta tio n  o f  an u tte ran ce  was ra tio n ­
ally g rounded in  the in te n tio n  beh ind  an u tterance, and th a t in te n tio n  could  
be w o rked  o u t fro m  w h a t was u ttered  and the circum stances o f  the u tterance. 
The reco gn itio n  o f  th e  in te n tio n  b eh ind  p ro d u c tio n  o f an u tterance -  an in ­
ten tio n , fo r exam ple, th a t he com e to  th in k  th a t the speaker believes p (in  ex­
h ib itive  cases) and  th a t he com e to  th in k  this (at least p a rtly ) as a consequence  
o f the speaker’s m a k in g  the utterance -  provides the h earer w ith  a reason to  
fo rm  th a t belief.
The a im  o f seeing language use as grounded  in  reasoning is p a rticu la rly  
clear in  G ric e ’s insistence on  the ca lcu lab ility  o f conversational im p lica tures . I 
therefore tu rn  n o w  to  th is  second aspect o f G rice ’s in fe ren tia lism  as it  relates 
to  language use, th e  ro le  o f  inference in  his th e o ry  o f conversation, specifically  
the d erivation  o f  im p lica tu res , bearing  in  m in d  N e a le ’s p o in t th a t G ric e ’s th e ­
o ry  o f  conversation can be seen as a co m p o nent o f  his th e o ry  o f  m ean ing .
A s is w e ll-k n o w n , in  his w o rk  on conversation G rice  show ed th a t the  
m ean in g  th a t a speaker conveys by m aking  an utterance on som e occasion  
m ay go w e ll b eyond  w h a t is asserted, o r w h a t is expressed in  v irtu e  o f the  
‘tim eless’ n o rm a l m ean ing s o f the expressions used174. U tte ran ces can have 
im p licatures -  im p lica tio n s  w h ich  are p art o f  the in tend ed  m ean in g  o f  the u t­
terance -  as w e ll as ex p lic it content. G rice proposed th a t conversational im ­
plicatures can be w o rke d  o u t fro m  w hat is said (and  the w ay it  is said) by as­
sum ing th a t the speaker is co n form ing  to  the C o o perative  P rin c ip le  and (at 
least some o f  the) conversational m axim s.
The presence o f  a conversational im p lica tu re  m ust be capable o f being  
w orked  out; fo r even i f  i t  can in  fact be in tu itiv e ly  grasped, unless the in ­
tu itio n  is replaceable by an argum ent, the im p lic a tu re  ( i f  p resen t at all)
174. These are, approximately, the two different senses of Grice’s ‘what is said’. For discussion of 
Grice’s settled view of ‘what is said’ see Wharton, 2002.
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w ill n o t  co u n t as a c o n v e r s a t i o n a l  im p lica tu re; it  w ill b e  a c o n v e n ­
t i o n a l  im p lica tu re . (i975> p. 50, h is  em p h a se s .)
... the final test fo r the presence o f a conversational im p lica tu re  [has] to be, 
as far as I  [can] see, a d e riv a tio n  o f  it. O n e  has to  p roduce an account o f  
h o w  it  has arisen and w h y  it is there. (1 9 8 1 , p. 1 87 )
T h at is, there are ‘co n vention al’ aspects o f m e an in g  (im p lic it as w ell as exp li­
c it) w hose recovery is a m a tte r o f  kn o w in g  an d  re triev in g  the re levan t m e an ­
ing, b u t crucially, n on -co n ven tio n a l com p o nents  o f th e  m ean in g  o f an  
utterance m ust be in fe rred , w o rked  o u t rationally . W h e n e v e r th ere  are  n o n -  
conventional com ponents, there  m ust be a d e riv a tio n  o f such e lem en ts  in th e  
fo rm  o f an argum ent. A g ain , it  is cruc ia l, as w ith  G rice ’s w o rk  on speaker 
m eaning , th at this d eriv a tio n  explains fo r  each im p lica tu re  n ot o n ly  th e  reason  
“w h y  it  is th ere”, b u t also p rovides som e k in d  o f account o f  “h o w  it has aris ­
en” -  th at is, a causal account.
Grice’s schema
G ric e ’s schema for th e  d eriv a tio n  o f conversational im p lica tures  shows th a t 
the process is envisaged as inference to  the best explanation, w h ere  w h a t is to  
be expla ined  is that th e  speaker has said th a t p  (in  a certa in  way, in  p a rtic u la r  
circum stances), and th e  exp lanation  sought is in  term s o f  the speaker’s in te n ­
tio n  to  convey an im p lica tu re  q:
A  general p a tte rn  fo r the w o rk in g  out o f  a conversational im p lica tu re  
m ig h t be given as fo llow s: ‘H e  has said th a t p; there is no reason to  sup­
pose th a t he is n o t observing  the m axim s, or at least th e  C P; he co u ld  n o t  
be doing  th is unless he th o u g h t th a t q; he know s (and know s th a t I  kn o w  
th at he know s) th a t I  can  see th at the supposition th a t he th in ks  th a t q is  
requ ired; he has don e n o th in g  to stop m e  th in k in g  th a t q; he  in tends m e  
to  th in k , o r is at least w illin g  to  a llo w  m e  to th in k , th a t q; and so he has 
im p lica ted  th a t q ”’ (G rice , 1975, p. 50: his em phasis.)
The Relevance Theory schema
Related patterns can be g iven  in  o th er in fe ren tia l p rag m a tic  theories. For ex ­
am ple, Sperber and W ils o n  give th e  o u tline  in  tab le 4  (below ) fo r P eter’s in fe r-
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ence of Mary’s intended meaning when she makes the utterance in (20b). 
(Sperber & Wilson, 2004, pp. 615-616: their examples (11) and (12).)
(20) a. Peter: Did John pay back the money he owed you? 
b. Mary: No. He forgot to  go to the bank.
Here the inference is guided by the presumption of optimal relevance and 
situation-specific expectations of relevance rather than the c p  and maxims, 
but there are similarities between the two schemas. In both the Gricean and 
the relevance-theoretic schemas, the input is something that the speaker has 
uttered, and the manner and circumstances of its utterance; the output is a 
hypothesised component or components of the speaker’s meaning that serves 
to explain why the utterance was made in the way that it was. The output 
meaning is, in both cases, in the form of an intention attributed to the speak­
er. In both schemas, the output is inferred on the basis of the input, together 
with such extra assumptions as are necessary, given a standing presumption 
or presumptions about the standards that the speaker’s utterance will attain.
There is, however, a significant difference here. In Grice’s schema, observ­
ance of the cp and maxims supplies premises to the argument175; in relevance- 
theoretic derivations the direction of the whole derivation -  and when it 
stops -  are guided by expectations of relevance, and governed by a presump­
tion that the utterance will be optimally relevant. I comment in chapter 5 on 
these points and the comprehension procedure they mandate.
A further difference is that Sperber and Wilson’s example illustrates three 
interlocked inferences to  the best explanation. Peter infers (1) M ary’s explicit 
meaning, (2) an implicated premise and (3) her implicated conclusion and 
perhaps other weak implicatures. In Grice’s schema only an implicature is de­
rived. However, applying Gricean reasoning to an example such as (20), one
175- Sperber and Wilson discuss this point (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 36). As they say, others 
have recast Grice’s maxims as code-like rules.
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Table 4 : Example outline of relevance-theoretic comprehension
(a) Mary has said to Peter, “Hex forgot to 
go to the BANK,/BANK,.”
[Hex = uninterpreted pronoun] 
[BANK, = financial institution] 
[BANK, = river bank]
(b) Mary’s utterance will be optimally re­
levant to Peter.
(c) Mary's utterance will achieve relev­
ance by explaining why John has not 
repaid the money he owed her.
(d) Forgetting to go to the BANK, may 
make one unable to repay the money 
one owes.
Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) 
logical form of Mary’s utterance into a 
description of Mary’s ostensive behaviour.
Expectation raised by recognition of 
Mary's ostensive behaviour and accept­
ance of the presumption of relevance it 
conveys.
Expectation raised by (b), together with 
the fact that such an explanation would 
be most relevant to Peter at this point.
First assumption to occur to Peter which, 
together with other appropriate premises, 
might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as 
an implicit premise of Mary's utterance.
(e) John forgot to go to the BANK,.
(f) John was unable to repay Mary the 
money he owes because he forgot to 
go to the BANK,.
(g) John may repay Mary the money he 
owes when he next goes to the 
BANK,.
First enrichment of the logical form of 
Mary's utterance to occur to Peter which 
might combine with (d) to lead to the sat­
isfaction of (c). Accepted as an ex- 
plicature of Mary’s utterance.
Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) 
and accepted as an implicit conclusion of 
Mary’s utterance.
From (f) plus background knowledge. One 
of several possible weak implicatures of 
Mary’s utterance which, together with (f), 
satisfy expectation (b).
2 2 3
could use the c p  and maxims to disambiguate (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 34) 
and perform reference assignment, operations that contribute to the explicit 
content of the utterance.
Indeed we have seen that Grice thought that in cases of ambiguity at least, in­
ferences based on the context of utterance would be needed to determine 
which possible meaning was intended. In fact, the principles regulating prag­
matic processing (whatever they are) must also be active in the inferential 
work necessitated by ellipsis, vagueness, loose use and other ways -  beyond 
ambiguity and referential indeterminacy -  in which linguistic meaning falls 
short of the proposition expressed by an utterance (Wilson & Sperber, 1981; 
Neale, 1992, pp. 520 , n 27).
4 .3 .4  EXPLANATORY POWER 
Explanation and justification
As I discussed above, the question is often raised how schemas of this type 
can be explanatory, given that hearers are not, most of the time, aware of con­
structing or rehearsing arguments of this sort in communication. Instead, the 
typical experience is that the speaker’s meaning (or rather, the hearer’s best es­
timate of it) is immediately available to the hearer without any need for con­
scious, explicit reasoning. It has been seen as problematic for Gricean 
explanations that explicit inference is largely absent from our experience of 
utterance interpretation. W hat, then, is the relation of such schemas to what 
goes on in the mind of a hearer?
A subsidiary question is what Grice's own view was. Taking the question 
about Grice first, one interpretation, which is fairly clearly mistaken, is that 
Grice thought that participants in conversation have to consciously, labori­
ously work their way through the derivation of what is meant from (facts 
about) the utterance and some principles of rational cooperation, passing 
through the mental states in the derivation, with awareness of doing so. It is 
straightforward to see that if this were so, schemas of this type could answer 
both the how and the why questions: the process would amount to building an 
argument step by step (including some non-demonstrative steps, presumably), 
as in Grice’s picture of reasoning. The input would thus both rationally justify
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and bring about the output. However, it is clear from what Grice says that this 
was not his view: implicatures can be “intuitively grasped” (Grice, 1975. P* 5o).
A more plausible -  and, I think, widespread -  interpretation of Grice is 
that he thought that sometimes reasoning or inference is involved in arriving 
at implicatures and sometimes it is not. W hen it is not, the implicature is 
grasped ‘in a flash’, intuitively. In these cases, one can always construct a chain 
of inferences which show how reasoning might have proceeded if there had 
been any reasoning involved, as is required by calculability, but, according to 
this view, in fact, on these occasions, there was none. Richard Warner inter­
prets Grice in this way, as I discuss below.
In this section, I argue instead that schemas of this kind are explanatory in 
part because in understanding utterances, hearers are engaged in reasoning, 
although they are not typically aware of the process. I also suggest that there 
are indications that Grice may have held this view, so that when a conversa­
tional participant arrives at an implicature, the process that got him or her to 
the implicature would count as reasoning for Grice. That is, I do not want to 
argue that Grice thought that on all occasions when language was in use 
speakers and hearers had to be engaged in explicit, conscious reasoning (that 
is the first of the three views), but I do want to suggest that he thought that 
they were engaged in reasoning.
In the end, regardless of Grice’s position, this is the view that I take. A 
view of this sort links together the answers to the how and the why questions. 
The schema shows why the interpretation is reached in that it shows that the 
interpretation was justified, in Davidson’s ‘anaemic sense’, at least, that it 
shows that there were reasons that seemed to the hearer at the time to justify 
the interpretation reached. The derivation, in other words, shows that there 
were reasons for the hearer as a rational but fallible agent to reach a certain 
interpretation.
The schema also shows in a certain sense how the interpretation was 
reached. It presents a reasoning process and the claim is that it was that reas­
oning process that led from the utterance to the interpretation. There is a 
problem with this claim, however. It does not fully answer the question, “In 
what way are derivations according to such schemas explanatory?”
225
There are two ways of making this objection, one of which is more cogent 
than the other. The less cogent way is as follows: We know (the objection 
claims) that such schemas are not causally explanatory because we are not 
aware of going through the steps of the derivation. Then the question about 
the explanatory force of Gricean derivations becomes the following:
what is the relation between the reasoning you might have engaged in and 
your understanding the sentence? How is there any explanatory power in 
the fact that, although you reached your understanding of the sentence in 
some other way, you might have reasoned your way to such an under­
standing? (Warner, 2001, p. x, his italics)
This objection is itself vulnerable to an objection. We know that unconscious 
processing goes on all the time, including, if mental-logic theorists are right, 
series of transitions between conceptual representations which parallel argu­
ments. Why then should broadly Gricean derivations not be instantiated in 
processing literally, step by step, but unconsciously? So this version of the ob­
jection would fail unless it could be shown that there could not be uncon­
scious derivations of this sort, and I do not think that this case has been made.
As we shall see, Francois Recanati would have a different objection to this 
first line of argument. For him, all inferential pragmatic processes are con­
scious in what he regards as the important sense: that they are available (at 
least retrospectively) to reflective awareness. I discuss Recanati’s position fur­
ther, below.
A better version of the objection, in my view, runs as follows: There are 
good reasons to suppose that heuristic processes are used in thought, particu­
larly rapid thought, conscious or unconscious, so it is implausible to believe 
that thought processes isomorphic to Gricean derivations take place in all or 
even most cases of utterance interpretation. If Gricean176 inferential schemas 
do not describe the thought processes and mental states involved in arriving
176. Note that while the relevance-theoretic type of derivation seen in table 4 is a good deal 
closer to the underlying heuristic it may also be somewhat idealised: no interpretations or 
parts of interpretations which were generated and rejected are mentioned. Further discus­
sion of the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure is reserved for chapter 5.
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at an implicature, then in what sense, this version of the objection asks, could 
they provide an explanation of how the implicature is derived?
I take it that Millikan’s objection to inferential, Gricean pragmatics dis­
cussed in chapter 1 is along related lines. Her objection is that the “Gricean 
analysis is very implausible if taken at face value as requiring that speakers 
and hearers harbor multiply embedded mental representations of one anoth­
er's mental representations during normal conversation” (Millikan, 2005, p. 
203) I assume that the objection here is that the representations postulated 
are improbable because they are too complex, rather than because we are not 
consciously aware of tokening such representations in utterance interpreta­
tion -  and thus this is related to the second objection.
I do not agree with Millikan’s objection, however. The complexity of rep­
resentations in itself need not be any bar to processing. We have considerable 
facility with m etarepresentations of thoughts and utterances, up to three or 
four levels deep. (Consider how many conversations include assertions along 
the lines of “He thought that she said that he said that...”.) W hat is more, a 
good deal of the embedding can be done automatically: the parsed structure 
of an utterance is presumably automatically embedded under: S [the speaker] 
said Similarly, the output of utterance interpretation procedures, even 
when they are very simple heuristics, as with ‘naive optimists’, is presumably 
embedded under: S means that. . . . So I do not think that the need for embed­
ded representations would tell against a full-computation version of Gricean 
accounts. Rather, I think it is implausible that full derivations take place, with 
manipulations of mental representations according solely to value-preserving 
rules. I think that it is im portant to answer this form of the objection to 
Gricean derivations.
I have already laid the ground for my answer to this version of the objec­
tion in chapters two and three. My answer, which I also attribute to Grice, is 
that most utterance interpretation proceeds a quick, heuristic way and is re­
lated to an explicit step-by-step derivation in just the same way that reasoning 
the quick way is related to reasoning the hard way. In fact, since I claim that 
working out the interpretation of an utterance is a reasoning process, I am 
claiming that the former cases are a subset of the latter.
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I am claiming also that Grice was implicitly committed to the position 
that language use involved reasoning, regardless of whether the thought pro­
cesses involved on a particular occasion were conscious or not. This seems to 
me to emerge from comparing what Grice said about aspects of language use 
with his views about reasoning in general. Therefore I discuss here the paral­
lels between what Grice said about the quick way of reasoning and about the 
need for implicature derivations to be reconstructable.
We have seen that Grice did not think that arriving at implicatures always 
involved conscious explicit inferences. Sometimes one might work out an im­
plicature laboriously; sometimes one might grasp it intuitively. Similarly, 
Grice did not think that reasoning in general was always conscious and expli­
cit. As discussed at length in chapter 2, his opinion was that there is a hard 
way of reasoning, which is the laborious, step-by-step construction of inferen­
tial chains, and there is a quick way, which is a substitute for the hard way, and 
is possible because of the intention behind the reasoning as well as habitu­
ation to particular kinds of inferential move (Grice, 2001, p. 17). W hat is im­
portant is that the ‘quick way’ of making inferential moves also counts as reas­
oning. Grice is quite clear about this. For example, he says that in the absence 
of explicit reasoning,
The possibility of making a good inferential step (there being one to be 
made), together with such items as a particular inferer’s reputation for in­
ferential ability, may determine whether on a particular occasion we sup­
pose a particular transition to be inferential (and so to be a case of 
reasoning). (Grice, 2001, p. 17)
The parallel with what Grice says about calculability is exact. A mental or 
verbal transition intuitively made will count as a case of reasoning if it paral­
lels an inferential step. If it does parallel an inferential step, then in principle it 
is capable of being worked out, just as “the presence of a conversational im­
plicature must be capable of being worked out... even if it can in fact be intu­
itively grasped” (Grice, i975> P- 50 ). The conclusion that I draw from this is 
that the parallel is so exact that Grice was implicitly committed to the view 
that I am advocating: arriving intuitively at a conversational implicature is an 
instance of reasoning.
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This recasts W arner’s question about the explanatory status of Gricean 
derivations as follows: what is the relation between the fu lly  explicit reasoning 
that you might have engaged in and understanding the sentence? How is there 
any explanatory power in the fac t that, although you reached your under­
standing o f the sentence by reasoning the quick way, you might have reasoned 
the hard way to such an understanding?
The claim that the explicit derivation is a causal explanation in such cases 
of quick, intuitive interpretation rests on the claim about quick reasoning in 
general that it is reasoning in that it is aimed at resembling reasoning the hard 
way. An intention, or the aim/purpose of a mental sub-system, directs non-al- 
gorithmic, possibly non-value-preserving processes towards a value-pre­
serving answer. Of course, such merely heuristic procedures do not guarantee 
the production of the answer that an explicit reasoning process, parallel to an 
argument, would have reached. To understand the form that pragmatic pro­
cessing takes we need to investigate the details of the heuristics used, as well 
as the explicit inferential derivation whose result the heuristics are aimed at 
reproducing. I suggest some answers to these questions in some remarks in 
the remainder of this section and in chapter 5.
The view that I am taking is quite closely related to the position taken by 
Sperber and Wilson. For them, pragmatic processing is inferential, whether it 
is spontaneous or laborious. Sperber (1995) suggests that the term  ‘inference’ 
is used by psychologists because it avoids the connotations of conscious expli­
citness that the word ‘reasoning’ has. There are subliminal, spontaneous infer­
ences as well as conscious ones (Sperber, 1997); but the more important dis­
tinction for psychological explanation is that between inferential and non- 
inferential (including pseudo-inferential177) processes. For Sperber and 
Wilson, an inference must have input and output related as premises and con­
clusion are in an argument (Sperber & Wilson, 1987b, p. 737). An interpreta­
tion of an utterance constructed by the hearer is an inference about the mean­
ing the speaker intended to convey, based on (and logically supported by) the 
utterance. I agree with these points about inference, while adding that it is my 
opinion that inferential processing which is directed towards a particular goal 
is reasoning. It is relevant, I think, that it is not customary in the psychology
177.1 discuss pseudo-inference in section 4.3.5 below.
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of reasoning to limit investigation to conscious processes, nor to say that a 
process used in solving reasoning problems is merely inference if it is not 
conscious.
Among those who favour a broadly Gricean approach, there have been 
several other answers to the question of how such schemas can be explanat­
ory. One line that has been taken is that the Gricean schemas have no psycho­
logical reality as an account of the processes involved in utterance interpreta­
tion. According to this view, they simply express constraints on correct 
interpretations of utterances. Hearers are disposed somehow to reach inter­
pretations which satisfy the c p  and maxims, or the Presumption of Relevance, 
but Gricean inference schemas do not describe how such interpretations are 
reached. (One recent advocate of such a view is Bave (2008).) A related view is 
that Gricean derivations have normative force rather than psychologically de­
scriptive force (Saul, 2002a; see also Saul, 2002b for Saul’s views on 
psychological reality and Gricean explanations)178. Such views suggest that 
Gricean schemas are not causally explanatory: they explain why (in one sense 
or another) but not how. Those who hold this kind of view would say that the 
question of how interpretations are actually reached is a separate psychologic­
al issue.
Psychological reality and consciousness
O ther theorists have focussed on the question, less important, in my opinion, 
of the apparent mismatch between Gricean derivations and our introspective 
intuitions about pragmatic processing. I think two broad lines can be distin­
guished here. One line is to deny that pragmatic processing generally involves 
inference or reasoning. Then Gricean derivations explain only in the sense 
that they illustrate how reasoning would proceed if there were any: they are 
‘as if’ explanations. Recanati’s view is the converse. For Recanati, implicature 
derivation is conscious: since it consists in person-level inferences it could 
not, he claims, be otherwise. I have explained that I share with Sperber and 
Wilson the view that the crucial elements of psychologically real, broadly 
Gricean explanation are 1) that it involves inference about speaker's inten­
tions, and 2) that an account is given of the processes that perform the infer­
178. Saul holds this view herself, and attributes it to Grice, if I have understood her correctly.
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ence. W hether the inferences involved are conscious seems to me to be a 
secondary question, at best. However, the question about the explanatory 
force of Gricean pragmatics has been thought to concern the availability to 
consciousness of explicit derivations, and I look at this question and its rela­
tion (or otherwise) to the personal/sub-personal distinction here.
One view of this question is akin to the second interpretation of Grice, 
above. On this type of account, some inferential pragmatics is conscious and 
explicit, but the conscious inference, through habituation, can become routin- 
ized and taken over by heuristics, and it is then no longer inferential. Robin 
Campbell (1981), for example, suggested that we should distinguish between 
conscious (phenic) and unconscious or subconscious (cryptic) processes. In 
his view, pragmatic processes are often phenic and inferential, in contrast to 
the exercise of linguistic knowledge, which is non-inferential and cryptic.
Campbell cites the construction of bridging inferences179 as the kind of 
pragmatic process that requires conscious inference:
Suppose, reporting a late-night gathering, someone says “And then the 
police arrived and we all swallowed our cigarettes”. To make sense of what 
was said we need a bridging inference. For example, that the cigarettes 
contained an illegal substance. I think it is fairly clear that in general such 
inferences involve real cognitive effort and hence phenic structures and 
processes... Ordinary communication ... is littered with all sorts of repair 
sequences showing, or so it seems to me, effortful cognition at work. 
(Campbell, 1981, p. 96)
This may be so. The interpretation of novel metaphors and the comprehension 
of figurative devices in literature are also areas in which effortful conscious 
reasoning may often occur.
I would resist in Campbell’s account the assumption that cognitive effort 
indicates conscious processing -  presumably unconscious processing also re­
quires effort -  and, more generally in accounts of this type, that whether a 
process is conscious or unconscious tells us what kind of process it is: in par­
ticular, whether it can be inferential and whether it counts as reasoning. We
179. The term is from Herb Clark (1977). For discussion of inferences of this type, see Wilson & 
Matsui, 1998; Matsui, 2000.
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have seen that it appears to be Richard W arner’s view that utterance interpret­
ation is not reasoning in the absence of conscious explicit derivations. Dis­
cussing the connections between Grice’s work on reasoning and his work on 
meaning, he writes:
We can imagine you -  the reader -  reasoning as follows with regard to [a 
sentence, s]. “The sentences standard meaning in English is \p\; Warner 
would not be producing that sentence in this context unless he intended 
to me to think that he believes [that p). He has no reason to deceive me, 
so he must believe that.” The problem, of course, is that people hardly ever 
reason this way when communicating. You did not reason in any such way 
when you read the sentence [s]. You read the sentence and understood -  
straightaway, without any intervening reasoning, without, indeed, think­
ing about it at all. (2001, p. x)180
Campbell, who refers to conscious pragmatic processes as ‘macropragmatic’ 
and unconscious ones as ‘micropragmatic’181, suggests that only the former in­
volve Gricean inference:
Macropragmatic processes would be analysed in terms of explicit infer­
ences guided by principles of rational cooperation while micropragmatic 
processes would be analysed as i f  they involved such inferences. ... it may 
be possible to go a little further and indeed, it is desirable to do so if one 
dislikes the notion of unconscious inference -  as I d o . ... it is typically the 
case that these cryptic processes are merely heuristic; they deal ad­
equately with the majority of circumstances but when they break down 
the control of the performance is returned by default, to deliberate phenic 
guidance. (Campbell, 1981, p. 100)
While I do not share Campbell's dislike of the notion of unconscious infer­
ence, there is a good deal here that I agree with. My view is that pragmatic 
processing is typically subliminal and that it is carried out in accordance with
180. W arner gives a specific example, but the point he is making does not depend on it, so 1 
have replaced his example sentence with V and the proposition it expresses with 'p\
181. In my opinion a better use for this terminology would be to make the distinction between 
the heuristic trial-and-error search process and heuristics that are sometimes employed in 
the course of that search.
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a heuristic, which itself typically employs further heuristic shortcuts or con­
straints. It is clear that when the usual process fails to deliver a satisfactory 
result it is possible for other, more laborious processes to step in. In cases in 
which we become aware of laborious processing, the additional processing is,
r  • * 1 8 2of course, conscious in some sense.
In saying this I am agreeing with Robyn Carston, who suggests that the 
normal state of affairs is that pragmatic processes are unconscious. However, 
Carston also suggests an alignment in pragmatic processing between the con­
scious/unconscious distinction, the distinction between modular and non- 
modular processes and the distinction between personal and sub-personal 
processes:
The appropriate distinction within modes of processing and levels of ex­
planation would seem to be between, on the one hand, a modular (sub­
personal) pragmatic processor which, when all goes well quickly and auto­
matically delivers speaker meaning (explicatures and implicatures), and, 
on the other hand, processes of a conscious reflective (personal-level) sort 
which occur only when the results of the former system are found 
wanting. (Carston, 2002a, p. 146)
I reserve comment on the modularity of pragmatic processing to chapter 5. 
On the application of the distinction between personal and sub-personal pro­
cesses to psychological accounts of processing I think some caution is advis­
able, partly because I think that applying this distinction can be seen as 
settling by definitional f ia t  the question of whether unconscious processes can 
be inferential or instances of reasoning -  although Carston does not employ it 
in this way183. Recanati does make this move. In his view, reasoning is a per­
sonal-level activity and therefore m ust be conscious in some sense, as I dis­
cuss below.
182. There may be other cases in which additional processing is not conscious, such as slow un­
conscious processing of utterances which made no sense when first encountered. Much later 
the correct interpretation may spring to mind. There may have been no extra conscious pro­
cessing; that does not indicate that there has been no extra processing.
183. Carston endorses the relevance-theoretic view that there are spontaneous inferences.
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The personal/sub-personal distinction
A related worry about the distinction is that it does not sit comfortably with 
the kind of explanation given in the cognitive sciences. Explanations are 
sought in terms of processes, rules and knowledge bases, perhaps modular. 
Such explanations will always be sub-personal in character, if it makes sense 
to classify them in this way at all, just as biological explanations are, whether 
they are in terms of organs, the properties of certain cells, or metabolic path­
ways184. Some of these explanations in terms of component systems of an or­
ganism cohere with personal-level propositions. At the personal level I might 
say, ‘1 am getting a cold, but I am fighting it’. This is presumably coherent with 
a sub-personal story in term s of the activity of white blood cells and various 
other systems and sub-systems, but neither description, in my opinion, is a 
substitute for the other. Similar considerations apply in psychology. That I 
(can) speak English (or Chinese) is a personal-level fact related to (but per­
haps not reducible to or a substitute for) a scientific explanation in terms of 
the state of my language faculty. Here I am echoing comments made by 
Chomsky:
No one expects ordinary talk about things happening in the “physical 
world” to have any particular relation to naturalistic theories; the terms 
belong to different universes... The same, then, should be true of such 
statements as ‘John speaks Chinese'... The theory of evolution and other 
parts of biology do try to understand John Smith and his place in nature; 
not, however, under the description “human being” or “person” as con­
strued in ordinary language and thought. (1995, pp. 32-33).
I think that the same sort of considerations apply equally to reasoning. Psy­
chological theories of reasoning are in terms of a component system or sys­
tems of humans, and this goes as much for conscious as for unconscious 
reasoning. It is a fact about me as a person that I ‘see’ (comprehend) what you 
mean by your utterance, when I do. This presumably coheres with an account 
of the working out in terms of processes governed by rules within a system or 
systems, but neither account replaces the other. The descriptions serve differ­
184- Statistical accounts, as in population biology, are quite different, of course.
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ent purposes and exist on different levels. Scientific psychological explanation 
is conducted more or less exclusively at the level of component systems 
whether the phenomena to be explained are more sub-personal’ (e.g. the 
workings of the visual system (Marr, 1982)) or more ‘personal’ (e.g. what the 
participant is paying attention to (Lavie & Tsai, 1994; Styles, 1997; Pashler, 
1998; Lavie, 2000)). I return to this point in the discussion of Recanati’s views, 
below.
Dual-process theories o f reasoning
The use of the term ‘reasoning’ in psychology may differ somewhat from or­
dinary use, if ordinary use reserves the word for conscious, effortful activity (I 
am not sure that it does, but am prepared to concede the point). It has been 
fruitful (e.g. in mental-logic theory) to propose one system for reasoning and 
investigate on that basis. Thus, Rips writes that is is necessary to postulate 
complex unconscious processes in theories of reasoning as elsewhere in 
psychology:
Johnson-Laird raises the issue of whether nonconscious procedures can 
be as sophisticated as conscious ones, but it is hard to see how cognitive 
psychology could make much progress if it were to limit nonconscious in­
formation-processing to simple routines. Surely, motor control, percep­
tion, sentence recognition, sentence production, categorization, recogni­
tion memory, and many other cognitive abilities depend on nonconscious 
processes of formidable complexity, and it would be astonishing if reason­
ing were an exception to this trend. (Rips, 1997, p. 413)
Recently, however, in the psychology of reasoning there has been considerable 
work on dual-process or dual-system theories. Such theories (Evans & Over, 
1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999) posit that there are two systems for reas­
oning and inference.185 System 1 is evolutionarily prior to system 2 and shared 
with other animals. System 2 is evolutionarily recent; presumably unique to 
humans. (These names for the systems are from Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & 
West, 2000.) System 2 is responsible for canonical logical inference, while sys­
185. Related claims have been made in the literatures on learning e.g. (Reber, 1993; Dienes & 
Perner, 1999) and judgment (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).
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tem 1 makes ‘quick and dirty’ approximations, by statistical processes or frugal 
heuristics.
For some, perhaps most, dual-process theorists (e.g. Evans & Over, 1996; 
Johnson-Laird, 2004)186, the two systems are responsible for implicit and ex­
plicit inference respectively.187 Then the claim, similar to Campbell’s claim 
about pragmatic processing, is that normatively inferential processes are 
laborious and conscious, and that automatic, unconscious processes are 
merely heuristic: “Dual-process theorists generally agree that System 1 pro­
cesses are rapid, parallel and automatic in nature: only their final product is 
posted in consciousness.” (Evans, 2003, p. 454). Such dual-process theorists do 
not, of course, share Campbell’s dislike of talk of unconscious inference. On 
the contrary, they need to talk that way in order to state the claim that uncon­
scious inference and unconscious reasoning are carried out by non-normative 
processes. W hat dual-process theories and the Campbell/Warner view have in 
common is the claim that unconscious processes do not involve normative 
(value-preserving) reasoning: unconscious processing is merely heuristic. 
Since I want to argue against views of this sort in pragmatics, I make some 
brief remarks here about what I take to be the problems with dual-process 
theories of reasoning in general.
One major motivation for the system i/system 2 distinction has been a de­
sire to explain individual differences in reasoning ability (e.g. Stanovich & 
West, 1998; Stanovich & West, 2000): why, for example, do some people 
nearly always give the normative answer on the abstract selection task while 
most never do? According to a dual-process account, good performance 
depends on the ability to engage and use system 2, that is, the ability to bring 
normative rules to bear on the problem. However, as I wrote in chapter 3, it 
seems that normative performance on reasoning tasks is more to do with the 
ability to interpret the task as the experimenter intended, ignoring informa­
tion that seems (but is not) relevant to the task as it is set. Summarising the
186. Johnson-Laird casts this as a “distinction between implicit and explicit inferences [which] 
goes back at least to Pascal, and ... was revived by Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977)” (2004, 
p. 188, his italics).
187. Care is needed in describing the commitments of such theorists. For example in a recent 
paper Evans (2006) finds a distinction in the literature between dual-process and dual-sys­
tem accounts.
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evidence, neurological as well as psychological, Noveck and Prado write that it 
shows that “correct performance on higher-level tasks has little to do with the 
better use of normative rules; it has more to do with avoiding biases while us­
ing such rules.” (Noveck & Prado, 2007, p. 164). The evidence is just not there 
for the proposition that fast, unconscious reasoning is necessarily non-norm- 
ative, i.e. that normative reasoning cannot be fast and unconscious.
I think the dual-process programme is in danger of conflating two distinc­
tions. The first is the distinction between inference procedures and the associ­
ative links governing recall of information which feeds those procedures. The 
second is between explicit reasoning by value-preserving rules and reasoning 
by heuristics that take shortcuts188. In the recent dual-process literature, both 
of these distinctions have at times been mapped onto the distinction between 
slow, conscious and fast, unconscious processes. Keeping these distinctions 
separate is im portant for a clear view of heuristic processes.
In chapter 3 I have explained some of the forms taken by heuristics for 
reasoning. Heuristics may, by definition, reach inaccurate answers, and some 
heuristics proceed fast and automatically. However, some spontaneous pro­
cesses are fully, canonically inferential, as when we rapidly deduce a proposi­
tion q from a sentence which expresses a proposition of the form p  & q, 
combine it with the already-known q — r and deduce r without awareness of 
making any of the steps. Conversely, some mere heuristics are consciously ap­
plied, as when we recognise that this is the Ruy-Lopez so we had better get 
our queen out early; or, trying to decide what to wear to a party, choose on the 
basis that ‘you can’t go wrong with a simple dress’. On the other hand, associ­
ative recall processes do seem to be inaccessible. One can attempt to ‘jog’ 
one’s memory but, as the idiom implies, that is more like hitting the TV when 
it is on the blink than getting into the workings.
In making these points, I am simply advocating a now traditional account, 
according to which there is processing by computation over mental represent­
ations in short-term memory or memories, sometimes conscious, sometimes 
not. W hether these processes are conscious partly depends on what else is go­
ing on at the time. Playing chess or performing mental arithmetic might typic­
188. Evans made essentially this point in a paper given at the In Two Minds conference, Cam­
bridge, 2006.
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ally be conscious activities (one heuristic, the other mostly canonical and 
value-preserving), but with enough practice they can be carried out sublimin- 
ally, and not necessarily inaccurately, while carrying on a conversation, for ex­
ample.189 It is compatible with this view to suppose, in addition, that any great 
expenditure of effort by a procedure is very likely to come to conscious aware­
ness, just as physical damage or unusual physical effort are brought to aware­
ness through pain or discomfort.
The standard picture is that reasoning processes are fed by perception, 
linguistic parsing and associative recall of stored information. The processes 
involved in perception, parsing and recall seem to be inaccessible to con­
sciousness. This does not amount to a dual-process account of reasoning, 
since these processes are not reasoning processes. One danger of dual-process 
theory, as of the importation into psychological science of the personal/sub- 
personal distinction190,1  think, is that conclusions may be drawn hastily about 
the nature of processes from the way that they appear to introspection.
My criticisms of dual-process theories extend to the views of some philo­
sophers that judgements that are made by non-conscious processes are only 
to be explained in terms of neurology, rather than in terms of unconscious use 
of rules (e.g. Brown, 1988, p. i7iff). My reply to this point of view is to echo 
Rip's comments (above). Unconscious rules are well attested, in many areas of 
cognition, including reasoning.
189. Cf Cherniak: “a person cannot, at one moment, think about all the information he pos­
sesses; he can only consider a subset of it. The contents of the short-term memory corres­
pond to what he is now thinking about, not necessarily consciously (as when I drive a car 
properly while conversing about something else)” (Cherniak, 1986, p. 52). See also Sperber 
and Wilson (1986, p. 139) on the possibility that there is more than one short-term memory.
190.1 do not think that dual-process theory, even if successful, would support the view that the 
distinction between inferential and merely heuristic processes aligns with the philosopher's 
distinction between personal and sub-personal processes. Such a line has been taken, how­
ever (by the philosopher Keith Frankish in a talk at the ‘In Two Minds’ conference, Cam­
bridge, 2006).
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4-3-5  LOGICAL A N D  NO N-LO G ICA L PROCESSES
A view related to modern dual-process theories was held by Barnard (1968)191, 
who divided processes for reaching judgements and choosing actions into lo­
gical and non-logical:
By ‘logical processes’ I mean conscious thinking which could be expressed 
in words or by other symbols, that is, reasoning. By ‘non-logical pro­
cesses’ I mean those not capable of being expressed in words or as reason­
ing, which are only made known by a judgement, decision or action. 
(Barnard, 1968, p. 302)
The similarities to modern dual-process theories of reasoning are marked: ac­
cording to Barnard, non-logical processes are rapid and not explicit. There are 
also similarities to Recanati’s views. According to both Barnard and Recanati 
there are essentially two types of mental processes: a) those involved in con­
scious thinking and reasoning; and b) processes which are non-conceptual, 
and therefore not consciously accessible, although they may produce concep­
tual output. Such views may be traced back to Thomas Reid192, who defines 
reasoning as:
the process by which we pass from one judgment to another which is the 
consequence of it. Accordingly, our judgments are distinguished into in­
tuitive, which are not grounded upon any preceding judgment, and dis­
cursive, which are deduced from some preceding judgment by reasoning. 
(Reid, 1855, p- 423) 193
Barnard’s version of this two-process view is remarkably modern, given that 
his remarks predate modern cognitive science and the adoption of the sym- 
bol-system hypothesis. He writes that solving a quadratic equation fast uses
191. Barnard’s theory is set out in an appendix to Barnard, 1968, (originally published in 1938), 
based on a lecture given in 1936.
192. Recanati cites Reid in this connection: e.g. Recanati, 2002b, p. 115.
193. This statement of Reid’s views is also compatible with my position (except in its use of ‘de­
duced’ where I would say ‘inferred’). Recanati adds the additional assumption -  which may 
be implicit in Reid’s use of the terms ‘intuitive’ and ‘discursive’ -  that reasoning is essentially 
a conscious activity. I leave the matter there, since exegesis of Reid’s views is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.
2 3 9
“acquired knowledge ... marshalled and applied quickly.” The person will be 
“unaware of what his brain actually does [and] unable to recall many of the 
broad steps that must have been taken.” A human “could not write the text 
books that are registered in his mind” (Barnard, 1968 , p. 3 0 6 ), as modern lin­
guistics also teaches us.
We now know (or have strong reasons to believe, at least) that such sys­
tems as visual processing and language processing work in terms of the ma­
nipulation of symbols, but that we do not have conscious access to the work­
ings of these systems -  and that even if we did we might struggle to express 
them in words.
Inference and pseudo-inference
A view related to Barnard’s is offered by Recanati. Recanati draws the dividing 
line between conscious and unconscious processes so that it coincides with 
Sperber s distinction between inference, including spontaneous inference, and 
non-inferential processing (Recanati, 2 0 0 4 , p. 43). Inference, as noted, relates 
input and output as premises and conclusion, and therefore both input and 
output of inference processes are, of necessity, conceptual representations.
Accordingly, formal processes which operate on non-conceptual repres­
entations are non-inferential. Processes of this type are sometimes described 
as inferential, however. According to Fodor, for whom all classical computa­
tions are by definition inferential (1983), the visual system performs a kind of 
encapsulated abductive inference. It takes visual stimuli as input. Its output is 
a representation of the scene that could have given rise to those visual stimuli. 
This process is “inverse optics”: the mind has to solve the “problem of arriving 
at [representations of] surfaces from images” (Poggio, Torre, & Koch, 1985, p. 
314), working backwards, as it were. The process can be seen as abductive ‘in­
ference’ in the sense that the output explains the input, and the input under- 
determines the output194: more than one scene could have given rise to the 
same visual stimuli, as many optical illusions demonstrate .195 Recanati agrees
194. There is more than one respect in which the visual system faces the problem that the input 
underdetermines the output: as well as the problem of inferring surfaces from images, there 
is the computation of 3D motion, again from two-dimensional cues (Poggio, Torre, & Koch,
1985, p. 314).
195- Others have also claimed that visual processing is a form of inference, among them the sci-
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with Sperber and Wilson that such processes, while they involve formal m a­
nipulation of symbols, are not strictly inferential. The key point, as noted by 
Sperber and Wilson (1987a, p. 737) (see also the discussion with references in 
Recanati, 2004, p. 41), is that the input to these processes is in the wrong form 
to perform inferences on. The input to the visual system is patches of light on 
the retina and corresponding activation of rods and cones in the eye, or per­
haps patterns in the visual echoic’ buffer, not propositions or proposition 
schemas. Activations in the visual buffer are non-conceptual both in the sense 
that they are non-propositional, and in that they are ‘iconic’ rather than ‘dis­
cursive’ (in the terms of Fodor, 2007). One cannot run modus ponens on an 
activation pattern or any other purely iconic representation.
I would call such processes pseudo-inference; Recanati refers to them as 
inference in the broad sense, distinguishing them from inference proper, 
which he calls narrow inference. Recanati’s distinction is therefore able to ac­
commodate cognitive science, while intended to support a binary division of 
mental processes into reasoning, which is essentially conscious, and non-lo­
gical processes, “not capable of being expressed in words or as reasoning”
R- availability
Recanati’s view is more nuanced than the claim that only processes that are 
experienced as laborious and conscious at the time are inferential. In his view, 
narrow inferences may be made spontaneously or explicitly, but are character­
ised by their availability to consciousness196. W hen a narrow inference has 
taken place, the inferer is aware that she has made an inference, in at least the 
sense that she could (although she may not) bring to awareness all of: (1) the 
input to the inference, (2) the output, and (3) the fact that the input and out­
put are inferentially related. This property (which I will call R-availability), is a 
necessary property of all narrow inference, according to Recanati, and of reas­
oning.197 Recanati discusses Sperber’s example of spontaneous inference.
entist Hermann von Helmholtz, who wrote of perceptions that “...by their peculiar nature 
they may be classed as conclusions, inductive conclusions unconsciously formed” (von 
Helmholtz, 1962) cited by Barlow, 2002, p. 602 (although Kubovy & Epstein, 2002, p. 619 
claim that for Helmholtz the kind of inference involved was deductive).
196. Recanati’s availability principle as it relates to ‘what is said’ was stated in Recanati, 1989.
197. I am hedging here because Recanati does not clearly distinguish reasoning from narrow
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Hearing the doorbell ringing, you form the belief that there is someone at the 
door. For Sperber, (and I agree) this example illustrates that beliefs can be 
reached without “deliberate, conscious inference”, but still inferentially. Re­
canati, on the other hand, claims that this sort of inference is conscious, since 
it is R-available. The input to the inference is the belief (itself acquired directly 
from perception) that the doorbell is ringing. This and the output belief are 
both “conscious and available to the subject” (Recanati, 2004* P- 42) according 
to Recanati, and the subject is also (potentially) aware that the output is infer­
entially grounded in the input: asked how she knows there is someone at the 
door she could reply: “Because I heard the doorbell.”
R-availability does not imply that the inferential steps made, or even the 
type of inference involved, can be brought to consciousness. That would be 
contrary to the evidence. As O’Brien writes:
we have no reason to expect that ordinary reasoners would monitor the 
sorts of processes they use to obtain any particular inference; that is, or­
dinarily people are not aware of whether an inference stemmed from lo­
gical, pragmatic, or any other sort of inference-making process, including 
from general epistemic knowledge, but would know at most that some 
proposition has been inferred. (O'Brien, 2004, p- 210)
That this is a fair point might be illustrated by the considerable argument, 
among experts in the field, about which abilities are tapped by the selection 
task. Apparently we do not have reliable intuitions about whether our infer­
ences are analytic or pragmatic, and whether the principles used are domain- 
general or domain-specific or due to use of the faculty for utterance 
interpretation.
The personal/sub-personal distinction is also central to Recanati’s distinc­
tion. For him all reasoning and narrow inference is personal; and no sub-per­
sonal process counts as reasoning or narrow inference, even if the processes 
causally involved are parallel to conscious reasoning. Recanati distinguishes 
between tacit sub-personal inferences and tacit personal inferences (the dis­
tinction is due to Garcia-Carpintero, 2001). Tacit sub-personal inferences are
inference in his comments on this subject. As noted, he cites Reid’s definition of reasoning, 
but prefers the term (narrow) inference in exposition of his own views.
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inferences only in the broad sense: they are those which are “ascribed to a 
cognitive system merely on the grounds that ‘the causal processes constituting 
the system mirror the processes of someone who [performed] the relevant 
[inferences] in an explicit form”’ (Recanati, 2004, p. 49)- For an inference to 
count as a tacit personal (narrow) inference, the rational agent who makes it 
must be “capable of making the inference explicitly and of rationally justifying 
whatever methods it spontaneously uses in arriving at the ‘conclusion!’ 
(Recanati, 2004, p. 49) The spirit of these claims, I think, is more conceptual 
than empirical. In other words, I think Recanati takes these remarks to 
amount to clarification of the concepts personal, sub-personal and, especially, 
inference and their relations to each other.
Recanati’s views on inference are the key to understanding his view of 
pragmatics. Spontaneously drawn narrow (i.e. personal) inferences provide 
Recanati with an answer to the question of how Gricean pragmatics is explan­
atory. On this view, the explanatory power of Gricean-type derivations in 
pragmatics is that reasoning/narrow inference is R-available: it can be brought 
to consciousness at the time or after the fact. Thus whenever there is narrow 
inference (spontaneous or otherwise) in pragmatics there is an awareness of 
the input, the output and the fact that they are inferentially linked: the essen­
tials of a Gricean explanation.
So in implicature derivation, which Recanati says is narrowly inferential, 
the idea is that the hearer must be able to be consciously aware of the deriva­
tion of implicatures: more specifically, that he must be capable of being aware 
of the input to the derivation, the fact that some proposition p  (what is said) 
has been expressed, and of the output, the implicature or implicatures, and of 
the fact that the implicature is the output from a personal, R-available infer­
ence process with p  in the input.
I share with Recanati the view that there is spontaneous pragmatic pro­
cessing carried out by reasoning/inference: in Recanati’s theory, for im­
plicatures; in my opinion, for interpretations as a whole. On the other hand, 
there are some marked differences between my view and his. The first is Re- 
canati's claim that narrow inference and reasoning are necessarily consciously 
available. Secondly, Recanati divides pragmatic processes into primary and 
secondary. The third difference is that given this division, I think that there are
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worries about the explanatory adequacy of Recanati s account of primary pro­
cesses, and also, for different reasons, secondary processes.
Primary and secondary pragmatic processes
Recanati, like relevance theorists (e.g. Wilson & Sperber, 1981; Carston, 
2002b) and other radical pragmatists, stresses that the proposition expressed 
by an utterance is considerably underdetermined by the linguistic facts about 
the utterance, so that there is a need for considerable pragmatic processing to 
get to the explicit meaning of an utterance from the kind of representation 
that would result from processing according to rules or principles in the 
grammar. However, he differs sharply from relevance theory in proposing that 
explicit meaning and implicit meaning are arrived at by two distinct types of 
mental activity, only one of which is properly inferential.
For Recanati, primary processes are non-inferential and sub-personal; 
secondary processes are inferential and personal. Secondary processes are the 
usual Gricean inferential derivations of implicatures from what is said, (or the 
fact that it was said, or the manner in which it was said) and given that they 
are personal, narrowly inferential processes are R-available. Primary pro­
cesses, which derive what is said, in a propositional form, from the linguistic 
input, are non-(narrowly) inferential and not R-available, according to 
Recanati.
The division into primary and secondary processes could be seen as an 
echo of Grice, since Grice only discussed the use of the Cooperative Principle 
and maxims in arriving at implicatures, leaving open the question of what 
principles govern processes such as reference assignment and disambiguation 
which contribute to what is said. However, there is a crucial difference: as dis­
cussed above, Grice thought that recognition of the intention behind an utter­
ance provides a reason for the hearer to think that the speaker believes a par­
ticular proposition (or wants him to entertain this proposition, or to have a 
certain other response), and that the intention is ‘recognised^ or rather 
worked out on the basis of the normal meanings of the expressions used and 
the context. The hearer has reasons for entertaining, and arrives by reasoning 
at, the explicit meaning of an utterance -  what is said -  as well as at im­
plicatures of the utterance. Thus, although Grice discusses calculability only
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for implicatures, potentially there is a Gricean story about arriving inferen- 
tially at explicit meaning too. In contrast, Recanati presents a picture of the 
derivation of what is said as a clearly non-inferential process, determined by 
brute facts about accessibility of senses of words and of referents198. (See 
Recanati, 2004, p. 30, for example derivations.)
... the interpretation [of the explicit meaning of an utterance] which even­
tually emerges and incorporates the output of various pragmatic pro­
cesses results from a blind, mechanical process, involving no reflection on 
the interpreter's part. The dynamics of accessibility does everything, and 
no ‘inference’ is required. In particular, there is no need to consider the 
speaker's beliefs and intentions. (Recanati, 2004, p- 32)
I have not taken it as one of the main tasks of this thesis to argue for an infer­
ential view of pragmatics against such opponents as Millikan and Burge. My 
aim is to argue that a broadly Gricean inferential-intentional approach is com­
patible with a realistic view of rationality, and to explore the consequences of 
the combination. The fundamentals of the Gricean approach are mostly pre­
supposed by this endeavour. Similarly, I do not think that it is a central con­
cern of this thesis to argue, contra Recanati, that it is utterance interpretation 
as a whole that is inferential, rather than the derivation of implicit meaning 
only. I think, however, that there are reasons to oppose the claim that the 
pragmatic processes involved in reaching explicit meaning are non-inferential. 
I have tried to show that Grices account of speaker meaning rests on the 
causal and justificatory force of speaker intentions, so that Gricean accounts 
of how utterances as a whole are understood, as well as Gricean accounts of 
implicature derivation, appeal to reasoning about speaker intentions as an an­
swer to both the how and the why questions.
We might also challenge the claim that the pragmatic processes involved 
in reaching explicit meaning are unavailable. If we ask someone why they 
think that speaker S meant p  (where p  is the proposition expressed by an ut­
terance) they might well say something like, “Because I heard her say x ”, or (if 
schooled in modern linguistics and the work of Grice) “Because I heard her
198. Recanati’s account of what is said still has an inferential flavour, however, in that what is 
said is represented as speaker’s meaning, as I commented in chapter 1.
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say x  and I had no reason to think that she was speaking ironically or other­
wise didn't mean what she said, and the form of words used in x  clearly con­
veys p, due to the meanings of the words and the syntactic structure, or so 
syntacticians and semanticists tell me.” For aspects of explicit meaning, simil­
ar points apply: e.g. "I knew you were talking about Recanati because you kept 
pointing at him”; “I thought that you meant bank bank, not river bank, be­
cause I asked you if you had any money, so why would you start talking about 
river banks?”
The point of this objection is that the hearer seems to have perfectly good 
reasons for thinking that the speaker meant p, may well be aware of these 
reasons and of the fact that they are reasons for thinking that S meant p, and 
may even be able to state them (with more or less precision, no doubt, 
depending on how thoughtful they are, how diligently they read Grice, and 
other factors).
Robyn Carston has raised essentially this objection to Recanati’s claim 
that primary pragmatic processes are not R-available:
... surely most hearers are able to perform the reflective activity of ‘mak­
ing explicit’ their tacit reference fixing process: if asked how he knows 
that the speaker was referring to Tony Blair (rather than Cherie Blair or 
John Prescott), the addressee could respond that he knows this because 
the speaker used the word “he” while pointing at (or demonstrating in 
some other ostensive way) Tony Blair. He thereby shows that his referen­
tial hypothesis has a rational basis and that he is consciously aware of 
both the hypothesis itself, the evidence on which it is based and the rela­
tion (inferential?) between them, and that, on reflection, he is able to 
make the connection explicit. (Carston, 2003, pp. 1- 2)
I do not think that Recanati would want to deny that hearers are capable of 
offering rationalisations for some explicit parts of speaker meaning. How can 
this fact be made compatible with Recanati’s claim that primary pragmatic 
processes are non-inferential and un(R-)available? I think Recanati has to say 
that it is not simply the R-availability of a narrow inference that marks out a 
process as inferential, but that R-availability is an essential property of that
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(type of) process. In fact, in a section that is explicitly a reply to some of Car- 
ston's criticisms, Recanati writes:
It is constitutive of conversational implicatures that the inference that 
gives rise to them is available to the interpreters ... On the other hand, I 
maintain that the reflective capacity to rationally justify one’s interpreta­
tion is not constitutive when the interpretation involves only primary 
pragmatic processes. (Recanati, 20041 P- 50)
If I am right, Recanati is saying that secondary pragmatic processes are essen­
tially R-available and primary pragmatic processes are essentially un(R-)avail- 
able and non-inferential (in the narrow, proper sense of inference). That is, his 
response to Carston is that you can sometimes consciously construct a kind of 
inference that could have led from an utterance to what is said, but this is only 
a rationalization (in the usual sense: an explanation in terms of reasons that 
may not have been operative) and is not enough to show that explicit meaning 
is arrived at inferentially.
Recall that Recanati makes use of the personal/sub-personal distinction, 
distinguishing between tacit sub-personal inferences and tacit personal infer­
ences. Recanati says that for implicatures:
A tacit inference is ok, provided it is of the ‘personal’ sort, i.e. provided 
the subject herself has the reflective capacities for making the inference 
explicit. To say that this capacity is constitutive, in the case of conversa­
tional implicatures, is to say that there would be no conversational im­
plicature if the interpreters did not have that reflective capacity. (Recanati, 
2 0 0 4 , p. 5 0 )199
This raises the theoretical question about reasoning: Is being able to reflect on 
an inference really determined by what kind of inference it is? This question 
ties in with a worry that may be empirical or conceptual. Recanati can be 
taken as making the empirical prediction that people who cannot consciously 
reason about intentions cannot derive implicatures. Alternatively he may be 
making the conceptual point that the concept of implicature should not apply
199. This quotation is extracted from the middle of the immediately previous quotation, i.e. in 
the original text this section fills the position of the ellipsis in the quotation above.
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to any mental representation that such an agent might derive from an 
utterance.
As we have seen in chapter 1, there is developmental evidence against the 
empirical prediction: very young children apparently lack key elements of the 
ability to reflect on mental states such as beliefs and desires, but they compre­
hend some implicatures and other pragmatic phenomena. As I have dis­
cussed, a number of studies show that children fail false belief tasks until 
around four years old (e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Clements & Perner, 1984; 
Perner & Lopez, 1997; Templeton & Wilcox, 2 0 0 0 ) . Children are capable of 
pragmatic interpretation much earlier than this. Recent work by Pouscoulous 
and Noveck (2 0 0 4 )  shows that even the youngest children tested (around 4  
y.o.) are capable of implicature retrieval if the cognitive demands made by the 
experimental task are low enough, as Noveck (2 0 0 1 ) anticipated. Develop- 
mentally, it seems that the ability to derive implicatures precedes general 
reflective reasoning about the beliefs of other agents. If Recanati’s claim is to 
be taken as an empirical prediction, there is growing evidence against it.
If, on the other hand, Recanati’s point is conceptual rather than empirical, 
it seems that he is committed to the claim that when young children -  who 
cannot consciously, reflectively reason about intentions -  understand utter­
ances, including implicit elements of the meaning, we cannot regard what has 
happened as involving implicature derivation. It would be strange to say this if 
it turns out that young children understand a speaker s implicated meaning by 
identical mechanisms to adults and arrive at the same mental representations 
in particular cases. These children would be making the same inferences ac­
cording to the same causal processes as adults. The only difference is that the 
adults are able, after the fact, to bring some aspects of the inference process to 
conscious awareness. If this is what Recanati means, then I think that his sug­
gestion should be rejected. As theorists we can decide how to define the term 
implicature and how to refine its definition in the light of evidence200; I see no 
point in defining it so that identical inferences carried out by essentially the
200. It seems that the meanings of theoretical terms are liable to change as understanding 
deepens, whether they are terms originally from natural language, such as ‘force’, or were al­
ways terms of art, like ‘implicature’. See Reid, 2004, pp. 53-54, on ‘number’, ‘multiply’ and 
‘divide’.
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same causal processes sometimes do and sometimes do not count as im­
plicatures, depending on some other ability of the agent.
Recanati’s views of pragmatics no doubt deserve more thorough discus­
sion than I have the space for here. The discussion in this section is simply in­
tended to suggest some of the problems that arise for theories which try to 
take reasoning or (narrow) inference out of pragmatic interpretation (or out 
of part of it) and for theories which claim that pragmatic inference is essen­
tially personal, conscious and available. I reserve for the next section, which 
concerns the specifics of the heuristics involved in utterance interpretation, 
two further worries about Recanati’s views: that he offers no causal account of 
the processes involved in spontaneous implicature derivation, and that his ac­
count of the derivation of explicit meaning is implausible precisely because 
the processes proposed are not inferential, so that in his picture there is no 
element of trial-and-error problem solving.
4 .3 .6  CONCLUSION
The aim of this section has been to advocate a particular way of looking at the 
role of rationality and reasoning in pragmatics. A secondary claim is that the 
view I have outlined was essentially Grice’s view. I have argued for a contro­
versial reading of Grice, suggesting that he saw the retrieval of implicatures as 
a case of reasoning. This seems to me to follow naturally from comparison of 
what Grice says about the hard way and the quick way of reasoning with his 
insistence on calculability of conversational implicatures. More broadly (and 
less controversially) meaning and reasons are intimately related in Grice’s 
work. Recognition of the intention behind what is uttered and how it is 
uttered not only causes the hearer to entertain an interpretation of the utter­
ance, but also provides the hearer with reason(s) for that interpretation, at 
least in the ‘anaemic’ sense standard in causalist theories (that there seem at 
the time to the hearer to be such reasons). It is traditional to see working with 
reasons as reasoning, and as Grice suggested, a picture of reasoning as the 
construction of trains of thought characterised by transitions that preserve ra­
tional acceptability shows how this can be so. Thus there is a Gricean account 
in terms of reasoning of the interpretation of speaker meaning.
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While this section has concerned the role of reasoning and inference in 
pragmatics, it has also been necessary to comment on dual-process theories 
and related views according to which fast, subliminal processes are necessarily 
merely heuristic. I agree with Simon201, Cherniak202 and Sperber and Wilson 
that the main task in the study of inferences or reasoning in cognitive science 
is to investigate the kind of inferences made and the mental mechanisms in­
volved in making them. However, as I have shown, a number of theorists -  in 
pragmatics, and in reasoning -  have thought that whether a process is con­
scious, or available to consciousness, tells us something important about its 
status. So part of the burden of this section has been to explore representative 
versions of these views and suggest that it is not necessary to hold such a view 
to see broadly Gricean explanations in pragmatics as explanatory.
The picture that emerges is that pragmatic interpretation is carried out by 
goal-directed inference, regardless of whether the inference is conscious or 
not, consciously available or not, personal or sub-personal. As we have seen, 
this picture is incompatible with the views of some theorists. Some, like 
Campbell, think that only conscious processes are inferential or count as reas­
oning. For them, when pragmatic interpretation is unconscious it must be us­
ing different mental processes: mere heuristics. Recanatis nuanced view is 
that the only inferential pragmatic processes are those which are personal and 
can be made conscious. In contrast to both of these views I have argued that 
whether a pragmatic process is conscious, or can be made conscious, tells us 
nothing in principle about the kind of process it is. I assume that the blend of 
heuristics and canonical warrant-preserving transitions involved in pragmatic 
interpretation is largely a m atter for empirical investigation. As in study of
201. Simon wrote in 1997 that in 1946 he had:
finessed the issue by assuming that both these processes [conscious and subconscious] 
were essentially the same: that they draw on factual premises and value premises, and 
operate on them to form conclusions that became the decisions (Simon, 1997, p. 131). 
Simon of course, presents much evidence for unconscious rational activity, e.g.:
It has been shown that many of the steps in mathematical invention -  than which there 
can presumably be nothing more rational -  are subconscious; and this is certainly true 
of the simpler processes of equation solving. (Simon, 1997, p. 84)
202. “This [i.e. Cherniak’s] rationality theory continues to be significantly idealised ... I will ... 
not distinguish between deliberate conscious inference and unconscious inference.” 
(Cherniak, 1986, p. 5)
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natural language syntax, introspective evidence plays an important role, but 
we should not expect that we have reliable intuitions about the processes or 
principles involved203. Our intuitions are primarily about the felicity and im­
mediate implications of the interpretation: not the process but the product204, 
although in pragmatics plausible rational reconstructions can generally be 
made because the input and output are both conceptual.205
I leave undetermined one question about Grice s views in this area. I do 
not know whether Grice would have endorsed Recanati’s position that only 
processes that the inferrer himself can become aware of as inferences are in 
fact inferences. As I have said, my own view is that this position is theoretic­
ally unstable and empirically untenable in the face of evidence that pragmatic 
inference can be carried out by children too young to reason consciously and 
explicitly about beliefs and intentions.
In the course of this chapter (and in chapter 3) I have given examples of 
heuristics that are consciously applied, and of unconscious processes that are 
algorithmic and warrant-preserving. I have little doubt, however, that heurist­
ics are central to pragmatic processing and that most pragmatic processing is 
carried out ‘beneath’ conscious awareness. In the final chapter I consider the 
specifics of pragmatic processing in more detail.
203. Noveck and Sperber (2007) say that pragmatic intuitions are much less direct than se­
mantic intuitions, since they involve reflection on imagined utterances in constructed scen­
arios, as syntactic and semantic intuitions (presumably) do not.
204. Nicolle and Clark (1999) found that when participants were asked to paraphrase what the 
speaker has said, in cases where there was one strong implicature this was often given; in 
other cases the proposition expressed was paraphrased. One implication of this research is 
that the product of utterance interpretation cannot always be picked apart by the hearer into 
what is said and what is implied, even reflectively, after the fact: an uncomfortable result for 
Recanati’s availability principle, as Nicolle and Clark suggest. Indeed, if the availability prin­
ciple is taken seriously, these results should lead to the conclusion that it is the input to 
pragmatic processing and the output taken as a whole that are available, supporting the the­
ory that pragmatic processing has one phase rather than two.
205. n .b . This is quite different from Recanati’s view. My view is that (normal, adult) humans 
can reason with conceptual representations, so we can generally reconstruct any inference. 
An indication of the difference is that my view does not entail, where Recanati’s does, that 
an agent is able necessarily to reconstruct his own inferences.
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Chapter 5 • Conclusion: The comprehension heuristic
a principle that is implied in all rational behavior [is] the criterion of effi­
ciency... to be efficient simply means to take the shortest path, the 
cheapest means, towards the attainment of the desired goals (Simon, 1 9 4 7 ,  
p. 12)
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter I have explored connections between rationality and 
communication, particularly in the interpretation of utterances, arguing that 
reasoning plays a crucial role. I have suggested, given that human rationality is 
bounded, that much of this reasoning involves shortcuts, many of them heur­
istics in the sense discussed in chapter 3: non-algorithmic procedures which 
do not guarantee reaching the right answer. In this final chapter I look in more 
detail at the processes for working out what a speaker meant by her utterance. 
I assume that the fine detail of the processes involved in the inferential recov­
ery of speaker meaning is largely an empirical matter. My comments here will 
be more general in nature, describing some properties that I would expect the 
processes to possess, given the task they face and the limits on human 
rationality.
The problem of utterance interpretation is a rather ill-structured problem 
in Simon's terms. I have claimed in chapter 3 above (following Simon) that as­
piration-level, sequential search heuristics, guided by recognition of features 
of the problem, are a solution to the general problem of how cognition deals 
with ill-structured problems, including problems of abductive inference. Sper- 
ber and Wilson's work on comprehension is a rich source of ideas about how 
an inferential utterance-interpretation procedure can be boundedly rational. 
The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure that they propose has 
some interesting properties tailored for the domain of intentional-inferential 
pragmatics, taking advantage of certain ways in which the task of comprehen­
sion is not completely ill-structured.
2 5 2
I look at several properties of the comprehension heuristic, including the 
need for aspiration-level search, the least-effort path followed and other con­
straints on the solutions generated, the role of feature-driven recognition, the 
stopping rule used and the overall frugality of the procedure. This last point 
leads to consideration of dedicated heuristics as a solution to Fodor’s problem. 
This solution differs from the strong modularity possessed by peripheral pro­
cesses. I comment on the way that encapsulation in terms of the process used, 
together with the frugality of that process, ensure that Fodor’s problem does 
not arise in practice for utterance interpretation. The final contention of this 
thesis, then, is that a dedicated fast and frugal heuristic is a cognitively realist­
ic, boundedly rational implementation of inferential-intentional pragmatics.
5.2 INFERENCE AND LOW-LEVEL EXPLANATION
In the previous chapter I have spent some time describing the views of 
Francois Recanati. I raised but left unanswered one question about the differ­
ence between his views and mine. I think that there are worries about the ex­
planatory adequacy of both Recanati’s account of primary processes, and, for 
different reasons, his account of secondary processes. I discuss these points 
here because I think that they illustrate, on the one hand, why there must be a 
low-level account of the processes involved in comprehension, and on the 
other, that the processes need to be inferential.
The simpler of the two points is the first, which I believe applies to Re- 
canati’s account of ‘secondary’ processing: implicature derivation. Recanati 
says -  and I agree -  that implicature derivation is inferential. If one accepts, as 
I do, that the steps involved in such inferences are (typically) not isomorphic 
to the steps in valid arguments then the question arises of how it is causally 
explanatory to claim that utterance interpretation, or some part of it, is infer­
ential, or an instance of reasoning. This is the modified version of W arner’s 
question in section 4-3-4 above.
My answer is that it is not enough simply to claim that utterance inter­
pretation is reasoning, or that it is inferential. That claim ties together the an­
swers to the how and the why questions discussed above, but it does not fully 
answer the how question, because it says only that in some sense the process
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is like a fully warrant-preserving derivation. A scientific pragmatic theory 
must attempt an account of the heuristic processes involved in utterance in­
terpretation -  and explain in what way such processes are inferential. The 
processes that accomplish reasoning are often faster and experienced as more 
intuitive than fully explicit inferential derivation. An account of pragmatic 
processing (or part of it) that claims only that utterance interpretation is a 
kind of reasoning which happens quickly through heuristic processes might 
be satisfactory as philosophy but not as a full scientific explanation. W hat is 
needed in pragmatics is an account of such processes.
W hen we consider the low-level account of utterance processing that is 
needed206, we can see that there should be consequences for the kind of ac­
count postulated that we are concerned with heuristics that perform infer­
ence. This is the second point that I want to make by comparison with Re­
canati’s account. In particular, for the comprehension process to be inferential 
rather than ‘blind’ or ‘brute’, there must be, in principle, some evaluation of 
solutions, rather than simple generation of one solution.
5.2.1 SEQUENTIAL TRIAL-AND ERROR SEARCH
Given that utterance interpretation requires rapid choice of a good solution 
from an open-ended set of alternatives, there is no realistic alternative to se­
quential trial-and-error search, for reasons discussed in general terms in 
chapter 3. It costs time and effort to search. Optimising theories (in Simon’s 
sense) simply assume that the best available solution will be found, as though 
all the alternatives were generated, evaluated and compared. Theories that 
idealise away from search in this way are unrealistic. As I have explained, it 
also costs to calculate the potential benefits of search, and the costs of this 
kind of calculation are generally prohibitive, so theories which posit optimisa­
tion under constraints are also unrealistic. Therefore, if the solution to a prob­
lem is to be picked from among a set that is not known in advance to be
206. Such accounts, are, of course, still somewhat idealised, as noted in chapter 3. The way that 
sequential trial-and-error search is implemented neurologically is a separate question. I 
have said that facts about accessibility help determine which solutions are tried. This could 
be seen as part of an underlying ‘pandemonium’ account of cognition, with competition 
between processes, and parts of processes, for resources.
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limited, then we cannot assume either that it is ‘as if’ all possible solutions 
were considered, or that the costs and benefits of continuing the search were 
calculated at each point in the search.
Sperber and Wilson make a further point about processes in which all po­
tential solutions are generated or found and ranked. If this must always be 
done, then every search will consume the same amount of effort: the effort re­
quired to generate and compare all alternatives. If the number of alternatives 
is large, or the cost of generating them is high, then the effort required to gen­
erate all of them will be prohibitive. In the case of communication this would 
mean that it would never be worth the effort of processing an utterance: “It is 
hard to think of any ostensive stimulus that would be worth such an absurd 
amount of effort.” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 166)
Therefore I proceed on the assumption that comprehension is carried out 
by a process that generates solutions one by one and tests them for acceptabil­
ity. This comprehension procedure must have a stopping rule that is well 
suited to the problem domain so that it tends to stop search when continuing 
would not be worthwhile. It must do so without exhaustive calculation of the 
pay-off that would be expected if the search were continued.207 Such a heurist­
ic is well-suited to implement inference because it tests solutions and can re­
ject them. To demonstrate what I mean by this, I compare what Recanati says 
about primary processes with the kind of heuristic that I suggest.
5 .2 .2  ACCESSIBILITY-ONLY ACCOUNTS
Recall that Recanati’s claim is that all the work for arriving at the explicit 
meaning of an utterance (‘what is said’ in his terms), is done by salience and 
accessibility. Recanati says that this is “a blind, mechanical process... The dyn­
amics of accessibility does everything, and no ‘inference’ is required." 
(Recanati, 2004, p. 32) The essential difference between this kind of account 
and an inferential account is not necessarily in the intricacy of the processing
207. Sperber and Wilson made a related point about the strength of assumptions. They hypo­
thesise that the mind does not generally represent the degree of likelihood with which each 
belief is held. Accordingly, there can in general be no calculation of the likelihood of a belief 
on the basis of the likelihoods of the assumptions which support it, nor can there be com­
parisons of degrees of confidence across domains (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, pp. 75-83).
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involved, nor in the amount of information brought to bear. I have said in 
chapter 3 that for complex problems ‘recognition’ (in Simon’s sense) of fea­
tures of the situation brings into play memory, itself structured in terms of 
frames and schemas. This is so for an inferential account such as Sperber and 
Wilson’s (1986, p. i37ff), as for an accessibility-only account. The difference 
between an inferential account and an account like Recanati’s is partly in con­
straints on the solutions generated in an inferential account (which I consider 
below), and partly that for Recanati’s ‘blind’ process, the solution reached is 
the only solution, whereas for a trial-and-error search process, any solution 
generated is only a potential solution until it is evaluated and accepted.
In either account, accessibility will determine the first interpretation 
reached. Consider for convenience the limited problem of determining the 
referent for the pronoun ‘he’ in sentences (21) a-c , neglecting any possible ref­
erents other than the individuals picked out by the DPs ‘a policeman’ and 
‘John’. (See Recanati, 2004, p. 32.) Various factors compete in influencing the 
accessibility of referents. The subject of a sentence is prominent, so the refer­
ent of ‘a policeman’ has an advantage, but ‘John’ is closer to ‘he’ than the sub­
ject, so John may be a more accessible referent on that count. In (21a), the 
decisive factor appears to be the predicate “steal a wallet” which may raise the 
accessibility of a stereotype or frame in which policemen attempt to catch 
criminals, thus making John the more accessible candidate for the remaining 
role in the frame, the culprit. In a similar way -  although the knowledge in­
volved is less stereotypical -  the policeman may be the more accessible refer­
ent in (21b).
(21) a) A policeman arrested John yesterday; he had just stolen a wallet.
b) A policeman arrested John yesterday; he had needed one more arrest to 
qualify for the end-of-year bonus.
c) A policeman arrested John yesterday; he had just taken a bribe.
The results on a particular occasion may depend on activation that is due to 
ideas that are ‘in the air’. If the remark follows conversation about a recent 
crackdown on corruption, then John might be the more accessible referent in
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(2ic) -  unless the crackdown was on corruption in the police. The difference 
between a model like Recanati’s and a trial-and-error search model of infer­
ence is that in the inferential model the most accessible interpretation is as­
sessed and only then accepted as the speaker meaning. In Recanati’s model 
the interpretation that is most accessible when the point of closure is reached 
is taken as the explicit meaning of the utterance.
Sperber has raised essentially this point about Recanati’s model (Recanati, 
2004, p. 32). His objection is that there seem to be cases where pragmatic pro­
cessing is subject to garden paths: processing goes in the wrong direction be­
fore it finds the right solution. However, as Recanati points out, a ‘blind’ pro­
cess can appear to exhibit similar behaviour if it receives input over some 
period of time. As the words of a sentence come in, they will raise the access­
ibility of certain frames or schemas in long-term memory. The process can be 
seen as occurring in a network of propagating activation, where the values at 
the inputs are set one by one and the solution is (or is read off, or otherwise 
determined by) the final state of the network. There can be transient states of 
the network on the way to its final state that are quite different from the final 
state, since a word that comes late in the utterance may considerably affect the 
final state reached. A further possibility (not mentioned by Recanati) is that 
garden path effects might arise in a network of this type because of the finite 
speed of propagation of activation through the network. In effect the network 
might be a bit ‘springy’ and would then take time to settle down to its final 
state, even neglecting the fact that information arrives sequentially in 
comprehension.
I agree, then, with Recanati that the simple possibility of garden-path 
effects is not in contradiction with a non-inferential account of pragmatic 
processing (or part of it) like his. However the point that I want to make is il­
lustrated by the contrasting positions taken by Recanati and Sperber. In an in­
ferential model like Sperber and Wilson’s it is always a possibility to reject an 
interpretation. In a ‘blind’ model it is not: the bare facts about accessibility 
and the structure of memory, including frames and schemas, have to make the 
interpretation come out correctly. A theory of this sort is a bet that except in 
cases where the speaker is misunderstood, our memories are structured so 
that the first interpretation that comes to mind -  at closure of the process,
25 7
once the sentence has been parsed in the linguistic and non-linguistic context 
in which it is uttered -  will always be rig h t.
This is a very strong claim, for which strong evidence would be needed, in 
my opinion. I do not go into the evidence here. Wilson and Matsui (1998) dis­
cuss some shortcomings of accessibility-only accounts. As they write, “most 
work on reference resolution... acknowledges,... that the most accessible can­
didate can be rejected and another selected on pragmatic grounds.” (p. 177)
A slightly more general claim is that a pseudo-inferential account of utter­
ance interpretation can work. Is it possible to explain the derivation of explicit 
meaning of utterances, including reference assignment, disambiguation and 
lexical enrichment, solely in terms of -  perhaps very intricate -  routines like 
the ones in visual processing for edge detection? This is an empirical question. 
In my opinion, the evidence is that it cannot be done this way because of the 
interdependence of explicit meaning with implicit meaning (which has to be 
inferred), as I discuss below. Even frameworks that have tried to bite off only a 
part of the problem have run into serious trouble because of this kind of in­
terdependence. An example is Discourse Representation Theory, which has 
these difficulties despite the assumption, made from the start, that some part 
of the account -  of the determination of referent of a pronoun, for example -  
must lie outside the system. Hans Kamp’s original interpretation rules require 
the selection of a “suitable” referent for the pronoun, acknowledged to be a 
“deliberately ‘fudgey’ formulation” since “To state what ... the set of suitable 
referents is, we would have to make explicit what the strategies are that speak­
ers follow when they select the antecedents of anaphoric pronouns” (Kamp, 
2002, p. 215), that is, to do full-blown inferential-intentional pragmatics. Even 
an approach as aware of pragmatics as Kamp’s faces the question of whether it 
is worth proposing complex bottom-up algorithms for (e.g.) reference resolu­
tion when it is clear that in general such questions ultimately depend on hear­
er inference about speaker intentions. (Breheny, 2003 presents the case for 
simple semantics together with inferential pragmatics as opposed to complex 
‘dynamic’ algorithms in semantics.)
It is worth noting that the claim made by an accessibility-only account like 
Recanati’s is stronger than a related claim that needs to be made about se­
quential search if such processing is to be frugal. In frugal sequential search,
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the correct solution is reached very quickly. The weaker claim is that accessib­
ility factors are partly  responsible for this rapid zeroing in. It is a weaker as­
sumption that our minds are well-enough attuned to the environment for ac­
cessibility to help reach the correct solution quickly, than it is to assume that 
such accessibility factors always208 deliver the correct solution.
5.2.3 CONSTRAINTS ON SOLUTIONS, AND THE STOPPING RULE
There are at least two other factors involved in helping to ensure that the 
comprehension heuristic rapidly arrives at the correct solution. I have dis­
cussed such factors in general terms in chapter 3, where I have noted that con­
straints on solutions generated are defined by the kind of problem addressed. 
The first such constraint on the solutions accessed that I want to discuss is 
Sperber and Wilsons claim that the search follows a least-effort path. This 
depends on a property that is specific to the comprehension process. In gen­
eral, the only justification for following a least-effort path in search is if there 
is good reason to expect a good solution to lie on that path. Many searches 
that we conduct involve considerably more than least possible effort, includ­
ing searches that involve generation of solutions. For example, academics 
(mostly) do not take a least-effort approach to research, writing the sloppiest 
possible version of a paper, only rewriting if and when it is rejected and then 
only in minimal ways.
Sperber and Wilson have argued that in comprehension it is reasonable to 
assume that the correct solution is on a least-effort path, because each utter­
ance carries a presumption of optimal relevance. (In technical terms, the 
speaker makes this presumption manifest in making an ostensive act). The 
presumption was given in (2), repeated here:
208. Cases of miscommunication aside, as noted above.
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(2 repeated) Presumption of optimal relevance
a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee s 
effort to process it.
b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the 
speaker’s abilities and preferences. (Sperber & Wilson, i 995> P- 270)
The hearer has no option but to assume that the speaker is rational, albeit 
boundedly so, since if the speaker is not rational at all there is no reason to 
suppose her actions serve her intentions. Therefore, as Sperber and Wilson 
say, “a rational communicator, who intends to make the presumption of relev­
ance manifest to the addressee, must expect the processing of the stimulus to 
confirm it” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 165). Thus the hearer can proceed ac­
cording to the assumption that the speaker will not have put him to gratuitous 
effort: the effort must at least m erit the pay-off. This means that the correct 
interpretation should be on the least-effort path, since otherwise an interpret­
ation that was on the least-effort path, but not the intended one, might stop 
search before the intended one is ever reached. Another way of seeing this 
point is to consider an intended interpretation conveyed using a rather obs­
cure stimulus, so that it is off the least-effort path. If the hearer finds the in­
tended interpretation at all, then it will have required considerable effort. The 
stimulus will therefore not satisfy clause (b) of the presumption, given that re­
levance is lower when effort is higher, and that some other stimulus, requiring 
lower effort, could have been used. Equally, since the presumption is symmet­
rical in efforts and effects, an interpretation that requires little effort but deliv­
ers inadequate effects for that effort will be rejected. (See discussion at Wilson 
& Sperber, 2002, p. 6osff. There is related discussion at Sperber & Wilson, 
1986, pp. 168-169, based on an older version of the presumption of relevance.) 
These are very strong constraints on the alternatives that need to be generated 
and tested.209
209. As Wilson and Sperber note, there are complications connected with the strategies em­
ployed by sophisticated hearers who know that a) speakers may be mistaken about the relev­
ance of their utterance to the hearer, and b) speakers may deceitfully produce utterances 
that are only intended to seem relevant (Wilson & Sperber, 2002, p. 605 note s). For discus­
sion see Sperber, 1994; Wilson, 2000.
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In fact the intended interpretation must either be the first one reached by 
following the least-effort path that satisfies clause (a) of the presumption of 
optimal relevance, giving an acceptable balance of cognitive effects for the 
effort put in, or there must be some reason to suppose that a more relevant 
stimulus can be found further along the least-effort path. In cases where there 
is reason to think that a more relevant stimulus can be found, clause (b) of the 
definition is not satisfied, and this mandates further search. For reasons 
already discussed, the determination of whether a particular interpretation 
satisfies clause (b) cannot be made by exhaustive calculation of the costs and 
benefits to be derived from further search: the decision about whether to con­
tinue must be available without such calculation. It could be that the search is 
currently looking very promising, in that it is bringing large returns for little 
effort, so that further solutions are, on the face of it, worth considering. Or 
there may be a specific expectation in the context which makes it clear that 
the interpretation under consideration is not as relevant as the speaker must 
have intended her utterance to be. These criteria are not mutually exclusive.
Note that what counts as a good return is dependent not only on expecta­
tions, but on what returns are being derived by other cognitive processes with 
which limited resources must be shared. I would expect that for fast, largely 
automatic, central processes the situation is similar to what has been found in 
the psychology of attention for perceptual processing. The work of Lavie and 
colleagues has demonstrated that in perception (auditory as well as visual) the 
depth of processing of any stimulus (or more accurately ‘channel’ of stimuli: 
e.g letters appearing at the top-right of a screen) depends on how much effort 
is being expended elsewhere. If the channel on which attention is mainly fo­
cussed requires little effort, then other channels are simultaneously monitored 
and processed. Conversely, if the attended channel requires a high level of 
effort, stimuli on other channels are not processed to any depth (Lavie & Tsai, 
1994; Lavie, 2000; Lavie, 2006).210 In general, it would be surprising if cognit-
In principle there are two ways that these complications might be accommodated in the 
current framework: (1) in terms of the sophistication of the expectations of relevance 
brought to comprehension by the hearer, with search following a least-effort path but stop­
ping at a different point (Sperber, 1994); or (2) in terms of perturbations from the least-effort 
path.
210. Pashler (1998) reaches a similar conclusion from an extensive review of the literature (but
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ive resources were not allocated to processes on the basis of expected returns, 
modulated by attentional factors211.
Returning to utterance interpretation, the implication of the preceding 
discussion is that the presumption of optimal relevance both constrains the 
solutions generated by showing that they must lie on a least-effort path and 
mandates a two-criterion stopping rule: stop if both a) the interpretation be­
ing tested is worth the effort expended in the search so far (given expecta­
tions); and b) there is no indication that a solution with a better balance of 
pay-off to effort put in (and with, necessarily, therefore, a higher pay-off) can 
be reached by continuing.
Sperber and Wilson give an example where the second part of the stop­
ping rule comes into play:
(22) Henry: Do all, or at least some, of your neighbours have pets?
Mary: Some of them do. (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 277)
The interpretation some (and possibly all) o f M ary’s neighbours have pets is rel­
evant enough, but not the most relevant one, so if this interpretation is 
reached, processing should continue. The interpretation should then be 
reached that some but not all of Mary s neighbours have pets.
Assuming that it is right that there is a presumption of optimal relevance, 
then there is a sense in which ‘blind’ accessibility-only accounts are accident­
ally close to being correct. As discussed, the presumption of optimal relevance 
mandates following a least-effort path, and the first interpretation that comes 
to mind must lie on that path. So the most accessible solution will at least be 
on the path to the solution, and, given that the attunement of our memory 
structure to the world is part of the reason for the frugality of comprehension, 
the most accessible interpretation will often be the intended solution. There 
will however be cases in which the most accessible interpretation is not cor­
rect and should be rejected in favour of an interpretation that, while on the
without reference to Lavie’s perceptual-load theory) that the correct account must be a hy­
brid between ‘early selection’ and ‘late selection’ theories.
211. Such attentional factors may be top-down or bottom-up. Attention can be consciously dir­
ected, but can also be captured by highly salient stimuli.
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least-effort path, is a bit harder to reach. This will occur when either the most 
accessible solution is not relevant enough even for the small effort required in 
reaching it (by clause a) or there is reason to suppose that putting a bit more 
effort in will bring significantly higher returns (by clause b), or both.
The second way that frugality is achieved by constraints on the solutions 
generated is related to a second problem with a non-inferential account. In a 
non-inferential account there is no licence to generate only solutions where 
the explicit meaning, together with implicated premises, logically supports 
the implicated conclusions. A theory like Recanati’s is committed to the claim 
that accessibility and salience will deliver the correct explicit meaning of ut­
terances without this constraint on the trial interpretations generated.
For Recanati the two types of process involved in pragmatics, primary and 
secondary, are analogous to visual processing of a scene, followed by infer­
ences about what is perceived. (For example, Holmes perceives a rope hanging 
down from the ceiling to the bed, and infers that the snake came down it.) 
While the two processes may happen close to simultaneously, the former 
feeds the latter, and the former is a pseudo-inferential ‘brute’ process, while 
the latter is a properly inferential process. The coherence of one’s inferences 
with what one perceives is a criterion for accepting or rejecting those infer­
ences, but it is not a criterion for rejecting one’s perceptions, barring certain 
exceptional circumstances like optical illusions. Such illusions in fact demon­
strate that one cannot generally change what one perceives on the basis of 
reflective inference, even when the inference suggests that one should. Anoth­
er way of putting this point is that there are certain constraints on the solu­
tions generated by perceptual processing, and other constraints on inference, 
but these constraints (except ones that apply to cognition in general) are not 
shared or met jointly.
In contrast, there is evidence suggesting that the implicatures and the ex­
plicit meaning of an utterance must be generated in tandem, because there are 
constraints on the interpretation of an utterance as a whole. There are ex­
amples that show that explicit content is enriched to just the degree required 
to support a particular implicature.
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(23) Peter: Do you want to go to the cinema?
Mary: I’m tired. (The example is from Sperber & Wilson, 1998. See also 
Recanati, 2 0 0 4 , P- 47 for discussion.)
Here the explicit meaning conveyed by M ary’s utterance is that she is tired at 
least to a degree that makes her not want to go to the cinema. This logically 
supports an implicature to the effect that she does not want to go to the 
cinema, which answers the question Peter posed. Given the contextual ex­
pectation that the question raises, without that implicature the utterance 
would not be sufficiently relevant, and without the enrichment of the explicit 
meaning, the implicature would not be warranted.
This kind of interdependence between explicit meaning and implicatures 
suggests that there must be mutual adjustment during their derivation. That 
in turn suggests that if the derivation of one is inferential, then the derivation 
of both must be. Recanati accepts mutual adjustment, but denies that it is a 
problem for his theory (Recanati, 2004, pp. 46-50). However, he does not ex­
plain how the content of implicatures in his picture could affect the content of 
the explicit meaning. Perhaps one could argue that the facts do not show that 
the derivation of explicit meaning is inferential, and that they show only that 
primary pragmatic processing (unlike visual processing) is not encapsulated. 
Then top-down suppression or activation from the result of secondary pro­
cessing might influence the blind primary processing. This argument, in my 
opinion, remains to be made.
I am more interested, here, in the strong constraint on interpretations that 
this kind of mutual adjustment suggests. All interpretations must be such that 
the explicit meaning -  together, perhaps with implicated premises -  warrants 
(i.e. logically supports) the implicatures or implications that make the utter­
ance relevant in the expected way. This, in its way, is as strong a constraint as 
the constraint discussed in chapter 3 that a maximum must lie on a particular 
curve. The analogy is rather precise. In both cases, the existence of the con­
straint means that it is rational to generate only solutions which satisfy the 
constraint. Further, the form of the constraint suggests how such solutions 
should be generated. If a solution lies on a curve, then the equation of the 
curve can be used to generate trial solutions. Similarly, given that explicatures
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must warrant implicatures or implications, that is, that there must be a logical 
argument with explicit meaning as premise and the implicatures or implica­
tions as conclusions, the generator for such conclusions can be simple for­
ward inference from the explicit meaning. I have described this kind of pro­
cess in chapter 3.
There is one further point of similarity. The starting point for the genera­
tion of solutions in both cases is not determined by the constraint. There must 
be some choice made of where on the curve to start looking for the maximum, 
and there must be some choice made of what enrichment of the encoded 
meaning to start with, and what other premises to attempt to combine with 
the explicit meaning to derive an implicated conclusion. In the generation of 
potential interpretations, the system can rely on the other very strong con­
straint already described, that a least-effort path is followed. That constraint 
mandates the use of the initially most accessible supplementary premises and 
enrichment of the explicit meaning as a starting point: on a least-effort path, 
you start where you already are.
The discussion above can be taken as my answer to an objection to the 
view that input to utterance interpretation is propositional. Opponents of this 
view might regard it as a kind of sleight of hand to say that the result of pars­
ing is embedded under something like “S said that...” and that this is the kind 
of input taken by pragmatic processing. They might say that one should be 
able to do the same for parsing or visual processing, or any pseudo-inferential 
process, and then claim that that process is inferential because it works with 
conceptual input and output. My reply is that one could indeed postulate that 
the input to any of these processes is embedded into a conceptual representa­
tion in a similar way, but that there is no reason to make this postulation un­
less doing so would be fruitful. I have tried to show how it is fruitful in theor­
ising about pragmatic processing to assume that the linguistic input is 
embedded in a conceptual representation: it allows the postulation of certain 
strong constraints that are supported by evidence of mutual adjustment 
between implicatures and explicatures. Theorists of linguistic parsing or visual 
inference could make a similar move if it seemed likely to be productive to do
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so212.1  suspect that they do not (Helmholtz, perhaps, aside -  see §4-3-5 above) 
because it is clear to them that it would not be.
One might suggest that this is an a priori issue: there should be some 
consideration that says that (e.g.) visual processing or linguistic parsing could 
not be inferential. One of the points I have tried to make in the previous 
chapter is that I do not think the introspective or ‘personal' status of a process 
are considerations that will do this job. It is more relevant that utterances are 
actions and may provide clues to relevant information (in the first instance, 
about the speaker's intentions, as discussed), while sentences do not do so in 
their own right, but only as uttered by speakers. The postulate that linguistic 
information is embedded into conceptual representation reflects this point.
5.3 HEURISTICS, MODULES AND EFFICIENCY
Rationality implies efficiency, as Simon said (see the epithet to this chapter). 
Utterance interpretation (and most utterance production) takes place under 
such severe time pressure that the efficiency of the processes involved 
becomes a central question. The discussion here of the constraints on the gen­
eration of trial interpretations is intended to show that it is plausible that a 
computational process can be efficient enough.
In general, the claim that a heuristic proposed for an inference process is 
frugal implies a claim that Fodor’s problem is not fatal for that kind of infer­
ence. Heuristics can ignore information, where an algorithmic procedure 
would have to take all information into account (and ideal visions of rational­
ity simply assume that conclusions are reached as though all information were 
somehow considered). Heuristics that are shortcuts, for a certain type of 
problem, in a certain domain -  that is, adaptive heuristics -  ignore informa­
tion in such a way that they are faster than algorithmic alternatives and more
212. Although doing so would neglect an important difference between perception and com­
prehension. It is utterances (or facts about them) that are found to be relevant, not speech 
sounds or sentences (or even sentence tokens). Phonetic representations have little intrinsic 
relevance to the hearer, unlike light impinging on his retina or sounds impinging on his ears. 
My thanks to Deirdre Wilson (p.c.) for pointing out the relevance of this point here. See also 
the next paragraph in the text.
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parsimonious with resources like representation and processing, while deliv­
ering answers that are accurate enough, enough of the time.
Recall that Fodors contention is that essentially no central (i.e. conceptu­
al) processing involving non-demonstrative inference can be explained com­
putationally, because a) any information might be relevant, since it might be 
evidence bearing on the conclusion, and b) the consequences of any postu­
lated conclusion should in principle be evaluated in terms of their effect on 
the global properties of the inferer’s belief system, such as its overall coher­
ence. His worries do not extend to peripheral processes such as visual pro­
cessing because these are informationally encapsulated. We can know, for ex­
ample, that the two horizontal lines in the Miiller-Lyer diagram are the same 
length, without this altering our perception that one of them is longer. In­
formation from long-term memory and from reflective inference cannot (in 
general) affect the results delivered by peripheral systems.
In recent years many theorists have suggested that central, conceptual 
processing has some structures of a modular or quasi-modular kind, and that 
aspects of central cognition can thus be separated out and studied. I do not 
want to enter the massive modularity wars in this thesis. My aim in this sec­
tion is to show that fast, automatic processes can solve some of the problems 
that modules are supposed to solve. The fast and frugal heuristics programme 
and work on central modularity, are, in my opinion two research programmes 
aimed at the same problem. W hether one describes an adaptive heuristic for a 
domain as a module depends on one s definition of the term ‘module’.
Fodor modules are strongly encapsulated processes, or bundles of pro­
cesses. A different type of strict modularity is possessed by Chomsky modules 
(this name for them is from Segal, 1996). A Chomsky module is a domain- 
specific database, i.e. a body of knowledge specific to a domain, as with know­
ledge of language. This second kind of strict modularity may be possessed by 
some central modules. Tsimpli and Smith (1998, p. 212) argue that the faculty 
of language is partly a central module in this sense.213 If a certain kind of pro­
213. This relies on a different view of centrality from mine. The consideration here is that the 
same database is involved in parsing and constructing sentences, input and output pro­
cesses: no one speaks only English and understands only Icelandic. In this thesis, centrality 
is defined by the type of input taken by a process. If a process takes conceptual input it is 
central, by definition.
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cessing only consults a domain-specific database, then it has a better chance 
of avoiding computational explosion.
I mention Fodor and Chomsky modules as solutions to the problem of 
computational explosion in order to set them aside. Pragmatic processing is 
not informationally encapsulated in Fodor’s sense: any information may be re­
levant214. The evidence is that general knowledge is used in pragmatic pro­
cessing: e.g. in (21c) above, the referent of ‘he’ may be determined partly by 
knowledge of the degree to which the local police are corrupt. In addition, 
there does not seem to be mentally represented knowledge specific to prag­
matics: the constraints and regularities I have described are properties of the 
process, not knowledge that is used to guide processing.215
I claim that for conceptual processes such as utterance interpretation 
there is a different type of solution to Fodor’s problem. Informational encap­
sulation is the key property of a Fodor module, but frugality and access to in­
formation are orthogonal issues.216 All four logical possibilities are exempli­
fied by some kind of processing. There are frugal, encapsulated processes. 
Visual processing is quick and mostly encapsulated, as is linguistic parsing. 
The ball-catching heuristic discussed in chapter 1 is very frugal and mostly en­
capsulated. The heuristic appears only to represent one quantity, and works 
that quantity out from a simple observation. One’s procedure for catching a 
ball is not sensitive to general inference. (The speed with which the process 
occurs may be largely responsible for this). Spontaneous deductions in reas­
oning problems are frugal (assuming that generation of trivial implicatures is 
ruled out), and in high-iQ participants they are (deliberately or habitually) en­
capsulated against such considerations as the plausibility of the conclusion.
214. Indeed in a central architecture where modules are interlinked it is not clear what inform­
ational encapsulation would amount to. Informational encapsulation is really the condition 
that information cannot affect peripheral processing from above: cross-modal phenomena 
such as the Stroop effect are not in contradiction with it, but effects on perception from be­
liefs reached by inference would be.
215. See Kasher’s work however for an attempt to deal with part of pragmatics as a Chomskyan 
competence -  a domain-specific body of knowledge, e.g. Kasher, 1991.
216. Since the question of whether the faculty for processing in a particular domain is modular 
is orthogonal to the question of whether it avoids computational explosion, it is not surpris­
ing that Sperber and Wilson have changed their position on the modularity of pragmatic 
processing without changing their position that pragmatic processing is not prone to 
Fodor’s problem.
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There are also processes that use no external information but require huge 
effort. Truth-table calculations only take into account the input information, 
but they are far from frugal. Playing chess uses heuristics that can mostly only 
take into account the state of the board and knowledge of previous games, but 
which are not usually quick.
There are of course also areas of life where cognition is non-encapsulated 
and non-frugal. Scientific investigation, Fodor’s favourite example of central 
cognition, is an obvious case in point, although even here much of the 
thought involved may be fast, heuristic and frugal. Fodor’s argument rests on 
an analogy between what scientists do (theory choice) and what individuals 
do in everyday reasoning, which has recently been challenged by Carruthers 
(2003) and Pinker (2005) as well as consistently by Sperber and Wilson (1986; 
1996).217
It is the fact that no theory is permanently established that makes it pos­
sible for science eventually to take into account any and all information. As 
Sperber and Wilson say (1986, p. 166), given that the aim is the best possible 
theory, there is no criterion by which a hypothesis can be permanently establ­
ished except comparison with all competitors, so exhaustive search is neces­
sary, and the domain of possible solutions is open-ended, so search continues 
indefinitely.
Finally there is the class of processes which I am most interested in, those 
which are not encapsulated but still frugal. The ‘take the best' heuristic is an 
example. It is not encapsulated in any strong sense. It can consult any cue in 
deciding which is the better alternative, and if the first cue it looks at is not 
decisive it looks at another, and so on. Thus on some occasions it will consult 
all of the available cues before making a decision. (In a real-world situation, if 
no decisive cue were found, more information would be sought, or decision 
deferred.) On average, however, it consults very few cues, so it is more frugal 
than the classical alternative, a weighted calculation across all the cues 
provided or available.
My point is that adaptive heuristics are not prone to Fodor’s problem be­
cause they systematically ignore certain information, but not necessarily by
217. I discussed in chapter three some of the points Sperber and Wilson make. See also the 
main text below.
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being encapsulated: rather, they do it by taking a limited amount of informa­
tion in a particular order and stopping soon. The relevance-theoretic compre­
hension procedure can consult -  in principle -  any information, in its task, 
inferring the best explanations of ostensive stimuli. This means that by defini­
tion, the comprehension procedure is a quasi-module in Smith and Tsimpli’s 
sense. It is domain specific, but not informationally encapsulated (Smith & 
Tsimpli, 1995; Tsimpli & Smith, 1998). Its frugality, however, does not follow 
from its quasi-modularity. It should be frugal because of the strong con­
straints and recognition factors discussed above.
5 .3 .I PROCESS ENCAPSULATION
Notwithstanding the existence of this dedicated (quasi-)module, it is possible 
to bring other processes to bear on utterance interpretation. As discussed 
above, if normal, fast processing fails to produce a result, slow, reflective pro­
cessing may be employed. Such processing will have similarities to fast pro­
cessing, but certain presumptions may be suspended: perhaps what the hearer 
is intended to find relevant is the fact that there are two potential interpreta­
tion, as in puns; perhaps the speaker was so confused or such a bore that the 
utterance falls massively short of relevance and the least effort path will not 
lead to the intended interpretation .218 Another possibility is that the piece of 
behaviour or sound taken as an utterance was not intentional so there is no 
intended interpretation: in such cases the best explanation lies elsewhere.
My suggestion is that there is a kind of process encapsulation. Input in a 
certain domain activates and is then processed by a certain heuristic or set of 
heuristics, fast and nearly automatically. On short timescales the process ap­
plied to a particular kind of problem or stimulus is inflexible. With a bit more 
time, and, possibly, conscious attention, the procedure might be varied to a 
greater or lesser degree. This proposal is a way of accounting for the fact that
218. In principle the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure and the fact that the hear­
er’s expectations of relevance may be revised in the course of the interpretation process al­
lows for such utterances. At the start, the interpretation is presumed to be the most relevant 
one the speaker was willing and able to convey; but a speaker may only intend an utterance 
to seem relevant, and interpretation may be successful nonetheless. However, it is intuitively 
clear that a certain level of conversational incompetence or selfishness sometimes defeats 
fast comprehension by the normal route.
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much rapid thought appears to follow similar tracks, pursuing specific aims, 
whereas at least some conscious, effortful thought has a more open-ended 
character.
In a paper defending Fodor’s analogy between central cognition in general 
and scientific investigation, Dominic Murphy claims that advocates of central 
modularity “bet that the world is divided up into domains that do not con­
strain each other, and that our mind mirrors that structure” (2006, p. 564). I 
suggest that the bet that one should make is rather different: that for some 
decisions, in some domains, at some time-scales, the mind behaves in a way 
that would work well if the world is compartmentalised in the way suggested. 
The world may be like that or not: the claim is about psychology, not about 
the ontology of non-mental parts of the world.
My proposal can be construed as the claim that modularity of central pro­
cesses is relative to timescale.219 We can integrate across domains or bring a 
fresh approach to a problem in a domain, but generally only if we have plenty 
of time. I think that there is evidence for this view from pragmatic illusions.
Perceptual and cognitive illusions
I have mentioned optical illusions. What happens in a perceptual illusion 
(there are illusions for other sense modalities as well as vision) is that informa­
tion held in the mind, even in active, short-term memory, cannot influence 
the result of processing by a perceptual module. There are phenomena that 
are in some ways similar in utterance interpretation, known in the psycholin­
guistics literature as semantic illusions (Erickson & Mattson, 1981; van 
Oostendorp & De Mul, 1990; van Oostendorp & Kok, 1990; Barton & Sanford, 
1993)- For example, in the middle of a questionnaire, participants are asked 
“How many animals of each kind did Moses take into the ark?” The majority 
give an answer, rather than noting that the question is odd, since it is Noah, 
not Moses, who is associated with the ark. Even when participants are told 
about such illusions and asked to look out for them, they still fall victim, al­
219. This would make modularity similar to the property of adiabacity. In thermodynamics, an 
adiabatic process is one in which no heat is transferred to or from the system under consid­
eration. The term “adiabatic” literally indicates an absence of heat transfer, but a transforma­
tion of a thermodynamic system is considered adiabatic when it is quick enough so that no 
significant heat transfer happens between the system and the outside.
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though at a lower rate. Allott and Rubio Fernandez (2002) argued that illu­
sions of this type are pragmatic rather than semantic illusions, created by 
shallow processing in utterance interpretation. As with other pragmatic phe­
nomena, the context should play a crucial role in the interpretations reached, 
and this role should not be explicable purely in terms of stereotypical know­
ledge such as frames or schemas. The experiments we suggested have not 
been carried out, but I assume here that it is correct that these illusions are es­
sentially pragmatic and conceptual in nature.
Illusions caused by shallow processing in pragmatics, while related to per­
ceptual illusions, are significantly different from them. They differ in that the 
problem is not that the pragmatic faculty does not have potential access to the 
right information but that it reaches a decision without considering some 
highly relevant information that it could have considered. The fatal ignition/il­
lumination mistake discussed in chapter 3 can be analysed similarly as due to 
shallow processing -  in that case by a central process concerned with action 
plans. W hat I am suggesting is that this difference between these two kinds of 
illusion is due to the difference between the underlying mental apparatus: for 
perceptual processing, a Fodor module which cannot consult certain sources 
of information; for pragmatic processing a fast process that can in principle 
consult any information, but in practice has rules which rapidly curtail search.
Perceptual illusions such as the Muller-Lyer illusion are persistent. The 
perceptual feeling that the top line is longer than the other line does not go 
away after measurement. Pragmatic illusions are not like this. Once you have 
properly understood that the word was ‘Moses’ the question no longer feels as 
though it is asking about Noah. So ones other beliefs can overturn pragmatic 
illusions. However they are persistent in another way. Even when one is told 
to look out for such illusions it is hard to avoid falling into the trap .220
I would like to suggest that these phenomena demonstrate what is effect­
ively a ‘soft’ form of informational encapsulation, contrasting with proper,
220. This may be hard to believe, but the experimental results demonstrate it, as does anecdot­
al evidence. I have carefully explained pragmatic illusions to a professor of linguistics, im­
mediately asked the ‘Moses’ question, received the illusory answer, explained what is wrong 
with it, then asked a second pragmatic illusion question, again getting the illusory answer. I 
stopped at that stage, but feel that it might have been possible to continue.
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‘hard’ encapsulation.221 In hard encapsulation, the module keeps doing its job 
the same way, delivering the same result regardless of the agent’s central or 
conscious beliefs, so one line in the Miiller-Lyer diagram, for example, always 
seems shorter than the other. Soft encapsulation occurs because a central pro­
cess is fast and frugal. Such a process aims to deliver a result quickly. If a res­
ult is found that is relevant in the expected way, then processing is ended, in 
some cases prematurely.
On my view, in pragmatic processing the information considered in pro­
cessing any input is stipulated by the process in a way that cannot be changed 
very much during processing. This latter property is not full-blown informa­
tional encapsulation, but it is clearly something quite different from Fodor’s 
view of central processes performing holistic abductive inference and deci­
sion-making. In particular it is quite different from scientific theory choice.
It has been notoriously hard to say what the scientific method is, as the 
history of the philosophy of science testifies. One thing that is clear is that 
conscious reflection on the problems faced at a particular time can modify the 
methods used by scientists. In this sense there is no heuristic of scientific 
method, although there are no doubt rules of thumb within particular fields of 
science (e.g. presented with an unknown chemical, look at the colour of flame 
it produces when heated).
One difference between ordinary central cognition and full-blown sci­
entific reasoning, on this thesis, is that while both involve abductive inference, 
ordinary central cognition is largely a matter of following heuristics at times- 
cales fast enough that the results of the processing do not significantly change 
the heuristic, whereas in science a significant role is played by changes in the 
methods of investigation used, driven by reflection on the results that are be­
ing produced.
221. Carruthers (2007) makes a related distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope en­
capsulation. Another useful comparison is with recent work by Hauser (2003) on modular 
macros: “fast, automatic, unconscious action sequences” (Hauser, 2003, p. 80).
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5.4 CONCLUSION
In this final chapter I have argued (following Sperber and Wilson 1986; 1996) 
that the pragmatic system works out speakers meaning frugally, zeroing in 
rapidly on the relevant interpretation and the assumptions needed to support 
it. It is relatively fast and frugal, following a least-effort path, and it has a 
rather singular dynamic aspiration level, exploiting the task environment of 
inferential-intentional comprehension. The process makes use of the way that 
the problem constrains possible solutions. It generates, I suggest, only hypo­
thesised solutions that stand in the right logical relationship to the facts to be 
explained. Crucially, it is a system that does not fall victim to Fodor’s problem.
Fodor’s claim, as I have explained, is that central cognition must somehow 
take into account all potentially relevant information because that is the only 
way to be sure that one has found the best solution. It has been said that the 
only cognitive systems that do not fall foul of Fodor’s problem are modular 
systems. I have argued (again agreeing with Sperber and Wilson) that the 
questions of modularity and computational explosion are orthogonal to each 
other. Strong modularity is the property of cognitive systems that are informa­
tionally-encapsulated and domain-specific. I have claimed that one reason 
that utterance interpretation is not subject to computational explosion is that 
it is subject to what might be called process encapsulation. The process that is 
followed in the initial attempt to work out the interpretation of an utterance, 
while inferential, is reflex-like in that it is fast and that major elements are uni­
form across utterances.
I have not outlined a comparable utterance construction procedure in this 
chapter. As I commented in chapter 4, an utterance is a kind of action, and 
like other actions is directed towards fulfilment of a goal or end. As Adam 
Morton writes:
Normally there are infinitely many means to one’s end, the best of which 
one has not thought of. So, almost always, there is nothing that is neces­
sary for one’s end, and a confusing set of things that are sufficient. W hat 
rationality demands is that one go through the few that one can focus 
one’s mind on and find an acceptable one. (Morton, 2006, p. 771)
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More work on production is required, but given that production operates un­
der similar constraints to interpretation, I think that the underlying processes 
are parallel to interpretation at least in that a) working out what utterance will 
convey roughly the desired meaning is a kind of reasoning; b) it is accom­
plished by aspiration-level terminated sequential search; c) often, but not al­
ways, the first acceptable solution generated will be the one chosen.
The aim in this chapter, and in the thesis as a whole, has been to show 
how realistic views of rationality and a broadly Gricean inferential-intentional 
view of pragmatics can cohere, and what light they shed on each other. I hope 
to have made the case that a bounded view of rationality is necessary, and that 
this view is compatible with the assumption that communication is inferen­
tial. I have shown how I believe that these views lead to a view of utterance in­
terpretation as carried out by a certain kind of heuristic search procedure.
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APPENDIX I
Grice’s ‘expansion’ o f Shropshire's ‘argument’
If the soul is not dependent on the body, it is immortal.
If the soul is dependent on the body, it is dependent on that part of the body 
in which it is located.
If the soul is located in the body, it is located in the head.
If the chicken's soul were located in its head, the chicken's soul would be des­
troyed if the head were rendered inoperative by removal from the body.
The chicken runs round the yard after head-removal.
It could do this only if animated, and controlled by its soul.
So the chicken's soul is not located in, and not dependent on, the chicken's 
head.
So the chicken's soul is not dependent on the chicken's body.
So the chicken's soul is immortal.
If the chicken's soul is immortal, a fortiori the human soul is immortal.
So the soul is immortal.
(Grice, 2001, pp. 11-12)
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APPENDIX II
Time taken to check consistency o f truth-table fo r 100 independent propositions
Number of rows = 2" : n=ioo
100 3= 2 = 1.27 x lO
Assume that rate of checking = 10 rows per second 
Number of seconds in a year = 6o x 6o x 24 x 365 = 31,536,000 
Years to check all rows = (number of rows)/(rate of checking x seconds in a year) 
= 1.27 x io 30/(io x 31,536,000)
= 4.03 x 1021
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